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因明與比量 : 關於量論的現象學考察=Hetuvidyaa and anumaana-pramaa.na : A Phenomenological Study on the Lore of Valid Cognition |
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| 著者 |
蔡瑞霖 (著)=Tsai, Jui-lin (au.)
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| 掲載誌 |
法光學壇=Dharma Light Lyceum
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| 巻号 | n.3 |
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| 出版年月日 | 1999 |
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| ページ | 72 - 90 |
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| 出版者 | 法光佛教文化研究所=Fa-kuang Institute of Buddhist Studies |
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| 出版サイト |
http://fakuang.org.tw/index1.htm
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| 出版地 | 臺北市, 臺灣 [Taipei shih, Taiwan] |
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| 資料の種類 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
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| 言語 | 中文=Chinese |
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| ノート | 附中英文摘要
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| キーワード | 量論; 勝義知識論; 知識論; 現量; 比量; 知覺; 推理; 陳那; 除分別; 因三相; 他比量; 自比量; 共比量 |
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| 抄録 | 包含著宗教實踐精神在內的「量論」，是佛教特有的知識論. 「量」(pramana)即尺度，標準之意思，引申為正確的知識及其獲得的途徑. 量可以有廣狹兩義，狹義的量指認識事物的標準或根據，廣義的量指認識作用之來源，形式，過程，結果及用以判斷知識真偽之標準等. 探討這個尺度標準之如何建立的學問，便稱為「量論」 (勝義知識論)，它包含了一般所謂「知識論」的基本意義. 佛教知識論所主張的最主有兩種量：「現量」(pratyak a- pramana)即知覺(perception)，「比量」(anumana-paramana)即推理(inference) -- 這個界定是佛教學者所共許的. 在陳那(Dignaga)的因明中，依量之認知方式，現量被規定為「除分別」(即與概念語言無關) 而直接感知者，比量則說為依「因三相」(完整的三支論式表達) 而比度推知者. 另外，從所量 (認知對象) 上說，以「自相」為直接感知之對象的是現量，以「共相」為比度推知之對象是比量. 換言之，現量 (知覺) 是沒經由種種語言概念之分別而直接顯現的量，比量 (推理) 則是藉三支論式之表達而間接推知的量. 這兩者之定義，是彼此相關的. 然而嚴格講，現量是比量的特殊狀態或未完成狀態. 若說整個量論都是關於 "量之推理" (比量) 的一門學問，亦不為過. 可以說，這門關於知識建立，推理與論證的學問，就是關於宗教實踐的「用論理學」 (applied logic，當然logic一詞未必恰當). 依此，在量的獲得來源上，現量有優位性. 然而，在量做為「能立」之目的上，比量是基本的形態. 對現量之描述總落在比量的表達形式中，故本文凡稱為量者即指比量，除非明白指出它是現量. 依是，本文擬探討： 現量之「除分別」的規定，及其與比量的區分判準為何? 所謂「分別」是否同於「判斷」的意思? 悟他門中有三種比量，即：他比量，自比量與共比量，所謂的「自比量」為何? 與自悟門中的「為自比量」如何區分? 又，比量與能立的關係為何? 關於量的問題釐清後，除確立量的四種相關形態外，本文將站在正確的量論 (勝義知識論) 立場來考察佛教因明 (勝義論理學) 的定位，藉以展望「因明唯量系」在大乘佛教分系中的正面意義. 文末綴以摘要式結論.
The lore of valid cognition which also includes the spirit of religious practice，is a special Buddhist form of epistemology. The Sanskrit word pramana (valid cognition) means originally "measurement" or "standard," and derived therefrom "faultless knowledge" and the means to acquire it. There are two meanings to this. In a narrow sense, pramana indicates the standard or basis of knowing objects, while in a broad sense it points to the source, form, process, and result of the function of knowing, as well as the standard to judge whether a knowledge is correct or not. It comprises the basic meaning of what is generally referred to as "epistemology".
Buddhist epistemology deals primarily with two types of valid cognition, pratyak a-pramana or perception and anumana-pramana or inference. All Buddhist scholars agree on this. According to Dign ga's logic, their difference in terms of method of cognition consists in perception being defined as direct recognition "free from discrimination" (i.e. without reference to ideas and language) while inference is said to be knowing through comparison and deduction based on a complete syllogism. Moreover, in terms of the object of cognition, when the particular is the object directly perceived, we are dealing with perception; when the general serves as the object of comparison and deduction, it is inference. In other words, perception is the valid cognition which manifests directly without availing itself of any concept belonging to language, while inference is the valid cognition which deduces indirectly by means of a syllogism. Both are mutually related.
Perception is, however, strictly speaking a special or incomplete form of inference. Thus it could be rightly
said that the lore of valid cognition as a whole is a study of the deduction of pramana. This subject of the establishment
of knowledge, deduction, and proof is the "applied logic" of religious practice (though the term "logic" is not necessarily very fitting here). Consequently, as far as the sources of valid cognition are concerned, perception occupies the prominent position. However, when pramana is taken as the aim of the establishing subject, inference becomes the basic form. Since the description of perception always depends on the form through which inference is expressed, the term pramana, when used in the present paper, generally refers to inference unless otherwise specified.
The present paper thus discusses 1) the stipulation that perception has to be free from discrimination as well as the criteria for differentiating between perception and inference. It is also checked whether "discrimination" equals "critical appraisal". 2) There are three types of inference to be found in terms of awakening others, to wit t'a pi-liang, tzu pi-liang, and kung pi-liang. What does fzu pi-liang mean and how does it differ from wei tzu pi-liang which belongs to the inference in terms of awakening oneself? And What is the relationship between inference and the establishing subject? 3) Th |
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| ヒット数 | 1887 |
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| 作成日 | 1999.11.20
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| 更新日期 | 2017.08.23 |
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