Author Affiliations: Lady Margaret Hall, University of Oxford, Norham Gardens, Oxford OX2 6QA, UK
關鍵詞
Madhyamaka; Nāgārjuna; Nihilism
摘要
Madhyamaka philosophy has been frequently characterized as nihilism, not just by its Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents, but also by some contemporary Buddhologists. This characterization might well strike us as surprising. First, nihilism appears to be straightforwardly inconsistent ("if there is nothing, there is still the fact that there is nothing, so there is something"). It would be curious if a philosophical school holding such an obviously deficient view would have acquired the kind of importance Madhyamaka has acquired in the Asian intellectual landscape over the last two millenia. Second, Madhyamaka by its very name proclaims to tread the "middle way", and what if anything would count as an extreme position but the view that there is nothing? This essay addresses both the systematic status of nihilist theories as well as the historical contexts in which Madhyamaka has been characterized as nihilistic, aiming to throw some light on plausible and implausible ways of understanding the Madhyamaka intellectual enterprise.
目次
Madhyamaka as Nihilism: The Case Against 337 Characterizing Madhyamaka as Nihilism 340 Non-Buddhist Characterizations of Madhyamaka as Nihilism 340 Uddyotakara 341 Kumārila 342 Śaṅkara 343 Rāmānuja 344 Madhva 345 Mādhava 345 Buddhist Characterizations of Madhyamaka as Nihilism 346 Buddhological Characterizations of Madhyamaka as Nihilism 352 The Williams–Burton Argument 354 Sketching a Consistent Form of Nihilism 358 How This Form of Nihilism Differs from the Form the Mādhyamika Rejects 362 Nihilism as an Extreme View 362 Nihilism as Annihilationism 363 Nihilism as the Denial of Efficacy 364 Nihilism as a Reified Non-Existence 365 Nihilism as Moral Nihilism 366 Nihilism With and Without Problematic Consequences 369 A Metaphilosophical Reason for the Nihilist Interpretation 370
