Gerald James Larson **The *trimūrti* of *dharma* in Indian thought: Paradox or contradiction?**

The article is in two parts. In the first part, I will offer some assertions regarding the meaning of the term *dharma* along with attempting to establish an interpretive model for viewing it in larger perspective. In the second part, I will raise the issue of the internal consistency of the notion as a normative idea and offer a fivefold typology of possible attitudes toward *dharma*.[1] At the outset perhaps I should define certain terms that I shall be using and assuming throughout the paper. By "regulative principle" I mean simply any normative or dominant idea generally accepted by people in a culture as

Gerald J. Larson is Chairman, Department of Religious Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara.

[1] By *trimūrti* of *dharma* I mean (1) *sādhāraṇadharma*; (2) *varṇāśramadharma*; and (3) *mokṣadharma*. The literature, both primary and secondary, on *dharma* is vast, but the following is a bibliographical note which will indicate sources used for this article. For a useful overview of *dharmaśāstra* and *dharmasūtra*, see section entitled "The Dharma-śāstras" in *Cultural Heritage of India*, 2d ed., vol. 2 (Calcutta: The Rama-krishna Mission Institute of Culture, 1962), pp. 301–448. The essays are of uneven quality, but excellent is V. Raghavan's "Manu-Saṃhita," pp. 335–363. One of the most important standard works on *dharma* is, of course, P. V. Kane's *History of Dharma Sāstra*, 5 vols. (Bombay: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1930–1962). Primary sources from *dharma* are indeed extensive, but only the following have been consulted in this paper: Georg Bühler, trans., *The Laws of Manu*, Sacred Books of the East, vol. 25 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1886; reprint ed. Delhi: Banarsidass, 1964); P. V. Krishna-macharya, ed., *Viṣṇusmṛti* (Madras: Adyar Library, 1964); S. C. Vasu, trans., *Yajna-valkya's Smrti* . . . , Sacred Books of the Hindus, vol. 2 (1909); S. K. Belvalkar, ed., *The Mahābhārata* (Critical Edition), the Śāntiparvan (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1966), and see especially introductions to "Rājadharma," "Āpad-dharma" (by S. K. Belvalkar), and "Mokṣadharma" (by V. M. Bedekar), in vol. 16, pp. 181–247. Other helpful studies that have been used follow in alphabetical order: A. S. Altekar, *Sources of Hindu Dharma in Its Socio-religious Aspects* (Sholapur: Institute of Public Administration, 1952); S. C. Banerji, *Dharma Sūtras* (Calcutta: Punthi Pustak, 1962); D. Mackenzie Brown, ed., *The White Umbrella* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1953); G. A. Chandavarka, *A Manual of Hindu Ethics*, 2d ed. (Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1925); Surama Dasgupta, *Development of Moral Philosophy in India* (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1961); M. N. Dutt, *The Dharma Sutras* (Calcutta: Society for the Resuscitation of Indian Literature, 1908); F. Edgerton, "Dominant Ideas in the Formation of Indian Culture," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 62:151ff.; idem, "Interpretation of the Bhagavad Gītā," in *The Bhagavad Gītā* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964); G. S. Ghurye, *Caste and Class in India*, 2d ed. (Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1957); E. W. Hopkins, *The Ethics of the Hindus* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1924); K. V. R. Iyengar, *Some Aspects of the Hindu View of Life* . . . (Baroda: Baroda University, 1952); K. P. Jayaswal, *Manu and Yajñavalkya—A Comparison and a Contrast* (Calcutta: Butterworth, 1930); S. K. Maitra, *The Ethics of the Hindus* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1925); R. B. Pal, *The History of the Hindu Law* . . . (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1958); R. B. Pandey, *Hindu Samskāras* 2d ed. (Delhi: Banarsidass, 1969); R. W. Scott, *Social Ethics in Modern Hinduism* (Calcutta: YMCA Publishing House, 1953); I. C. Sharma, *Ethical Philosophies of India* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1965); finally, for discussions of *dharma* from a sociological perspective, see Max Weber, *The Religion of India* (New York: The Free Press, 1958); and M. N. Srinivas, *Social Change in Modern India* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966).

being in some sense important for the ordering and conduct of life. By the terms "culture" and "Indian culture" I simply accept the following definitions offered by F. Edgerton in "Dominant Ideas in the Formation of Indian Culture":

[Culture] . . . is a total way of human life viewed as a norm, and as such approved or at least tolerated, by a people as a whole, or by its articulate representatives generally.
    Indian culture is the norm of human life approved or accepted generally by the civilized inhabitants of India (Hindus) since roughly round about four or five hundred B.C. Its classical expression is found in literature from about that time on, in the Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit languages, and later in other languages, some Indo-Aryan, some Dravidian. It may properly be spoken of as approximately a unit in some important respects, and in most of these respects it is still the dominant cultural pattern over the greater part of India. (*Journal of the American Oriental Society* 62:151.)

I

The term *dharma* seems to be one impossible to reduce even to a few basic definitions. It is ubiquitous throughout the texts of the Indian tradition, ancient and modern, and has been used in a bewildering variety of ways. John Wisdom's parable about the meaning of the term "God" at least on the surface seems to be relevant with respect to the Sanskrit term *dharma*— that is, it has been applied, twisted, and qualified in so many ways that from the point of view of ordinary language it is meaningless or at best a convenient dumping ground for ideas that do not fit in more meaningful categories. But perhaps that is to be a bit harsh, and one should make an effort to say something more intellectually charitable.

    Typical of attempts to talk about the term *dharma* is Edgerton's comment: "*Dharma* is propriety, socially approved conduct, in relation to one's fellow men or to other living beings (animals or superhuman powers). Law, social usage, morality, and most of what we ordinarily mean by religion, all fall under this head." (*Ibid.*) V. Raghavan in an understandable cop-out simply suggests that *dharma* is " . . . all comprehensive . . . and difficult to define or understand."[2] E. W. Hopkins suggests such ideas as "right usage" and "good form" and points out that *dharma* can be traced back to the old Vedic notions of *ṛta* and *sat* (order as opposed to chaos).[3] In the *Atharva Veda* and the Brāhmaṇas the notion of order is connected with Prajāpati, but the references are puzzling. Sometimes Prajāpati is said to be in control of all law and order, and at other times he is described as the "firstborn" of right order. In the older Vedic tradition, Varuṇa and Indra are linked with

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 341.
[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 50–51.

the idea of law and order, but again it is not clear whether they are the sources or the guardians of the idea.[4]

When turning to *Dharmasūtra, Dharmaśāstra,* the epics, and the *Gītā,* if anything, the problem is even more complicated. Like the notions of *karman* and *saṁsāra,* it appears to be universally the case that everyone just knows what the term means, and one tends to find merely various types of *dharma* discussed. There is a *dharma,* for example, which applies to one's caste status and to one's stage in life—that is, *varṇāśramadharma.* At the same time, there is a *dharma* for kings—*rājadharma*—spelled out at great length in the Śāntiparvan of the *Mahābhārata.*[5] Then too, there is a *dharma* for the fighting of war (*yuddhadharma*) and a *dharma* for meeting emergencies whether individual or corporate—*āpaddharma.*[6] Moreover, there is a *dharma* for the age in which we live—*yugadharma*—and our *kaliyugadharma* is different than the *dharmas* for other *yugas.* There is, in addition, a common *dharma* for all men in whatever condition—*sādhāraṇadharma* or *sāmānya-dharma.* Manu gives two lists of such common *dharmas,* one includes such prescriptions as steadfastness, forgiveness, cleanliness, wisdom, learning, truth, and restraint of anger; the other, a more simplified list made up of non-violence, truth, nonthieving, purity, and control of the senses.[7] Finally, one finds numerous references to *mokṣadharma* or the *dharma* having to do with ultimate freedom. Manu divides *mokṣa* into two parts: *pravṛttidharma* or *mokṣa* involving worldly activity, and *nivṛttidharma* or *mokṣa* involving retirement from worldly activity. Manu basically recognizes only three ends of life, *dharma, artha,* and *kāma,* and places *mokṣa* under the category of *dharma.*[8] Other texts imply that *mokṣadharma* is somehow qualitatively different from ordinary *dharma, artha,* and *kāma.*

In spite of this amazing diversity, perhaps there is a thread that runs through all this material which in some sense ties things together. That thread, however, is not so much an abstraction like law or rational order, nor is it really custom as usually understood, nor is it religious or moral obligations in the usual sense. I would suggest the notion of "usage," not in terms of social usage but, rather, in the sense of "usage" understood linguistically. For purposes of communication, there is a correct way to use language; so, it seems to me, *dharma* implies "correct usage" both individually and corporately from the perspective of this linguistic model. There are four characteristics of "usage" in a linguistic sense which appear to be relevant to the term *dharma.*

[4] *Ibid.*
[5] S. K. Belvalkar, *The Mahābhārata* (Critical Edition), vol. 16, pp. 181–195.
[6] *Ibid.,* pp. 195–199.
[7] G. Bühler, *The Laws of Manu,* VI.92 and X.63.
[8] Raghavan, *op. cit.,* pp. 342, 359.

(1) "Correct" or "proper usage" in language means the use of reasonably correct grammatical principles, whether employed consciously or unconsciously. Yet the principles of grammar are themselves derived from the description of previous usage. Pāṇini's scientific grammar, for example, is based upon his description of the way people used the Sanskrit language in the fifth century B.C. probably in northwest India.[9] In a similar way *dharma* is a set of principles whose source or basis is often earlier usage in this linguistic or grammatical sense.

(2) "Usage" in a linguistic framework is a relative notion. Proper or correct usage is necessary for communication, but there are a variety of frameworks in which different kinds of usage are allowed. Appropriate communication includes such diverse norms as proper usage when addressing a dignitary, proper usage when addressing children, or proper usage when speaking or writing a formal document. Eloquence or sophisticated style may be desirable but would not be the norm. Rather, the norm would be adequacy of expression in the given concrete situation. Similarly, the notion of *dharma* implies a relative framework of conception and application. The *dharma* or "usage" is determined by the concrete context—that is, the king, the student, the warrior, and the holy man all have their appropriate duties, obligations, and natural inclinations which must be articulated or acted upon according to a given context.[10]

(3) "Usage" in language is not something confined just to situations of ethical ambiguity or philosophical reflection. Correct or proper usage pervades every event or action of personal or social life. The way in which one uses language determines style, orientation, attitude, and the impression one makes upon others in every moment of waking life. Moreover, such "usage" carries over into one's thinking, imagination, and feelings. So, also, it appears to be the case that *dharma* makes a similar kind of total claim or is all-comprehensive, having relevance often on a level of specific details in every-day life—for example, daily cleanliness, personal habits of all kinds, specific greetings for certain kinds of people, etc.[11]

(4) "Proper usage" in a linguistic framework, generally fixed in principle, changes or is flexible over long periods of time. Certain usages become characteristic and acceptable in some geographical areas but not in others. The values of words and expressions change from one historical period to another, and although there are obvious continuities and conservative tendencies which range over centuries, there is yet a surprising flexibility,

---

[9] For an excellent discussion of the structure and method of Pāṇini's work, see V. N. Misra, *The Descriptive Technique of Pāṇini* (The Hague: Mouton, 1966).
[10] See, for example, the varying obligations as set forth in Bühler, *op. cit.,* chaps. 2, 3, 6, 7, etc.
[11] See *Manu, Yājñavalkya, Viṣṇusmṛti,* etc.

sometimes in the direction of greater and greater artificiality or decadence of usage, sometimes in the direction of a tightening or condensation of past usage leading to more analytic and simplified modes of expression. Similarly, the idea of *dharma* has undergone numerous changes in such texts as *Manu*, *Yājñavalkya, Viṣṇusmṛti*, etc. One reads of usages appropriate in specific areas or of specific groups, and one reads of *dharma* changing from one *yuga* to another. A dialectic of continuity and change unfolds itself, inspired, on the one hand, by principles derived from past usage, and preserved yet revised, on the other, by the consensus of the community especially as articulated by the community's most eloquent spokesmen.[12]

Thus, *dharma* appears to mean "correct" or "proper usage" understood from this linguistic perspective. Most of the earlier mentioned varieties of types of *dharma—varṇāśramadharma, rājadharma, yuddhadharma, yuga-dharma, sādhāraṇadharma, svadharma*, etc.—would have a place in such an interpretation. In fact, as has sometimes been suggested in the literature, one could reduce all of the varieties of *dharma* in this ordinary sense to two: (1) *sādhāraṇadharma* or general aspects of "correct usage" regardless of age or station in life; and (2) *varṇāśramadharma* or specific usages required in given contexts.[13] Included in the latter category would be *yuddhadharma, rājadharma, yugadharma*, etc.

II

Unfortunately, however—and this brings us to the second part of the paper —there is one variety of *dharma* which does not fit into the above categories and yet is crucial for a proper understanding of *dharma* as a regulative principle in Indian culture. That variety, of course, is *mokṣadharma*, the *dharma* having to do with ultimate freedom or release.[14] Edgerton expresses the problem in the following manner: "There are two radically different norms of human life and conduct, both at least tolerated, indeed in some sense accepted and approved, each in its own sphere. I shall call them the *ordinary* and the *extraordinary* norms. One strange thing is that one of them seems to involve a complete negation or rejection of the other as an acceptable norm."[15] In the context of this article, the problem could be stated as follows: Whereas proper or correct usage understood in the framework of a linguistic model fits the notion of *sādhāraṇadharma* and *varṇāśramadharma*, the notion of *dharma* as *mokṣa* or the notion that the fulfillment of *dharma*

[12] A discussion of such variations may be found, for example, in Manu, *op. cit.*, pp. 401–417.
[13] Maitra, *The Ethics of the Hindus*, pp. 1–24. Cf. also Raghavan, Banerji, Dutt, Kane, etc.
[14] V. M. Bedekar, "Mokṣadharma," pp. 205 ff.
[15] "Dominant Ideas," pp. 151 ff.

is *mokṣa* does indeed appear to be a direct contradiction or negation of the whole idea of correct usage. S. K. Maitra in his book, *The Ethics of the Hindus,* states the problem very simply. Hindu ethics, involving the notion of *dharma* at almost every point, is " . . . a scheme of practical ethics which has the annulment of the practical life for its object."[16] There would seem to be, therefore, in Indian culture a dualism between what one might call an "ordinary *dharma*" which includes both *sādhāraṇadharma* and *varṇāśrama-dharma,* and an "extraordinary *dharma,*" which is *mokṣadharma.*

As in the first section of this article, the temptation is to suggest that there is no solution worth attempting. Either we are dealing with divergent traditions which have been unsatisfactorily conflated, or we are dealing with a nonproblem because the term *dharma* has been stretched to the point of nonsense or meaninglessness. Both answers have been given in the literature on the problem of *dharma,* but neither answer represents an especially favorable assessment of the idea of *dharma* as a regulative principle in Indian culture.

Another possible approach is to suggest that Indian culture has produced various interpretations of the relationship between "ordinary *dharma*" and "extraordinary *dharma*"—some of which indeed are contradictory but others of which, in some important sense, are resolutions of the problem and all of which are necessary to consider if the issue of a "regulative principle" in Indian culture is to be seriously raised. In other words, the very tension or polarity between "ordinary *dharma*" and "extraordinary *dharma*" brings one to the very heart of the problem of *dharma* as a regulative principle in Indian culture and the Indian tradition's own ambiguity or uncertainty regarding the issue. I propose, therefore, in the remainder of the article to set forth a typology of possible relations between "ordinary *dharma*" and "extraordinary *dharma*" based upon the Indian intellectual tradition. As in any typology, the constructs, of course, are to some extent ideal, and perhaps no tradition is the perfect embodiment of the type.[17] Yet the typology has the advantage of placing the issues in an intelligible framework—a starting point for further reflection.

It is possible to isolate at least five types of relationships between "ordinary *dharma*" and "extraordinary *dharma*." These five types are as follows.

(1) *Ordinary* dharma *totally negated in principle by extraordinary* dharma. In Indian culture, both ancient and modern, there is an interpretation of *mokṣa* which stresses the complete negation of ordinary *dharma* in personal and social life. The empirical world of proper usage, institutions, political responsibility, family relationships, etc., is a world of unqualified suffering,

---

[16] *Op. cit.,* p. 235.
[17] Moreover, it should be said that the types of relationships suggested here are not meant to be exhaustive.

a world that literally must be destroyed. Freedom is construed as complete isolation from not only social and political involvements but also from ordinary personal life. Ordinary *dharma* in such a view may be tolerated for one reason or another, but no positive value of any kind is attributed to it. This type of relationship between ordinary and extraordinary *dharma* is represented primarily by the traditions of classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga.[18] The ideal is the complete isolation of *puruṣa* in which all relationships are finally obliterated. This is indeed a radical, perhaps anarchistic, interpretation wherein no attempt is made to find a place of value for ordinary *dharma*.

(2) *Ordinary* dharma *and extraordinary* dharma *are synthesized using an analogy of genetic or biological development.* According to this type of interpretation, *mokṣadharma* is to be pursued only after one has completed obligations arising from ordinary *dharma*. This, of course, would be the view of Manu and other exponents of *dharmaśāstra*.[19] The pursuit of *mokṣa* comes only toward the end of life and does not negate the value of earlier ordinary *dharma*. In fact, ordinary *dharma* in this view may serve as a necessary preparation for the eventual pursuit of ultimate freedom. The problem in this type of interpretation, obviously, is that it tends to negate the value of *mokṣadharma*. A careful reading of Manu, for example, gives the impression that the author(s), at best, is paying only lip service to the ideal of *mokṣa*. *Mokṣa* is what a man pursues when he is ready to die and hence has little relevance for the actual pursuit of ordinary life.

(3) *Ordinary* dharma *in tension with extraordinary* dharma *in daily life.* In this view, the claims of ordinary *dharma* are inextricably and problematically allied with the claim of extraordinary *dharma*. To fulfill the obligations relating to ordinary *dharma* requires a constant awareness of the quest for freedom. In fact, in this view freedom is to be attained precisely in the midst of the performance of ordinary *dharma*. The embodiment of this type of interpretation, of course, would be a text like the *Bhagavad Gītā* in which Lord Kṛṣṇa tries to convince Arjuna that the obvious ordinary-*dharma* context is at the same time an extraordinary-*dharma* context. The *Gītā*, of course, has been interpreted in a great variety of ways, but it cannot be doubted that the author(s) of the *Gītā* attempts at least on one level to reinterpret *mokṣa* in terms of the *svadharma* of Arjuna and hence to synthesize or conflate the claims of ordinary and extraordinary *dharma*.[20] There is a dynamic and dialectical tension between *dharma* and *mokṣa* in the *Gītā*;

[18] For excellent discussions of the Yoga traditions, see M. Eliade, *Yoga: Immortality and Freedom* (New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1958), chaps. I and II; and J. W. Hauer, *Der Yoga* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1958), pp. 309ff. For Sāṃkhya, see G. Larson, *Classical Sāṃkhya* (Delhi: Banarsidass, 1969), pp. 220ff.

[19] In addition to Manu, see also Yājñavalkya, Viṣṇusmṛti, etc.

[20] For helpful discussions on the interpretation of the Gītā, see F. Edgerton, "Interpretation of the Bhagavad Gītā," pp. 140–186, and Eliot Deutsch, *The Bhagavad Gītā* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), pp. 159–190.

and, although the resolution of the tension in the *Gītā* moves in a conservative direction, it is certainly no accident that Gandhi found resources in the text which led in quite a different direction.

(4) *Ordinary* dharma *criticized and rejected by extraordinary* dharma *but with the result of establishing a new* dharma. This type, of course, comes very close to the first type, but differs in that it attempts to establish another ordinary-*dharma* context to replace the rejected one. In this view, although the realm of ordinary-*dharma* is the locus of suffering and must be rejected, nevertheless, the possibility is raised that there may be a new way of constructing an ordinary *dharma* that more adequately reflects the claim of the extraordinary *dharma*. The representative of this type would be the early traditions of Buddhism and the establishment of a new social institution, namely, the *saṅgha*.[21] The old ordinary *dharma* of priests, sacrifice, and social class is clearly rejected, but in its place a new social reality, a new *dharma,* is established. This new *dharma* requires a reinterpretation of "correct" or "proper" usage but still gives relevance and value to ordinary *dharma,* if properly reinterpreted.

(5) *Ordinary* dharma *as the embodiment of extraordinary* dharma *on a lower level of understanding.* In this view, the claims of ordinary *dharma,* though criticized from the perspective of the ultimate intuitive realization, are essentially left untouched and fully operative on the level of ordinary functioning. This view would be what Karl Potter has aptly called "leap-philosophy" and would be represented by some traditions of the Advaita Vedānta as well as the Mādhyamika of Nāgārjuna.[22] However sophisticated and intellectually satisfying such a "two-levels-of-truth" view is, it does appear that such an interpretation from the point of view of ordinary *dharma* is by far the most conservative, indeed reactionary! It leaves the entire substructure of ordinary *dharma* untouched and provides no rationalization or critical access to the problems of ordinary *dharma* from the perspective of ultimate truth. That so many Indian intellectuals and academicians have adopted such an interpretive perspective is surely one important reason why modern Indian philosophy has failed to develop a significant tradition of social criticism. One result for modern India has been that socially concerned intellectuals have had to turn to the social sciences of Western intellectual history or to some variety of Marxism to find norms for social criticism. The philosophers of modern India, with the possible exception of Gandhi if one wishes to consider him a philosopher, have contributed almost nothing to this most important enterprise.

[21] D. E. Smith ed., *South Asian Politics and Religion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), see especially sections on Buddhist *saṅgha*; M. Weber, *The Religion of India,* pp. 204–230; and R. Puligandla and K. Puhakka, "Buddhism and Revolution," *Philosophy East and West* 20, no. 4 (Oct. 1970): 345–354.
[22] *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 236–256.

The title of this paper is "The *trimūrti* of *dharma* in Indian thought: Paradox or contradiction?" In answer to that question, the following might be said. Types (1) and (2) briefly outlined earlier would seem to lead to the conclusion that ordinary *dharma* and extraordinary *dharma* are ultimately contradictory. The corollary, then, is that the former, by implication, asserts the extraordinary *dharma* as the only valid regulative principle, and the latter asserts ordinary *dharma*. Types (3) and (4) seem to lead to the conclusion that ordinary *dharma* and extraordinary *dharma* represent an on-going paradox, both intellectually and culturally. Though the extraordinary *dharma* is the ultimate ideal and serves as a critical norm for gaining access to everyday life, nevertheless attention and concern for the claims of ordinary *dharma* can never ultimately be negated without negating, in some important sense, the extraordinary *dharma* itself. Type (5) refuses to answer the question either way and thus shows itself at best as intellectually and culturally uninteresting from the point of view of determining the importance of *dharma* as a regulative principle in Indian culture.

A CONCLUDING NOTE ON LI IN CHINESE THOUGHT

Although the purpose of my article was not to deal with the Chinese notion of *li*, perhaps I might be permitted to make one brief comparative comment. It appears to be the case that the sense of tension and polarity so prominent in the Indian tradition's effort to deal with the issue of a regulative principle is almost totally lacking in Chinese intellectual history. Whereas paradoxical and contradictory norms frequently collide and interact throughout the development of Indian intellectual history, the Chinese tradition (I am thinking primarily of original, state, and Neo-Confucianism) appears to be searching for harmony, balance, and continuity between heaven and man, between the absolute and the relative, and between the transcendent and the immanent. Such a quest for continuity appears to have become an important element in the content of the notion of *li* itself. The history of the development of the notion of *li* is at one and the same time the history of the quest for continuity. The problem, however, seems to be that such a quest for a regulative principle historically has been plagued by the problem of the norm for continuity. In other words, the question can and has been asked: What provides continuity for the notion of continuity? One obvious answer, of course, is the past. The norm is provided by correct usage as derived from the past. That kind of answer, however, appears to rationalize a conservative and regressive posture with respect to the issue of establishing a regulative principle in culture. It provides little rationalization or critical access with respect to constructing new interpretations of the present culture or society. In a word, it can become as intellectually uninteresting as type (5) in the earlier analysis of the Indian context.