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Madhyamaka Buddhist Meta-ethics: The Justificatory Grounds of Moral Judgments |
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| Author |
Finnigan, Bronwyn
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| Source |
Philosophy East and West
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| Volume | v.65 n.3 |
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| Date | 2015.07 |
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| Pages | 765 - 785 |
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| Publisher | University of Hawaii Press |
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| Publisher Url |
https://uhpress.hawaii.edu/
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| Location | Honolulu, HI, US [檀香山, 夏威夷州, 美國] |
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| Content type | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
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| Language | 英文=English |
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| Abstract | Whether the metaphysical commitments of Madhyamaka Buddhism afford a satisfactory justificatory ground for moral judgments is investigated here. Finnigan and Tanaka (2011) argue that they do not. Their argument has since been challenged by Tillemans (2010–2011), who alleges that both Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas can readily justify moral judgments by respective appeal to the doctrine of the two truths. This claim is contested here with respect to Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka. Several arguments are provided to show that Prāsaṅgika cannot satisfactorily justify their moral judgments by appeal to the notion of conventional truth. |
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| Table of contents | [Table of Contents]
Relevant Methodological and Background Assumptions
A Moralized Approach to Conventional Truth
Contextualizing Conventional Truth
Limiting Conventional Truth to ‘Purely’ Descriptive Facts
‘Normatizing’ Conventional Truth: An Empirical Approach
Normatizing Conventional Truth: A Sui Generis Approach
A Final Attempt: Go Non-Cognitivist?
Tension between Non-Cognitivism and Conventional Truth
Conclusion
Notes
References |
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| ISSN | 00318221 (P); 15291898 (E) |
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| DOI | 10.1353/pew.2015.0071 |
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| Hits | 348 |
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| Created date | 2015.10.28 |
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| Modified date | 2019.05.17 |
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