

# The Contrast of Late Ming Weishi Commentaries and Edo Weishi Commentaries on Xuanzang's *Guan suoyuanyuan lun* \*

Yang, Chih-Chang \*\*

## Abstract

In the late Ming there was a renaissance of Weishi (consciousness-only) in which at least thirty-five Weishi commentaries were produced in China without access to the key Weishi commentaries authored by Kuiji, Huizhao, and Zhizhoh. On the other hand, the Weishi lineage of Faxiang Zong in Japan together with those key Weishi commentaries have never been interrupted since Tang dynasty. Due to the lost Weishi lineage and texts, those late Ming made Weishi commentaries have been in doubt and challenged. Especially some Weishi experts in Japan in the Edo period criticized some late Ming authors for producing valueless and incorrect Weishi commentaries. This article attempts to investigate if such challenges and criticisms are fair enough and if the differences between the late Ming commentaries and

---

2017.07.17 收稿，2017.12.18 通過刊登。

\* I wish to express my deep gratitude to Professor Chen-kuo Lin (林鎮國教授) and Ph.D. Kai-ting Jian (簡凱廷博士) for their inspiration/encouragement and for their generous sharing with me those valuable Edo commentaries material. But, whatever oversights and/or flaws in this article are solely on my own. In addition, I also like to thank editors and reviewers for their comments, suggestion, and support.

\*\* Ph.D. Student of Graduate Institute of Religious Studies of NCCU.

the Edo commentaries in terms of the access to the key Tang Weishi commentaries shape how these two groups understood and interpreted the same Weishi text.

Thus, this study selects Xuanzang's *Guan suoyuanyuan lun* which is Xuanzang's translation of Dignāga's *Ālambana-parīkṣā* as a base text and compares two late Ming commentaries that were written by Mingyu and Zhixu with two Edo commentaries that were authored by Kiben and Kaidou. The analysis is conducted in two levels: the high-level analysis and the deeper dive analysis. In the high-level analysis, several interesting areas are identified including: 1) the Edo commentators had much longer commentator's introduction. 2) Kiben, Kaidou and Mingyu spent most effort in commenting on the second verse & the second prose. 3) The quotation accounts for approximately 40% of the Edo commentaries. On the contrary, in the late Ming group Mingyu quoted about 10% and Zhixu quoted less than 1%. In the deeper-dive analysis of the sources and the frequencies of quotations, of the longer Edo commentator's introduction, of the controversial about the second moon as "dṛṣṭānta" (example), of what making the appearance of the collection, and of what making the sense faculties, it is found that the access to the key Tang Weishi commentaries does significantly impact the commentators' capacity to identify controversial issues, to distinguish different realists' views, and to address the Weishi internal arguments. However, there are some occasions that commentators seemed choosing not to use all the sources that available to them. Several possibilities were discussed. In addition, the commentators' different agendas, sense of subjectivity, and personal expertise also play important roles in determining

whether and/or how they comments on what.

**Keywords:** Weishi (Conscious-only), Late Ming Buddhism, Edo Buddhism, *Guan suoyuanyuan lun*.



## I. Introduction

When Yogācāra philosophy was transmitted into China and Japan, there were two different streams that were identified as the old translations and the new translations, respectively. The former basically refers to those translations by Bodhiruci 菩提流支, Paramārtha 真諦 (499-569) and etc. Which were done before the time of Xuanzang 玄奘 (602-664). The latter are primarily those translations which were done by Xuanzang.<sup>1</sup> Those Yogācāra works that translated by Xuanzang become the dominant philosophy of Weishi (唯識, consciousness-only) in China, particularly the *Cheng Weishi Lun* 成唯識論 (hereinafter referred as CWL) that's believed to be mainly based on the view of Dharmapāla.

Kuiji 窺基 (632-682), the successor of Xuanzang, and his successors Huizhao 慧沼 (650-714) and Zhizhou 智周 (668-723) completed the system of Chinese Weishi school by adding commentaries on the *Cheng Weishi Lun* and by establishing Faxiang Zong (法相宗). In addition to Kuiji's *Cheng Weishi lun shuji* 成唯識論述記, there are three indispensable commentaries called 'Weishi sangeshu' 唯識三箇疏 that are essential to learning the philosophy of Weishi school: the *Cheng Weishi lun zhangzhong shuyao* 成唯識論掌中樞要 by Kuiji, the *Cheng Weishi lun liaoyi deng* 成唯識論了義燈 by Huizhao and the *Cheng Weishi lun yanmi* 成唯識論演秘 by Zhizhou. For unknown reasons, however, those important Weishi (唯識, consciousness-only) commentaries were getting forgotten

<sup>1</sup> Yoshifumi Ueda, "Two Main Streams of Thought in Yogācāra Philosophy," *Philosophy East and West* 17, no. 1/4 (January-October 1967): 155-56.

over time and eventually lost in circulation. Between the seventh century when Xuanzang's Weishi School reached its hegemony and the sixteenth century when the late Ming renaissance of Weishi started, there were very few studies associated with the philosophy of Weishi except some references found in *Huayan jing shuchao* 華嚴經疏鈔 written by Chengguan 澄觀 (738-839), in *Zongjing lu* 宗鏡錄 by Yongming Yanshou 永明延壽 (904-975), and in *Weishi kaimeng wenda* 唯識開蒙問答 by Yun feng 雲峰 in Yuan Dynasty (1271-1378).<sup>2</sup> However, when exactly those important commentaries were lost in the circulation in China remains uncertain. Two things that we know for sure so far are that they were still in circulation when *Zongjing lu* was compiled for one thing. They were already totally lost in the late Ming for another.<sup>3</sup> These commentaries were not re-introduced back to China from Japan until the end of the nineteenth century when Japanese Buddhist scholar Nanjō Bunyū 南條文雄 (1849-1927) sent his Chinese friend Yang Wenhui 楊文會 (1837-1911) two hundred thirty-five Buddhist texts including those important Weishi commentaries.<sup>4</sup> Since Tang dynasty (618-907) when Chinese Weishi school were transmitted to Japan, Japanese Faxiang Zong have been continuing for over one thousand three hundred years without interruption.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Shi Shengyan 釋聖嚴, "Ming mo de weishi xue zhe ji qi si xiang 明末的唯識學者及其思想," *Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies* 中華佛學學報, no. 1 (March 1987): 3-4.

<sup>3</sup> Shi Shengyan 釋聖嚴, "Ming mo de weishi xue zhe ji qi si xiang 明末的唯識學者及其思想," 17-18.

<sup>4</sup> John Makeham, *Transforming Consciousness: Yogācāra Thought in Modern China* (Oxford: Oxford University Press (UK), 2014), 2.

<sup>5</sup> Yibiao Chen 陳一標, "Zhong ri faxiang zong chuan Cheng yu zongfeng zhi bijiao

In the late Ming there was so-called renaissance of Weishi in which there were at least thirty-five Weishi commentaries that were produced in the period between 1511 and 1647 in China.<sup>6</sup> Since such renaissance happened without access to those important Weishi commentaries written by Kuiji, Huizhao, and Zhizhoh, the doubts and challenges were inevitable. Especially for those Weishi experts in Japan where their Weishi transmission were never interrupted, they could not help but identify the mistakes in the late Ming Weishi commentaries and challenge whether those late Ming authors who did not have access to those essential Weishi commentaries were capable to produce any precise and insightful Weishi commentaries.<sup>7</sup> Also, because those important Weishi commentaries by Kuiji and his successors had been reintroduced from Japan back to China in late-Qing, some might consider most of the late Ming Weishi texts redundant.<sup>8</sup> Are those doubts, challenges, and considerations fair enough? Why and why not? In order to address these questions, this study selects *Guan suoyuanyuan lun* 觀所緣緣論 which is Xuanzang's translation of Dignāga's *Ālambana-parīkṣā* as a base text and samples its commentaries that were done by Mingyu 明昱 (1527-1616) and by Zhixu 智旭 (1599-1655) in the late Ming

---

中日法相宗傳承與宗風之比較,” *Hsuan Chuang Journal of Buddhist Studies* 玄奘佛學研究, no. 3 (July 2005): 105-206.

<sup>6</sup> Shi Shengyan 釋聖嚴, “Ming mo de weishi xue zhe ji qi si xiang 明末的唯識學者及其思想,” 21-23.

<sup>7</sup> Kaiting Jian 簡凱廷, “Wanming weishixue zuopin zai jianghu shidai de liuchuan yu jieshou chutan 晚明唯識學作品在江戶時代的流傳與接受初探,” *Chung-Hwa Buddhist Studies* 中華佛學研究, no. 16 (December 2015): 62-63.

<sup>8</sup> Makeham, *Transforming Consciousness: Yogācāra Thought in Modern China*, 11.

and by Kiben 基辨 (1718-1791) and by Kaidou 快道 (1751-1810) in Japanese Edo period. The main contrast groups are Chinese Late Ming Weishi commentaries vs. Japanese Edo period Weishi commentaries. However, in order to identify and control “the variance within group” if any, the comparison include two authors within each group. Mingyu and Zhixu within Late Ming group and Kiben and Kaidou within the Edo Period. The focus is the comparison between the Late Ming Group and the Edo Group. The key priori difference between these two groups is that whether or not having the access to the key Weishi commentaries that authored by Kuiji, Huizhao and Zhizhou. Both notions of “substantive tradition”<sup>9</sup> and of “invented tradition”<sup>10</sup> indicate that people tend to value the past and have the desire to maintain the continuity with the past in some ways. I assume that both the Late Ming Group and the Edo Group share such propensities. However, due to different access to the past, two groups are expected to make different senses of tradition and to construct the tradition in different ways. The purpose of this study is to see how such a priori difference shapes how each group understood and interpreted the base text.

Before moving to the specific comparison and analysis, the quick brief review of the late Ming Buddhism in which Mingyu and Zhixu were situated and of the Edo Buddhism in which Kiben and Kaidou were based is provided as a backdrop as below.

---

<sup>9</sup> Edward Shils, *Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 1-33.

<sup>10</sup> Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012): 1-14.

## II. The late Ming Buddhism

### A. Threat from Catholic missionaries

If Wanli 15 (1587) was a year of no significance marking when the Ming dynasty started in decline<sup>11</sup>, Wanli 29 (1601) would be a year of significance marking the coming of the pre-modernity in China. It was the year when the Italian Jesuit priest Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) made it in requesting for the summon of Wanli Emperor (1563-1620). In recognition of Matteo Ricci's scientific abilities, Wanli Emperor granted him good patronage and a position in the court. Many Ming court officials were in contact with Matteo Ricci by exchanging Western and Eastern knowledge and perspectives. His Chinese style of evangelization earned favorable impression and well reception. Some of prominent officials were converted to be Catholic like Xu Guangqi 徐光啟 (1562-1633). Sheng Yen listed 30 Catholic missionaries who came to China in the late Ming between 1581 and 1643.<sup>12</sup> They tended to treat Confucianism friendly but were hostile toward Buddhism because they viewed Buddhism as a direct competitor that inhibited their rapid growth in China. Such competition was reflected in their works like Matteo Ricci's *Tianzhu Shiye jinzhu* 天主實義 that criticized and repelled Buddhism and Taoism and like Zhixu's *Pixie ji* 闢邪集 that refuted and challenged back the criticism from Catholic missionaries.

<sup>11</sup> Ray Huang, *A Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 1-41.

<sup>12</sup> Shi Shengyan 釋聖嚴, *Ming mo zhongguo fo jiao zhi yan jiu* 明末中國佛教之研究, trans. Shi hui-jing 釋會靖 (Guan Shigian 關世謙) (Taipei: Dharma Drum Publishing 法鼓文化, 2009), 75-77.



## B. Talks between Confucians and Buddhists

Compared to the hostile attacks from the external Catholicism, the internal competition from Confucianism to the late Ming Buddhism shifted from exclusive competition to inclusive competition. Because Wang Yangming's *xin xue* (心學, school of mind) was replacing Cheng-Zhu school (程朱理學, *cheng zhu li xue*) as the dominant Neo-Confucianism in the late Ming. Different from Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) who repelled Buddhism, the more idealist oriented Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472-1529) and his supporters were more friendly to Buddhists and willing to exchange views with Buddhists. They did not even mind inviting Buddhist monks to their auditoriums to lecture Buddhist Sutra. Wang Yangming's *xin xue* triggered the popularity of lecturing in mid and late Ming period. Although there is no direct evidence to support that it caused and facilitated Buddhist lectures, the same popularity of lecturing was also observed in the Buddhism among monks and laity in the late Ming. Such phenomenon did not happen in the Buddhism before the late Ming period.<sup>13</sup>

## C. The late Ming renaissance of Weishi

The late Ming renaissance of Weishi was initiated by Luan Putai 魯菴普泰 who was the author of *Bashi gui ju buzhu* 八識規矩補註 and *Dacheng baifa mingmen lunjie* 大乘百法明門論解. These two texts was the entry material of Weishi study then. The late Ming

<sup>13</sup> Yunu Chen 陳玉女, *Mingdai fomen neiwai sengsu jiaoshe de changyu* 明代佛門內外僧俗交涉的場域 (Taipei: Daw Shiang Publishing 稻鄉出版社, 2009), 96-107.

Weishi masters like Yunqi Zhuhong 雲棲祿宏 (1535-1615), Zibo Zhenke 紫柏真可 (1544-1604), Hanshan Deqing 憨山德清 (1546-1623), Xuelang Hongen 雪浪洪恩 (1545-1608) all learned indirectly from Luan Putai through either Wuji Wuqin 無極悟勤 (1500-1584) or Bianrong Zhenyuan 徧融真圓 (1506-1584). Xuelang Hongen compiled the *Xiangzong bayao* 相宗八要 that was comprised of *Baifa mingmen lun* 百法明門論, *Weishi sanshi lun* 唯識三十論, *Guansuo yuanyuan lun* 觀所緣緣論, *Guansuo yuanyuan lunshi* 觀所緣緣論釋, *Yinming ruzheng lilun* 因明入正理論, *Liulihoshi fashi* 六離合釋法式, *Sanzhi biliang* 三支比量, *Bashi Guiju Song* 八識規矩頌. *Xiangzong bayao* 相宗八要 became the basic text books then for Weishi teaching.<sup>14</sup>

Among thirty-five Weishi commentaries in the late Ming, there were eight commentaries for the core text *Cheng Weishi Lun* 成唯識論. Shaojue Guangcheng 紹覺廣承 (1560-1609) and his students Lingyuan Dahui 靈源大惠 (1564-1636), Xinyi Dazhen 新伊大真 (1580-1650) and Xinyi Dazhen's student Zhisu 智素 authored four out of the eight commentaries. Not including another commentary that authored by Bianyin Daji 辯音大基 who was also Shaojue Guangcheng's direct student. This is the reason that Shen Yen identified Shaojue Guangcheng as having a great contribution to the promotion of late Ming Weishi study.<sup>15</sup> The rest four commentaries are *Cheng Weishi lun suquan* 成唯識論俗詮 by Gaoyuan Mingyu 高

<sup>14</sup> Kaiting Jian 簡凱廷, "Wanming weishixue zuopin zai jianghu shidai de liuchuan yu jieshou chutan 晚明唯識學作品在江戶時代的流傳與接受初探," 46-47.

<sup>15</sup> Shi Shengyan 釋聖嚴, "Ming mo de weishi xue zhe ji qi si xiang 明末的唯識學者及其思想," 6.

原明昱 (1527-1616), *Cheng Weishi lun jijie* 成唯識論集解 by Yiyu Tongrun 一雨通潤 (1565-1624), *Cheng Weishi lun zheng yi* 成唯識論證義 by Wang Ken Tang 王肯堂 (1549-1613), and *Cheng Weishi lun guanxin fayao* 成唯識論觀心法要 by Ouyi Zhixu 藕益智旭 (1599-1655). In addition, Zibo Zhenke himself authored *Bashi gui ju song jie* 八識規矩頌解 and was the key person who inspired Wang Ken Tang to study CWL and *Yinming ruzheng lilun* 因明入正理論. Hanshan Deqing himself authored *Baifa mingmen lun lunyi* 百法明門論論義 and *Bashi gui ju song tongshuo* 八識規矩頌通說 and his student Xuzhong Guangyi 虛中廣益 authored *Baifa mingmen lun zuanshi* 百法明門論纂釋 and *Bashi gui ju song zuanshi* 八識規矩頌纂釋. The most productive authors are Gaoyuan Mingyu and Ouyi Zhixu. They were each responsible for eight commentaries.

#### D. Sanjiao tongyuan and Jushi Buddhism

The renaissance of Weishi in the late Ming was not limited to Weishi study but to more comprehensive Buddhist activities. Sheng Yen reviewed *Jushi chuan* 居士傳 (the biographies of Buddhist laity) and found the number of the biographies increased dramatically from only four in the period of early-mid Ming to over one hundred in the late Ming. It indicates the very active Buddhist laity community in the late Ming. Sheng Yen attributed such significant growth to two reasons: a) because Wang Yangming school was getting closer to Buddhism; b) because the four famed great Buddhist masters of late Ming- Yunqi Zhuhong, Zibo Zhenke, Hanshan Deqing, and Ouyi Zhixu- highly promoted the concept of *sanjiao tongyuan* (三教同源, three religions, Confucianism, Buddhism, & Taoism, share a

common origin.) Thus many Confucian and Taoist scholars started engagement with Buddhism.

In addition, if there was anything that could well reflect the vigor of Buddhist laity community in the late Ming, I would suggest the monk-laity collaborative endeavor to initiate printing *Jiaxing Cang* 嘉興藏 (Jiaying version of the Buddhist Canon) in the late Ming. It was a private project that was not sponsored by government but by laity. According to Lan's studies<sup>16</sup>, the lay scholar official Yuan lefan 袁了凡 (1533-1606) initiated the idea but the project was not kicked off until Zibo Zhenke became the champion and his student monks Micang 密藏 and Huanyu 幻余 as real organizers. Besides four monks Zibo Zhenke, Micang, Huanyu and Hanshan Deqing, there are more than twenty lay names listed as project sponsors and supporters. Due to budget concern and the consideration of easier circulation, *Jiaxing Cang* 嘉興藏 featured thread-bound books. Another valuable feature is that *Xubian* (續編, the sequel) of *Jiaxing Cang* 嘉興藏 contained over three hundred Buddhist books which were not reserved in other Buddhist Canon.

---

<sup>16</sup> Jifu Lan 藍吉富, "Jiayingcang yanjiu 《嘉興藏》研究," Research Report for "Taiwan Digital Archives Expansion Project: The Research and Establishment of Chinese Buddhist Tripitaka Electronic Text Collection, Taipei Edition" 「數位典藏國家型科技計畫：臺北版電子佛典集成之研究與建構」研究報告, 1992, accessed July 5, 2017, <http://taipei3.cbeta.org/jiaying.php>. And "Jiaying dacangjing de tese ji qi shiliao jiazhi 嘉興大藏經的特色及其史料價值," in *Fojiao de sixiang yu wenhua-Yinshun dao shi ba zhi jin liu shou qing lunwen ji* 佛教的思想與文化——印順導師八秩晉六壽慶論文集, ed. Shi Shengyan 釋聖嚴 (Taipei, Fa-kuang Publishing 法光出版社, 1991), 255- 66.

### E. The talks between *chan* (禪) and *jiang* (講)

Since the beginning of Ming, all temples were classified into three groups: the first group is called *chan* (禪) who focused on practices without words; the second group is called *jiang* (講) who were scholar monks responsible for scriptures study and lectures; the 3<sup>rd</sup> group is called *jiao* (教) who were those ritual specialists for prayer, repentance and funeral.<sup>17</sup> Such division led to the antinomian problem for first group, the lack of practice problem for the second group and discipline problem for the third group. The late Ming started seeing the increasing exchanges and talks between *chan* (禪) and *jiang* (講).

## III. The Edo Buddhism

### A. System of head and branch temple (寺院本末制度)

The system of head and branch temples is a Japanese Buddhist temples system that was established by the *Tokugawa* government to control Buddhist institutions. Each Buddhist sect were required to designate a headquarter temple that shall be approved by the government. Then all the branch temples were subject to the order of the head temple. If any, the conflicts among Buddhist sects would be subject to the arbitration by the *Tokugawa* government.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Shi Shengyan 釋聖嚴, *Ming mo zhongguo fo jiao zhi yan jiu* 明末中國佛教之研究, 93-96.

<sup>18</sup> Shi Shengyan 釋聖嚴, “Ribon fojiao shi 日本佛教史,” in *Rihan fojiao yanjiu* 日韓佛教研究, *Xiandai fojiao xueshu congkan* 82 現代佛教學術叢刊 (八十二), ed. Man-tau Chang 張曼濤 (Taipei: Dacheng wenhua 大乘文化, 1978), 217.

## B. Family-temple registration system (檀家制度)

The family-temple registration system started before the Edo period. Initially it was only a voluntary system in which households financially supported a Buddhist temple that would provide those households with religious services in return. Due to the *Shimabara* Rebellion occurred between 1637-1638, in order to inhibit the Christianity, the *Tokugawa* government turned it into a compulsory system that all citizens were required to register with a Buddhist temple. As a result, the living of Buddhist temples and monks were well secured. The competition from Christianity was removed.<sup>19</sup>

## C. Scholarship and Training facilities (檀林) for Monks

In the regulation of Buddhist temples, the incentive for the scholarship was one of the essential elements. It regulated the requirements of monk's scholar qualification. *Tokugawa* Ieyasu encouraged the scholarship by offering scholar fees. With the incentives, all Buddhist sects established facilities called *danrin* 檀林 to train monks. There were many levels in the training institution between the head and the students. The statistics indicates that the average number of monk students in each training facility started up at around fifty. The number for some facilities increased to over two hundred in early 1770s, then jumped to over one thousand in late 1770s and climbed over one and half thousand in the early 1800s.<sup>20</sup> Thus, the competition among the student monks could be imaginably

---

<sup>19</sup> Shi Shengyan 釋聖嚴, "Ribon fojiao shi 日本佛教史," 218-19.

<sup>20</sup> Shi Shengyan 釋聖嚴, "Ribon fojiao shi 日本佛教史," 224-25.

fierce.

## IV. The Analysis of AP commentaries

### A. High Level Analysis

#### (A) Methodology to identify the variance

First of all, I count the number of Chinese characters that used in Xuanzang's *Guan suoyuanyuan lun* 觀所緣緣論<sup>21</sup> (hereinafter referred as GSYYL) that is Xuanzang's translation of Dignāga's *Ālambana-parīkṣā* (hereinafter referred as AP) and break down the GSYYL into nine sections: AP Intro prose, the first verse & the first prose, the second verse & the second prose, ..., and the eighth verse & the eighth prose together with brief section summary as Table A. From the Table A, we can see that the top three sections that use more Chinese characters are: the section of the eighth verse & the eighth prose which is about elucidating the sense faculties, the section of the second verse & the second prose which is about refuting the appearance of collection as the percept<sup>22</sup> and the section of the fifth verse & the fifth prose which is about refuting that the fundamental articles have different shapes. Because shapes disappear when things breakdown to articles.

<sup>21</sup> Dignāga 陳那造, trans. Xuanzang 玄奘譯, *Guan suoyuanyuan lun* 觀所緣緣論, CBETA, T31, no. 1624.

<sup>22</sup> Douglas Duckworth and Malcolm David Eckel, *Dignaga's Investigation of the Percept: A Philosophical Legacy in India and Tibet* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), xv-104. Note of author: I am trying to leverage the English translation of AP key terms in this book unless I come out better ones.

Table A

Xuanzang 玄奘 觀所緣緣論 (SGYYL)	Number of Chinese characters	%	Brief Section Summary
AP Intro Prose	48	5%	Summarizing counter arguments and refuting as no ground. (總斥非理)
1st verse & 1st prose	88	10%	Refuting fundamental articles as the percept and defining the percept. (破極微、揭正義)
2nd verse & 2nd prose	140	16%	Refuting the appearance of collection as the percept. (破和合)
3rd verse & 3rd prose	84	9%	Refuting collected features as the percept. (破極微相資)
4th verse & 4th prose	92	10%	Refuting that the collection of same articles could feature different shapes. Because shapes are not real. (破所資形別)
5th verse & 5th prose	116	13%	Refuting that the fundamental articles have different shapes. Because shapes disappear when things breakdown to articles. (破微相失本)
6th verse & 6th prose	68	8%	Elucidating internal cognitive object and establishing own theory. (明內塵)
7th verse & 7th prose	100	11%	Elucidating internal cognitive object by addressing the objection. (決他疑)
8th verse & 8th prose	164	18%	Elucidating the sense faculties. (明內根)
Total	900	100%	



## (B) Which group got longer commentator's introduction?

Using Xuanzang's GSYYL in Table A format as a base, I do the same count for Zhixu's *Guan suoyuanyuan lun zhijie* 觀所緣緣論直解<sup>23</sup> (hereinafter referred as GSLZJ), Mingyu's *Guan suoyuanyuan lun huishi* 觀所緣緣論會釋<sup>24</sup> (hereinafter referred as GSLHS), Kiben's *Guan suoyuanyuan lunshi* 觀所緣緣論釋<sup>25</sup> (hereinafter referred as GSLS), and Kaidou's *Guan suoyuanyuan lun yishu* 觀所緣緣論義疏<sup>26</sup> (hereinafter referred as GSLSY), exclude Xuanzang's GSYYL that quoted in their commentaries and come out a comparison table as Table B. I highlight the top three sections in all four commentaries which use more Chinese characters in red (#1), yellow (#2), and green (#3). There is one more section added in Table B for the commentator's introduction. Here we could immediately notice the difference between the Late Ming commentators and the Edo commentators. The Edo commentators had much longer commentator's introduction than the Late Ming ones. In terms of number of Chinese characters, Kaidou's introduction alone is even longer than any of the entire commentaries from the Late Ming group. Why? We would come back later to review this difference in detail.

<sup>23</sup> Zhixu 智旭, *Guan suoyuanyuan lun zhijie* 觀所緣緣論直解, CBETA, X51, no. 831.

<sup>24</sup> Mingyu 明昱, *Guan suoyuanyuan lun huishi* 觀所緣緣論會釋, CBETA, X51, no. 830.

<sup>25</sup> Kiben 基辨, *Guan suoyuanyuan lunshi* 觀所緣緣論釋 (Kyoto: Kyoto University Library, Manuscript of Kan'en 4寬延 4年寫本).

<sup>26</sup> Kaidou 快道, *Guan suoyuanyuan lun yishu* 觀所緣緣論義疏 (Kuaibian Manuscript of Bunka 14 快辨文化14年抄本).

Table B

	Xuanzang 玄奘 觀所緣緣論	%	Zhixu 智旭 觀所緣緣 論直解	%	Mingyu 明昱 觀所緣緣 論會釋	%	Kiben 基辨 觀所緣緣 論釋	%	Kaidou 快道 觀所緣緣 論義疏	%
Commentator's Intro			470	14%	138	4%	941	10%	3,807	28%
AP Intro Prose	48	5%	143	4%	357	10%	1,213	13%	1,384	10%
1st verse & 1st prose	88	10%	248	8%	396	11%	942	10%	1,062	8%
2nd verse & 2nd prose	140	16%	383	12%	579	17%	1,681	18%	2,628	19%
3rd verse & 3rd prose	84	9%	298	9%	384	11%	329	4%	407	3%
4th verse & 4th prose	92	10%	336	10%	241	7%	656	7%	608	4%
5th verse & 5th prose	116	13%	506	15%	206	6%	310	3%	847	6%
6th verse & 6th prose	68	8%	200	6%	329	9%	1,154	12%	456	3%
7th verse & 7th prose	100	11%	237	7%	323	9%	554	6%	775	6%
8th verse & 8th prose	164	18%	476	14%	517	15%	1,475	16%	1,771	13%
	900	100%	3,297	100%	3,470	100%	9,255	100%	13,745	100%
	100%		366%		386%		1028%		1527%	

## (C) Which sections have more to say?

In order to reduce possible noises due to the commentator's intro and to focus on the main body of commentaries for AP, I remove the counts for commentator's intro and revise the table as Table C. Basically the highlighted top three sections in Table C remain in the same order but the percentage deviation increases. In terms of priority, different from Xuanzang's GSYL, Kiben, Kaidou and Mingyu all treated the second verse & the second prose as the top section. However, percentage wise, the Edo group is significantly higher than Mingyu. This is a section about refuting the appearance of collection as the percept. We will return later to have deeper dive on what took them so many words to say. The top section in GSYL becomes the number 2 section that shared across commentators and across groups. Furthermore, the percentages were almost the same. This is a section about elucidating the sense faculties. We will figure out later if all commentators shed the same light as well. In addition, Zhixu is different not only within the late Ming group but also from the Edo group when he treated the fifth verse and the fifth prose as his top section. The fifth verse and the fifth prose is about refuting that the fundamental articles have different shapes.

## (D) How different could the quotations be?

When I finished the first round reading of four commentaries, I was under strong impression that the Edo Group tended to do much more quotation than the late Ming Group. In order to validate my impression and to measure the difference, I first do the cross

Table C

	Xuanzang 玄奘 觀所緣緣論	%	Zhixu 智旭 觀所緣緣 論直解	%	Mingyu 明昱 觀所緣緣 論會釋	%	Kiben 基辨 觀所緣緣 論釋	%	Kaidou 快道 觀所緣緣 論義疏	%
AP Intro Prose	48	5%	143	5%	357	11%	1,213	15%	1,384	14%
1st verse & 1st prose	88	10%	248	9%	396	11.9%	942	11%	1,062	11%
2nd verse & 2nd prose	140	16%	383	14%	579	17%	1,681	20%	2,628	26%
3rd verse & 3rd prose	84	9%	298	11%	384	11.5%	329	4%	407	4%
4th verse & 4th prose	92	10%	336	12%	241	7%	656	8%	608	6%
5th verse & 5th prose	116	13%	506	18%	206	6%	310	4%	847	9%
6th verse & 6th prose	68	8%	200	7%	329	10%	1,154	14%	456	5%
7th verse & 7th prose	100	11%	237	8%	323	10%	554	7%	775	8%
8th verse & 8th prose	164	18%	476	17%	517	16%	1,475	18%	1,771	18%
	900	100%	2,827	100%	3,332	100%	8,314	100%	9,938	100%

check with CEBTA database and SAT Daizōkyō text database and then count the number of Chinese characters for the quotation. (Note: when I count the quotation, I include the name of sources that specified by commentators and the Chinese characters that commentators use to indicate the end of quote if any.) I come out separate quotation comparison Table D and Table E for the main body of commentaries for AP and for the commentator's Intro, respectively. Table D, as a focus for the main body of AP, illustrates a significant difference between the late Ming group and the Edo group. The quotation accounted for approximately 40% of commentaries by the Edo group. They quoted almost in every single section. On the other hand, in the late Ming group, Mingyu quoted about 10% whereas Zhixu quoted less than 1%. Why did the late Ming group quote much less than the Edo group? Is it because the late Ming group lost those Tang Weishi commentaries? To find out, we will need to review in details later what sources these two groups quoted and which sources the late Ming group did have access to and which not.

## B. Deeper Dive Analysis

(A) What the sources of quote and the frequencies of quotes tell?

For the main body of AP, I find that Zhixu quoted only one time. The source is CWL. Mingyu quoted seven times: six times he quoted the *Guan suoyuan lunshi* 觀所緣論釋 that translated by Yijing 義淨 (635-713) and another time he quoted his own *Guan suoyuanyuan lun shiji* 觀所緣緣論釋記 that's his note on Yijing's

Table D

Quotation	Zhixu 智旭 觀所緣緣論 直解	Quote	Mingyu 明昱 觀所緣緣論 會釋	Quote	Kiben 基辨 觀所緣緣 論釋	Quote	Kaidou 快道 觀所緣緣論 義疏	Quote
AP Intro Prose	143	0	357	203	1,213	386	1,384	672
1st verse & 1st prose	248	0	396	0	942	335	1,062	192
2nd verse & 2nd prose	383	0	579	98	1,681	921	2,628	1,350
3rd verse & 3rd prose	298	0	384	0	329	32	407	111
4th verse & 4th prose	336	0	241	0	656	169	608	147
5th verse & 5th prose	506	20	206	0	310	0	847	310
6th verse & 6th prose	200	0	329	37	1,154	630	456	158
7th verse & 7th prose	237	0	323	0	554	171	775	191
8th verse & 8th prose	476	0	517	19	1,475	603	1,771	845
	2,827	20	3,332	357	8,314	3,247	9,938	3,976
		0.7%		10.7%		39.1%		40.0%

Table E

Quotation	Zhixu 智旭 觀所緣緣論 直解	Quote	Mingyu 明昱 觀所緣緣論 會釋	Quote	Kiben 基辨 觀所緣緣 論釋	Quote	Kaidou 快道 觀所緣緣論 義疏	Quote
Commentator's intro	470	0	138	27	941	101	3,807	1,589
		0%		20%		11%		42%

*Guan suoyuan lunshi* 觀所緣論釋. On the other hand, we see in Table F that Kiben quoted thirty and eight times from ten different sources. Out of the ten sources, there are four sources available to the late Ming group but Zhixu and Mingyu each only used one source.

The most impressive is the variety of sources and the number of frequency that Kaidou quoted. Table G indicates that Kaidou quoted seventy and four times in total from twenty and seven different sources. Out of the twenty and seven sources, there are twelve sources available to the late Ming. However, again Zhixu and Mingyu each only used one source.

One of reasons that the Edo group quoted much more frequently from much more sources than the Late Ming group is definitely that the sources that accessible to the late Ming group are indeed much less than the Edo group. However, this single reason alone could not explain why Zhixu and Mingyu each chose to use only one source out of the twelve sources that available to them. For example, why didn't Mingyu even quote CWL which's supposed to be the root commentary for Weishi? Even Zhixu quoted CWL one time, the frequency is much less than the Edo group. As both Zhixu and Mingyu had their own commentaries on CWL and they did not have access to other CWL's commentaries, shouldn't they leverage CWL more? We would find more clue to this regard in later discussion.

In addition, the variance within the Edo group should not be ignored. Kiben quotation list shows that he had an intention

Table F

Item #	Kiben 基辨 Quotation Sources fpr AP main body	Quote Frequency	Accessible to the Late Ming	Zhixu Quote	Mingyu Quote
1	Cheng weishi lun shuji 成唯識論述記 by Kuiji 窺基	21	No	No	No
2	Cheng weishi lun 成 唯識論 by Xuanzang 玄奘	5	Yes	Yes (1)	No
3	Cheng weishi lun liaoyi deng 成唯識論 了義燈 by Huizhao 慧 沼	4	No	No	No
4	Wuxiang sichen lun 無相思塵論 by Paramartha 真諦	2	Yes	No	No
5	Cheng weishi lun yiyun 成唯識論義蘊 by Daoyi 道邑	1	No	No	No
6	Chengweishi lun yanmi 成唯識論演秘 by Zhizhou 智周	1	No	No	No
7	Dacheng fayuan yilin zhang 大乘法苑義林 章 by Kuiji 窺基	1	No	No	No
8	Guan suoyuan lunshi 觀所緣論釋 by Yijing 義淨	1	Yes	No	Yes (6)
9	Weishi ershi lun shuji 唯識二十論述記 by kuiji 窺基	1	No	No	No
10	Weishi ershi lun 唯識 二十論 by Xuanzang 玄奘	1	Yes	No	No



to primarily leverage the commentaries of the Faxiang Zong. Especially, the commentaries by Kuiji and Huizhao. We will see his agenda more clearly when we discuss his commentator's introduction later. Different from Kiben, Kaidou seems trying to quote as much sources as he could including Abhidharma commentaries that representing the perspective of Theravāda. This seems reflects both Kaidou's scholar style and his expertise in Abhidharma commentaries.<sup>27</sup>

**Table G**

Item #	Kaidou 快道 Quotation Sources for AP main body	Quote Frequency	Accessible to the Late Ming	Zhixu Quote	Mingyu Quote
1	Wuxiang sichen lun 無相思塵論 by Paramartha 真諦	10	Yes	No	No
2	Weishi ershi hun shuji 唯識二十論述記 by Kuiji 窺基	9	No	No	No
3	Cheng Weishi Lun 成唯識論 by Xuanzang 玄奘	9	Yes	Yes (1)	No
4	Cheng weishi lun shuji 成唯識論述論 by kuiji 窺基	8	No	No	No
5	Guan suoyuan lunshi 觀所緣論釋 by Yijing 義淨	4	Yes	No	Yes (6)

<sup>27</sup> SAT DB shows that Kaidou have many works regarding Abhidharma.

Item #	Kaidou 快道 Quotation Sources for AP main body	Quote Frequency	Accessible to the Late Ming	Zhixu Quote	Mingyu Quote
6	Apidamo shun zheng lilun 阿毘達磨順正理 論 by Xuanzang 玄奘	4	Yes	No	No
7	Apidamo jushe lun 阿毘達磨俱舍論 by Xuanzang 玄奘	4	Yes	No	No
8	Yinming ruzheng lilun shu 因明入正理論疏 by kuiji 窺基	4	No	No	No
9	Za a han jing 雜阿含 經 by Gunabhadra 求 那跋陀羅	2	No	No	No
10	Apidamo dapipo sha lun 阿毘達磨大毘婆 沙論 by Xuanzang 玄 奘	2	Yes	No	No
11	Cheng weishi lun liao yi deng 成唯識論 了義燈 by Huizhao 慧 沼	2	No	No	No
12	Xianyang shengjiao lun 顯揚聖教論 by Xuanzang 玄奘	1	No	No	No
13	Yuqieshi di lun 瑜伽 師地論 by Xuanzang 玄奘	1	Yes	No	No
14	Yibu zonglun lun shuji 異部宗輪論述記 by Kuiji 窺基	1	No	No	No
15	Qi shi jing 起世經 by Jina-gupta 闍那崛多	1	Yes	No	No

Item #	Kaidou 快道 Quotation Sources for AP main body	Quote Frequency	Accessible to the Late Ming	Zhixu Quote	Mingyu Quote
16	Jushe lun ji 俱舍論記 by Puguang 善光	1	No	No	No
17	Apidamo jushe lun fayi 阿毘達磨俱舍論 法義	1	No	No	No
18	Xiao jing xu shu 孝經 序疏	1	No	No	No
19	Chengweishi lun yanmi 成唯識論演秘 by Zhizhou 智周	1	No	No	No
20	Yinming zhengli men lunben 因明正理門論 本 by Xuanzang 玄奘	1	Yes	No	No
21	Yinming ruzheng lilun 因明入正理論 by Xuanzang 玄奘	1	Yes	No	No
22	Dalou tanjing 大樓炭 經 by Fali & Faju 法 立 & 法炬	1	Yes	No	No
23	Dacheng guang wuyun lun 大乘廣五蘊論 by Divakara 地婆訶羅	1	No	No	No
24	Da cheng weishi lun xu 大乘唯識論序	1	No	No	No
25	Dacheng apidamo zaji lun 大乘阿毘達磨雜 集論 by Xuanzang 玄 奘	1	Yes	No	No
26	Dacheng fayuan yilin zhang 大乘法苑義林 章 by Kuiji 窺基	1	No	No	No

Item #	Kaidou 快道 Quotation Sources for AP main body	Quote Frequency	Accessible to the Late Ming	Zhixu Quote	Mingyu Quote
27	Dafang guangfo xin huayan jing helun 大 方廣佛新華嚴經合論	1	No	No	No

## (B) Why longer Commentator's introduction?

In the overview of Table B, it is brought to our attention that the Edo commentators had much longer commentator's intro than the late Ming ones. Here I like to review why Kiben and Kaidou had much more to say here.

First Kiben seems eager to demonstrate in the commentator's introduction that it's the Faxiang Zong in Japan that inherits the mantle and continues carrying the torch of Weishi philosophy. He started by distinguishing the new AP translation which done by Xuanzang from the old translation done by Paramārtha and made a judgement that the new translation was to correct the old translation.<sup>28</sup> Next, he criticized those commentaries done by those late Ming master like Zhixu, Zhenjia 真界 and etc. for over half of mistakes because they did not have access to the commentaries by Kuiji and Huizhao.<sup>29</sup> Then, he was proud that the Weishi school in Japan was more flourishing than China because the lineage of the Faxiang Zong in Japan never stopped and its texts never got lost.

<sup>28</sup> Kiben 基辨, *Guan suoyuanyuan lunshi* 觀所緣緣論釋: "...是正舊翻之訛謬..."

<sup>29</sup> Kiben 基辨, *Guan suoyuanyuan lunshi* 觀所緣緣論釋: "...明朝有智旭、真界等師雖為少釋，時已澆季，舊墳翳失，不見慈恩、潤洲等釋，故所註述錯謬過半..."

Thus, he felt the responsibility to do this commentary according to the theory and the idea of Kuiji and Huizhao. Last, he shared his thought about the purpose of AP and explicated the Chinese title of AP in very Kuiji way which is *Liu li he shi* (六離合釋, six analysis of compounds.)<sup>30</sup>

As Kiben, Kaidou was also very critical of Zhixu and Zhenjia in the very beginning of his commentator introduction. His criticized both Zhixu and Zhenjia for doing nothing but “expanding” the AP. They simply did not know what they were talking about in terms of which school against which school by advocating what theories. Due to their ignorant understanding, Kaidou was suggesting that their works did not deserve reference. Because of this, Kaidou would like to do his AP commentaries by elaborating AP’s arguments and theories primarily based on how AP was referred to, Kaidou found, in CWL, *Weishi ershi lun shuji* and *Weishi san shier lun shuji*.<sup>31</sup> Here we clearly see that Kiben and Kaidou shared strong sense of subjectivity as the Edo scholar monks vs. the late Ming monks. However, there is still difference between Kiben and Kaidou. Kiben was intended to proudly emphasize the orthodoxy of the non-stop Weishi lineage of Faxiang Zong in Japan as an insider. Thus, he specifically resorted to the authority of Kuiji and Huizhao.

<sup>30</sup> Wei-Jen Teng, “Medieval Chinese Buddhist Exegesis and Chinese Grammatical Studies,” *Taiwan Journal of Buddhist Studies* 臺大佛學研究, no. 28 (December 2014): 105-42.

<sup>31</sup> Kaidou 快道, *Guan suoyuanyuan lun yishu* 觀所緣緣論義疏: “...然如二師注者, 僅廣其文而已, 至若立破, 則曾不知其所對, 將誰宗誰計, 且於解也味。豈足以采用哉。故今者專依成唯識及二十、三十述記中, 提此論立破明了之處, 略節章句, 敷暢義理, 或有失者, 後哲幸句吝鄙斧...”

Not belonging to Faxiang Zong, Kaidou could only appeal to the authority of the texts and the authority of Dignāga as a Bodhisattva. In fact, the longest two quotations found in Kaidou's introduction is two myths about the author of AP, Dignāga: one myth from *Da tang xiyu ji* (大唐西域記, Great Tang Records on the Western Regions) about how Dignāga was converted from the path of Arhat to the path of Bodhisattva and another myth from *Cheng Weishi lun yanmi* 成唯識論演秘 about how Dignāga used Buddhist logics to conquer non-Buddhists.

(C) What controversial about the second moon?

In previous high level review, we find that Kiben, Kaidou, , and Mingyu all spent the most of theirs words to take care of the second verse & second prose that is about refuting the appearance of collection as the percept. Having a closer look, firstly I find that Kiben said a lot about the problem of using the second mood as “*dr̥ṣṭānta*” (喻, example).

Kiben started his explication of the second verse by distinguishing two possible ways to break down the second verse in Buddhist three-membered syllogism (三支比量) according to Kuiji & Huizhao and to Zhizhou, respectively.<sup>32</sup> I come out Table H to compare these two different ways.

<sup>32</sup> Kiben 基辨, *Guan suoyuanyuan lunshi* 觀所緣緣論釋: “...此量宗因喻有二途, 一云, 和合於五識此有法, 設所緣非緣是非也, 彼體實無故此因, 猶如第二月此喻, 此慈恩淄洲義, 又云, 和合是有法, 於五識設所緣非緣此法, 因喻如前, 濮陽依此...”

**Table H**

	(A) Kuiji & Huizhao	(B) Zhizhou
1. Pakṣa (宗, thesis)	Even assuming <b>Dharmin</b> is the object of the cognition, <b>Dharmin</b> is not the condition.	Even assuming <b>Dharmin</b> is <i>the object of the cognition in the five consciousness</i> , <b>Dharmin</b> is not the condition.
2. Hetu (因, reason)	Because Dharmin is not real.	Because Dharmin is not real.
3. Dṛṣṭānta (喻, example)	Like the 2nd moon.	Like the 2nd moon.
Dharmin (有法, the subject of a thesis)	The appearance of a collection <i>in the five consciousness</i> .	The appearance of a collection.

Remark: the 2nd verse: 和合於五識，設所緣非緣，彼體實無故，猶如第二月

Based on Xuanzang’s translation, Dignāga’s three-membered syllogism is supposed to be like (B). The reason that Kuiji and Huizhao had to modify Dignāga’s three-membered syllogism in (A) way is that they found couple of things wrong with using the second mood as “dṛṣṭānta” (喻, example): 1) Kuiji maintained that the second moon is supposed to be the object of the cognition in the sixth consciousness, not in the five consciousness because it is not real; 2) Huizhao was concerned that the second mood as “dṛṣṭānta” could not be established if assuming Dharmin is the object of the cognition in the five consciousness. Because Sautrāntika does not advocate that the second mood is the object of the cognition in the five consciousness, either. However, if Dharmin were defined as the appearance of a collection in the five consciousness, there would be

nothing wrong with the second mood as “*dr̥ṣṭānta*”. The fact that the second mood is the object of the cognition in the sixth consciousness indicates that the second mood is not real. Thus, the second mood could not be the condition. Neither could the appearance of a collection. However, Zhizhou argued that there had been two occasions when the assumptions were used in the scriptures: one was to set the assumptions when the counterparties disapproved whereas the host party approved. The other was, even when both parties disapprove, in order to win this argument, also setting the assumption by pretending to allow that. Just like *She dacheng lun* (攝大乘論, *Mahāyāna-samgraha*) in which Sautrāntika was assumed to be allowed to treat *rūpa* and mind as each other’s *amanantara-pratyaya*, the immediately antecedent condition. Although the second mood as “*dr̥ṣṭānta*” is not approved by the counterparties as the object of the cognition in the five consciousness, in order to argue against the counterparties in terms of the condition, the host party allows the assumption that Dharmin is the object of the cognition in the five consciousness. What is wrong with that? Kiben thinks Zhizhou explication won because the argument of the second prose is about the condition, not about the object of the cognition.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>33</sup> Kiben 基辨, *Guan suoyuanyuan lunshi* 觀所緣緣論釋: “...今按淄洲濮陽意, 淄洲依疏中唯意識得下義, 不取餘義, 濮陽依疏中最初釋設字, 疏云, 但以義縱, 和合設為所緣, 故文中云設, 非第二月亦許所緣, 此中但遮有緣義, 不說彼為五所緣故, 此文中第二月, 亦之言, 亦和合色, 和合設為所緣, 第二月亦設為五所緣, 但所諍在緣義, 故第二月設縱五所緣, 奪緣義故, 長行中釋能立因云, 如是和合於眼等識無有緣義, 不言設所緣但所諍有緣義, 與秘所言意同, 燈所言, 雖疏中釋不穩當, 第二月意識所緣故, 五識言置有法中, 則法設所緣, 設言繫同喻, 第二月則為無用, 第二月不設許, 實是意識所緣故, 五識言置法中, 則設言遮, 所立不成, 如此論則秘釋為勝...”



Thus, the temporary assumptions either about that the appearance is assumed as the object of the cognition or about that the second moon is assumed as the object of the cognition were all not true and irrelevant. I have no intention to be another Judge here in terms of which argument is making more sense. What's interesting is Dignāga's logic in terms of the second mood as "dṛṣṭānta" did make his followers across several generations within Faxiang Zong so confusing and/or so uneasy that they had to figure out a way to say something about it.

From the same Edo group, Kaidou also see some problems of using the second mood as "dṛṣṭānta". Kaidou used two Q&A (Questions and Answers) to highlight two minor problems: a) Q: The second mood is a "dṛṣṭānta" about eye consciousness only and cannot be applied to other consciousness. Why said "five" consciousness while the *Wuxiang sichen lun* 無相思塵論 by Paramārtha only mentioned "consciousness" without specifying "five"? A: Good question. It would be no mistakes to say "consciousness" as *Wuxiang sichen lun*. Being specific by saying "five" is for easy understanding. b) Q: Let's say only "consciousness", the pakṣa (thesis) shall be depending on different consciousness, how could one "dṛṣṭānta" work? A: Even the pakṣa is depending, the "dṛṣṭānta" is not as long as its statement is correct. Furthermore, five consciousness are in disorder regardless. Just an easy example like the second moon. Here we see the more conventional logic challenges than the Buddhist logic challenges that Kiben dealt with above.

On the other hand, neither Zhixu nor Mingyu reported any

problem of using the second mood as “*dr̥ṣṭānta*”. When Zhixu analyzed the second prose in Buddhist three-membered syllogism, his analysis is like the conventional (B) in Table H. However, we should keep it mind that Zhixu are Mingyu could not see the problem as Kiben saw because they did not have the access to the commentaries by Kuiji, & Huizhao and Zhizhou. However, they did not sense the possible conventional logic problem as Kaidou did, either. This is nothing to do with their access to Tang commentaries.

(D) What making the appearance of the collection?

Regarding the second verse & second prose, both Kaidou and Kiben explicate how those realists like the Old & New Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika define the appearance of the collection.

Kiben first distinguished Old Vaibhāṣika from Sautrāntika. Old Vaibhāṣika advocate that each individual fundamental particle has real physical appearance. But Sautrāntika maintain that the appearance of collected particles like the *aṇu* (阿拏色) which is made up by seven particles and can be seen is unreal. Then he distinguished New Vaibhāṣika from Old Vaibhāṣika. To Old Vaibhāṣika, each individual particle is real. When particles come together, they do not get into each other. They do not support each other, either. Thus they have their own appearance as the object of five consciousness. However, from the perspective of New Vaibhāṣika, when seven particles come together, they do not get into each other but they support each other to produce the appearance that is the object of five consciousness. Old Vaibhāṣika’s theory in

which the article is real but cannot be seen is short of the element “the object of the cognition” that is required by Dignāga’s definition of the percept. Sautrāntika’s theory in which the appearance of collected particles can be seen but unreal lacks of the element “the condition” that is required by Dignāga’s definition of the percept. That is why there is a modified theory of New Vaibhāṣika. Such modification indicates that Buddhist theories are neither self-evident nor transcendent but dynamic and evolving over time.

In addition to the above distinction among Old & New Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika, Kaidou also quoted a more comprehensive classification of four categories from *Cheng Weishi lun liaoyi deng* 成唯識論了義燈. It’s classified by the particles in two levels. 1) The category of “Unreal in coarse level and real in dedicate level” is advocated by Sautrāntika. 2) The category of “Real in coarse level but unreal in dedicated level” is the particle theory of Mahāyāna. 3) The category of “Both real in coarse level and in dedicated level” is maintained by Vaibhāṣika. 4) The category of “Both unreal in coarse level and in dedicate level” is argued by Ekavyāvahārika and Prajñaptivāda.

It should be noted that Kaidou and Kiben primarily quoted *Cheng Weishi lun shuji* 成唯識論述記, *Cheng Weishi lun liaoyi deng* 成唯識論了義燈, and *Cheng Weishi lun yanmi* 成唯識論演秘 for the above discussion. Due to no access to these commentaries, both Zhixu and Mingyu did not cover any similar discussion to this regard. This case seems supporting Kaidou’s candid criticism that the late Ming scholar monks had no ideas which schools against

which schools by advocating what theories.

(E) What making the sense faculties?

In the high-level analysis, we found that both groups treated the eighth verse and the eighth prose as their second longest section and all four commentators spent the same percentage of their words on this section that is about elucidating the sense faculties. The sense faculties in Buddhism are referring to eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and body. The conventional wisdom has it that eyes see, ears hear, nose smells, tongue tastes, and the body touches and feels. However, such conventional wisdom is based on the realistic point of view, not necessarily the perspective of the Weishi (conscious-only). How did Dignāga define the sense faculties in AP?

First of all, Kaidou pointed out that different masters had different explanations about what the five sense faculties were. He liked to explicate AP theory first and then briefly discussed different theories.<sup>34</sup> Although Kiben did not make it so clear in the first place, Kiben included different competing theories later as well. Kiben quoted CWL's explication about what Dignāga meant by "five sense faculties": Those seeds (種子, Skt. *bīja*) which were stored in the *Yi shou shi* (異熟識, the consciousness which brings various kinds of karmas to fruition. Another name for *ālaya-vijñāna*) and could produce the five consciousness are called *Se Gong Neng* (色功能) which are five sense faculties.<sup>35</sup> Kaidou also referred to the

<sup>34</sup> Kaidou 快道, *Guan suoyuanyuan lun yishu* 觀所緣緣論義疏: "...就此五根, 西方諸師各作異解, 令先釋論文後, 異說畧敘..."

<sup>35</sup> Dharmapāla, ed. 護法等造, trans. Xuanzang 玄奘譯, *Cheng Weishi Lun* 成唯識

discussion regarding *sahabhv-āśraya* (俱有依, that exists together with mind and mental factors and on which mind and mental factors depends) in CWL Volume No 4 which mentioned four masters who had different theories about “five sense faculties”. The first master named Nanda shared the same theory with Dignāga, and *Weishi ershi lun* 唯識二十論. But their theory is conflicting with Buddha’s teaching. Kaidou briefly noted two of several mistakes that were reported in CWL: 1) the seeds of the eighteen realms (十八界, Skt. *astādaśa-dhātavaḥ*) would mess up and 2) neither the seeds of the *jianfen* (見分, the seeing aspect of the consciousness) nor the seeds of *xiangfen* (相分, the seen aspect of the consciousness) would work.<sup>36</sup> In Buddhism the eighteen realms comprised six sense faculties (eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body, and mind), their six objects (form & color, sound, smell, taste, touch, and idea or thought) and six consciousness (the consciousness of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind). These realms cover all the beings. From the perspective of CWL, the eighteen realms each have their own seeds according to the Buddha’s teachings.<sup>37</sup> In other words, the five sense faculties each have their own seeds while the five consciousness each have their own seeds instead of the seeds of the five consciousness are the five sense faculties as AP said. Also, the five consciousness

---

論, CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 19, c23-24 : “...異熟識上能生眼等色識種子，名色功能，說為五根...”

<sup>36</sup> Kaidou 快道, *Guan suoyuanyuan lun yishu* 觀所緣緣論義疏: “...若五色根即五識種，十八界種應雜亂，又見相二分種並非...”

<sup>37</sup> Dharmapāla, ed. 護法等造, trans. Xuanzang 玄奘譯, *Cheng Weishi Lun* 成唯識論, CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 19, c29-p. 20, a1: “...然十八界各別有種。諸聖教中處處說故...”

each have seeds to produce *jianfen* (見分, the seeing aspect of the consciousness) and *xiangfen* (相分, the seen aspect of the consciousness). Which seed of the consciousness should be defined as the five sense faculties? If the seed of *jianfen* were defined as the sense faculties, the sense faculties would belong to the aggregate of consciousness. If the seed of *xiangfen* were defined as the sense faculties, the sense faculties would fall into the category of the external realm. Either way would be conflicting with Buddha's teaching that the five sense faculties are all the aggregate of the form and belong to the internal realm.<sup>38</sup>

Due to the various mistakes, both Kiben and Kaidou all noted that Dharmapāla was trying to help Dignāga by making a convenient excuse. Kaidou specifically quoted the excuse from CWL: there is a seed of supportive actions (增上業種) which is stored in the eighth consciousness and which could support five consciousness. Such seeds are called five sense faculties that belongs to the aggregate of the form. They should not be treated as those causal seeds that could produce the five consciousness.<sup>39</sup> But such excuse was refuted by Sthiramati (安慧). Kaidou noted the Sthiramati's refutation reason: "...Because the five sense faculties are supposed to be morally neutral in actions, there would be ten mistakes associated with

<sup>38</sup> Dharmapāla, ed. 護法等造, trans. Xuanzang 玄奘譯, *Cheng Weishi Lun* 成唯識論, CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 20, a1-4: "...又五識種各有能生相見分異。為執何等名眼等根。若見分種應識蘊攝。若相分種應外處攝。便違聖教眼等五根皆是色蘊內處所攝..."

<sup>39</sup> Dharmapāla, ed. 護法等造, trans. Xuanzang 玄奘譯, *Cheng Weishi Lun* 成唯識論, CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 20, a15-17: "...異熟識中能感五識，增上業種名五色根，非作因緣生五識種..."

such case...<sup>40</sup> That being said, both Kiben and Kaidou noted that Dharmapāla had his own position as the chosen theory in CWL and used his to refute Sthiramati's. Kiben called Dharmapāla's theory as the theory of "only manifest operation" (唯現行) in which the five sense faculties is the operating faculties that are manifested by the eighth consciousness (阿賴耶識, Skt. ālaya-vijñāna). In fact, according to Dharmapāla, the world (器世間) on which the sense faculties depending is manifested by the ālaya-vijñāna as well.<sup>41</sup> Kaidou briefly summarized Dharmapāla position as that there are manifestly operating pure substances (淨色) which are the five sense faculties.<sup>42</sup>

However, how to explain that Dignāga made the mistake? Is it a blind mistake or a convenient mistake? Since Kaidou spoke well of Dignāga in his introduction, Kaidou did provide a good justification for a convenient mistake by quoting *Weishi ershi lun shuji* 唯識二十論述記. According to Kuiji, without establishing the concept of the eighth consciousness, Dignāga had to say the seeds are the sense faculties in order to refute Sautrāntika's theories that there are sense faculties independent of consciousness and that there are substantial substances that are external to minds. Without saying in this way, the sense faculties would become independent of the six

<sup>40</sup> Kaidou 快道, *Guan suoyuanyuan lun yishu* 觀所緣緣論義疏: "...應五色根非無記故, 如是有十個過難..."

<sup>41</sup> Kiben 基辨, *Guan suoyuanyuan lunshi* 觀所緣緣論釋: "...第二唯現行家, 此護法等正義, 依深密、楞伽、瑜伽、顯揚、辨中邊等, 說阿賴耶識變似色根及根依處器世間..."

<sup>42</sup> Kaidou 快道, *Guan suoyuanyuan lun yishu* 觀所緣緣論義疏: "...第四護法正義, 別有現行淨色為其五根..."

consciousness.<sup>43</sup> This is a good justification indeed. However, later on Kaidou threw another seemingly conflicting question when he tried to explicate the eighth prose. His question is: when you are were talking about the key terms like *Ben shi* (本識, the fundamental consciousness), *Xian shi* (現識, the manifesting consciousness), *Yi shou shi* (異熟識, the consciousness which brings various kinds of karmas to fruition), how could you say the eighth consciousness were not established yet?<sup>44</sup> I do not know to whom Kaidou raised this question. One of possibilities might be an overall reflection: is it possible for Dignāga to epistemologically convince those realists without touching the ontological ground?

Back to the late Ming group, we find that both Zhixu and Mingyu were totally silent about arguments about what makes the five sense faculties. What they did seems almost like Kaidou's criticism that they only "expanding" the AP. First, I was wondering if the silence was again because Zhixu and Mingyu had no access to the Tang commentaries of CWL as the Edo group. But this seems no longer a good excuse for this case because the arguments were totally available to them in CWL. Secondly, I guessed if the silence was because Zhixu and Mingyu had difficulties in understanding CWL's discussion to this regard. In fact there was a complaining

<sup>43</sup> Kuiji 窺基, *Weishi ershi lun shuji* 唯識二十論述記, CBETA, T43, no. 1834, p. 990, c14-19: "...種子功能名五根者, 為破經部等, 離識實有色根, 於識所變似眼根等, 以有發生五識用故, 假名種子及色功能, 非謂色根即識業種, 破經部等心外實色, 由未建立第八識, 若不說種為眼等根, [眼等]便離六識而有, 故說種子為眼等根..."

<sup>44</sup> Kaidou 快道, *Guan suoyuanyuan lun yishu* 觀所緣緣論義疏: "...未建立有第八故者, 未可矣, 云本識、現識、異熟識, 何得云, 未建有第八耶..."



by Wang Ken Tang about how difficult it was in studying CWL in the late Ming. In his preface for *Cheng Weishi lun suquan* 成唯識論俗詮, Wang Ken Tang mentioned that there was a time they had difficulties in even punctuating CWL and AP.<sup>45</sup> But looking into *Cheng Weishi lun suquan* 成唯識論俗詮<sup>46</sup> by Mingyu and *Cheng Weishi lun guanxin fayao* 成唯識論觀心法要<sup>47</sup> by Zhixu, I find that both Zhixu and Mingyu were fully aware that there were four Indian masters arguing about what five sense faculties were at least when they finished their CWL commentaries. Now the question would be whether Zhixu and Mingyu did their AP commentaries first or their CWL commentaries first. We did find that Zhixu quoted CWL one time in his AP commentaries. But his quotation was from the first volume of CWL. We do not know whether Zhixu read through to the fourth volume of CWL then for catching the arguments. In addition, it seems strange that Mingyu did not quote CWL in his AP commentaries. Referring to Sheng Yen's study, I find that Mingyu's *Cheng Weishi lun suquan* 成唯識論俗詮 was done in 1611 but the finish date of his AP commentary is unknown. For

<sup>45</sup> Mingyu 明昱, *Cheng Weishi lun suquan* 成唯識論俗詮, CBETA, X50, no. 820, p. 503, a15-24: "...余始聞唯識宗旨於紫柏大師。授以此論。命之熟究。茫無入處。求古疏鈔。已不可得。後閱開蒙。及檢宗鏡華嚴疏鈔。遇談此論處。輒錄之簡端。於是漸有一隙之明。繼聞巢松緣督諸師。留神此論。結侶焦山。博究大藏。將為解釋。亟移書招之。二師各出其所標點之本。互相印證。余是以有正訛標義之刻。於是四方學者。始以此論為可究。而求刻本者。源源來矣。然闕疑尚多。意猶未愜。聞王太古言。相宗之精。無如高原法師者。觀所緣緣論釋。曾不可以句。而師釋之如指諸掌。則其他可知也..."

<sup>46</sup> Mingyu 明昱, *Cheng Weishi lun suquan* 成唯識論俗詮, CBETA, X50, no. 820, p. 565, c13- p.567, c24.

<sup>47</sup> Zhixu 智旭, *Cheng Weishi lun guanxin fayao* 成唯識論觀心法要, CBETA, X51, no. 824, p. 348, a23- p.350, b09.

Zhixu, his Weishi commentaries were all dated in 1647. This might be Sheng Yen's convenient estimation. Thus we might need more information in order to figure out why Zhixu and Mingyu were silent about the possible mistakes that made by Dignāga in AP. Here there are at least two possibilities: 1) they still not knew or understood those arguments<sup>48</sup> well in CWL Volume 4<sup>th</sup> when they did their AP commentaries. 2) they well understood the arguments in CWL Volume 4<sup>th</sup> as Kiben and Kaidou but decided to remain silent about it. The former scenario would be easier for explaining Zhixu and Mingyu's silence. The latter scenario would invite more questions than answers. We saw the similar silence in *Guan suoyuan lunshi* 觀所緣論釋 that was Dharmapāla's AP commentary that translated by Yijing. Kaidou wondered if AP's main argument was good enough to stop at the first half of the 7<sup>th</sup> prose or it's just because the rest of Sanskrit text were lost.<sup>49</sup> We do not know whether Dharmapāla decided to stop his AP commentary in the first half of the seventh prose or Yijing stopped his translation there. I count number of the Chinese characters of the discussion of CWL Volume 4<sup>th</sup> regarding the arguments of the four masters, the total number is 1,661. It is much longer than Xuanzang's translated AP that is only 900 characters long. In other words, in order to explain clearly the correct view (Dharmapāla's view) of what the five sense faculties are and to elaborate on why Dignāga's view in AP was a convenient

<sup>48</sup> Dharmapāla, ed. 護法等造, trans. Xuanzang 玄奘譯, *Cheng Weishi Lun* 成唯識論, CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p.19, c12- p.21, a03.

<sup>49</sup> Kaidou 快道, *Guan suoyuanyuan lun yishu* 觀所緣緣論義疏: "...釋論終此上二句頌，而無有己下釋，若所緣緣正論為斯足故，或彼梵本缺失..."

mistake, Dharmapāla had at least 1,661 characters to say if not whole ten volumes of CWL. Thus if we were Dharmapāla, what would we do? Being silent might be one of alternatives, wouldn't it?

(F) What is the purpose and scope of AP?

Per Edo commentators' discussions above, in terms of what making the sense faculties, Kuiji argues that, without establishing the concept of the eighth consciousness, Dignāga had to make a convenient reasoning. But why was it so difficult for Dignāga to establish the eighth consciousness?

According to 因明正理門論本 (Xuanzang's Chinese translation of the *Nyāyamukha* by Dignāga), in Dignāga's Buddhist logic system that is based theory of *trairūpya* (因三相), a statement of a thesis (宗, *pakṣa*) is comprised of a property-possessor (有法, *dharmin*, i.e. the subject of a thesis itself) and a property (法, *dharma*). A thesis is supposed to be established (or proved) by another property (宗法, *pakṣadharmā*, the property of the *pakṣa*) as a reason (i.e. *hetu*) that is mutually agreed by both sides of the argument.<sup>50</sup> Since the eighth consciousness is not mutually agreed by all Buddhists and non-Buddhists, Dignāga is not allowed to use it as a reason. Furthermore, Dignāga is not allowed to use the eighth consciousness as the *dharmin*, either. Because the legitimate *dharmin* in Dignāga logic system must be mutually agreed, too. Otherwise

<sup>50</sup> Dignāga 陳那造 & Xuanzang 玄奘譯, *Yinming zhengli menlun ben* 因明正理門論本, CBETA, T32, no. 1628, p.1, b11: "...此中宗法唯取立論及敵論者決定同許..."

the reason would commit the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddhi* (所依不成).<sup>51</sup> In fact, only the mutually-agreed dharma as a reason is allowed to prove another dharma in question. The other three combinations that either dharmin to prove dharmin or dharmin to prove dharma or dharma to prove dharmin were all rejected by Dignāga.<sup>52</sup> Thus, there seems no way for Dignāga to argue for the eighth consciousness either as reason or as dharmin in his logic system.

Other alternative is for Dignāga to consider establishing the eighth consciousness in the same way as he exceptionally used *reductio ad absurdum* to prove his unique theory of self-cognition in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* Chapter I.<sup>53</sup> But I doubt that Dignāga would go down that path. It is not only that Dignāga never incorporated *reductio ad absurdum* in his formal Buddhist proof. But also because the proof of the eighth consciousness involves not an epistemological *reductio ad absurdum* but an ontological *reductio ad absurdum* which seems too complicated and too faith dependent for common people to accept. Here suffice it to refer to one example before Dignāga: *Yuqie shidi lun* 瑜伽師地論 (*Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra*) Volume 51 in which the proof of the eighth consciousness was an

<sup>51</sup> Dignāga 陳那造, trans. Xuanzang 玄奘譯, *Yinming zhengli menlun ben* 因明正理門論本, CBETA, T32, no. 1628, p.1, b21-22: “...或於是處有法不成。如成立我其體周遍於一切處。生樂等故...”

<sup>52</sup> Shoryu Katsura's unpublished English translation note on this verse in Dignāga 陳那造, trans. Xuanzang 玄奘譯, *Yinming zhengli menlun ben* 因明正理門論本, CBETA, T32, no. 1628, p.1, c11-12: “...有法非成於有法 及法此非成有法 但由法故成其法 如是成立於有法...”

<sup>53</sup> Shoryu Katsura, “The *Reductio Ad Absurdum* Argument in India with Special Reference to Nagarjuna and Dignaga,” *The Journal of Ryukoku University* 龍谷大學論集, no. 466 (July, 2005): 14-16.

ontological *reductio ad absurdum* based on another eight ontological sub-theories.<sup>54</sup> It appeared not quite successfully accepted within the Buddhist world. Not to mention non-Buddhist world.

Another alternative is for Dignāga to start an alliance with realists like Sautrāntika who argue we could never really grasp the external things directly but infer through the image of the thing on the consciousness only. Then Dignāga arguing that the cognition as means and cognition as result is the same one. The essence of knowledge is about “*svasa vedana*” which means the cognition recognize itself or the knowing know itself. Moreover, the internal appearance of cognition/knowledge is the only reality.<sup>55</sup>

In short, if the agreement of the consciousness-only could at most be reached only at the epistemological level, in order to obtain such agreement, the ontological inquiry like “what we are” seems would have to leave it open. The bottom line go backs to the question: whether the AP is about “what we claim to know” or “what we are” or both. If the scope and the purpose of the short AP was

<sup>54</sup> Maitreya 彌勒說, trans. by Xuanzang 玄奘譯, *Yuqieshi dilun* 瑜伽師地論, CBETA, T30, no. 15798, p.579, a10-25: “...問前說種子依。謂阿賴耶識。而未說有有之因緣廣分別義。何故不說。何緣知有廣分別義。云何應知。答由此建立是佛世尊最深密記。是故不說。如世尊言。阿陀那識甚深細 一切種子如瀑流 我於凡愚不開演 恐彼分別執為我 復次嘔陀南曰。執受初明了 種子業身受 無心定命終 無皆不應理 由八種相。證阿賴耶識決定是有。謂若離阿賴耶識依止執受不應道理。最初生起不應道理。有明了性不應道理。有種子性不應道理。業用差別不應道理。身受差別不應道理。處無心定不應道理。命終時識不應道理。何故若無阿賴耶識依止執受不應道理...”

<sup>55</sup> Masaaki Hattori 服部正明, “The Epistemology of Dignāga 陳那之認識論,” trans. Yu-kwan Ng 吳汝鈞, in Yu-kwan Ng’s *Methodology of Buddhist Studies* 佛學研究方法論 (Taipei: Taiwan Student Book 臺灣學生書局, 2006): 426-360.

only to investigate if “what we claim to know” is consciousness-only, it would seem to be OK for Dignāga to just pursue the epistemological agreement only, wouldn’t it?

## V. Summary

In the late Ming there was a so-called renaissance of Weishi in which at least thirty-five Weishi commentaries were produced in China without access to the key Weishi commentaries that authored by Kuiji, Huizhao, and Zhizhoh. On the other hand, the Weishi lineage of Faxiang Zong in Japan together with those key Weishi commentaries have never been interrupted since Tang. Due to the lost Weishi lineage and texts, those the late Ming made Weishi commentaries have been in doubt and challenged. Especially some Weishi experts in Japan during the Edo period criticized some late Ming authors for producing valueless and incorrect Weishi commentaries. This study is intended to see if such challenges and criticisms are fair enough. In order to do so, the study selects Xuanzang’s *Guan suoyuanyuan lun* as a base text and compares two late Ming AP commentaries that were written by Mingyu and Zhixu with two Edo AP commentaries that were authored by Kiben and Kaidou.

In the section of high-level analysis, the methodology to identify the variance between the late Ming Group and the Edo Group is first to divide the AP commentaries into nine sections: AP Intro prose, the 1st verse & the 1st prose, the second verse & the second prose, ..., and the eighth verse & the eighth prose as

AP main body plus another commentator's intro. Next, to count the number of Chinese characters that used in every section. Then, to compare the top three sections that used the most characters by groups and by authors. The high-level analysis helps identify several interesting areas for deeper dive analysis: 1) the Edo commentators had much longer commentator's introduction than the late Ming; 2) Kiben, Kaidou and Mingyu all treated the second verse & second prose as the top section. However, percentage wise, the Edo group is significantly higher than Mingyu. 3) The quotation accounts for approximately 40% of the Edo commentaries. On the contrary, in the late Ming group Mingyu quoted about 10% and Zhixu quoted less than 1%.

In the deeper analysis, the sources and the frequencies of quotations are reviewed by groups and by authors. It is found that Zhixu quoted one time, Mingyu quoted six times from two sources, Kiben quoted thirty and eight times from ten sources, and Kaidou quoted seventy and four times from twenty and seven sources. The major reason that the Edo group quoted much more frequently from much more sources than the late Ming group is that the sources that accessible to the late Ming group are indeed much less than the Edo group. However, this single reason alone could not explain why Zhixu and Mingyu each chose to use only one source out of the twelve sources that available to them. Another interesting finding is that Kiben's quotation list shows that he had intention to primarily refer to the commentaries of the Faxiang Zong. His purpose could be better understood in his commentator's introduction. On the other

hand, Kaidou liked to quote as much sources as he could including Abhidharma commentaries that representing the perspective of Theravāda. Which reflects Kaidou's scholar style and his expertise in Abhidharma commentaries.

In the deeper analysis of why much longer Commentator's introduction by Edo group, it is found that Kiben and Kaidou shared strong sense of subjectivity as the Edo scholar monks against the late Ming monks. Both were very critical of the late Ming Zhixu and Zhenjia. But they had slightly different agenda. Kiben was intended to emphasize the orthodoxy of the non-stop Weishi lineage of Faxiang Zong in Japan. Kaidou was proud of his scholarship by appealing to the authority of the texts.

In the deeper analysis of what controversial about the second moon, It is found that Kiben had a lot to say about the problem of using the second mood as “*dr̥ṣṭānta*” (喻, example). It is not only a very technical discussion about Buddhist logic but also a crisis management within Faxiang Zong. Dignāga's logic in terms of using the second mood as “*dr̥ṣṭānta*” makes his followers across several generations within Faxiang Zong so confusing and/or so uneasy that they had to figure out a way to smooth it out. Kaidou also saw some problems of using the second mood as “*dr̥ṣṭānta*” but his discussion dealt with more conventional logic problems instead of technical problems heavily involving Buddhist logic. On other hand, neither Zhixu nor Mingyu reported any problem of using the second mood as “*dr̥ṣṭānta*”. Both Zhixu and Mingyu could not see the problem because they did not have the access to the commentaries by Kuiji,



& Huizhao and Zhizhou. However, they did not sense the possible conventional logic problem as Kaidou did, either. This is nothing to do with their access to Tang commentaries.

In the deeper analysis of what making the appearance of the collection, it is found that Kiben tried to distinguish Old Vaibhāṣika, New Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika by what, they believe, makes the appearance of the collection. Kaidou also quoted a more comprehensive classification of four categories from *Cheng Weishi lun liaoyi deng* to distinguish Sautrāntika, Mahāyāna, Vaibhāṣika, and Ekavyāvahārika & Prajñaptivāda. Here we see that Buddhist theories are neither self-evident nor transcendent but dynamic and evolving over time. Here Kaidou and Kiben primarily quoted *Cheng Weishi lun shuji* 成唯識論述記, *Cheng Weishi lun liaoyi deng* 成唯識論了義燈, and *Cheng Weishi lun yanmi* 成唯識論演秘 for the related discussion. Due to no access to these commentaries, both Zhixu and Mingyu did not have any similar discussion to this regard. This seems supporting Kaidou's criticism that the late Ming scholar monks had no ideas which schools against which schools by advocating what theories.

In the deeper analysis of what making the sense faculties, it is found that both Kiben and Kaidou made it clear that different masters had different explanation about what the five sense faculties are. And Dignāga's theory was a convenient one, not the final one. Also, Kiben and Kaidou were fully aware that the final correct view is Dharmapāla's theory that "only manifest operation" (唯現行) is the five sense faculties. On the other hand, both Zhixu and Mingyu

were totally silent about arguments for what makes the five sense faculties. Looking into their CWL commentaries, I find that both Zhixu and Mingyu were also fully aware that there were four Indian masters arguing about what five sense faculties were at least when they finished their CWL commentaries. Their CWL commentaries detailed most of what Kiben and Kaidou noted in AP about this topic. But the question is whether Zhixu and Mingyu did their AP commentaries first or their CWL commentaries first. More evidence is needed in order to figure out why Zhixu and Mingyu were silent about what making the sense faculties.

In addition, in the deeper analysis of what making the sense faculties, Kaidou raised a good question: is it possible for Dignāga to epistemologically convince those realists of “consciousness-only” without resorting to the ontological ground like the eighth consciousness. This good question alone deserves another dedicated paper to address. Due to the scope of this study, the discussion could only be limited to the brief of some technical difficulties for Dignāga to prove the eighth consciousness. Considering those technical difficulties, if possible, the best alternative for Dignāga seems to decouple the agreement of the consciousness-only at the epistemological level and the agreement of the consciousness-only at the ontological level and to secure the agreement at the epistemological level first. After all, if the scope and the purpose of the short AP was only to investigate if what we claim to know is consciousness-only, it seems OK for Dignāga to just focus on the epistemological agreement.

In conclusion, the access to the key Tang Weishi commentaries does significantly impact commentators' capacity to identify controversial issues, to distinguish different realists' views, and to address the Weishi internal argument. However, there are some occasions that commentators seemed choosing not to use all the sources that available to them. In addition, the commentators' different agendas, sense of subjectivity, and personal expertise also play important roles in determining whether and/or how they comments on what.



## Reference

### Primary Sources

- Dharmapāla, ed. 護法等造 . Translated by Xuanzang 玄奘譯 .  
*Cheng Weishi Lun* 成唯識論 . CBETA, T31, no. 1585.
- Dignāga 陳那造 . Translated by Xuanzang 玄奘譯 . *Guan suoyuanyuan lun* 觀所緣緣論 . CBETA, T31, no. 1624.
- . *Yinming zhengli menlun ben* 因明正理門論本 . CBETA, T32, no. 1628.
- Kuiji 窺基 . *Weishi ershi lun shuji* 唯識二十論述記 . CBETA, T43, no. 1834.
- Maitreya 彌勒說 . Translated by Xuanzang 玄奘譯 . *Yuqieshi dilun* 瑜伽師地論 . CBETA, T30, no. 1579.
- Mingyu 明昱 . *Cheng Weishi lun suquan* 成唯識論俗詮 . CBETA, X50, no. 820.
- . *Guan suoyuanyuan lun huishi* 觀所緣緣論會釋 . CBETA, X51, no. 830.
- Zhixu 智旭 . *Cheng Weishi lun guanxin fayao* 成唯識論觀心法要 . CBETA, X51, no. 824.
- . *Guan suoyuanyuan lun zhijie* 觀所緣緣論直解 . CBETA, X51, no. 831.
- Kaidou 快道 . *Guan suoyuanyuan lun yishu* 觀所緣緣論義疏 . Kuaibian Manuscript of Bunka 14 快辨文化 14 年抄本 .
- Kiben 基辨 . *Guan suoyuanyuan lunshi* 觀所緣緣論釋 . Kyoto: Kyoto University Library, Manuscript of Kan'en 4 寬延 4 年寫本 .

## Secondary Sources

### 1. Book

Chen, Yunu 陳玉女. *Mingdai fomen neiwai sengsu jiaoshe de changyu* 明代佛門內外僧俗交涉的場域. Taipei: Daw Shiang Publishing 稻鄉出版社, 2010.

Duckworth, Douglas, and Malcolm David Eckel. *Dignaga's Investigation of the Percept: A Philosophical Legacy in India and Tibet*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Ranger. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Huang, Ray. *A Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981.

Makeham, John. *Transforming Consciousness: Yogācāra Thought in Modern China*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (UK), 2014.

Shi, Shengyan 釋聖嚴. *Ming mo zhongguo fo jiao zhi yan jiu* 明末中國佛教之研究. Translated by Shi hui-jing 釋會靖 (Shigian Guan 關世謙). Taipei: Dharma Drum Publishing 法鼓文化, 2009.

Shils, Edward. *Tradition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.

### 2. Article

Chen, Yibiao 陳一標. “Zhong ri faxiang zong chuancheng yu zongfeng zhi bijiao 中日法相宗傳承與宗風之比較.” *Hsuan Chuang Journal of Buddhist Studies* 玄奘佛學研

究, no. 3 (July 2005): 105-26.

Hattori, Masaaki 服部正明. “The Epistemology of Dignāga 陳那之認識論.” Translated by Yu-kwan Ng 吳汝鈞. In Yu-kwan Ng’s *Methodology of Buddhist Studies* 佛學研究方法論, 399-440. Taipei: Taiwan Student Book 臺灣學生書局, 2006.

Jian, kaiting 簡凱廷. “Wanming weishixue zuopin zai jianghu shidai de liuchuan yu jieshou chutan 晚明唯識學作品在江戶時代的流傳與接受初探.” *Chung-Hwa Buddhist Studies* 中華佛學研究, no. 16 (December 2015): 43-72.

Katsura, Shoryu 桂紹隆. “The Reductio Ad Absurdum Argument in India with Special Reference to Nagarjuna and Dignaga.” *The Journal of Ryukoku University* 龍谷大學論集, no. 466 (July, 2005): 2-18.

Lan, Jifu 藍吉富. “Jiaxing dacangjing de tese ji qi shiliao jiazhi 嘉興大藏經的特色及其史料價值.” In *Fojiao de sixiang yu wenhua-Yinshun dao shi ba zhi jin liu shou qing lunwen ji* 佛教的思想與文化——印順導師八秩晉六壽慶論文集, edited by Shi Shengyan 釋聖嚴, 255-66. Taipei: Fa-kuang Publishing 法光出版社, 1991.

——. “Jiaxingcang yanjiu 《嘉興藏》研究.” Research Report for “Taiwan Digital Archives Expansion Project: The Research and Establishment of Chinese Buddhist Tripitaka Electronic Text Collection, Taipei Edition” 「數位典藏國家型科技計畫：臺北版電子佛典集成之研究與建構」研究報告, 1992. Accessed July 5, 2017. <http://taipei3.cbeta.org/jiaxing.php>.

Shi, Shengyan 釋聖嚴. “Riben fojiao shi 日本佛教史,” in *Rihan fojiao yanjiu* 日韓佛教研究, Xiandai fojiao xueshu congkan 82 現代佛教學術叢刊 (八十二), edited by Mantau Chang 張曼濤, 115-232. Taipei: Dacheng wenhua 大乘文化, 1978.

——. “Ming mo de weishi xue zhe ji qi si xiang 明末的唯識學者及其思想.” *Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies* 中華佛學學報, no. 1 (March 1987): 1-41.

Teng, Wei-Jen 鄧偉仁. “Medieval Chinese Buddhist Exegesis and Chinese Grammatical Studies.” *Taiwan Journal of Buddhist Studies* 臺大佛學研究, no. 28 (December 2014): 105-42.

Ueda, Yoshifumi 上田義文. “Two Main Streams of Thought in Yogācāra Philosophy.” *Philosophy East and West* 17, no. 1/4 (January-October 1967): 155-65.

## 晚明和江戶唯識註釋的比較 ——以《觀所緣緣論》為例

楊志常\*

### 摘要

在晚明的唯識復興期間，中國出現了至少三十五本唯識註釋本，這些唯識著作都是在唐朝窺基、慧沼和智周等重要唯識註疏佚失中完成的。然而，自唐以來，日本法相宗的法脈和唯識的重要經典註疏，卻未有類似的中斷和佚失。因此，晚明的唯識著作不免遭受質疑與挑戰。其中，來自日本江戶註釋家的批評，尤其嚴苛，毫不留情地指責晚明的唯識註釋錯誤百出，沒有參考價值。本文試圖考察江戶唯識註釋家如此的批評是否公允，以及晚明與江戶註釋家之間有沒有唐朝唯識註疏輔助的差異，如何型塑他們對於同一個唯識文本的了解和詮釋。

本研究選擇玄奘譯的《觀所緣緣論》當作基準文本，比較晚明唯識註釋家智旭、明昱與江戶唯識註釋家基辨、快道的註釋。分析先以綜觀高度的分析來尋找差異點，如江戶註釋家有比較長的導言和比較大比例的引述等差異。再深入地分析差異點，如引述的來源和頻率、為什麼有比較長的導言等議題。分析發現：有沒有唐朝唯識註疏的輔助，的確對於註釋家尋找爭議點、區別不同的實在論、和處理唯識派內部爭論的能力有很大的影響。此外，分析也發現，註釋家的主體性、不同的議程和個人專長，對於註釋家決定要註釋什麼以及如何註釋上，扮演著舉足輕重的角

---

\* 作者係國立政治大學宗教研究所博士生。



色。

關鍵詞：唯識、晚明佛教、江戶佛教、《觀所緣緣論》



