Author Affiliations: University of Hawai‘i West O‘ahu
關鍵詞
Strong AI; emptiness; other minds; Buddha’s omniscience
摘要
The question of whether we can build machines that can think and feel has been with us since at least the time of Descartes. However, it has taken on a new sense of urgency and significance as our lives have become progressively more integrated with and dependent on artificially intelligent technologies. But what does ‘artificial intelligence’ mean exactly? Is it truly possible to build computers that can think and feel like us, and what would it mean if we could? This paper will explore John Searle’s famous rejection of the possibility of such ‘strong AI’ through his Chinese Room Argument and how he handles several replies to his argument. We will then discuss these replies further in the context of Buddhist considerations with respect to the emptiness of persons (pudgalanairātmya), emptiness (śūnyatā) more generally, and the status of the succession of mental states in others (santānāntara)—especially as this pertains to Buddha’s purported omniscience. Doing so will give us resources to examine the implications of Buddhist considerations for strong AI, thus giving us a sense of what a Buddhist perspective might say about the possibility of developing such technology.
