作者為玄奘大學宗教學系所副教授兼應用倫理研究中心主任=Associate Professor of Graduate Institute of Religion and Director of Research Center for Applied Ethics, Hsuan Chuang University
This article explores the metaethics of Buddhist systematic theorization. First, can moral words and moral sentences be defined through Buddhist ethical judgment and moral principles? Second, what is the objective reality of Buddhist moral judgment? By Hume's law, an "is" proposition does not necessarily imply an "ought" proposition; i.e., fact judgment differs from value judgment. Generally speaking, we need to suppose a self-evident truth or a first principle. Yet, in Buddhism, we directly derive the "ought" principle from the "is" phenomenon by experience verification and reason analysis. In some sense, Buddhism is inclined to naturalism, which directly defines an ethical word by individual nature or an experience-meaningful word. Thus, Buddhism induces the "is" principle of pratitya-samutpada and self-love by phenomenon. From pratitya-samutpada and self-love, Buddhism proves the "ought" principle of life-protection. The moral argument of "ought" or "ought not" originates from the desire of life, not the desire of God. This defines and distinguishes the ethical words and value judgments of good, evil, right and wrong. The ethical and practical goal of the Buddhist life-protection principle is to satisfy the desire of sentient beings' happiness or utility. Therefore, Buddhism is strongly inclined to teleology. On the other hand, empathy must be given equally towards all sentient beings, and their need for happiness and utility. In this sense, Buddhism is also strongly inclined towards deontology. From the thread of the above systematic theorization, this article asks four questions about how the "is" proposition proves the "ought" proposition. Throughout the discussion, each question is philosophically analyzed in a radical manner.
