Theological Studies
Vol.59 No.2
June 1998
Pp.349-351
Copyright by Theological Studies Inc.
ON DECONSTRUCTING LIFE-WORLDS: BUDDHISM, CHRISTIANITY, CULTURE. By Robert Magliola. American Academy of Religion Cultural Criticism Series. Atlanta: Scholars, 1997. Pp. xxiv + 202. $29.95; $19.95. Edith Wyschogrod remarks in her Preface that "Magliola has written a highly unusual book"; she is surely correct. For one thing, M. devotes two-thirds of the book to his own autobiography; and, for another, this unexpected subject matter is presented in unconventional prose--alternatively playful, lyrical, oblique, and morose, as if M. desired to convey how different periods and events in his life felt to him rather than to present a dry rehearsal of the facts. Nevertheless, a couple of points about academic method emerge from this stow which are worth mentioning. First, M. clearly dislikes the tendency of the academy to compartmentalize itself into various "disciplines." Even while the academy pays lip-service to the idea of interdisciplinary studies, M. observes that his own shift from one discipline to another required him to make new friends and colleagues, join new learned societies, go to new conferences, and subscribe to new journals. Our courses may be interdisciplinary (sometimes), but our research and the institutional apparatuses that support it remain very inbred. Second, M. wants to pursue his work in a more holistic manner. Religion and literature both create "life-worlds" which people inhabit as whole psycho-physical-spiritual beings. In studying Buddhism, for example, M. reminds us that the old masters, who produced the philosophical texts that scholars study today, were meditators, and their ruminations frequently came from subsequent reflection on meditative experiences. How can scholars understand the depth of these works when they do not meditate? To correct this, especially in the area of interreligious dialogue, M. ends his autobiography with a form of meditation to be practiced by mixed religious groups, and it is significant that this book itself represents a kind of valedictory as he moves out of urban academic life into a Vipassana meditation community in Thailand to deepen his own practice. The remainder of the book contains four short essays that make connections between Buddhism (particularly of the Prasangika-Madhyamika school), Derridean deconstruction, and Christian theology. The first sets the general tone and agenda for the others. It seeks to show that the particular way in which the Prasangika-Madhyamika school presented (or chose not to present) its elaboration on the Mahayana Buddhist notion of emptiness (sunyata) shares much in common with Derrida's deconstruction thought, and in fact can help to complete it. M. assumes that readers are familiar with both postmodern deconstructive thought and ancient Buddhist philosophy. M.'s claim here is that Derrida's thought intersects that of the second-century Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna. Both use the logic of their debate partners to undermine the foundations of that logic. (The Prasangika-Madhyamikas got their name from their procedure of showing that the opponents' position necessarily led them, by their own rules, to absurd consequences, or prasanga.) Both refuse to put forth any "system" of their own that would imply "closure" to any given problem. The Prasangikas, following Nagarjuna, had no philosophical system of their own, but confined their activity to demolishing their opponent's positions in a relentless campaign of reductio ad absurdum. The way in which Nagarjuna can help to complete Derrida's project lies in the Buddhist doctrine of the Two Truths, Conventional Truth and Ultimate Truth. Conventional Truth is the provisional construction we put on the pure factuality of the world and its "goings-on," and they enable us to function within it by making distinctions between, say, food and nonfood, enemies and nonenemies. This Conventional Truth, M. asserts, corresponds roughly to Derrida's "logocentrism" (143). Ultimate Truth consists in discovering the pure provisionality of all our groupings and differentiations. However, Nagarjuna and his followers were able to affirm the value of Conventional Truth: without it, we could not long survive, and so it remains Truth, not deceit. This is the move that could complete Derrida's system, which so far has not come back to assigning a positive value to our "logocentric" constructions of the world (150). The other essays deal with various consequences of applying Nagarjunian/Derridean thought to different religious/philosophical enterprises. The second analyzes a specific Derridean text (the Denegations), the third criticizes the Abe-Cobb strand of Buddhist-Christian dialogue for its overly logocentric emphasis (via Masao Abe's presentation of a Yogacara Buddhist-based reading of Zen), and the fourth is a marvellous analysis of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity as seen through the application of Nagarjunian/Derridean thought to conciliar theology. All of the essays are dense and difficult, but worth reading. M.'s initial autobiographical statement should appeal to anyone interested in the interplay of emotion and intellect in the development of a modern academic. The later essays are addressed to scholars conversant with both Buddhist thought and postmodern critical theory. Readers with backgrounds in both these areas will find M.'s reflections on the intersections and double-binds with Nagarjuna's and Derrida's systems provocative and stimulating.