《維摩詰經》=Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra; 佛教倫理學=Buddhist Ethics; 慈悲=compassion; 無我=nonself; Charles Goodman
本文之目的在於透過「慈悲」與「無我」兩個概念論述《維摩詰經》的倫理學型態。探究進路將以 Charles Goodman 主張維摩詰居士的菩薩行是一種結果主義（consequentialism）之論證與主張作為思考線索，除了批判反思其論證是否合理、是否符應於《維摩詰經》的義理外，並進一步以《維摩詰經》為核心文獻論述以「慈悲」與「無我」所建構之佛教倫理學的內涵與型態。 本文指出，Goodman 的論證表面上看起來頗具說服力，但卻存在著內在矛盾。依據他的論證，他在結果主義者「 決斷的程序 」（ a decision procedure ）中考慮了無我、無住與慈悲的內涵，但卻以結果主義整體「評價的結構」（ a structure of evaluation ）的判準來衡量《維摩詰經》的倫理學型態時忽略了無我與無住的內涵，使得他的論證結果與他的原初定義產生衝突。 依據《維摩詰經》的核心理論與觀點，本文並不同意將其倫理學型態歸類為結果主義。此外，由於無我與慈悲乃奠基於空性的體認之反思，本文主張《維摩詰經》依於無我、慈悲、無住、空、不二……等的概念所揭示的倫理學內涵，可假借《維摩詰經》自身「不盡有為，不住無為」來權說其「特殊的倫理學型態」，此相較於 Goodman 的觀點，是與《維摩詰經》的義理較為一致的。
This essay takes a critical look at the ethical system of the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra through analyzing the concepts of ‘compassion’ and ‘nonself ’. I take as my main line of inquiry Charles Goodman’s argument that the bodhisattva conduct of Vimalakīrti is a type of consequentialism, aiming not only to establish the validity of his arguments against the original standpoint of the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra, but furthermore also using the text as a core reference to explore types of Buddhist ethics based on the two theories of ‘compassion’ and ‘non-self ’. However, despite appearing quite convincing initially, Goodman’s argument is inherently flawed: having taken into account the implications of ‘non-self’, ‘non-abiding’ and ‘compassion’ during the decision procedure of the consequentialist, he however neglects the implications of ‘non-self’ and ‘non-abiding’ during the structure of evaluation of consequentialism as a whole in his appraisal of the ethical system of the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra, thus resulting in a conflict between the outcome of his argument and his initial definition. I argue that the core standpoint of the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra is irreconcilable with a consequentialist ethical system, and further point out that since the theories of ‘non-self ’ and ‘compassion’ are based on the realization of emptiness, the core implications of the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra which relies on concepts such as ‘non-self ’, ‘compassion’, ‘non-abiding’, ‘emptiness’, ‘non-duality’ and so forth can be taken as an authoritative persuasion of its distinctive ethical system under the guise of ‘neither exhaust the conditioned, nor abide in the unconditioned ’ as put forward in the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra.