Changing Principle in the Samantapāsādikā¡¦s Commentary
on the Firs Rule of the Defeat Peculiar to Nuns
Institute of Religion and Cuture Tzu Chi University Juo-hsűeh Shih
Journal of the Center for Buddhist Studies
Vol.5(2000)
pp.135-158
Abstract
The ruling against physical contact with
the opposite sex is shared by monks and nuns. In commenting on this rule for
nuns, the Samantapaasaadikaa¡Ðthe commentary on the Paali Vinaya¡Ðraises a
hypothetical case of physical contact between a monk and a nun. In the same
situation , the monk is not to be accused of an offence, but the nun is. The
reason given is because the rule for nuns contains the word saadiyeyya(should
consent to ). Consent indicates passivity.
The investigation of this issue
involves three criteria: consent, activity vs passivity, and immobility. As the
rule for nuns is expressed passively but that for monks actively, this paper firstly demonstrates that
passivity or activity is no crucial factor. So the word saadiyeyya
is irrelevant to deciding penalties. Secondly, this paper looks carefully into
the rule prohibiting sexual intercourse in order to extract some principles for
determining guilt in sexual offences. This discussion shows that the offender's
mental attitude (i.e. consent to the act after its perform-ance or initial
intention to do the act), not his/her physical reaction to the act serves as
the criterion for determining guilt. In the rule against monks' physical
contact with women, however, there exists one dubious case, which seems to
present conflicting principles. But our interpretation excludes the superficial
inconsistency. Moreover, immobility as a factor for innocence is fairly likely
to be of later origin. This paper goes on to examine the corresponding or
relevant texts of the other Vinaya traditions. We find consistency in the
primary principle(i.e. consent or no consent) for determining guilt. The
consideration of immobi-lity is shared only by the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya, and
for this Vinaya immobility never leads to innocence. The Chinese recension of the
Samantapaasaadika also demonstrates
that immobility does not guarantee innocence. Thus we may con-clude that the
Samantapaasaadika switches the
principle for determining innocence from mental attitude to physical reaction.
This new principle, however, applies only to monks. So in the case of physical
contact if a monk is the passive partner and he remains motionless, he is not
to be accused of an offence even though heconsents to it. Consent implies
pleasure derived from the act. Such growing to-lerance does not apply to nuns.
Keywords:
Vinaya, Buddhist ethics, Buddhist nuns
1. Introduction
In the Bhikkhu Pātimokkha (monastic code for monks) the
first class of offence, i.e. the category of Defeat (Pārājika) contains four
rules, but in the Bhikkhunī
Pātimokkha ( monastic code for nuns ) there are eight rules in the same
category. The first four of the
eight rules are common rules (i.e. to be observed by both monks and nuns) and
hence are adopted from the Bhikkhu Pātimokkha. The latter four rules are
peculiar to nuns, among which the first one prohibits physical contact with
men. I shall refer to this rule as Defeat 1 (N). In commenting on this rule,
the Samantapāsādikā ( Sp hereafter ) raises a hypothetical case of physical
contact between a monk and a nun. The penalties for them respectively are,
however, not the same: in the same situation, the monk is not to be accused of
an offence but the nun is. Why is there such discrepancy? The Sp then refers to
the authority of the commentarial tradition, according to which, the pivot lies
in the word sādiyeyya (should consent to) in the rule for nuns.
The ruling against physical contact
with the opposite sex is shared by both monks and nuns, however, in the nuns'
Vinaya it falls into the first (the most serious) category, i.e. Defeat, but in
the monks' counterpart it belongs to the second category, i.e. Sa~nghādisesa (S
agh hereafter). It is interesting
to investigate the ground for such a penalty decision presented in the Sp. For
this purpose, it is necessary first to compare Defeat 1 (N) and S
agh 2 (M).
In
addition to such comparison, we have to look further into the first rule
prohibiting sexual intercourse. This ruling is common to both monks and nuns,
therefore I shall refer to it as Defeat 1 (M+N). This discussion provides us
with the principles for determining a monk's guilt in sexual offences. Finally
the examination of the corresponding texts of the other Vinaya traditions will
broaden our view, particularly the Chinese recension of the Samantapāsādikā
(ChinSp hereafter) is inspiring. The issues involved in the discussion are
technical and complicated. But they are worth pursuing, because what finally
emerges is that principles for judging an offence changed over time. One could describe the direction of
change as becoming harsher towards nuns; but this is of secondary
importance. It is the fact of
change itself which is of great interest, for it has hitherto gone unnoticed in
Vinaya studies.
2. Physical contact with the opposite sex by monk or
nun: the Pāli tradition
2.1 The
Sp's position
In commenting on Defeat 1 (N), t he Sp
discusses the hypothetical case
of such contact between a monk and a nun. The fact that
the sexual partner of an offending nun is a monk, rather than any other man, or
that the partner of an offending monk is a nun, rather than any other woman, is
of no relevance; the hypothetical meeting of the two simply serves to juxtapose
the rule for nuns with that for monks. The following passage presents different
decisions and the reason for the difference, ascribing them to the commentarial
tradition:
However,
in the case of a monk and a nun, [Case 1]: should the nun touch the monk,
should he remain motionless but mentally consent to (sādiyati) it, he is
not to be accused of an offence. [Case 2]: Should the monk touch the nun,
should she remain motionless and accept (adhivāseti) it mentally only,
even though she does not disturb her limbs, she is to be accused of the offence
of Defeat when it is a matter of Defeat, a gross offence when it is a matter of
a gross offence, an offence of wrong-doing when it is a matter of wrong-doing.
Why? Because of the words "should consent (sādiyeyya) to physical
contact"[1]. This is the
decision in the commentaries.[2]
There seem to be two issues here: the physical
(active/passive) and the mental (consent/no consent). We shall see below that
to equate passivity (which refers to how the act is initiated) with immobility
(which refers to reaction to the initiative) is too simple, but for the moment
this can stand.
We have mentioned in the introduction
that the monks' rule parallel to Defeat 1 (N) is S
agh 2. Both prohibit physical contact with a sexual motive, but the monks' rule
is expressed actively, the nuns' rule passively. The reasoning in the above Sp passage would seem to be:
because Defeat 1 (N) is formulated in a passive manner (i.e.consent to the
touching by a man), a nun commits an offence even though she is passive. For
the same reason, in Case 2 a nun is to be accused of an offence even though she
does not move at all but merely "accepts" it mentally. However, the
monks' rule, i.e. S
agh 2, expresses activity, so when the nun is the initiator, the monk is not to
be accused of an offence if he merely "consents to" it mentally,
because the monks' rule does not use the word "consent to" (see next
section). Although this is not spelt out in the text just quoted, it is logical
to infer so from the context.
To summarise the above analysis in
simplified formulas:
For nuns:
Defeat 1 (N)
= passivity + consent ¡÷ offence
Case 2
= passivity + consent ¡÷ offence
(physical reaction is not considered relevant)
For monks:
Sa^ngh 2 (M)
= activity (consent is
envisaged) ¡÷ offence
Case 1
= passivity ¡÷ no offence
(consent is not considered relevant)
Case 2 agrees with Defeat 1 (N) in the physical
passivity and mental consent to the act, so there is an offence. Case 1 is the
negative corollary of Sa^ngh 2 (M), so there is no offence.
2.2 Saadiyati and
adhivaaseti
Before
we discuss the issues of passivity and consent, we must dispose of another
matter raised by the above passage. The word there used to describe the monk's
attitude is saadiyati, while the word for the nun's attitude is adhivaaseti.
Is there any difference? Apparently not, because the passage immediately goes
on to say that adhivaaseti glosses the word saadiyeyya
which is used in the rule. Nevertheless, since so much will hang on the word saadiyat,
it seems advisable to investigate its use more thoroughly. My conclusion will
mean that we can accept what the passage says, for the difference between the
two terms is at most one of nuance. Those readers willing to accept the
conclusion without further evidence are advised to skip the rest of this section.
According to the Paali-English
Dictionary(PED hereafter), saadiyait
means "to enjoy for oneself, to agree to, permit, let take place".
The word is etymologically connected to Sanskrit svaadu, "sweet,
pleasant"; but how is it used in Paali?
Where it means "consent to" or
"accept", it is synonymous with adhivaaseti,
to which A Critical Paali Dictionary (CPD hereafter) gives three meanings: (1) to wait; (2)
to consent (especially to accept an invitation); (3) to bear, endure, pardon,
give in[3].
To take an example in the Dighaanikaaya (DN hereafter): adhivaasetu me bhava.m Gotamo ajjataanaya bhatta.m saddhi.m bhikkhusa^nghena ti. adhivaasesi Bhagavaa tu.nhi bhaavena[4] ("May the venerable Gotama, together with the Savg7ha of monks, accept today's meal from me." The
Blessed One accepted it in silence). The subcommentary identifies adhivaasetu
with saadiyatu: adhivaasetuuti sadiyatu[5]. However, it may be possible to distinguish a nuance
between these two words by enhancing the connotation of saadiyati to imply taking pleasure and by
weakening that of adhivaseti to mean "allow".
The use of saadiyati
in the sense of accepting or consenting to is frequent in the Vinaya. For
example, Nissaggiya Pacittiya (N-Paac hereafter) 18: yo pana bhikkhu jaataruuparajata.m ugga.nhaapeyya vaa ugganhapeyya vaa upanikkhitta.m vaa
saadiyeyya ¡K[6] (Should any monk receive gold or silver or have them
received or consent to their deposit ¡K). Saadiyeyya
occurs in N-Paac 7 (M+N)[7]
and Paac 47 (M+N)[8]
respectively in the context of accepting material offering. On the other hand, saadiyati
is also used to mean to consent to/accept appointment as an exhorter of nuns (bhikkhunovaadaka-sammuti.m saadiyati).[9]
In matters concerning sexuality, whether saadiyati
should be rendered as "consent to" or "feel pleasure in" is
often ambiguous. Among the four additional Defeats peculiar to nuns, Defeats 1
and 4 (5 and 8 respectively in a full list of the Paatimokkha) contain the word saadiyeyya.
Defeat 1 (N)[10] prescribes
that nuns should not have physical contact with men; here the word
saadiyeyya is usually rendered as "should consent to", in that
this rule is formulated in a passive manner:
yaa pana bhikkhunii avassutaa avassutassa purisapuggalassa¡Kaamasanaj vaa ¡K patiipi.lanaj va saadiyeyya, ayam pi paaraajikaa hoti ¡K
(Should any nun, ¡Koozing with desire, consent to the touching or ¡K or
pressing by a male person, who is oozing with desire ¡K, she too becomes
defeated ¡K).
Defeat 4 (N)[11]
prohibits nuns from preliminary actions of asaddhamma (wrong practice)
and it is also formulated passively: yaa pana bhikkhunii avassutaa avassutassa
purisapuggalassa
hatthagaha.na.m vaa
saadiyeyya
sa^nghaa.ti
ka.n.nagaha.na.m vaa
saadiyeyya ¡K
purisassa vaa abbhaagamanaj saadiyeyya ¡K
(If any nun, oozing with desire, should consent to the taking hold of her
hand(s) by a male person, oozing with desire, or should consent to the taking
hold of the edge of [her] outer robe, ?or should consent to the approach of a
man ?. Under the precondition that she is oozing with desire, presumably the
nun derives pleasure from the taking hold of her hand(s), but in the case of
taking hold of the edge of [her] outer robe, or the approach of a man, it would
make better sense to render saadiyeyya
as "should consent to" as in Defeat 1 (N).
A
collation of the Chinese translations of this rule confirms this rendering. The
corresponding rules (i.e. Defeat 6 = Paali Defeat 4 or 8 in a full list) of the
Dharmaguptaka (Dha hereafter), Mahaasaajghika (Maa
hereafter), Mahii¡¦saasaka (Mi hereafter) and Sarvaastivaada (Sa hereafter)
read very similarly and all of them contain the expression "allow/consent
to the taking hold of hand(s) and robe [by the man] ¨ü¡e¨k¤l¡f®»¤â®»¦ç ".[12]
The corresponding rule of the Muu (Chinese and
Tibetan) is formulated quite differently so that no parallel can be recognised.
However, one does read the expression "allows him to approach her or go
with him".[13] In his
German translation of the corresponding rule in the Maa, Waldschmidt renders svaadiiyeta as
"sich gefallen läßt".[14]
On the other hand, we shall see below
that in S
agh 2 (M) the parallel to saadiyati
in Chinese versions does connote feeling pleasure, as is appropriate to that
context.
So, finally, what of our Sp passage? As
it says, saadiyati can be used as a synonym of adhivaaseti.
On the other hand, saadiyati
may imply pleasure. By preferring to use adhivaaseti,
the Sp excludes from discussion the question whether the nun takes pleasure in
the contact; mere consent is enough to make her guilty.
2.3 Defeat
1 (N) compared to Sa^ngh 2 (M)
These two rules prohibit physical contact with a member
of the opposite sex. As mentioned above, whether the sexual partner is ordained
is not relevant. But in its hypothetical juxtaposition of monk and nun, the Sp
is implicitly juxtaposing these two rules; so our next step must be to consider
them as they appear in the Paali.
Defeat
1 for nuns says:
Should any nun, oozing with desire, consent to the touching,
or handling, or taking hold of, or contacting, or pressing by a male person,
who is oozing with desire, below the collarbone, above the kneecaps, she also
becomes defeated and no more in communion. She is "above the
kneecaps". (yaa pana bhikkhunii avassutaa avassutassa
purisapuggalassa adhakkhaka.m
ubbhajaanuma.n.dala.m aamasana.m
vaa paraamasanaj vaagaha.na.m va chupana.m vaa patipiilanaj va saadiyeyya, ayam pi paaraajikaa hoti
asa.mvaasaa ubbhajaanuma.n.dalikaa
ti.)[15]
This envisages passivity on the nun's part, touching
and so on by a man. No action of the nun can be observed, so her attitude is
the criterion for determining guilt. If she consents (i.e. puts up no
resistance), there is an offence; if she does not, there is no offence. That is
why the rule contains the word "should consent to" (saadiyeyya).
This is attested in the non-offence (anaapatti)
section, where "not consenting" (asaadiyantiyaa is listed as one of the reasons for innocence:
There is no offence should it be unintentional, or
should she be unconscious, not aware, not consenting, mad, distracted,
afflicted by pain, or the original offender. (anaapatti asa~ncicca, asatiyaa, ajaanantiyaa, asaadiyantiyaa, ummattikaaya, khittacittaaya, vedana.t.taya, aadikammikaaya ti.)[16]
Sa^ngh 2 for monks
prescribes:
Should any monk, affected by desire, with perverted
heart, come into physical contact with a woman, or hold her hand, or hold a
braid of her hair, or touch some of her limbs, [he commits an offence which]
entails legal acts of the S
agha. ( yo pana bhikkhu otinno viparinatena
cittena matugamena
saddhij kayasaj-saggaj samapajjeyya hatthagahaj vaa venigahaj vaa abbatarassa vaa a~n~natarassa vaa a^ngassa paraamasanaj sa^nhaadiseso ti.)[17]
The non-offence section[18]
is exactly the same as that just cited for Defeat I (N), except of course that
it is in the masculine.
In contrast with Defeat 1 (N), this rule is formulated
in an active manner, so the word saadiyeyya would be redundant: consent
is presupposed by the activity of the agent. So the presence or absence of a
word for consent is irrelevant to determining guilt.
We shall see below that the evidence of the other
traditions corroborates this conclusion: in most of themthe rule corresponding
to S
agh 2 (M) does contain a word corresponding to saadiyeyya. So its absence from the Paali rule
seems to be of no significance.
2.4 Principles for determining a monk's guilt in sexual
offences
The active
construction in S
agh 2 (M) informs us that a monk commits an offence of S
agh when he takes the initiative in physical contact with a woman. The passive
construction of Defeat 1 (N) shows that a nun commits an offence of Defeat even
though she be the passive party. The rule for nuns appears to be stricter than
that for monks. This distinction, however, is superficial, as we shall see by
looking further at the question of a monk's activity or passivity.
The passive case is not so fully discussed under S
agh 2 (M) as under the first Defeat common to both monks and nuns, the prohibition on sexual intercourse,
where many examples of passivity are discussed.
2.4.1
Mental attitude: consent/pleasure
The rule proper of Defeat 1 (M+N) envisages activity,[19]but
the surrounding text considers many cases where a monk is involved in sexual
intercourse passively (willingly or unwillingly) or accidentally or
unexpectedly. The surrounding text
in this case includes not only casuistry but also the Vinitavatthu. This is a further text, annexed to the non-offence
(anaapatti) section, which served as guidance to the later Vinaya
experts by providing cases in which the potential offenders are involved for a
variety of reasons.[20]
In each case the Buddha asked the monk whether he consented (sadiyi tvaj bhikkhu ti). If he did, he
committed an offence of Defeat; if he did not, then there was no offence.[21]
For example, a monk, while sleeping, was defiled by another monk. As he( i.e.
the defiled) was unconsciously involved in sexual intercourse, that fact alone
was not sufficient to decide whether or not he committed an offence; his mental
attitude towards the act was the decisive factor. So this is the decision: if
he [i.e. the defiled one] consents to the act on waking up, both are to be
expelled; if he does not, the defiling monk alone is to be expelled (pat.ibuddho saadiyati, ubho naasetabbaa; pa.tibuddho na saadiyati, duusako naasetabbo).[22]
In some contexts saadiyati may
be rendered as "consent to" with the implication of "feeling
pleasure", as in the case just mentioned. However, such an implication
must be spelt out on certain occasions when the potential offenders are left
with no room to agree or disagree with what happens to them. For example, the
text discusses a case of forced sexual intercourse. In Vesaalii some naughty
boys caught a monk and a nun and forced them to have sex. In that case, the
decision is: if both feel pleasure in the act, both are to be expelled. If both
do not feel pleasure in it, both are innocent (ubho saadiyi.msu ubho
naasetabbaa. ubho na
saadiyi.msu ubhinna.m anaapatti).[23]
It is evident that the feeling derived from the act becomes another principle
for judging whether or not there is an offence. One may therefore extract a
principle from these instances : that in a passive case, mental attitude
towards the act or even the feeling derived from the act is the criterion for
judging whether there is an offence.
2.4.2
Initial intention
The above principle, i.e. feeling
derived from the act, is not applicable to cases where offenders tried to take
advantage of a legal loophole. For example, [Case 1]: a monk engaged in sexual
intercourse with the view that he would not be committing an offence, in that
he felt neither pain nor pleasure, because his faculties were impaired. However,
this is the decision: Monks, whether or not this foolish man had [any] feeling,
he committed an offence of Defeat (vedayi vaa so bhikkhave moghapuriso na vaa vedayi, aapatti paaraajikassaati).[24]Another
incident [Case 2] recounts that a woman twice invites a
monk to sexual intercourse, and in the first case he is not to exert himself
but she will (ehi bhante ahaj vaaayamissaami tvaa.m maa vaayaami, evaan te anaapatti bhavissatiiti),[25]
while in the second case she will not exert herself but he will (ehi bhante
tva.m vaayama aha.m na vaayamissaami, evan te anaaapatti bhavissatiiti).[26] She thought that so long as one of the
parties remained motionless, there would be no offence for the monk (evan te
an-aapatti bhavissatiiti). She was wrong. In
both cases, the verdict is the same: Monk, you have committed an offence of
Defeat (aapattij tva.m bhikkhu aapanno paaraajikan ti).[27]
In
Case 1, the offender's feeling derived from the act ceases to be the principle for
judging an offence, because he intended to take advantage of a legal loophole.
In that case, it is his initial intention that counts. Case 2 shows that
passivity (i.e. immobility,
another legal loophole ) does not guarantee innocence. Since the offender
intentionally had sexual intercourse, his initial intention determined his
guilt. It is clear, then, that a different principle is applied in judging
cases where the intention was to take advantage of a legal loophole. Case 2
confirms that there is an offence for the monk whether he be active or passive.
Thus activity or passivity is by
no means the criterion for judging a case; in other words, passivity does not
necessarily make a monk free of guilt. In the first instance the monk "did
not exert his body", but he still incurred a Defeat. In these cases, the
monk was not asked whether he consented to it or not, because it is
self-evident that he agreed to the woman's suggestion.
Does the same principle apply to S^nagh
2 (M)? Apparently yes, but the matter is complicated.
We begin by noting that in the
non-offence (anaapatti) section, "not consenting" (asaadiyantassa)
is a reason for innocence, as it is in the cases of Defeat 1 (M+N) against
sexual intercourse and Defeat 1 (N) against nuns' physical contact with men.
Furthermore, in the Viniitavatthu of S^nagh 2
(M), one does find an instance where a monk was passively involved in physical
contact with a woman. When asked whether he consented to it or not, he answered
in the negative and thus was exempt from an offence (saadiyi tva.m bhikkhuuti. Naaha.m bhagavaa saadiyin ti. anaapatti bhikkhu asaadiyantassaa ti).[28]
Since this shows the same principle, consent, to determine guilt, what is the
problem?
2.4.3
Conflicting principles?
The problem lies in the casuistry to this rule. After
discussing cases where the monk is the passive party (Vin III 124.32¡Ð125.30 = II:3.1¡Ð5), the conclusion
(Vin III 125.31¡Ð126.3 = II:3.6) seems to present two conflicting principles,
physical reaction and initial intention, by which to judge an offence.
According to the latter half of that passage, the determining factor for
innocence is the monk's initial intention. So long as it is his intention to
remove himself ( mokkhaadhippaayo) from physical
contact with the woman, there will be no offence whatever happens, i.e. whether
or not he exerts his body or recognizes the contact.[29]
In this case, physical reaction plays no role. But if he intends contact (sevanaadhippaayo), then four possibilities
are considered:
Case 1: If he exerts his body (kaayena vaayamati)
and recognizes the contact, it is an offence of S^nagh.
Case
2: If he exerts his body but recognizes no contact, it is an offence of
wrong-doing.
Case
3: If he does not exert his body but recognizes the contact, there is no
offence (sevanadhippayo na ca kaayena vaayamati phassa.m pa.tivijaanaati sanaapatti).[30]
Case
4: If he neither exerts his body nor recognizes the contact, there is no
offence either.
Contrasting Cases 1+2 with Cases 3+4, one would at
first sight take physical reaction to be the principle for deciding an offence,
as does the Sp passage with which we began. But this principle conflicts with
that of mental attitude, the primary one in making verdicts. However, another
interpretation is possible, one which creates no conflict.
In Cases 1+2, the monk eventually
exerts his body and hence is no longer the passive partner although he was
passive initially.[31]
His mobility shows consent to the act, so there is an offence. In Cases 3+4,
the monk does not exert his body, so he remains the passive partner in physical
contact. In such a case, his
immobility implies lack of consent to what is happening. Therefore, what is crucial
is not his mobility or immobility per se, but what that indicates about
consent. This interpretation is supported by the ChinSp (see below).
However,
the Sp's comment on this passsage gives a different interpretation, reversing
the parts mental attitude and physical reaction play in judging whether or not
there is an offence.
In the third case, there is no
offence owing to the lack of bodily exertion. Because if any one, even desiring
association, recognizes, consents and experiences mere contact by remaining
motionless, for him there is no offence, in that offence does not exist in the
mere arising of a thought. (tatiye kaayena avaayamato anaapatti, yo hi sevanaadhippaayo pi niccalena kaayena kevala.m phassa.m pa.tivijaanaati saadiyati anubhoti tassa cittuppadamatte apattiya abhavato anaapatti.)[32]
This is a specious argument. It is true that a mere
thought, however evil it may be, never incurs any offence, as the Vinaya only
deals with actual events. But that certainly does not mean that the Vinaya concerns
itself only with monks' and nuns' actions, not their thoughts. Gombrich has
argued against such a standpoint and remarked: " [A] monk can only be disciplined for
something he did consciously (sa~ncicca). This synthesis between
intention and action, between the mind and the body, in Buddhist ethics was
doubtless first worked out in monastic jurisprudence."[33]
When nothing happens, one's intention plays no role; but when something does
take place, one's intention plays an essential part, even if one is the passive
party. We have seen this to be attested by many decisions about penalties found
in the canonical Vinaya texts.
In the passage just cited the Sp argues
that since his desire for association is a mere thought, the monk in the
hypothetical case is innocent. But the principle that a thought alone incurs no
offence is not applicable here, because it was not a mere thought in isolation:
there was already an actual context. Although the monk was passive and remained
motionless, he did experience and
consent to physical contact with a woman. So one expects his mental attitude to
be the factor determining guilt.
The same discrepancy between the canonical text on S^nagh 2 (M) and the
Sp's commentary arises in an other case. In the Vinitavatthu[34]it
says that a monk committed an offence of S^nagh because he became
infatuated (saratto) and raised his foot when revered by a woman.
What makes this an offence of S^nagh is actually the monk's infatuation, and
his movement results in direct physical contact with the woman. However, in
commenting on this case, the Sp says:
In
the case of veneration, he should prevent a woman from rubbing his feet
desiring to pay veneration. He should cover his feet or remain immobile.
Because there is no offence for one who does not move although he consent/feel
pleasure in his heart. (vandanavatthusmi.m itthii paade sambaahitvaa vanditukaamaa vaaretabbaa paadaa vaa paticchaadetabbaa niccalena vaa bhavitabba.m niccalassa hi cittena saadiyato pi anaapatti)[35]
Covering his feet is to avoid physical contact. If this
is not possible, alternatively he may remain motionless. One would expect this to suggest that
he does not consent to it but cannot avoid it. The Sp's commentary, however,
disregards how he feels but takes account of how he reacts physically.
2.4.4 A
different interpretation: immobility implies lack of consent
On an examination of the Paali canonical texts, we have demonstrated that mental
attitude, not physical reaction, is the primary principle for determining
guilt, but there exists a seemingly conflicting principle, i.e. physical
reaction, in a discussion of an exceptional case. We have also shown that the
Paali post-canonical commentary makes use of this dubious principle for the
innocence of monks. However, a different interpretation is possible, an
interpretation which gives rise to no conflict with the main principle for
determining guilt or innocence.
To attempt at a fresh interpretation of
that case, it is necessary to clarify the applications of mental attitude and
physical reaction either separately or jointly. To that end I shall first
classify three possible modes of presenting a passive case:
(1) Consent alone is mentioned. In a passive case, the
potential offender's consent needs to be spelt out in order to judge an offence
because there will be no offence if (s)he does not consent to the act. As can
be seen in Defeat 1 (N), the nun is passive and the rule says that if she
consents to physical contact with men, she commits an offence of Defeat. In
this situation, physical reaction does not need to be stated in that it is not
crucial.
(2) Immobility plus consent. In addition to the passive
partner's mentality, his or her physical reaction is also stated. However, that
addition affects nothing because mental attitude is the decisive factor for an
offence or innocence. For example, the Sp's commentary says that if the nun
mentally accepts that act but remains motionless, she is still to be accused of
an offence.
(3) Immobility alone is stated. Immobility of the
passive partner can signify the opposite mentality: it may signify their
consent to the act in that they put up no resistance, or, it may signify their
unwillingness (when there is no way to escape); they would otherwise exert
their bodies in response to the act. Owing to the equivocal nature of the
mention of immobility, in the case where an offence is incurred, consent must
be stated in order to legitimate it. In the case where immobility alone is
stated, the implication is that the passive party is not consenting. That leads
to his or her innocence. So the pivot of not being guilty still lies in the
passive party's mentality, not physical reaction. In this interpretation, there is consistency in the main principle for judging an offence in
the canonical text.
A further analysis of that exceptional case may provide
us with clues to resolve the confusion as regards whether bodily immobility
leads to the conclusion that mental attitude is a mere thought, which is the
cause of innocence:
Case I: The monk desires association,
but does not exert his body. The implication is that he does not feel pleasure
in physical contact with women.
Case II: The monk desires association.
He feels pleasure in physical contact with women and exerts his body [in
response].
In either Case I or Case II,
"desire for association" is a thought, and whether the very thought
remains "a mere thought" or whether it prompts the passive party into
an actual contact depends on his attitude towards physical contact with women.
In Case II, by his mental act (i.e. feeling pleasure in physiccal contact), the
monk enters an actual contact. In that situation, his desire for association is
no longer a "mere thought". In Case I, the monk may, due to a sense
of guilt, refrain from taking delight in physical contact although originally
he is not without desire. His desire remains "a mere thought" in that
it is not developed into any bodily exertion or mental enjoyment. That is why
the monk commits no offence.
That exceptional case falls in the
category of Case I. The above analysis demonstrates that the mention of
immobility does not mean replacing the principle of attitude with that of
physical reaction. However, the Sp apparently understands it differently by
referring "a thought" to attitude towards the act, not the original
intention before the act. We learn by comparison that there is disagreement
between the Sp and ChinSp, for in the latter immobility is not the decisive
factor for innocence (see below Sec.3.3, pp. 24f). Our foregoing discussion is inspired by the ChinSp.
3. Physical contact with the opposite sex by monk or
nun: the other traditions
3.1 The canonical texts of the Bhik.sunii-Vinaya
We have shown above that in the Paali Vinaya what happens is not enough to determine
whether there is an offence: why and how it happens must be taken into
consideration. To determine guilt, mental attitude is the crucial factor.
Collation of the parallel texts in the
other traditions shows that most of them use the same principle. The
non-offence section in the Dha is basically the same as in the Paali. It contains similar factors[36]
for innocence to those listed in the Paali,
but elaborates on the cases where the nun is not oozing with desire or the
contact is unintentional.[37]
The Sa gives a different list: contact while regarding the man as her father,
brother or son; contact in an emergency, and so on.[38]
In conclusion, there is no offence in any case where she conceives no desire.[39]
The Chinese recension of the Muulaasarvaastivada Vinaya (ChinMuu hereafter) demonstrates the same principle: the nun's
mental attitude (i.e. whether she has passion) is the criterion for deciding
whether there is an offence. This is attested by an example: if a nun is ill
and a man is massaging her, if she becomes desirous, there is an offence of
wrong-doing; if she does not, there is no offence.[40]
In the Mii, there are four factors for innocence: madness,
disturbance in mind, illness and being the original offender. This list appears
only at the end of Defeat 1 (M+N) and is omitted in the rest of the rules
because it applies to all of them.[41]Additional
factors are given wherever applicable. In the rule against physical contact, no
word-for-word commentary or casuistry is provided because they are the same as
those in the corresponding rule for monks, namely, S^nagh 2 (M). From the
casuistry one learns that a pure mental attitude is the only factor for
innocence.[42] (see below)
The Maa is the only tradition which allows no innocence. Even
if neither the nun nor the man feels desire, there is an offence of light
infringement.[43]So for the Maa what happens is crucial: once physical contact occurs,
the nun is guilty of an offence, albeit a light one.
3.2 The canonical texts of the Bhik.su-Vinaya
3.2.1 Saadiyeyya
Subsection 2.2 above discussed the
meaning of the verb saadiyati and its use in the current context; and in
3.3 we said that though its optative form, saadiyeyya, was absent from
the wording of rule Saasdfsafsdfis S^nagh 2 (M), .this did not affect the
meaning of the rule or detract from the principle that for monks as for nuns
consent is crucial for determining offences of this character. We begin this
section by collating the parallel passages in the other Vinaya traditions, thus
both shedding light on the exact meaning that they attributed to this term and
corroborating our conclusion that in this respect there is no difference
between the rulings for monks and
for nuns. Readers not interested in a detailed study of the meaning of this
word are again advised to skip to 3.2.2.
In the Maa-L, both the monk's and nun's rules (S^nagh 2, M and
Defeat 1 ( 5 in a full list) , N = Paali Defeat 1, N) against physical contact
contain the word saadiyeya.
Maa-L S^nagh 2 (M):
yo puna bhik.su otiirno vipari.natena cittena maatrgraamena saardha.m kaayasa.msarga.m samaapadyeya sa.myathiida.m
hastagraha.na.m vaa ve.niigraha.na.m vaa anyataraanyatarasya vaa punr a^ngajaatasya aamo.sa.naparaamo.sana.m saadiyeya S^aghaati¡¦se.so.[44]
Ma-L Defeat 5 (N):
Yaa puna bhik.sunii ava¡¦srutaa ava¡¦srutasya puru.sasya adho kak.saabhyaam upari jaanuma.n.dalaabhyaam aamo.sa.naparaamo.sa.na.m saadiyeya iya.m pi bhik.suni paaraajikaa bhavaty asamvaasya.[45]
In S^nagh 2 (M), ssadiyeya
can be rendered as "should feel pleasure", for since the monk is the
initiator, that already implies his "consent". In Defeat 5 (N),saadiyeya
can still be rendered as "should consent to", as the nun is passive.
The two translations differ because of the context, but what is important is
that the rules use the same word.
Collating S^nagh 2 (M) of the Paali, Ma[46] and Ma-L, one finds that
they read nearly the same, but the Ma¡¦s
and Ma-L's rules contain the word saadiyeya[47]which is not found in the Paali. The Chinese rendering
of the Maa Vibhavga reads: " feeling [the pleasure in]
fineness and smoothness ¨ü ²Ó ·Æ ",[48]
but in the Praatimok.sa-suutra it is
"feeling pleasure ¨ü¼Ö".[49] It seems that in Chinese saadiyati
is rendered as "feeling pleasure" or more specifically "feeling
[the pleasure in] fineness and smoothness".[50]
The Sanskrit Mu has the different
word sviikuryaat, which means:
"should agree, accept, assent".[51]
Its Chinese rendering in both the Vibhavga and Praatimoksa-suutra is "generating
the mind of feeling pleasure" §@¨ü¼Ö¤ß.[52]
The Sanskrit Sa[53] does not
contain any description of the monk's mental attitude, neither does its Chinese
parallel in the Vibhavga.[54]
However, in the Chinese Praatimok.sa-suutra, the expression
"fineness and smoothness ²Ó·Æ" appears.[55]
Among the other
Vinayas in non-Indian languages, the Dha has no expression equivalent to saadiyeyya
in its Vibha^nga[56] and Praatimok.sa-suutra.[57]However,
the Mii does. The rules in
its Vibha^nga[58]and
Praatimok.sa-suutra[59]
read exactly the same: "If a monk, affected by desire, with perverted
heart ¡K seizes [her] body part by part, rubbing [to feel] fineness and
smoothness (¼¯µÛ²Ó·Æ), [he commits an offence of ] S^nagh."[60]
The Chieh-t'uo-chieh-Ching ( ¸Ñ²æ§Ù¸g )[61]
uses another phrase: "If a monk ¡K comes into physical contact with a woman
¡K should [he] touch [her] body part by part, feeling the touching (ıIJ), [he commits an
offence of] S^nagh."[62]
As pointed out above, the sense of "fineness and smoothness ²Ó·Æ" may be
derived from the phrase kaayasajsaggaj saadiyeya/saadiyeyya, of which
the expression " ıIJ feeling the touching" in the
Chieh-tuo-chieh-Ching ¸Ñ²æ§Ù¸g may be another translation.
s In summary, some traditions use the
word saadiyeya/saadiyeyya, which in this context they interpret as expressing
pleasure; some do not. In some traditions, this word or its equivalent
expression ( in the case of
Chinese and Sanskrit verions) appears in both texts, namely, Vibha^nga and Praatimok.sa-suutra, but in some it appears only in the latter.
Moreover, it appears in almost all the Chinese Paartimoksa-suutra texts except for the Dha; the same holds true of
the extant Sanskrit Praatimoksa-suutra texts except for
the Sa.
3.2.2
Principles for determining guilt
The monastic discipline for nuns is
compiled on the model of that for monks, and we have seen that the non-offence
section of S^nagh 2 (M) in the Paali Bhikkhu-Vinaya reads exactly the same as
its parallel in Defeat I (N). A collation of the different recensions of S^nagh
2 (M) confirms that the factors for innocence parallel those in the related
Bhikkhunii-Vinaya traditions
as they have been presented above. I shall therefore focus on cases where the
monk is passive.
We have seen above in the Paali that if
a monk intends to get free of a woman, he is not guilty of an offence even
though physical contact occurs and even though he exerts his body and
recognizes the contact. The Mii presents the same
case with a minor discrepancy:[63]
a monk is seized by a woman, but he desires no association and tries to free
himself from her; if he does not consent to (or, feel [pleasure] in) the
contact, even if he recognizes it ( ÁöıIJ¦Ó¤£¨ü ), there is no
offence for him. Here the monk's intention is made clear by expressions such as
"desiring no association" and "not consenting to the
contact". It is obvious that
the Paali and the Mi use the same
principle in deciding the case: mental attitude is the crucial factor.
The Sa[64]
discusses cases where the monk plays the passive role, and the description of
the monk is always: infatuated, exerts his body and feels the sensation of
fineness and smoothness (¦³±ý¤ß¡A¨°Ê¡A¨ü²Ó·Æ). In these cases, he commits an offence of S^nagh or a
gross offence, depending on the situation. However, there is no presentation of cases where the monk
remains motionless.
We recall the discussion in the Paali
casuistry which gave rise to conflicting interpretations in the later Paali
tradition (see pp. 11 above). There is no such discussion in the Mi Nor does the ChinMuu[65] contain anything even remotely similar. However, the
Dha[66]
does contain similar casuistry,[67]
and it is of great interest, for it disagrees with the Paali. The difference
between the two traditions can easily be seen from the following table.
|
mental attitude |
exerts the body |
recognize the contact* |
penalties |
|
Paali desiring association** |
yes |
Yes |
Sa^n |
|
yes |
No |
wrong-doing |
|
|
no |
yes |
no offence |
|
|
no |
no |
no offence |
|
|
Dha oozing with desire ±ý¤ß¬VµÛ |
yes |
yes |
Sa |
|
yes |
no |
Gross offence |
|
|
no |
yes |
Gross offence |
|
|
no |
no |
wrong-doing |
* The wording in the Dha is different: feeling pleasure
in contact.
** Sevanaadhippaaya.
We recall that in case 3 the Paali frees
the monk from guilt if he does not exert his body, even though he does desire
association (sevanaadhippaayo) with the woman.
The Dha, by contrast, allows no innocence when the monk's mentality is not
pure. In an actual event, the
passive partner's mental attitude, in the Dha called "oozing with
desire" ±ý¤ß¬VµÛ, is no mere thought (as was argued by the Sp), so a
monk still incurs an offence of wrong-doing even if he does not exert his body,
or feel pleasure in the contact.
Another example suffices to demonstrate
the Dha's stance : immobility never leads to innocence. In the case of a woman
paying veneration parallel to that in the Paali Viniitavatthu which we dealt with above, it says that a woman,
while venerating him, seizes a monk's feet, if he feels pleasure in the contact
but remains motionless, he commits an offence of wrong-doing.[68]
The Maa[69] too considers this case, but with a different
conclusion: instead of deciding the penalty, the text only offers
recommendations. It says that in case a woman comes to venerate a monk's feet,
if he becomes infatuated, he should sit upright and bid the woman pay reverence
at some distance. However, if the woman, out of faith, eventually draws near to venerate him,
at that moment the monk should bite his tongue so that the pain will distract
him from the sensation of female fineness and smoothness.[70]
This last recommendation clearly indicates that what concerns the canonical
commentator(s) - as in the Paali - is the control of the monk's mind, not the
movement of his body.
Like the Paali, the Maa shows much concern with heterosexual relationships, in
that its casuistry[71]
contains extensive discussion of occasions when there may be some contact, direct
or indirect, between a monk and a woman. While it is not necessary to go into
every detail, one important point must not be overlooked, a point closely
related to our previous discussion of the Sp's theory of innocence: immobility
= mere thought = no offence.
The
discussion of the Maa usually starts with
a scenario in which a monk appears together with a woman, for example, walking
on the same road; holding the same vessel; sharing the same coach and the
like. These are considered as
improper conduct. However, should the monk become desirous, it is an offence of
light infringement of the Vinaya (vinayaatikrama);
should he touch (or move or shake), out of desire, something shared with the
woman, it is a gross offence (sthuulatyaya;
Paali: thullaccaya). In
many cases the penalty decision stops here and it informs us that even a
"mere thought" (becoming desirous) incurs an offence, albeit a light
one, and that "intention" plus "action" incurs a heavier
offence.
In some cases, however, the decision goes
on to determine innocence. For example, suppose a monk and a woman are walking
on a piece of long board, this is not appropriate, but should the monk become
desirous, it is an offence of light infringement of the Vinaya; if the monk
becomes desirous and shakes the board, it is a gross offence; if the board does
not shake or if a man is standing between the monk and the woman, there is no
offence.[72] Note that
the "immobility" of the board makes the monk guiltless. This is open
to two lines of interpretation:
firstly, the result of the monk's action serves as the criteria for
determining guilt. As the board does not shake as his action intends, there is
no offence. Secondly, when the board does not shake, it means that the monk
does not take an action and that implies he is not desirous, that is why he
commits no offence.
I take the second line, for the first
one is not in accord with the principle underlying the penalty decision. Remember that it incurs a light offence even though the monk only
becomes desirous but takes no action yet. Apparently even a "mere
thought" counts, then how can he be guiltless after taking an action (this
implies that he has become desirous)? and how can he be guiltless just because
his intention is not fulfilled?
The difference between the Paali and Ma lies here: in the Paali, the monk is the passive
partner, who consents to the contact but remains motionless. There is no
offence for him, because a "mere thought" does not count. The Ma presents active cases, and this tradition is strict to
the effect that a "mere thought" without action still counts. So
there is no room for innocence unless the monk has a pure mind, i.e. not
becoming desirous. This results in his taking no action, and his inaction is
reflected by the "immobility" of the object the monk may move or
shake.
3.3 The post-canonical commentaries
The two post-canonical commentaries to
the Sa S^nagh 2 (M)[73]
do not contain any discussion of cases in which a monk is the passive partner
in physical contact with a woman.
The ChinSp has a subtler consideration
than the Paali Sp, but at first sight it seems to present, like the latter,
conflicting principles. However, a close examination of the ChinSp proves that the principle applied in its commentary on Sa^ngh
2 (M) is consistent, and that
the ChinSp differs from the Sp on
the part immobility plays in deciding whether there is an offence.
Within one single passage
(T1462[24].762a.20-28) one reads the
following verdicts: in one case [Case 1] it says that there is an offence of
S^nagh for the monk who is oozing with desire and moves his body;[74]
in another case [Case 2], where a woman seizes a monk, It is a wrong-doing for the monk
who, out of desire, feels pleasure
in [the contact] but remains motionless.[75] Following this, there is yet another
case [ Case 3 ] in which no offence is committed by a monk who is oozing with
desire but remains motionless.[76]
Case 2 and Case 3 present an
interesting contrast. Although immobility is present in both cases, it does not
nullify guilt in Case 2: there is at least an offence of wrong-doing even
though he remain motionless. It is therefore evident that immobility cannot be
the decisive factor for judging an offence. Yet what is decisive? The difference between Case 2 and Case
3 is that the former has the word "feel pleasure ¨ü¼Ö", which is the
Chinese rendering for saadiyati, but Case 3 has not. That is the reason
why in Case 3 there is no offence. So innocence is not due to immobility but to
not feeling pleasure in the act.
It is the same principle, i.e. mental attitude towards the act, that the
ChinSp applies in discussing the passive cases. As we remember, the Sp's
commentary totally disregards the potential offender's mental attitude and
makes physical reaction the criterion for the monk¡¦s innocence.
4. Conclusion
The investigation of the dubious
decisions quoted in the Sp involves three criteria: activity/passivity, consent
and immobility. Our discussion proves that although S^nagh 2 (M) and Defeat 1
(N) are differently formulated, they both rule: firstly, that physical contact
with the opposite sex, whether in active or passive mode, entails an
offence; and secondly, that mental
attitude ( i.e. consent to the act after its performance or initial intention
to do the act) is the primary principle for determining guilt. We also demonstrate that immobility
does not guarantee innocence, and
that although the Paali canonical text at first sight seems to present a
conflicting principle not found in the other traditions, our interpretation
excludes the superficial inconsistency.
However, if one follows the Sp's position, taking
physical reaction to be a new principle for judging an offence, there is
obviously disagreement between the casuistry and the Viniitavatthu as regards the criteria for deciding
penalties. One point deserves attention: the natures and styles of the
casuistry and the Viniitavatthu are
apparently different. The former consists of systematic penalty gradation based
on hypothetical examples. For the purpose of gradation, it is necessary to go
into the details of any situation and take all possibilities into
consideration. Contrary to the casuistry, the Viniitavatthu deals with actual[77]
cases and is much simpler in style, in that normally the Buddha applies an
essential principle (e.g. consent to the act or not) to judge an offence
without going into detail (e.g. exerting the body or not).
Thus the Viniitavatthu and the casuistry appear to me to have been
composed by different authors and they may represent different strata of the
canonical text. It seems that the
consideration of physical reaction in judging a case represents a later development in most of the Vinaya
traditions, thus it is not entirely impossible that the exceptional case in the
Paali canonical casuistry is a later interpolation (Even so, the further
innocence by immobility is unique in the Paali tradition alone).
This assumptive view just mentioned is
based on the following observations: (1) The discussion considering immobility
as a factor for determining guilt, as far as our examination goes, is an
isolated case in the Paali canonical commentary; (2)such a case is shared only
by the Dha, also in the canonical casuistry; and most importantly, (3) immobility never leads to innocence
for the Dha; (4) the ChinSp disagrees with the Sp on switching the principle
for determining a monk's innocence from his mental attitude towards the act to
his physical reaction to the act, that is to say, immobility for monks alone
results in innocence.
In commenting on Defeat 1 (N),
the Paali post-canonical tradition has presented a changing principle, namely,
physical reaction to sexual contact, for determining guilt. However, this new
principle applies only to monks. When it comes to the case of nuns, the old
principle, namely, mental attitude, applies.
Abbreviations and Bibliography
BD = I. B. Horner, The Book of the Discipline
(Vinaya.tpitaka), 6 Vols.,
London 1938-1966 (Sacred Books of the Buddhists, 10, 11, 13, 14, 20, 25).
BhiPr = Ernst Waldschmidt, Bruchstycke des Bhik.su.ni-Praatimoksa der Sarvaasivaadins,
Leipzig 1926 (Kleinere Sanskrit-Texte, 3). [Nachdruck: Wiesbaden 1979
(Monographien zur indischen Archäologie, Kunst und Philologie, 2), 1-191].
BhiVibh = Bhikkhunii-Vibha^nga/Bhik.su.ni-Vibha^nga.
BhiVin(Ma-L) = Bhik.sunii-Vinaya, including Bhik.sunii-Prakiir.naka and a summary of the Bhik.su-Prakiir.naka of the AArya-Mahaasa.mghika-Lokotta-ravaadin, ed. Gustav Roth,
Patna 1970 (Tibetan Sanskrit Work Series, 12).
Chin = Chinese.
ChinMu = the Vinaya of the
Muulasarvaastivaadins, T1443[23].
ChinSp = S^naghabhadra, Shan Chien P'i P'o Sha, A
Chinese Version of Saman-Tapaasaadikaa, transl. P. V. Bapat in collaboration with A. Hirakawa.
Poona 1970 (Bhandarkar Oriental Series, 10).
CPD = A Critical Paaali Dictionary, begun by V.
Trenckner, ed. D. Andersen, H. Smith, H. Hendriksen, Vol. 1, Copenhagen
1924-1948, Vol. 2, Copenhagen 1960-1990, Vol. 3 (Fasc. 1-3): Copenhagen
1992-1994.
Dha = Dharmaguptaka Vinaya, T1428[22].
DN = Dighanikaaya, ed. T. W. Rhys
Davids, J. E. Carpenter, 3 Vols. London 1890-1911.
Finot, "PrMoSuu(Sa)" = [Louis Finot and É. Huber] "Le Praatimok.sasuutra des Sarvaastivaadins", texte Sanskrit par M. Louis Finot, avec la
version chinoise de Kumarajiva traduit en Français par M. Édouard Huber", Journal Asiatique, Novembre-Décembre 1913, 465-557.
Gombrich, "Buddhist Ethics" = Richard F.
Gombrich, "Notes on the Brahminical Background to Buddhist Ethics" in
Buddhist Studies in Honour of Hammalava Saddhaatissa,
eds. G. Dhammapala, R. Gombrich, K.R. Norman. Colombo 1984.
Hirakawa, Vinaya-pitaka =
Akira Hirakawa, A Study
of the Vinaya-pi.taka.
Tokyo 1970.
Hirakawa, Two Hundred and Fifty Precepts =
Hirakawa, Studies on the Two
Hundred and Fifty Precepts, 4 Vols. Tokyo 1993-1995.
M = Monks.
Maa = Mahaasaa.mghika Vinaya,
T1425[22].
Mii= Mahii¡¦sasaka Vinaya, T1421[22].
M+N = For both monks and nuns.
MW = M. Monier Williams, A Sanskrit-English
Dictionary. Oxford 1899.
N = Nuns.
N-Paac = Nissaggiya Paacittiya/Ni.hsargika-Paacattika.
op. cit. = opere citato.
PED = The Paali Text Society's Paali-English
Dictionary, ed. T.W. Rhys Davids, W. Stede, London 1921-1925.
PrMoSuu(Ma) = The Pratimoksasutram of the MahaS^naghikas, ed. W. Pachow, R.
Mishra. Allahabad 1956.
PrMoSuu(Ma-L) = Nathmal Tatia (ed.), Lokottara-mahaasaa^mghikaana^m Praatimok.sasuutram. Patna 1975.
PrMoSuu(Mu) = A.C. Banerjee, Two Buddhist Vinaya Texts in Sans.krit. Praatimoksasuutra and Bhik.sukarmaavakya. Calcutta 1977.
PrMoSu(TibMu) = " So-sor-thar-pa; or, a Code of Buddhist
Monastic Laws: Being the Tibetan Version of Pratimoksa of the Muula-sarvaastivaada School", ed. and tr. S.C. Vidyabhusana, JASB
1915, 29-139.
Sa = Sarvaastivaada Vinaya, T1435[23].
Sp = Samantapaasaadikaa Vinaya-a.t.thakathaa ed. J. Takakusu, M.
Nagai (Vols. 5 and 7 by Mizuno), 7 Vols., London 1924-1947 (PTS) [Index Vol. by
H. Kopp, London 1977 (PTS)].
s.v. = sub verbo.
Sv-.t= Dighanikaaya.t.thaakaa.thatikaa, Liinatthava.n.nanaa 3 Vols. ed. Lily de Silva. London 1970 (PTS).
T = Taishoo
Shinshuu Daizokyo, 100 Vols. Tokyo
1924ff.
Vin = Vinaya-pitaka, ed. Hermann
Oldenberg, 5 Vols. London 1879-1883.