Fan Chen's Treatise on the Destrnetibility of the Spirit
and its Buddhist critics
By Ming-Wood Liu
Philosophy East and West
Volume 37, no. 4 (1987)
P402-427
(C) bye the University of Hawaii Press.
P402
Fan Chen's(a) (circa 450-circa 515) Treatise on the
Destructibility of the Spirit (Shen-mieh lun(b),
henceforth referred to as Treatise) , which
represents the climax in the heated dispute between
Buddhists and non-Buddhists over the question of the
immortality of the soul, is among the most
controversial pieces of Chinese philosophical and
antireligious literature.(1) For its strong
anti-Buddhist sentiment, it created an immediate
commotion on its first appearance, and no less a
person than the Emperor Wu(c) (464-549) of the Liang
dynasty(d) had felt obliged to defend his faith
against its blunt attack and to rally the support of
monks, nobles, and ministers to the refutation of
its position. While it gradually fell into oblivion
as the problem of the immortal spirit became no
longer a central issue in Buddhist circles from the
mid-sixth century onwards, discussion of it came
into vogue once again in the 1950s, when the
materialistic basis of its deliberation began to win
recognition. From then on, it was universally
acclaimed by Marxist historians as one of the
masterpieces of Chinese materialistic writings, and
was assigned a prominent place in almost every work
on the development of Chinese thought and religion
which came out of Mainland China.(2) Scholars of
other political and intellectual persuasions,
however, reacted to it differently, and in a recent
Western article we find Fan Chen being faulted for
misinterpreting the doctrine of causation, for being
inappropriate and inaccurate in the use of analogy,
and for being "superficial and shallow in
learning."(3) This study is an attempt to approach
the Treatise from a less partisan and more analytic
standpoint. We shall try to present each of its
central ideas as it is actually given in the text,
and examine its meaning in the context of the
essay's overall argument. And if we do not refrain
from making appraisals, our judgments will be based
on internal rather than external grounds, that is,
on the consideration of consistency of thought and
accomplishment of set objectives, rather than on its
being a confirmation of our own philosophical
position. To this end, we find it useful to examine
some of the objections raised against the Treatise
by its contemporary critics and Fan Chen's replies
to them, for they bring into focus some of the
irreconcilable differences which divided the two
rival camps in the debate, and in this way help us
to locate where the real significance and problem of
Fan Chen arguments for the destructibility of the
spirit lie.
Ming-Wood Liu is a Lecturer in Chinese Philosophy at
the Department of Chinese, University of Hong Kong.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: This article was completed during
my tenure as visiting scholar at Harvard
University,from 1985 to 1986. I would like to
express my heartfelt gratitude to the staff of the
Harvard-Yenching Institute, especially to the
Director, Professor Albert M. Craig, to the
Assistant Director, Mr. Edward J. Baker. and to Miss
Maureen Hanrahan for their warm hospitality and
prompt assistance. I am particularly grateful to
Professor Tu Wei-ming for kindly reading over this
article and offering many valuable comments. and to
Mr. Chi-wah Fong, my former student,for some of the
ideas found in it. A special word of appreciation is
also due to the Hsuu Long-sing Research Fund
administered by the University of Hong Kong for a
grant which made this study possible.
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BACKGROUND OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE TREATISE
It is common knowledge that Buddhism teaches the
doctrine of anaatman, or no-self. Thus, in Early
Buddhism, it was maintained that sentient beings are
merely amalgamations of the five evanescent
elements--matter, sensation, perception,
predisposition, and consciousness--and there is no
permanently and independently existing entity called
the self to be found. While later Buddhists might
make more elaborate analysis of these elements and
even introduce into their systems of thought
concepts which carry ostensive substantive
connotation (the idea of aalaya of the Yogaacaarins
is a good example), they unanimously adhered to this
tenet of no-self as a canonical truth which allows
of no questioning.
The fate of the doctrine of no-self took an
unexpected turn in China. While most Chinese
Buddhists from the T'ang dynasty(c) (that is, the
seventh century) onwards were aware that the Buddha
had preached the idea of no-self, this was not the
case in the beginning years of the propagation of
the religion in the country. Strongly attracted by
the Buddhist teachings of retribution and
transmigration, many early Chinese Buddhists
speculated that there must be present in every
sentient being an immutable "spirit (shen(f)), which
does not disappear at death, but continues to pass
from one life to another, reaping the fruits of its
former deeds. Thus, already in the early third
century, we find that Mou Tzu(g), one of the first
Chinese intellectuals converted to Buddhism, in
defending the Buddhist concept of rebirth against
critics, compared the body of the individual to
leaves and roots and his spirit to seeds, and argued
that even though the leaves and roots of a plant may
wither and perish, its seeds will continue to live
forever.(4) In the next three centuries, the idea of
the indestructible spirit was generally regarded as
a basic feature of the Buddhist religion, largely
because it was taken as an indispensable element of
the tenets of retribution and transmigration
considered to be the backbone of the Buddhist world
view; and controversy over the problem of the
indestructible spirit often figured as part of a
larger controversy over the feasibility of the
teachings of karman and rebirth.(5) So, on the one
hand, we have the anti-Buddhists, who thought that
by denying the notion of permanent spirit, they
would bring to nought the theories of retribution
and transmigration and so exhibit the absurdity of
the Buddhist picture of life, while on the other
hand, we have the Buddhists, who came to the rescue
of the concept of permanent spirit in their effort
to uphold their beliefs of retribution and
transmigration, which they treasured as the kernel
of their religious heritage.(6) In their replies to
the attacks of the anti-Buddhists, the Buddhists
often attributed to the permanent spirit functions,
which have little immediately to do with karman and
rebirth but are commonly associated with the idea
"spirit" in orthodox Chinese thought, such as being
the origin of life, the source of thought and
feeling, the subject of purposive actions, the
object of ancestral worship and so forth; and they
cited the indispensability of these functions as
proof of the existence of their bearer.(7) Yet, it
is important to keep in mind that the notion of
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indestructible spirit found its place in early
Chinese Buddhist thought first and foremost as a
component of the doctrines of retribution and
transmigration; and consideration of its role in the
explication of psychological and volitional
phenomena and so forth came into the picture largely
by way of association and for the sake of argument.
In other words, the idea of indestructible spirit
figured in early Chinese Buddhism primarily as a
practical and religious idea, not as a theoretical
and philosophical concept.
The historical background of the compilation of
the Treatise exemplifies clearly the aforementioned
attitude of the anti-Buddhists. According to Fan
Chen's biographies in the Ch'i shu(h) and Liang
shu(i) , the composition of the Treatise was
occasioned by a discourse between the Prince Hsiao
Tzu-liang(j) (460-494) and Fan Chen on the question
of retribution.(8) Knowing that Fan Chen did not
believe in karman, the Prince demanded how he could
in such a circumstance account for the differences
between the high and the low, between the rich and
the poor, and so forth in society. Fan Chen gave the
following famous reply:
Human lives are like flowers of the same tree. They
grow on similar branches, and bloom on similar
calyces. When blown by wind, they fall. Some brush
against screens and curtains and fall on rugs and
mats: some are stopped by fences and walls and drop
by the side of lavatories. Those which fall on rugs
and mats are [like] your Highness; those which drop
by [the side of] lavatories are [like] my humble
self. Even though the high and the low follow
diverse paths, where does [the karmic law of] cause
and effect come in?(9)
It is said that the Prince was deeply puzzled by
this naturalistic and fatalistic interpretation of
human destiny, and so Fan Chen retired and wrote the
Treatise to further elaborate his stand. Thus, we
can see that Fan Chen, like the anti-Buddhists of
his time, took up the refutation of the concept of
indestructible spirit mainly with an eye to the
undermining of the theory of retribution.
Again, similar to his contemporary
anti-Buddhists, Fan Chen saw his refutation of the
tenets of karman and rebirth through the refutation
of the concept of indestructible spirit as a
powerful weapon against the Buddhist religion in
general. The Treatise concludes with a vehement
peroration of the harmfulness of Buddhism, which
shows unmistakably that Fan Chen had no less than
the denouncement of the entire Buddhist religion in
view in composing the essay:
Buddhism is detrimental to the government and
`srama.nas are corrupting the common customs. [Like]
violent wind and rising mist, they sweep over [the
entire nation] without ceasing. Distressed by the
harms it brings, I ponder how to rescue those who
have been overwhelmed [by it].(10)
As Fan Chen perceived it, much of the pernicious
influence of Buddhism has to do with its teachings
of retribution and transmigration:
It deceives the people with vague sayings, frightens
them with the miseries of Aviici hell, entices them
with bizarre statements, and delights them with the
pleasures of Tu.sita heaven. As a consequence,...
all families abandon their
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nearest and dearest, and all people terminate their
line of descendants. So, the ranks [of the army] are
deprived of soldiers, and government offices are
emptied of clerks. Grains are used up to feed lazy
vagrants, and materials are exhausted for the
construction [of monasteries and images].(11)
In discrediting the notion of future rebirths as
determined by past deeds by demonstrating the
destructibility of the spirit, Fan Chen hoped to
open the eyes of the populace to the absurdity of
Buddhist thought and so check ascent its rapid in
the country.
THE ARGUMENTS OF THE TREATISE
The Treatise is written in the form of a dialogue
between an opponent of the thesis of the
destructibility of the spirit and its defender, the
latter apparently representing Fan Chen's own
position.(12) It begins with the question:
Question: You maintain that the spirit is
destructible. How do you know it to be
destructible?(13)
Fan Chen lays down the central principle of the
Treatise in his reply:
Answer: The spirit is the same as the body; the body
is the same as the spirit. Thus, when the body
exists, the spirit exists; when the body perishes,
the spirit is destroyed.(14)
This argument has two premises:
1. The body and the spirit are one.
This is interpreted by Fan Chen as meaning:
2. The existence of the body is ontologically prior
to the existence of the spirit.
These two premises, together with the commonly
recognized fact that the body disintegrates on
death, give the conclusion of the destructibility of
the spirit which Fan Chen desires.
To further elucidate premises (1) and (2), Fan
Chen introduces a pair of concepts: "substance"
(chih(k)) and "function" (yung(l)):
Answer: The body is the substance of the spirit; the
spirit is the function of the body. So, the body
refers to the substance and the spirit refers to the
function. Body and spirit can not be separated from
each other.(15)
According to Fan Chen, what constitutes the
"substance" of a human individual is his material
body. As for the so called "spirit," it is merely
the material body's "function," and can not exist
apart from the physical frame. Fan Chen illustrates
this contingency of the "function" spirit upon the
"substance" body with the relation between the
property "keenness" and the object "knife":
Answer: The spirit is to its substance [that is, the
body] as keenness is to knife;(16) the body is to
its function [that is, spirit] as knife is to
keenness. The term "keenness" does not [denote]
"knife"; the term "knife" does not [denote] "keen-
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ness". Nevertheless, apart from keenness, there is
no knife; apart from knife, there is no keenness. We
have never heard of keenness surviving the
destruction of the knife. How can we allow that the
spirit remains after the body has perished?(17)
Just as the function "keenness" vanishes with the
destruction of the object "knife," the "function"
spirit also does not remain once the "substance"
body is gone.
The rest of the Treatise deals with a number of
objections which may be raised against the two
premises of the oneness of body and spirit and of
the ontological dependence of the latter upon the
former. The first has to do with consciousness,
which is generally regarded as a peculiarity of the
spirit:
Question: The substance of trees is devoid of
consciousness, the substance of human beings is
endowed with consciousness. As human beings have a
substance [without consciousness] like trees while
[humans] also possess consciousness different from
trees, does it not [prove] that trees have [only]
one [substance], while human beings have two?(18)
From the fact that human beings are endowed with
consciousness, a trait which is not shared by
material objects such as trees, the opponent
concludes that there must exist in them two distinct
substances: a nonconscious material substance like
that of trees, and a conscious mental substance
different from that of trees. Fan Chen retorts by
maintaining that it is not necessary to postulate a
separate mental substance, that is, the spirit, to
account for the phenomenon of consciousness:
Answer: That is a strange way of putting it! If
human beings had [one nonconscious] substance like
[that of] trees constituting their bodies, and again
[another] conscious [substance] different from [that
of] trees forming their spirits, your argument might
hold. In fact, the substance of human beings is a
substance endowed with consciousness; the substance
of trees is a substance devoid of consciousness. The
substance of human beings is not the substance of
trees; the substance of trees is not the substance
of human beings. How can there be [in man one
nonconscious] substance like [that of] trees, and
then [another] conscious [substance] different from
[that of] trees?(19)
In Fan Chen's opinion, it is not the case that man
is made up of one nonconscious, material substance
similar to that of trees forming his body, and
another conscious, mental substance different from
that of trees constituting his spirit. Rather, man's
material substance, that is, his body, itself
possesses the property of consciousness; and in this
way is basically unlike the material substance of
trees and can give rise to all sorts of intelligent
behaviors.
The opponent is not convinced, and goes on to
bring in the phenomenon of death to prove his point.
It is an observable fact that at the time of death,
man's physical body remains unchanged while his
consciousness disappears. Does this not indicate
that man does have two substances, one nonconscious
and the other conscious, the former staying while
the latter departs when death comes?
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Fan Chen, consistent to his view that the bodily
substance of man is in essence conscious, denies
that man's physical body actually remains the same
at death:
Answer: The dead possess a [nonconscious] substance
like that of trees, but do not have a conscious
[substance] different from that of trees; the living
possess a conscious [substance] different from that
of trees, but do not have a [nonconscious] substance
like that of trees.... The body of the living is not
[the same as] the body of the dead; the body of the
dead is not [the same as] the body of the living;
[the two] being dissimilar to the extreme. How can
it ever happen that there be in the bodily form of
the living the skeleton of the dead?(20)
As Fan Chen perceives it, death does not mean the
divorcement of a conscious, mental substance
"spirit" from a nonconscious, material substance
"body," but rather the losing by the conscious,
material substance "body" of its former essential
property of being conscious and its transformation
into an entirely new substance similar to that of
trees in that it becomes totally devoid of the
conscious feature. Thus, despite outward appearance
to the contrary, Fan Chen can insist that "The body
of the living is not the same as the body of the
dead; the body of the dead is not the same as the
body of the living; the two being dissimilar to the
extreme."
The second objection is connected with the
faculty of thought, likewise taken as pertaining
specifically to the spirit in traditional Chinese
thought:
Question: If the body is the same as the spirit, are
such [bodily organs] as hands also [the same as] the
spirit?
Answer: They all have their shares of the spirit.
Question: If they all have their shares of the
spirit, the spirit is capable of thought, and so
such [bodily organs] as hands should also be capable
of thought.
Answer: [Bodily organs] such as hands have the
sensations of pain and itching, and do not have the
thoughts of right and wrong.
Question: With respect to sensation and thought, are
they the same or different?
Answer: To sense is the same [spiritual function]
as to think. When [a spiritual function is] superficial,
it is sensation; when [it is] profound, it is thought.(21)
The opponent reasons that if the body is one with
the spirit, every part of the body, including such
organs as the hand, should exhibit features typical
of the spirit. Now, since one of the most
distinctive features of the spirit is its ability to
think, such bodily organs as the hand should also be
capable of thought, a conclusion which is, however,
adamantly contradicted by fact.
Fan Chen's response shows that he concedes the
opponent's point that the body, in being one with
the spirit, should demonstrate in all its parts
spiritual character, but he does not agree with the
opponent's supposition that the spiritual character
demonstrated has always to be "thought." Fan Chen
conceives spiritual disposition as being of various
degrees of depth. When it is profound, it
constitutes thought; when it is superficial, it
forms sensation. And
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it is the superficial, not the profound form of
spiritual disposition, with which such bodily organs
as the hand are associated.
Now, if Fan Chen is correct, "sensation" and
"thought" would make up the shallow and deep ends of
the spiritual spectrum. Given premise (2) that the
spirit is ontologically dependent on the body, both
ends should alike have their bodily bases. We have
seen that Fan Chen ascribes "sensation" to such
bodily organs as the hand. It remains for him to
specify the bodily source of thought:
Question: If thoughts of right and wrong are not the
concern of hands and feet, to what do they pertain?
Answer: Thoughts of right and wrong are governed by
the heart organ.
Question: This heart organ is the heart which is
one of the five viscera, isn't it?(22)
Answer: It is so.
Question: In what way are the five viscera different
from each other that the heart alone has thoughts of
right and wrong?
Answer: In what way also are the seven apertures
different from each other that their functions are
not the same?(23) What reasons are there?
Question: Thoughts are without location. How do we
know that they are governed by the heart?
Answer: When our heart is sick, our thoughts become
confused. In this way, we know that the heart is the
root of thought.(24)
Fan Chen traces the bodily origin of thought to the
heart, which in his opinion is none other that the
heart organ constituting one of the five viscera. To
support his view, he refers to the common experience
of our thoughts getting confused when our hearts
become sick, which strongly suggests that the
operation of the former is dependent on the working
of the latter.
The third objection concerns the moral and
intellectual differences between the sage and the
common man:
Question: The body of the sage is similar to the
body of the common man, and yet there is the
distinction of sages and common men. So, we know
that body and spirit are different.(25)
We can analyze the opponent's objection as follows:
1. The sage and the common man are similar in their
bodies.
2. The sage and the common man are dissimilar in
intelligence and moral perfection.
3. The dissimilarities in intelligence and moral
perfection between the sage and the common man
can not be explained by appealing to their
bodies (1, 2).
4. There must exist a spirit separated from the
body to account for the intellectual and moral
differences between the sage and the common man
(3).
Fan Chen tackles the query by rejecting
assumption(1):
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Answer: Not at all. Pure gold glitters, while
unwashed gold does not glitter. How could pure gold
which glitters contain impurities which do not
glitter? Likewise, how could the spirit of a sage
reside in the [bodily] vessel of a common man? Nor
would it ever happen that the spirit of a common man
be lodged in the body of a sage. So, eight-colored
eyebrows and eyes with double pupils were
[respectively] the appearances of [Fang] Hsun(m) and
[Chung] Hua(n), and dragon [-shaped] face and horse
[-shaped] mouth were [respectively] the looks of
Hsien [Yuan](o) and Kao [T'ao](p).(26) Such are the
pecularities [of the sages] in outward form. The
heart of Pi Kan(q) had seven openings placed side by
side, and the gall bladder of Po Yo(r) was big as a
fist.(27) Such are the speciality [of the sages]
with respect to inner organs. So, we know that
certain parts of[the bodies of] the sages are quite
out of the ordinary. Not only is their way [of
living] superior to that of the common folk, their
bodies are also more excellent than those of all
creatures. I find [your idea] that sages and common
men are alike in their bodily forms difficult to
accept.(28)
According to Fan Chen, sages in general possess
certain extraordinary bodily features, some external
such as eight-colored eyebrows and eyes with double
pupils, and some internal such as a heart with seven
holes and a gall bladder as big as a fist, which set
them off from the average person. Their superiority
in intellectual and moral achievement can therefore
be explained by referring to these features, and
there is absolutely no need to postulate a "spirit"
to account for the situation.
To maintain that sages and common men possess
distinct types of bodies which account for their
intellectual and moral differences in turn leads to
other perplexities. First, it is not uncommon to
find people of very dissimilar intellectual and
moral attainment sharing almost the identical
physical appearances, and the opponent is quick to
cite the well-known instances of the physical
resemblances between Confucius (551-479 B.C.) and
the scheming courtier Yang Hue(s), and between the
saintly Emperor Shunt and the self-willed upstart
Hsiang Chi(u) (232-202 B.C.) to support his thesis
that with regard to the body, the sage and the
common man are actually the same.(29) Second, if
intelligence and moral aptitudes are based upon
bodily factors, sages of similar high levels of
intellectual and moral perfection should exhibit the
same bodily features. But, as the opponent
immediately points out: "Ch'iu(v) (Confucius) and
Tan(w) differed in their looks, and [the emperors]
T'ang(x) and Wen(y) were unlike in their
appearances."(30)
Fan Chen approaches the first query by noting
that the observed physical resemblances between
sages and common men are merely apparent:
Alabaster is like jade, but it is not jade. Cranes
resemble phoenixes, but they are not phoenixes. Such
being the case with things, the same should [also]
be true with people. Hsiang [Chi] and Yang [Hue]
were like [Shun and Confucius] in [outward]
appearance, but not in actual substance. As they can
not match [Shun and Confucius] with respect to the
heart organ, mere [similarities in] appearance are
meaningless.(31)
To be a sage, one must have all the sage's requisite
bodily characteristics, and Fan Chen mentions here
specifically the sage's heart organ. Thus, despite
their respective closeness in external appearances
to Emperor Shun and Confucius,
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Hsiang Chi and Yang Huo remained in the rank and
file of the common folk because they lacked the
sage's heart organ. That Fan Chen considers the
heart organ to be the root of intellectual and moral
differences as well as the seat of thought is
further attested by his answer to the second query:
Sages resemble [each other] with respect to their
heart organs, but their [bodily] forms need not be
the same;(32) just as horses may be of different
kinds of coat and yet be equally fleetfooted, and
jade stones may be of different colors and yet be
alike beautiful....(33)
It is the heart organ alone which distiguishes the
sage from the common man. So long as they have
similar heart organs, sages may assume the most
diverse external appearances and yet all be sages.
Finally, the ancestral cult and a belief in
ghosts were orthodox customs in ancient China. So
the problem arises as to how to make sense of these
customs if nothing of the deceased, whether in the
form of body or spirit, remains after death. To the
question why the Hsiao ching(z) , a Confucian
classic, enjoins the construction of ancestral
temples and the practice of ancestral offering, if
the spirits of our forebears disintegrate together
with their bodies at death, Fan Chen replies:
Answer: This is [simply] the way of instruction of
the sages, with the aims of complying with the
feelings of the filial and arousing the will of the
indolent and the mean. This is what [the I ching(aa)
] means by "spirituality and clarity [depend upon
the right man]."(34)
Ancestral rituals, which perpetuate the memories of
our forefathers, perform the very significant role
of providing an avenue for our expression of
affection for them, as well as fostering an attitude
of zeal and a feeling of gratitude. And it is with
these emotive and educative functions in mind, and
not with the paying of homage to the surviving
spirits of our forebears, that past sages encouraged
the practice of ancestral worship.
As for past accounts of the activities of
ghosts, Fan Chen's position is largely skeptical.
When the opponent cites the narrations in the Tso
chuan(ab) of the princes Po Yu(ac) and P'eng
Sheng(ad), dressed in armor and assuming the form of
a boar, respectively, returning after death to
avenge themselves on their enemies,(35) to show that
the dead continue to exist in the guise of ghosts,
Fan Chen rejoins:
Answer: Demons are indiscernible and [it is hard to
say whether] they exist or not. Many people have
come to a violent end, and yet not all of them
become ghosts. Why should P'eng Sheng and Po Yu be
the only ones capable of doing so? Here was
[perceived] a man [in armor] and there was [seen] a
boar. They might not be the princes of [the states]
of Ch'i(ae) and Cheng(af) [after all].(36)
If Fan Chen can dismiss the stories of Po Yu and
P'eng Sheng as testimonies of popular superstitions
and as not representing the actual belief of the
author of the Tso chuan, then passages in the I
ching which speak explicitly of ghosts and spirits
are more difficult to brush away:
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Question: The I [ching] says: "Through this, one
comes to know the conditions of ghosts and spirits.
In so far as a man resembles heaven and earth, he
will not come into opposition with them." It also
speaks of "a wagon full of ghosts."(37) What is the
meaning of these sayings?(38)
Being a Confucian by upbringing, Fan Chen feels
obliged to abide by the statements of the I ching,
one of the most venerable of Confucian scriptures.
So, he concedes, albeit reluctantly, that there are
such beings as ghosts; but he proceeds to add that
they pertain to an "invisible" realm totally
separate from the "visible" realm of man, and are
not the surviving spirits of the deceased. In this
way, he finds it possible to acquiesce to the
general belief in the existence of ghosts without
compromising his thesis of the destructibility of
the spirit:
Answer: There is [the category] bird and there is
[the category] animal, this being the distinction of
the flying and the walking; there is [the category]
man and there is [the category] ghost, this being
the distinction of the visible and the invisible.
[But to say] that men become ghosts after death and
ghosts turn into men after their destruction is
something I do not understand.(39)
APPRAISAL OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE TREATISE
After recapitulating the principal arguments of the
Treatise, we are ready to give our appraisal of
them. As proposed in the foreword, our appraisal
will center on two considerations: first, the
fulfillment of avowed objectives, and second, the
internal consistency of thought. The Treatise was
already the object of much controversy on its first
appearance, and some of the critical remarks of its
contemporaries, especially those of Hsiao Ch'en(ag)
(478-529), Ts'ao Ssu-wen(ah), and the famous poet
Shen Yueh(ai) (441-513), are highly suggestive. They
will be examined in some detail in the next section
for the purpose of illustrating the points we raise
in our assessment.
Fan Chen's ultimate objective in arguing against
the concept of indestructible spirit, as we have
noted in our exposition of the background of the
Treatise, was to undermine the Buddhist teachings of
karman and rebirth. Now, it has often been pointed
out that the tenets of karman and rebirth are
actually not predicated upon the idea of immortal
soul, that sabyamuni himself preached the
non-existence of changeless selves, and that, as a
consequence, Fan Ch'en's whole program of refuting
the Buddhist doctrines of retribution and
transmigration by calling into question the notion
of permanent, self-subsistent spirit was misguided
from the very beginning. While observations of this
kind are admittedly not without ground, it remains
an undeniable fact that most Buddhists of Fan Chen's
time did think that their faith in karman and
rebirth involved the notion of indestructible
spirit, and they further conceived this spirit on
the traditional Chinese model of a mental substance
being at once the seat of life, the center of
consciousness, the source of sensation and thought,
and so forth. Thus, if Fan Chen succeeded in
disproving the existence of such a spirit, he would
certainly undermine their conviction in retribution
and transmigration, and would do severe damage to
the Buddhist course in China.
P412
But even granted that the concept of
indestructible spirit was central to the kind of
Buddhism practiced by most of Fan Chen's
contemporary believers, we still have to ask if Fan
Chen offered solid reasons against its validity.
Given the fact that the idea of indestructible
spirit was taught by Chinese Buddhists as an
essential element of the theories of karman and
rebirth, the most direct and conclusive way of
confuting it was evidently to demonstrate either (a)
that the operation of karman and rebirth need not
assume the existence of such a spirit, or (b) that
there are actually no such things as karman and
rebirth. Both approaches, however, were not open to
Fan Chen: in the case of(a) because he did not
believe in the reality of karmam and rebirth, and in
the case of (b) because the denial of the existence
of indestructible spirit was envisaged by him as a
step towards the denial of karman and rebirth, not
vice versa. Another obvious procedure which Fan Chen
could have taken was to show that the concept of
indestructible spirit is logically inconsistent or
contradicted by fact. That he likewise did not do.
The Treatise has indeed dealt with a number of
orthodox arguments for the presence in man of an
imperishable spirit besides the perishable body
(such as the need to assume an origin of life and so
forth) and demonstrated the reasons offered to be
inconclusive. Yet, inconclusiveness does not imply
invalidity, not to say that valid ideas are very
often entertained on invalid grounds. In short, we
can find in the Treatise no definite proof that the
Buddhist concept of indestructible spirit is
inadmissible.
But if Fan Chen failed to refute the Buddhist
concept of indestructible spirit directly by proving
it to be wrong, did he succeed in refuting it
indirectly by demonstrating its opposite concept,
that is, the destructibility of the spirit, to be
right? That, in fact, was the course which Fan Chen
took. The Treatise, as can be seen from the
preceding analysis, is essentially an attempt to
establish the two premises of the oneness of body
and spirit and of the ontological dependence of the
latter upon the former, from which the conclusion of
the destructibility of the spirit can be drawn.
However, the manner in which Fan Chen sets about in
the Treatise to establish the two premises is highly
problematic. He has put forward hardly any logical
and empirical evidence to support the two
suppositions. Rather, he satisfies himself with
merely examining a number of objections to which
they are most likely to be subjected (such as in
connection with the questions of conscious behavior,
intellectual and moral aptitudes, ancestral worship,
and so forth) in order to indicate that they are not
real objections. Now, objections which can be raised
against any statement are theoretically infinite,
and one can never arrive at an absolute decision
regarding the truth of an assertion by rejecting
attempts to falsify it. Thus, the two premises
remain largely hypotheses, and naturally, the same
is the case with the conclusion of the
destructibility of the soul which is based on them.
So, in falling short of refuting the concept of
"indestructible spirit" both directly and
indirectly, the Treatise can not satisfy our first
requirement of "fulfillment of avowed objective."
The situation in quite different, however, with
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regard to the second requirement of "internal
consistency of thought." Starting from the two
"materialistic" premises asserting the ontological
primacy of the body over the spirit, Fan Chen
steadfastly reduces all major mental phenomena to
bodily functions. So, consciousness is made out to
be an essential property of the body, the losing of
which constitutes death. Sensation and thought are
pictured as the functions of such external organs as
the hands and of the internal organ, the heart,
respectively. Differences in intellectual and moral
endowments are traced back to divergences in bodily
constitution, especially in the constitution of the
heart. The significance of ancestral worship is seen
in its educative efficacy, and ghosts are relegated
to another realm of existence having nothing to do
with the surviving souls of the dead. Indeed, with
respect to oneness of purpose and acuteness of
thought, the Treatise is among the most articulate,
clear-sighted, and coherently reasoned pieces of
ancient Chinese materialistic literature. From the
perspective of the development of materialistic
philosophy in China, it fully deserves the lavish
acclaim it currently enjoys in the scholastic
circles of Mainland China.
The foregoing are preliminary remarks, the full
significance of which we shall try to bring out in
what follows by reviewing some of the criticisms the
Treatise received in its time and Fan Chen's
responses to them.
CONTEMPORARY CRITJCISMS AND FAN CHEN'S RESPONSES
The fact that Fan Chen pinned his thesis of the
destructibility of the spirit on premises for which
he had offered no positive evidences in support had
already caught the attention of his contemporary
Buddhist critics, notably Hsiao Ch'en, who
commented:
Now, in speaking of the oneness in substance of body
and spirit, one should give proofs of their
inseparability. But it is simply asserted: "The
spirit is the same as the body; the body is the same
as the spirit.... Body and spirit can not be
separated from each other." Such [a way of] arguing
is baseless, and is contrary [to the character of] a
sound exposition.(40)
Under such a circumstance, the Buddhists' natural
reaction was to stick fast to their own conception
of the existence of a spiritual substance distinct
from the bodily substance, so that the impermanence
of the latter would not in any way affect the
indestructibility of the former. This, in point of
fact, was what Ts'ao Ssu-wen did when he quoted Fan
Chen's proposition: "The spirit is the same as the
body; the body is the same as the spirit. Thus, when
the body exists, the spirit exists; when the body
perishes, the spirit is also destroyed"--only to
contravene it with the opposite claim of the
separate existence of body and spirit in man:
The body is not the same as the spirit; the spirit
is not the same as the body. They come together to
give rise to various functions; but coming together
is not sameness.(41)
Unlike Fan Chen, who seldom offered positive
proofs for his thesis of the oneness of body and
spirit, the Buddhists often supported their belief
in the
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separability of body and spirit by putting forward
factual evidence, some of the most important of
which we have already come across in our exposition
of the Treatise as objections to Fan Chen's idea of
a destructible soul. Another of the Buddhists'
favorite kinds of factual evidence was appealed to
by both Hsiao Ch'en and Ts'ao Ssu-wen when they
presented the premise of the existence of two
substances "body" and "spirit" as a rival theory to
Fan Chen's premise of the existence of one bodily
substance only, and that is connected with the
phenomenon of the dream.(42) Now, when a person is
dreaming, his body is unconscious, and yet his
spirit continues to perceive and experience things.
Is this not a clear indication that the spirit can
function apart from the body? That the spirit is
acting independently of the body in dreams appears
all the more plausible if we consider the following
facts:
1. In dreams, a person's spirit may undergo
experiences which are contrary to the current
state of his body. Thus, it is recorded that
Ch'in Miu-kung(aj) and Chao Chien-tzu(ak)
dreamed of themselves wandering off to the
highest heaven and enjoying all its rare
pleasures, when their bodies remained on earth
and were suffering from the most severe
sickness.(43)
2. In dreams, a person's spirit can perform all
sorts of impossible feats, which his actual body
can never execute, such as flying thousands of
miles up into the sky, transformint tself into a
butterfly, and so forth.
Fan Chen's rejoinder to this "dream" argument of
the Buddhists confirms unequivocally our observation
on the remarkable consistency of his thought. True
to his original supposition of the ontological
dependence of the spirit on the body, Fan Chen
firmly rejects the suggestion that the spirit is
functioning apart from the body in dreams, and
points to the fact that people inevitably allude to
their bodily states when reporting their dream
experiences to demonstrate that the spirit is as
much reliant on the body when it is in dream as when
it is awake:
[As for the cases of] Chao Chien-tzu becoming the
guest of the [One on] High and Ch'in Miu-kung
soaring up to [the place of the Heavenlyl Emperor
[in their dreams], it is reported that their ears
heard [the grand music of] the Central Sky, and
their mouths even partook [food of] a hundred
tastes.(44) In like manner their bodies should have
rested in huge [celestial] mansions, and their eyes
should have been delighted [by the panoramic view
of] high and low. They might even have worn
embroidered [godly] raiments and controlled bridles
[of heavenly horses huge] as dragons. So, we know
that what the spirit [in dream] desires is not
different from that of a person [who is awake]. With
the four limbs and seven apertures, (45) [the
dream-body] is in every part equivalent to the body
[that is awake]. One bird can not go far and so
birds do not fly unless in pairs. If the spirit is
in need of nothing, why has it to rely on the body
for its subsistence?(46)
By the spirit in dream being reliant on the body,
Fan Chen does not mean that the spirit comes to be
associated with another body distinct from the one
which it is united with when it is awake. In fact,
he cites the very impossibility of such a state of
affairs as evidence against the second point rasied:
P415
When you say that the spirit wanders as a butterfly
[in dream],(47) do you mean that it actually becomes
a flying insect? If so, when it dreams of becoming a
cow, it would draw the carts of man; when it dreams
of becoming a horse, it would be ridden by people;
and at daybreak, there should be [discovered the
corpses of] a dead cow and a dead horse. But why are
such objects not found?... Dreams are illusory, and
come out of nowhere. It is odd that you would take
them as real. [Giving free rein to] our imagination
at daytime, [our minds] roam all over sky and sea
while [our bodies remain] seated. [As a
consequence,] our spirits inside become confused,
and falsely perceive [all kinds of] strange things
[in sleep].(48)
If the spirit in dream really becomes a butterfly, a
cow, a horse, and so forth, it would be able to
perform all the acts proper to these creatures, such
as wandering in the sky, drawing carts, riding
people, and so forth. But such deeds are only
possible through the body. Hence, there would exist
the bodies of a butterfly, a cow, and so forth with
which the spirit in dream performs its actions. But
such bodies are nowhere to be found in the real
world. This seems to suggest that the spirit does
not in fact become a butterfly, a cow, and so forth
in dream, and all those extraordinary feats it
executes in the dream state are mere illusions. As
for the cause of such illusions, Fan Chen imputes it
to the delusive influence of the imagination, which
confuses the mind and makes it fancy in sleep all
sorts of strange happenings. To counter the first
point raised, Fan Chen appeals to the deep concern
the spirit feels for the welfare of the body in
everyday life, without meeting the force of the
objection to its face:
If it is as you suggest, the bodies [of Ch'in
Miu-kung and Chao Chien-tzu] were sick without their
spirits being sick. Then, when we are hurt and feel
pain, our bodies would be in pain without our
spirits feeling pain. When we are troubled and feel
worried, our bodies would be worried without our
spirits feeling worried. As [all] worries and gains
are taken care of by the body, why should [the
spirit] bother about things which are of no [concern
to it at all]?(49)
The preceding exchange between Hsiao Ch'en and
Ts'ao Ssu-wen on the one side and Fan Chen on the
other repeats a pattern which characterizes a large
part of the deliberation in the Treatise. First, we
have the proponents of the idea of indestructible
spirit alluding to some common experiences to
support their thesis of the existence of two
substances, body and spirit. Then we have Fan Chen
criticizing the proofs offered, as well as giving an
alternative explanation of the mentioned experiences
from the perspective of his materialistic premise of
the existence of one bodily substance only. While in
rejecting his opponent's argument, Fan Chen does in
this particular incidence go further than usual to
show its mistake (in conceiving of the spirit as
functioning apart from the body, by noting that
dream experiences can be related only in bodily
terms), he still has not put forward any concrete
reason to support his own understanding (of dream
experiences as products of false imagination). Thus,
even if the opponents' interpretation of the
experiences concerned is erroneous, the soundness of
Fan Chen's own interpretation is still up in the
air. Needless to say, the Fan Chen
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disclaimer, even if justified, has repudiated only
one of the grounds for holding the premise ofthe
existence of two substances. It has by no means
shown that the premise itself is inadmissible.
We have seen how Fan Chen brings in the simile
of knife and keenness to clarify the "substance"
vis-a-vis "function" relation between body and
spirit in the Treatise. On the one hand, the
"function" spirit can not exist without the
"substance" body, just as there is no keenness
without knife; on the other hand, the "substance"
body will not be the same "substance" without its
spiritual "function," just as knife will no longer
be knife without its keen property. Meant largely as
an illustration and being entirely peripheral to the
overall argument of the Treatise, this parallel that
Fan Chen draws between the knife-keenness relation
and the body-spirit relation has received much
attention from commentators ancient and modern, so
much so that any discussion of the essay would
appear incomplete without a few words on the various
criticisms it receives on this score.
One form of criticism stems from reading this
parallel as an argument by analogy. In an argument
by analogy, we compare two things, A and B: we find
some resemblances, say X, Y, and Z, between them;
and then we reason that since A has some further
feature, it is most likely that B also has this same
feature. Now, it has been pointed out by Shen Yueh
that not only do no such resemblances X, Y, and Z
exist between the knife-keenness relation and the
body-spirit relation, but there are actually many
marked dissimilitudes:
1. A knife can be broken into two halves without
losing its keenness, whereas a body can not be
cut into two portions without being deprived of
its spiritual disposition.
2. Keenness pertains to only one, and at most two,
sides of a knife, whereas the influence of the
spirit pervades the entire body of man.
3. Keenness, as the function of a knife, can cut
all objects indiscriminately, whereas spirit, as
the function of the body, assumes diverse
noninterchangeable roles according to the part
of the body through which it operates.(50)
The problem with this criticism is that it
attributes to Fan Chen a step of reasoning which he
never means to take. Fan Chen mentions the case of
knife and keenness mainly to illustrate truths
regarding the body-spirit relation which he obtains
from his "materialistic" premises. He does not
bother himself with comparing carefully all aspects
of the knife-keenness relation with those of the
body-spirit relation to establish a strict
correspondence, for he does not have in mind the
presenting of an argument by analogy in the first
place. And to fault him for giving an invalid
argument by analogy is to misplace the original
purport of the simile.
More relevant and so more damaging is the
allegation that the simile of knife and keeness does
not represent those traits it sets out to exemplify,
but can instead be borrowed to exemplify exactly the
opposite traits:
P417
1. Shen Yueh observes that a knife can be remolded
into a sword without the function of keenness
being destroyed. So, keenness can exist in the
absence of a knife. In the same manner, spirit
can exist in the absence of the body.(51)
2. Hsiao Ch'en notes that a knife can turn blunt
and still be considered a knife. So, knife and
keeness can exist apart from each other. In the
same manner, body and spirit can subsist each
independent of the other.(52)
Different opinions have been expressed regarding
the soundness of such criticisms.(53) The decision
seems to hinge on how the words "knife" and
"keenness" are understood. If we take "knife" here
to mean any cutting instrument, and "keenness" the
ability to cut in general, it is indeed hard to
conceive of the ability to cut as existing apart
from any cutting instrument,(54) and of any object
deserving the name "cutting instrument" as being
devoid of the ability to cut. Yet, if we take
"knife" to indicate more specifically, say, a small
cutting instrument with a handle, and "keenness,"
say, a high degree of sharpness, then it can
certainly be argued that there can be keenness
without knife and knife without keenness, for a high
degree of sharpness can just as well be found in a
large cutting instrument without a handle, and a
short cutting instrument with a handle need not
always have to be of a high degree of sharpness.
Whatever the case may be, it should be remembered
that what is at issue is only the cogency of a
comparison; and even granting that the critics are
right and that the parallel Fan Chen draws is
misguided, this alone would not seriously impair the
Treatise's overall position. Also, the fact that the
comparison can be turned into an illustration of the
opposite conception of the separate existence of
body and soul does not by any means show that his
conception is well-founded, as the critics would
like us to believe, for to offer an illustration and
to give a proof are two different matters.
Our exposition so far reveals that the two
parties in the dispute are actually arguing at cross
purposes. First, we have the anti-Buddhist Fan Chen,
who proposes the materialistic premises of the
oneness of body and spirit and of the ontological
dependence of the latter upon the former, from which
he gets the conclusion of the destructibility of the
spirit he desires. Then, we have the Buddhists, who
produce the dualistic proposition of the separate
existence of body and spirit to prove that the
impermanence of the former would not entail the
destructibility of the latter. To defend his
materialistic presuppositions, Fan Chen sets about
to demonstrate that all the common experiences
brought in by the Buddhists to support their
dualistic model, such as the phenomenon of the
dream, can be construed in such a way as to be in
line with his conception of the existence of one
bodily substance only. The Buddhists in their turn
hold firm to their original interpretations of these
experiences, which they can do in full honesty, as
Fan Chen's alternative accounts contain little if
any definite evidence that their understanding is
invalid. To illustrate his materialistic premises,
Fan Chen puts forward the simile of knife and
keenness. The Buddhists duly redefine this simile
and transform it into an illustration of their own
dualistic position.
P418
Indeed, despite its heatedness and earnestness, the
controversy has basically so little to do with
factual consideration, and the intellectual
frameworks of the two sides involved have so little
in common, that the possibility of reaching any
meaningful agreement seems to be foredoomed from the
very beginning.
This antinomic character of the dispute becomes
apparent once again over the questions of the source
of consciousness and of the nature of death. We have
perceived how Fan Chen rejects the Buddhist thesis
of consciousness as the distinctive mark of a
spiritual substance existing independent of the
bodily substance, and proposes a different theory of
consciousnesss being the bodily substance's
essential attribute. We have also observed how Fan
Chen repudiates the Buddhist notion of death as the
divorcement of the spiritual substance from the
bodily substance, and advocates instead the idea of
death as the losing by the bodily substance of its
conscious property. Yet, since Fan Chen has never
given any definite proof that the views he renounces
are mistaken, the Buddhists' response is again to
reaffirm their original conceptions as against the
alternative pictures suggested:
When the Treatise maintains that the substance of
human beings is endowed with consciousness whereas
the substance of trees is devoid of consciousness,
is it not [out of the consideration] that human
beings are aware of coolness and warmth, feel pains
and itches, and live if nourished and die if harmed?
But the same is true of trees. In spring, they grow;
in autumn, they wither, When planted [in soil], they
always thrive; when plucked out [from the ground],
they always die. How can it be said that they are
devoid ofconsciousness? Now, the substance of human
beings is like that of trees. When the spirit
remains, the body abides; when the spirit departs,
the bodyperishes. When [the body] abides, [man is
like] a prosperous tree; when [the body] perishes,
[man is like] a withered tree. How can you judge
that it is not the spirit [in man] which knows, and
maintain that it is his [bodily] substance that
knows? All beings know with their spirits, and never
know with their [bodily] substance; just as plants
and insects are by nature only sensible to [the
alterations of] growth and decay and of life and
death, while the consciousness of human beings
[further] understand the differences of safety and
danger and of advantages and disadvantages. How can
it be maintained that it is not [the case] that man
has [one nonconscious] substance like [that of]
trees constituting his body, and another conscious
[substance] different from [that of] trees forming
his spirit? Thus, body and spirit are two [separate
entities], and can be differentiated from each
other.(55)
These remarks of Hsiao Ch'en amount largely to a
reassertion of the Buddhist position that it is not
the body but the spirit which is endowed with
conciousness, and that death is the consequence of
the separation of the latter from the former. To
counter Fan Chen's contention that the bodily
substance of men possesses consciousness and that it
is this character which distinguishes it from the
bodily substance of trees, Hsiao Ch'en has indeed
come forward here with the rather novel idea that
even material objects like trees likewise have
consciousness, only that it is a lower form of
consciousness restricted to the perceptions of
growth and decay and of life and death, and
incapable of further discerning the differences of
safety and danger and of advantages and
disadvantages,
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as can the consciousness of men. But that is merely
to extend the compass of the spiritual realm. It
does not provide any additional theoretical ground
for the interpretation of the phenomena of
consciousness and death based on the dualistic
model.
Hsiao Ch'en's objections to Fan Chen's view of
the relation between sensation, thought, and the
body are more interesting, for they at least raise
some concrete points of dissent:
1. On Fan Chen's admission that all parts of the
body "have their shares of the spirit," Hsiao
Ch'en rejoins:
The Treatise holds that body and spirit are not
different and [bodily organs] such as hands have
their shares of the spirit. In such case, the
spirit would have as its substance the body; [as
a consequence,] when the body is healthy, the
spirit would be healthy, and when the body is
wounded, the spirit would be impaired. But what
is the spirit? It is the faculty of thought. Now,
people may have their hands and legs broken and
muscles and skin injured and yet their intellect
still stays undisturbed. For instance, Sun
Pin(al), having his legs amputated, became yet
more skillful in military tactics;(56) and Lu
Fou(am), being deprived of his hands, lived yet
more in harmony with the Confucian path.(57)
These are decisive proofs that the spirit exists
apart from the body, and the body may become
injured and the spirit [still] be unharmed.(58)
2. To Fan Chen's attribution of spiritual functions
to such bodily organs as eyes and ears, Hsiao
Ch'en enlists the following counter-evidences:
If it is as held that mouth, nose, ear, and eye
each has its share of the spirit, then when one
eye suffers from an ailment, the spirit of sight
would be destroyed and both eyes would become
blind, and when one ear becomes sick, the spirit
of audition would be injured and both ears would
turn deaf. But such is not the case [in real
life]. So we know that the spirit [has the bodily
organs] as [its] apparatuses, and not as [its]
substance.(59)
3. On Fan Chen's ascription of the function of
thought to the heart organ in particular, Hsiao
Ch'en retorts:
Again, it is said that the heart [organ] is the
source of thoughts and thoughts can not reside in
other parts [of the body]. If [by other parts]
are meant [such other bodily organs as] mouth,
eye, ear, and nose, what is asserted is indeed
true. If [by other parts] are meant the heart of
other people, then it is not the case. Although
ear, nose, [and so forth] together constitute the
body, they can not mingle with each other, for
their offices are not the same and their
functions differ. [On the other hand,] even
though other hearts pertain to other bodies, they
can communicate with each other, for their
spiritual make-ups are equally profound and their
thoughts are alike efficacious. So, the Shu
ching(an) avers, "Open your mind, and enrich my
mind."(60)... The Shin ching(ao) states, "What
other men have in their minds, I can measure by
reflection."(61)... How can it be said that the
feelings of A can not take up abode in B's
figure, and the character of C can not reside in
D's frame?(62)
The preceding refutations are indeed pertinent
as objections, but it should be observed that they
need not cause Fan Chen any real embarrassment.
Refutation (1) is based on the tacit assumption
that the essence of the spirit is thought, an
assumption which we have already encountered in the
query of the interrogator in the Treatise.(63) So
Hsiao Ch'en reasons that if body and spirit are
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indeed not different, as Fan Chen maintains, then
when the body is injured, the spirit would also be
injured. Now, as the essence of the spirit is
thought, the injury of the spirit would mean the
injury of the ability to think. Thus, if Fan Chen is
right, when such bodily organs as hands and legs are
wounded, the ability to think, that is, the
intellect, would also be harmed. But that is clearly
contradicted by experience. As a consequence, Fan
Chen must be wrong in holding that body and spirit
are not different.
What Fan Chen has to do in reply is to deny the
tacit assumption, which he has already done in the
Treatise when he has spoken of the spiritual faculty
as spanning a wide spectrum, with "sensation" at the
shallow end and "thought" at the deep end. He would
admit that his thesis of the oneness of body and
spirit entails their simultaneous injury, but he
would disagree that the injury of the spirit
necessarily involves the injury of the capacity to
think. He would clarify that what type of spiritual
functions are wounded depends on the particular
bodily organ impaired. When hands and legs are hurt,
only the sensations associated with them are
affected. Since Fan Chen locates the seat of thought
in the heart, he would further add that the ability
to think is disturbed only when the heart organ is
harmed. That Sun Pin and Lu Fou became all the more
clever in their respective arts after losing their
legs and hands is not at all inconceivable, for legs
and hands are not those parts of the body having to
do with the intellectual kind of spiritual
activities.
The rationale of refutation (2) is not at all
clear. It appears to stem from comprehending Fan
Chen's statement that "all bodily organs have their
shares of the spirit" as meaning that every type of
bodily organ has its specific spirit, such as the
eyes, the spirit of sight, the ears, the spirit
of audition and so forth. Further, these spirits
exist in such a way that when any portion of the
types of bodily organs to which they are allied
perishes, they will be annihilated also. Given these
facts, it would indeed follow that "when one eye
suffers from an ailment, the spirit of sight would
be destroyed and both eyes would become blind, and
when one ear becomes sick, the spirit of audition
would be injured and both ears would turn deaf," and
Hsiao Ch'en's objection would hold. The problem, of
course, is that Fan Chen never intends his statement
to be read that way; and that is all that he would
need to point out to defend himself.
Refutation (3) concedes that a person's thoughts
pertain only to his heart organ, and not to his
other bodily organs such as the mouth, ear, and so
forth. But it continues to argue that they can
nevertheless pertain to the heart organs of other
men, and cites the possibility of the sharing of
thoughts and feelings between people to bear out its
contention. The problem with this refutation is that
it has confused the two senses of thought: thought
as the faculty of intelligence, and thought as idea.
When Fan Chen asserts that a person's thought
pertains to his heart organ only, he has the faculty
of intelligence in consideration. It being an
obvious fact that people's faculties of intelligence
can not be interchanged, Fan Chen thereby holds that
each person's thought is confined to
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his specific heart organ. He does not mean to say
that there can be no exchange of thought between
people, when "thought" is understood in the sense of
"idea." So, an attack against him for denying
interpersonal communication in maintaining that
people's thought pertains to their heart organs only
is totally beside the mark.
On the question of the ground of sagehood, the
exchange reverts once more to its regular antinomic
pattern. We have already beheld in our analysis of
the Treatise the Buddhist contention that the idea
of an independently existing spirit is necessary to
account for the moral and intellectual
dissimilitudes between the sage and the common man,
and Fan Chen's retort that all such dissimilitudes
can be explained by referring solely to bodily
differences. As customary, in proposing his
alternative theory, Fan Chen has made no attempt to
demonstrate the falsity of the opinion he dismisses.
So, as usual, the Buddhists' response is simply to
affirm anew their original view. Thus, Hsiao Ch'en
begins his defence by flatly denying Fan Chen's
suggestion that sages and common men are unlike in
bodily constitution, and turns once again to the
physical resemblances between Yang Huo and Confucius
and between Hsiang Chi and Emperor Shun to carry his
point:
The Treatise states, "How could the spirit of a sage
reside in the [bodily] vessel of a common man? Nor
would it ever happen that the spirit of a common man
be lodged in the body of a sage." Now, in their
bodily vessels,] Yang Huo was like Confucius, and
Hsiang Chi resembled Emperor Shun. These are
instances of the spirit of the common man dwelling
in the bodies of the sages.(64)
He stresses the absoluteness of their bodily
likenesses as against Fan Chen's intimation of their
superficiality:
[The cases of] alabaster and jade and of cranes and
phoenixes can not serve as illustrations [of what we
have in hand]. Alabaster is named in specific
alabaster, and jade is named in particular jade.
Cranes are referred to as "the wandering cranes,"
and phoenixes are called "the holy phoenixes." In
appellation, they are diverse; in appearance, they
are also dissimilar. But Shun had double pupils and
Hsiang Yu also had double pupils. What we have [in
their case] was not [two dissimilar things]
alabaster and jade with two [dissimilar] names, but
[eyes with] double pupils perceived to be alike.(65)
He further mentions the cases of legendary figures
assuming the physical forms of animals to show that
intellectual and moral excellences can not be
affairs of the body:
Furthermore, there were [the instances of] Nu
Kua(ap) with the body of a snake, and of Kao T'ao
with the mouth of a horse.(66) The spirits of sages
not only may enter the [bodily] vessels of common
men, but also may reside in the bodies of reptiles
and animals.(67)
While Fan Chen cites the example of speedy horses
with coats of like color to prove that distinction
in talent originates not from the external frame but
from the heart organ, Hsiao Ch'en sees this as
evidenct that thebody as a whole is
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irrelevant with respect to native abilities:
Now, horses with coats of like color may yet be nags
or spirited steeds. Thus, [we know that] coat has
nothing to do with the factor of speed, for the body
is not the carrier of sageness.(68)
Debates on the meaning of ancestral worship and
the existence of ghosts take this same antinomic
line. We have seen in our review of the Treatise
that the Buddhists take the survival of the spirits
of the dead and their continuous existence as ghosts
as the rationale for the practice of ancestral
worship, whereas Fan Chen finds the significance of
ancestral worship in its emotive and educative
functions. In their rejoinder to Fan Chen's
suggestion, the Buddhists have recourse once more to
the authority of the Confucian classics and the
examples of Confucian saints. So, Ts'ao Ssu-wen
castigates Fan Chen's conception of the ancestral
cult as personal prejudice contrary to the teaching
of the Confucian sages, and quotes the words of the
Hsiao ching:
The Hsiao ching says, "Formerly, the Duke of Chou
sacrificed to Hou Chi(aq) and treated him as
Heaven's equal. He made ancestral sacrifice to the
Emperor Wen at the ming-t'ang(ar), and treated him
as the Supreme Lord's equal."(69) If body and spirit
were destroyed together [at death], what was there
to be treated as Heaven's equal? What was there to
be treated as the Supreme Lord's equal?(70)
To treat something nonexistent as the equal of
Heaven is to deceive Heaven. To pay homage to
something nonexistent in public is to deceive man.
So, if Fan Chen is right, the Duke of Chou would
have been guilty of deceiving both Heaven and man
when making sacrifice to his forefathers and urging
his subjects to follow suit. The same would have
been true of Confucius when he made a point to offer
his daily food, be it coarse rice or plain
vegetable, to his forebears,(71) and of the author
of the Li chi, who enjoins descendents to approach
their ancestors with joy and to send them off with
sadness during sacrifices.(72)
Fan Chen's answer to Ts'ao Ssu-wen, which has
been passed down to us, testifies signally to that
remarkable consistency of thought of his which we
have previously noted. Fan Chen readily admits that
it follows from his thesis of the destructibility of
the spirit that ancestor worship is meaningless when
considered apart from its social functions. Indeed,
if men were all wise and virtuous, Confucian saints
would not have preached the doing of homage to those
who have died. But since this virtue is not the case
in actual life, the sages had to resort to
sacrifices to their ancestors as expedient
"instructions" to cultivate the mind and guide the
feelings of the ignorant and the untutored:
If people were all saints, there would be no
instruction in the first place. The enacting of
instructions is essentially for the sake of the
common people. The common people's disposition is to
esteem life and to scorn death. [If they think that]
the deceased survives [in the form of] souls, there
would develop in them the thought of respect; [if
they know that] consciousness ceases with death,
there would arise in them the attitude of
irreverence. Knowing such to be the case, the saints
thereby established [ancestral] temples, halls,
altars, and platforms to
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promote their mind of sincerity, and set up
[sacrificial] feasts and offerings to perpetuate
their [emotion of] selflessness.... Thus, the loyal
and the faithful have occasions to express their
feelings, and the arrogant and the brutal have
something to be afraid of. As a consequence,
[beneficial] teachings radiate from above, and
social customs become pure down below.(73)
Realizing that ordinary people "esteem life" and
"scorn death," ancient sages set up ceremonies of
ancestor worship and encouraged descendants to offer
sacrifices to their deceased forebears with the aim
of nourishing their "mind of sincerity" and
promoting their "emotion of selflessness." In doing
so, they were not endorsing the vulgar opinion of
the survival of the dead in the form of souls. To
the charge that if Fan Chen is correct Confucian
sages would have been practicing deceit when they
spoke of deceased ancestors as if living in
promoting the worship of them, Fan Chen gives the
following defence, which, ironically, is highly
reminiscent of the Buddhist notion of "skillfulness"
(fang-pien(as)):
The saints [, like the Tao(at) ] manifest as
benevolence but conceal their workings.(74) They
comprehend the divine and understand the
transformation [of things].(75) So, it is said that
saints are equal to the duties of all positions,
while the virtuous maintain the duties of their
position [only].(76) HOW can we judge them [solely]
by the expedient devices [they employ], and confine
our view of them to their words [alone]? By
deception is meant deeds which are harmful to common
morals and lead to devious paths. If [what is
concerned] can bring security to the ruler and peace
to the ruled, improve customs and reform mores, [so
that] the three luminary bodies [that is, the sun,
moon, and stars] become bright above and the common
people are happy below, what has it to do with
deception?(77)
Deceit, as Fan Chen sees it, has the nature of
"being harmful to common morals" and "leading to
devious paths." But in instructing the common folk
to pay homage to their dead ancestors, the sages
"bring security to the ruler and peace to the ruled"
as well as "improve customs and reform mores." Their
way of guiding the nonenlightened according to their
needs is a concrete sign of their great benevolence
and infinite wisdom. How can it be labeled
"deception?"
CONCLUSION
Fan Chen composed the Treatise with the aim of
discrediting Buddhism by refuting its teachings of
transmigration and retribution, and he approached
his task by calling into question the concept of
indestructible spirit, which he considered to be an
indispensable element of the two teachings. We have
observed that even if we concede that the idea of
indestructible spirit is essential to the beliefs of
rebirth and karman, as most Chinese Buddhists of Fan
Chen's time were ready to do, Fan Chen still fell
short of accomplishing his objective. This was not
due to mere stubborn refusal to listen to reason on
the Buddhists' part, but was largely because Fan
Chen devoted himself, both in the Treatise and in
his subsequent exchanges with his Buddhist
opponents, chiefly to fencing off objections to his
thesis of destructibility of the soul, instead of
giving positive evidence against the notion of
indestructible spirit which he set out to dismantle.
So, we have to conclude that the great admiration
for Fan Chen in Mainland China
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today as a critic of idealism, that is, the theory
of the independent existence of the mental realm, is
a bit unwarranted.
If our analysis demonstrates Fan Chen's
limitation as a refuter of idealism, it also bears
witness to his considerable achievement as an
advocate of materialism, that is, the theory that
mental phenomena are ultimately explicable in
material terms. He postulated the two materialistic
suppositions of the oneness of body and spirit and
of the ontological dependence of the latter upon the
former. He developed from them a picture of human
existence which comprises the many aspects of
consciousness, sensation, intelligence, life and
death, and so forth--a picture which is at once
concise, uniform, and highly persuasive by the
standard of knowledge of his time. Readers familiar
with Western literature on the subject of the
immortal soul would not have failed to notice the
ideas of such famous Western polemics against the
concept of eternal spirit as the De Rerum Natura of
Lucretius (circa 99-circa 55 B.C.) and the Leviathan
of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) echoed in Fan Chen's
arguments and presented in as convincing, sharp, and
interesting a fashion. Indeed, not only as a
materialistic tract, but also as an essay on the
problems of body, mind, and death, the Treatise
merits serious attention from historians of the
philosophy of both East and West.
NOTES
1. The Treatise has long been lost as an
independent work and has been passed down to us only
in the form of citations included in the essay Nan
Shen-mieh-lun(au) of Hsiao Ch'en(ag) (478-529)
(included in Seng-yu(av) (445-518), ed., Hung-ming
chi(aw)) and as a part of Fan Chen's biography in
Yao Ssu-lien's(ax) (557-637) Liang shu(i). These two
versions disagree only in minor details, and as the
Hung-ming chi is the earlier work, we shall base our
discussion on its text. A complete translation of
the Treatise can be found in Etienne Balazs, Chinese
Civilization and the Bureaucracy, ed. Arthur Wright,
trans. H. M. Wright (New Haven, Connecticut and
London: Yale University Press, 1964), pp.266-276.
2. To appreciate the high regard in which the
Treatise and its author are held in contemporary
Chinese academic circles, see, for example, Ch'en
Yuan-hui(ay), Fan Chen ti wu-shen-lun ssu-hsiang(az)
(Wuhanb(ba), 1957), pp. 41-43; Hou Wai-lu(bb) and
others, Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang t'ung-shih(bc), vol. 3
(Peking, 1957), pp. 373-374; Jen Chi-yu(bd), ed.,
Chung-kuo che-hsueh shih(be), vol. 2 (Peking, 1963),
pp. 292-294; and Fang Li-t'ien(bf) and others, eds.,
Chung-kuo ku-tai chu-ming che-hsueh-chia
p'ing-chuan(bg), vol. 2 (Shantung(bh), 1980), pp.
483-485.
3. W. Pachow, "The Controversy over the
Immortality of the Soul in Chinese Buddhism, "
Journal of Oriental Studies 16, nos. 1-2 (1978): 38.
4. Mou Tzu, Li-hou lun(bi) , in Seng-yu,
Hung-ming chi (Takakusu Jujiro(bj) and Watanabe
Kaikyoku(bk), eds., Taisho shinshuu daizokyo(bl), 85
vols. (Tokyo, 1924-1934), vol. 52, p. 3b; hereafter
cited as T).
5. For details on the background and history of
the debate on the question of the indestructibility
of the soul between Buddhists and anit-Buddhists
before Fan Chen, consult W. Pachow, "Controversy,"
pp. 27-32. 36-37; Whalen W. Lai "Beyond the Debate
on 'The Immortality of the Soul': Recovering an
Essay by Sheh Yueh," Journal of Oriental Studies 19,
no. 2 (1981) : 139-145; Chu Po-k'un(bm), "Chin
Nan-pei Ch'ao shih-ch'i wu-shen-lun che fan-tui
Fo-chiao chung ling-hun pu-ssu hsin-yang ti
tou-cheng(bn) , " Pei-ching Ta-hsuueh hsueh-pao
(jen-wen k'o-hsuueh(bo)) (1957, no. 2): 29-45; Hou
Wai-lu, T'ung-shih, pp. 361-372; T'ang
Yung-t'ung(bp), Han Wei Liang-Chin Nan-pei Ch'ao
Fo-chiao shih(bq), 2d ed. rev. (Peking, 1963), pp.
423-428; Lu Ch'eng(br), Chung-kuo Fo-hsuueh yuan-liu
lueh-
P425
chiang(bs) (Peking, 1979) , pp. 152-155; Tsuda
Saukichi(bt), "Shimmetsu fumetsu no ronso(bu)," in
Tsuda Saukichi, Shina Bukkyo no kenkyuu(bv) (Tokyo,
1957), pp. 160-181; Enokido Akira(bw), "Shimmetsu
ronri no yurai(bx) , " Chuugoku tetsugaku 5(by)
(1967): 28-38; Kimura Sencho(bz), "Goho-setsu no
juyo to shimmetsu fumetsu(ca) , Bukkyogaku
seminaa(cb) 20 (1974) : 285-302; and Nitsugiri
Jikai(cc), "Shin fumetsu ron to shuukyo sho(cd),
Otani gakuho(ce) 53, no. 4 (1974): 70-72.
6. For a translation of relevant documents in
the dispute, consult Waiter Liebenthal, "The
Immortality of the Soul in Chinese Thought, "
Monumenta Nipponica 8, nos. 1-2 (1952): 327-397.
7. The term "spirit" (shen) is a legacy of the
Chinese cultural milieu, and in borrowing it to
explain the functioning of karman and rebirth, the
Buddhists naturally took over as well the
conventional Chinese understanding of the concept.
For information concerning the traditional
connotations of the term "spirit" in China, refer to
Whalen W. Lai, "Beyond the Debate," pp. 141-144; Mou
Chung-chien(cf), "Chung-kuo li-shih shang kuan-yu
hsing-shen wen-t'i ti cheng-lun(cg), " in T'ang
Ching-chao(ch) , ed., Chung-kuo wu-shen-lun
ssu-hsiang lun-wen chi(ci) (Chiangsu(cj), 1980), pp.
127-136; Wang Chu-chung(ck), "Lueh-lun Sui-T'ang
i-ch'ien hsiang-shen-kuan ti fa-chan(cl)," She-hui
k'o-hsueh chi-k'an(cm) 3 (1981): 25-30; and Tsuda
Saukichi, "Shimmetsu," pp. 94-144.
8. Biographies of Fan Chen can be found in Yao
Ssu-lien, Liang shu (Peking, 1973), pp. 664-671, and
Li Yen-shao(cn), Nan shih(co) (Peking, 1975), pp.
1420-1422. For contemporary accounts, see Balazs,
Chinese Civilization, pp. 256-260; Fang Li-t'ien,
P'ing-chuan, pp. 449-455; and Matsuo Ryokai(cp),
"Shimmetsu ron shoko(cq)," Taisho Daigaku kenkyuu
kiyo(cr) (1964): 132-135.
9. Yao Ssu-lien, Liang shu, p. 665.
10. T, vol. 52, p. 57b,
11. 15-16. 11. Ibid., p. 57b, 11. 21-26.
12. For analyses of the Treatise and accounts of
Fan Chen's debates with the Buddhists, consult
Balazs, Chinese Civilization, pp. 262-265; Aloysius
Chang, "Fan Cheng and His 'Treatise on the
Destruction of the Soul'," Chinese Culture 14, no. 4
(1973): 1-8; W. Pachow, "Controversy," pp. 33-35;
Whalen W. Lai, "Beyond the Debate," pp. 1 46-148;
Chu Po-k'un, "Chin Nan-pei Ch'ao shih-chi," pp.
45-60; Hou Wai-lu, T'ung-shih, pp. 381-398; Ch'en
Yuan-hui, Fan Chen, pp. 9-40; Kuan Feng(cs), "Fan
Chen t'ung Hsiao ch'en kuan-yu 'hsing-shen pu-erh'
ho `hsing-shen fei-i' ti lun-cheng(ct)," Kuang-ming
jih-pao(cu), 10 August 1962, p. 4; T'ang Yung-t'ung,
Fo-chiao shih, pp. 470-473; Jen Chi-yu, Chung-kuo
che-hsueh shih, pp. 283-292; Fang Li-t'ien,
P'ing-chuan, pp. 470-482; Lok Shou-ming(cv), "Fan
Chen ti hsing-shen-kuan tsai jen-shih-shih shang ti
ti-wei(cw)," in Chung-kuo She-hui K'o-hsueh-yuan
Che-hsueh Yen-chiu-so(cx) , ed., Chung-kuo
che-hsueh-shih yen-chiu chi-k'an(cy) 2 (1982) :
349-375; Matsuo Ryokai, "Shimmetsu ron, " pp.
149-154; and Hachiya Kunio(cg), "Hanshin `Shimmetsu
ron' no shiso ni tsuite(ds)," Toyo Bunka Kenkyuujo
kiyo(db) 61(1973): 63-118.
13. T, vol. 52, p. 55a, 1. 10.
14. Ibid., p.55a, 11.11-12.
15. Ibid., p. 55a, 11.16-17.
16. Some versions of the text read "blade"
(jen(dc)) instead of "knife" (tao(dd)), and it has
been argued that the relation between "body" and
"spirit" as conceived by Fan Chen is more aptly
illustrated by the relation between "blade" and
"keenness" than by the relation between "knife" and
"keenness," as "keenness" is an essential property
of"blade," but not of"knife." On the other hand, we
do sometimes talk of a blade turning blunt or of a
blunt blade, which seems to indicate that in
ordinary language, "keenness" is not necessary to
the concept "blade," in the same manner as it is not
necessary to the concept "knife."
17. T, vol. 52, p. 55b, 11.15-18.
18. Ibid., p. 55b, 1.28c, 1.1.
19. Ibid., p. 55c, 11.2-6.
20. Ibid., p. 55c, 11.14-18.
21. Ibid., p. 56a, 1.25b, 1.2.
22. The five viscera are: heart, liver, spleen,
lungs, and kidneys.
23. The seven apertures art: two eyes, two ears,
two nostrils, and mouth.
24. T, vol. 52, p. 56b, 11.9-16.
25. Ibid., p. 56c, 11.17-18.
26. Fang Hsun, Chung Hua, and Hsien Yuan are,
respectively, the other names of Yao(de), Shun(t)
and Huang-ti(df), legendary emperors in prehistoric
China. Kao T'ao was allegedly one of leading
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ministers of Shun in charge of the maintenance of
law and order. Tales of their extraordinary
appearances were already well-known in the Han
dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220), and references to them
can be found in works of that time, such as Wang
Ch'ung's(dg) (27-circa 104) Lun-hen(dh) (Shanghai,
1974), p. 36.
27. Pi Kan so enraged Emperor Chou(di), last
ruler of the Shang dynasty(dj) (circa 1766-1125
B.C.) , with his repeated reprimands concerning
immorality that the latter had him put to death by
tearing out his heart. Po Yo was the given name of
Chiang Weidk (202-264), a leading general of the
State of Shu(dl) in the period ofthe Three Kingdoms
(220-265). Anecdotes about their heart and gall
bladder can be found in Ssu-ma Ch'ien(dm) (145-circa
86 B.C.), Shih chi(dn) (Peking, 1959), p. 108, and
P'ei Sung-chih's(do) (372-451) commentary on the
San-kuo Chih(dp) (Peking, 1962), p. 1068.
28. T, vol. 52, p. 56c, ll.19-26.
29. Ibid., p. 56c, 11.27-29. For references to
the physical resemblances between Confucius and Yang
Huo and between Emperor Shun and Hsiang Chi, refer
to Ssu-ma Ch'ien, Shi chi, p. 1919 and p. 338.
30. Ibid., p. 57a, 1.5. Ch'iu and Tan were the
personal names of Confucius and the Duke of
Chou(dg). T'ang and Wen were the founders of the
Shang dynasty and Chou dynasty(dr) (1122-256 B.C.),
respectively.
31. T, vol. 52, p. 57a, 11.1-3.
32. The version of the Liang shu is used in
rendering this sentence. The Hung-ming chi's
version reads, "Sages resemble each other for being
alike in the sage-organs, but their organs need not
be the same," which hardly makes sense.
33. T, vol. 52, p. 57a, 11.7-8.
34. Ibid., p. 57b, 11.12-13. For the quotation
from the I ching, see Richard Wilheln, trans., The I
Ching, rendered into English by Cary F. Baynes
(London: Routledge Be Kegan Paul, 1951), p. 349.
35. For detailed accounts of these incidences in
the Tso chuan, see James Legge, trans., The Chinese
Classics, vol. 5 (reprint, Hong Kong: University of
Hong Kong Press, 1960), pp. 81, 82, 613, and 618.
Also see Balazs, Chinese Civilization, pp. 273-274
n. 39.
36. T, vol. 52, p. 57a, 11.16-18. Po Yu and
P'eng Sheng were members of the ruling clans of the
kingdoms of Cheng and Ch'i, respectively.
37. See Wilhelm, I Ching, pp. 316-317, and p.
161. Changes in the translation have been
introduced.
38. T, vol. 52, p. 57a, 11.19-20.
39. Ibid., p. 57a, 11.21-23.
40. Ibid., p. 55a, 11.18-20.
41. Ibid., p. 58a, 11.17-18.
42. See ibid., pp. 55a-b and 58a-b.
43. For references to these incidences, see
Ssu-ma Ch'ien, Shih chi, pp. 1786-1787.
44. See ibid., p. 1787.
45. See n. 23 preceding for a list of the seven
apertures.
46. T, vol. 52, p. 58c, 11.9-14.
47. This refers to the famous butterfly dream of
Chuang Choud(ds) (369-286 B.C.). Consult Burton
Watson, trans., The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu
(New York & London: Columbia University Press,
1968), p. 49.
48. T, vol. 52, p. 58c, 1.25-p.59a, 1.7.
49. Ibid, p. 58c, 11.17-21.
50. See ibid., p. 254a.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid, p. 55b.
53. For some examples, see Jen Chi-yuu,
Chung-kuo che-hsueh shih p. 287, and W. Pachow,
"Controversy," pp. 34 and 35.
54. Unless we subscribe to the Platonic theory
of the existence of a separate world of ideas.
55. T, vol. 52, p. 56a, 11.11-21.
56. See the biography of Sun Pin in Ssu-ma
Chien, Shitr chi, pp. 2162-2165.
57. See the biography of Lu Hou in Fang
Hsuuan-ling(dt) (578-648) and others, Chin slru(du)
(Peking, 1974), p. 1256.
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58. T, vol. 52, p. 56b, 11.25-29.
59. Ibid., p. 56c, 11.4-7.
60. See Legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 3, p.
252.
61. See Legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 4, p.
342.
62. T, vol. 52, p. 56c, 1l.8-16.
63. Refer to n. 21 preceding.
64. T, vol. 52, p. 57a, 11.24-26.
65. Ibid., p. 57a, 1.27-b, 1.1.
66. Nu Kua was a legendarys female ruler in
prehistoric China. Reference to her snake-body can
be found, for example, in Ts'ao Chih's(dv) (192-232)
Nu-kua tsan(dw) , in Ts'ao chi ch'uan-p'ing(dx)
(Shanghai, 1933) vol. 2, p. 7. As for Kao Tao's
appearance, see n. 26 preceding.
67. T, vol. 52, p. 57b, 11.1-2.
68. Ibid., p. 57b, 11.8-9.
69. See Mary L. Makra, trans., The Hsiao Ching
(New York: St. John's University Press, 1961), p.
19. Hou Chi was reputedly a minister of Emperor Shun
in charge of agriculture and the founder of the
house of Chou. Refer to Ssu-ma Ch'ien, Shih chi, pp.
111-112. The ming-t'ang, the "bright hall," was the
part of the imperial residence where court and
sacrificial ceremonies were held.
70. T, vol. 52, p. 58b, 1l.7-9.
71. Ibid., p. 58b, 11.15-16. This practice by
Confucius is recorded in the Lun yu(dy). See Legge,
The Chinese Classics, vol. 1, p. 233.
72. T, vol. 52, p. 58b, 11.16-17. See James
Legge, trans., The Li Ki, in The Sacred Books of the
East, ed. F. Max Muller, vol. 28 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1885), p. 210.
73. T, vol. 52, p. 59a, 11.19-26.
74. This is a reference to the I ching. See
Wilhelm, I Ching, p. 321.
75. This is another quotation from the I ching.
See ibid., p. 363.
76. This is a statement taken from the Tso
chuan. See Legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 5, pp.
386 and 388.
77. T, vol. 52, p. 59b, 11.12-16.
a 范縝 x 湯
b 神滅論 y 文
c 武帝 z 孝經
d 梁朝 aa 易經
e 唐朝 ab 左傳
f 神 ac 伯有
g 牟子 ad 彭生
h 齊書 ae 齊
i 梁書 af 鄭
j 蕭子良 ag 蕭琛
k 質 ah 曹思文
l 用 ai 沈約
m 放勛 aj 秦繆公
n 重華 ak 趙簡子
o 軒轅 al 孫臏
p □陶 am 盧浮
q 比干 an 書經
r 伯約 ao 詩經
s 陽貨 ap 女媧
t 舜 aq 后稷
u 項籍 ar 明堂
v 丘 as 方便
w 旦 at 道
p428
au 難神滅論 ck 王舉忠
av 僧祐 cl 略論隋唐以前形神觀的發展
aw 弘明集 cm 社會科學輯刊
ax 姚思廉 cn 李延壽
ay 陳元暉 co 南史
az 范縝的無神論思想 cp 牧尾良海
ba 武漢 cq 神滅論小考
bb 侯外廬 cr 大正大學研究紀要
bc 中國思想通史 cs 關鋒
bd 任繼愈 ct 范縝同蕭琛關於`形神不二'和`形神非一'
的論爭
be 中國哲學史 cu 光明日報
bf 方立天 cv 樂壽明
bg 中國古代著名哲學家評傳 cw 范縝的形神觀在認識史上的地位
bh 山東 cx 中國社會科學院哲學研究所
bi 理惑論 cy 中國哲學史研究集刊
bj 高楠順次郎 cz 蜂屋邦夫
bk 渡邊海旭 da 范縝`神滅論'ソ思想ズコゆサ
bl 大正新脩大藏經 db 東洋文化研究所紀要
bm 朱伯昆 de 刃
bn 晉南北朝時期無神論者反對佛教中 dd 刀