唯識學「自證」(svasaṃvitti)理論之研究:以《成唯識論》為中心=The Theory of “Self-cognition” (svasaṃvitti) in Yogācāra Doctrine: With Focus on Cheng Wei Shi Lun (Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi)
The thesis in my paper is the theory of “self-cognition” (svasaṃvitti) in Cheng Wei Shi Lun (Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi). I want to discuss the philosophical significance of “self-cognition” in Yogācāra doctrine. Self-cognition originally means that the mind knows itself. This characteristic of mind has a close relationship with the idealistic stance of Yogācāra. I try to analyze two aspects of “self-cognition” in Cheng Wei Shi Lun, namely, “self-cognition as the result of cognition” and “self-cognition as the substance of cognition.” Firstly, the original statement that self-cognition is the result of cognition can be traced back to Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya. Cheng Wei Shi Lu has not only followed Dignāga, but also developed its own theory. According to Cheng Wei Shi Lun, self-cognition is the result that the seeing-portion (darśana-bhāga) grasps the seen-portion (nimitta-bhāga). And this result also illuminates that self-cognition can recognize the seeing-portion. The self-cognition which knows itself can be thought as a reflexive cognition. This kind of cognition, in Cheng Wei Shi Lun, is explained as “that cognition which recognizes itself must be pratyakṣa” or “the internal clinging to mind,” which is totally different from the intentional cognition such as seeing-portion grasping the seen-portion. In addition, I will discuss the fourth division of cognition, namely, the cognition of self-cognition, which is considered as a unique theory of Cheng Wei Shi Lun. But I will show that the reasons to support this statement are not logically perfect. Secondly, I will discuss “self-cognition as the substance of cognition” and its proof of recollection. In order to manifest self-cognition as the substance of cognition, Cheng Wei Shi Lun pays more attention to emphasizing the three divisions rather than the non-separation of the cognition. Self-cognition is the supporting base for both seeing-portion and seen-portion. It has been combined with some idealistic conception such as “vijñāna-pariṇāma,” etc. in Cheng Wei Shi Lun, which indicates that we always create unceasingly new desires or meanings because of the cognitive activities. It demonstrates that “self-cognition” in Cheng Wei Shi Lun is not only related to epistemology but the meaning of existing as well. Finally, the proof of recollection to support the existence of the self-cognition is a strong argument. It cannot be denied by the refutation in Madhyamakāvatāra in the conventional sense.