The proposition “whatever is impermanent is dukkha (yad-aniccaṃ taṃ dukkhaṃ)” (henceforth abbreviated as YATD) plays a crucial role in early Buddhism. Preserved in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas, this proposition connects the basic doctrine of dependent origination with such propositions as “every compounded thing is dukkha” as well as with the Noble Truth of Suffering. However, we rarely find a detailed analysis of YATD in current scholarship. As a result, the meaning of ‘dukkha’ as well as the relation between ‘dukkha’ and ‘impermanent’ remains largely unclear. This paper discusses YATD in three steps. First, as to its logical form, I observe that YATD constitutes a universal proposition and that the order between the concepts of “impermanent” and “dukkha” is not to be reversed. Second, I argue against interpreting ‘dukkha’ simply as “feelings of suffering,” as this leads to problematic readings of YATD in the Āgamas. Third, I propose that ‘dukkha’ in YATD should be interpreted as a disposition that causes sentient beings the feelings of suffering. Based on this proposal, I suggest that YATD be read as “whatever is impermanent is of a disposition of causing sentient beings the feelings of suffering.”
