Via an investigation into the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa’s (hereafter abbreviated as MPPU) critique of Abhidharmic realism the main aim of this dissertation is to disclosing the manner in which Mādhyamika philosophy deals with the topic of truth and reality .
For the sake of clarity and focus, I shall divide Abhidharmic realism into metaphysical realism and epistemic realism. Because Abhidharmic realism usually intermingles metaphysical reasoning with epistemological arguments, differentiating between these two approaches will be helpful in gaining a clearer understanding of its philosophical ideas.
In the beginning of second chapter, I investigate the textual nature of the MPPU as a commentary to the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, and based on various philosophical perspectives in this text, I demonstrate that the ‘thorough reality of all dharmas’ (sarvadharmāṇām bhutalakṣaṇam) is the main philosophical issue at hand. Accordingly, I formulate the grounds for MPPU’s critique of Abhidharmic realism. Apart from this, the chapter proves that the MPPU’s main target of criticism is the Sarvāstivāda and further indicates that the focus of the critique is the presupposition that cognitive objects ought to be real. I point out that such a presupposition is no guarantee for true knowledge.
The third chapter is an inquiry into the criticism of the Abhidharmic metaphysical realism via the issues of existence of dharmas in the three periods of time, time (kāla or samaya), causal relationship, and existence (bhava). Abhidharmic realism starts with the naïve realistic viewpoint that the objects of cognition are real, and then moves on to claim that time, causal relationship, and existence should be real, and even going so far as to suggest that the atom (paramāṇu) is the foundation behind all existence. I attempt to show that the MPPU criticizes Abhidharmic presuppositions not only because they fail as a support for truth, but also bring about misunderstanding of the world. Furthermore, the MPPU’s critical approach also discloses its own position on emptiness as the reason for Being qua Being. Hence, following the critique of substantial metaphysics, it offers its own metaphysics of emptiness.
The fourth chapter reflects on the arguments of both the MPPU and Abhidharmic realism regarding the problem of how cognizance of the ‘thorough reality of all dharmas’ is possible. The focus of the discussion falls on the different viewpoints of Abhidharmic realism a
