This paper is an exploration of the early Buddhist understanding of brahmacariya in the context of the intellectual climate at the time of the Buddha. I endeavor to demonstrate how the Upanisadic worldview is undermined and eventually superseded by different “materialist” worldviews and how the ethical discourse of the Post-Upanisadic age is threatened by these materialists’ views. I point out that one of the common features of these views is the denial of the performance and consequence of action. This denial of the existence of action and the ethical conduct by the dominant “ethical nihilists” (as we shall call them) then create a predicament for moral reasoning. In this regard Buddhist theory holds that there are three components of action: kamma, kiriya and viriya. According to the Buddha, practicing brahmacariya is a viriya (effort, exertion), the last component of action. Hence, in order to argue for the ontological significance of brahmacariya, the Buddha has to offer convincing explanations of all three components—kamma, kiriya and viriya. I therefore explore the early Buddhist notions of kamma, kiriya and viriya at length by comparing them with the teachings of other religious teachers especially Nigantha Nataputta. I conclude by discussing how Ananda labels the teaching of the Nigantha Nataputta and others as anassasika brahmacariya (the discomforting brahmacariya); that is, as harsh austerity which is unable to give blessing.
