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緣起、二諦與因明— 以清辨《般若燈論‧觀緣品》與《掌珍論》 為主的研究=Dependent-Arising, Two Truths and Logic in Bhāviveka's philosophy： Focusing on chapter one of Prajñāpradīpa and Jewels in the Hand |
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| 著者 |
林恕安 (撰)
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| 出版年月日 | 2018 |
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| ページ | 346 |
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| 出版者 | 國立政治大學 |
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| 出版サイト |
https://www.nccu.edu.tw/
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| 出版地 | 臺北市, 臺灣 [Taipei shih, Taiwan] |
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| 資料の種類 | 博碩士論文=Thesis and Dissertation |
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| 言語 | 中文=Chinese |
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| 学位 | 博士 |
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| 学校 | 國立政治大學 |
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| 学部・学科名 | 宗教研究所 |
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| 指導教官 | 林鎮國 |
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| 卒業年 | 106 |
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| キーワード | 清辨; 《般若燈論》; 因明; 緣起; 二諦=Two Truths; 《掌珍論》=《Jewels in the Hand》; Hetuvidyā; Pratītyasamutpāda; Bhāviveka; Prajñāpradīpa |
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| 抄録 | 此論文的研究在於說明清辨的緣起觀、二諦觀與因明的使用如何在其思想中相互交涉與互相影響。
對於清辨如何解釋緣起與空性的關係一直以來並沒有太多的研究著墨，尤其在清辨承許世俗自性有的主張下，他究竟要如何說明中觀的內涵呢？本文從《中論》論釋《般若燈論》最核心的〈緣起品〉說明清辨在藏譯本中對於緣起的定義，以及緣起的觀念如何相涉於清辨的二諦觀而推導出因不成因直到果成的緣起內涵及二諦合觀的概念。同時藉由翻譯出尚未有中譯的藏譯本，與漢譯本比較並梳理出其中的差異，並檢視兩譯本對於緣起定義互相疏漏的可能原因。
藏譯本中二諦合觀的概念是指對於緣起的現象必先建立在承認一切法勝義空的前提下而說，而此緣起觀亦是要確保不會有任何由基礎主義而說的緣起觀，此也與清辨以勝義簡別說明一切法空以及其重視因明周遍的概念相呼應。也就是說若是由緣起談性空，則無法以論式說明其周遍範圍。因此，清辨能以因明論式說明與其緣起觀具有不可分割的關係。
另外，從《般若燈論》、《掌珍論》的文獻資料中說明了清辨對於「世俗自性有、勝義空」的立場，並確認了其隨順世人的世俗諦立場，以及其世俗諦的看法如何成為因明使用上的立基點—亦即由世人所認許的元素，使得推論能有辨明之力量。然而，清辨雖然使用因明說明其主張，但他在《般若燈論》第二十七品附錄揭示其的確意識到即使是因明的內涵元素等皆於勝義為空，以釐清對其作法的疑慮，並依此而還原他使用因明或說隨順勝義的究竟本懷。而此也凸顯出由應成派立場批判清辨的非恰當性，也就是說，雖然清辨的作法不同於龍樹，但他使用因明的立基放置在其所建立的二諦架構下不但不違反中觀的精神且能持守中觀空的立場。
清辨以勝義簡別作為內涵的隨順勝義鋪排行者聞思修的第一步，藉由能理解的論式引領行者由世俗進入勝義的路徑，由論文檢視而發現其勝義簡別的運用不僅不違背陳那的因明內涵， 更由此顯示出其傳承印度論理學的精神。同時，文中也特別以印度邏輯的脈絡說明清辨使用一詞多義的方式包藏自宗主張的真正內涵。
清辨是否傳承龍樹的精神一直以來總為後期的說法所質疑，然而任何一位思想家的主張必與當時的時代氛圍有所相涉，為了不使中觀被誤解為斷滅論者，清辨提出了看似不同於龍樹的方法，然唯有從多方面說明其脈絡才能忠實於其立場並給予適切的評論。本文的重要性除了將藏文的相關素材翻譯為中文外，更關鍵的是在於從清辨對於緣起、二諦及因明的看法與交互影響還原了清辨的本懷與脈絡，並認肯了其繼承龍樹中觀思想的精神。
My dissertation focuses on how the concepts of Two Truths, Dependent-Arising (Pratītyasamutpāda) and Logic (hetuvidyā), interact in Bhāviveka's Madhyamaka Philosophy.
It is important to know how Bhāviveka explains Madhyamaka Philosophy, particularly when he admits that each thing has its own nature in conventional reality. However, there are few studies on his interpretation of the relationship between Dependent-Arising and emptiness.
First, my dissertation works on the translation of Chapter 1—The Analysis of Dependent-Arising—in the Tibetan version of Prajñāpradīpa and explains how Bhāviveka's concept of Dependent-Arising is placed within his perspective pertaining to the Combination of Two Truths.
The two versions—the Tibetan version and the Chinese version—are compared to spot any differences between them and I found out that the difference is related to the concept of ""Combining of Two Truths,"" with which the Tibetan version seems to be more consistent. The concept of Combining of Two Truths means that one has to admit that the prerequisite of everything is empty in the ultimate truth before describing the phenomena of Dependent-Arising because this prerequisite guarantees that there is no any concept of Dependent-Arising from the viewpoint of fundamentalism. This is in accordance with Bhāviveka's using the qualification “from the viewpoint of ultimate truth” such that he can ensure the boundary of emptiness. In other words, if the concept of Dependent-Arising issues forth from the viewpoint of fundamentalism, where the Chinese version seems to be, the demonstration for the proof of emptiness will encounter some problems. Therefore, Bhāviveka's concept of Dependent-Arising and his use of logic are inseparably related.
In addition, this dissertation proves Bhāviveka's theory of Two Truths, from his works Prajñāpradīpa and Jewels in the hand (*Karatalaratn) instead of from the Tibetan tenets, that each thing has its own nature in the conventional truth and how this can be the basis for his application of logic. Even though he uses logic to demonstrate assertions, in the appendix of Prajñāpradīpa (after Chapter 27), he supplements that intentionally even logic is empty in the ultimate truth, such that his ultimate intention of using logic as an illusory tool can be understood. Because of that, the criticism from the Prāsaṅgika school is not appropriate. In other words, Bhāviveka's method may seem to be different from Nāgārjuna's, but his use of logic, placed under his theory of Two Truths, does not violate the spirit of Madhyamaka Philosophy.
When using this application of logic, the most distinguishing feature is his usage of the qualification “from the viewpoint of ultimate truth” to explain the meaning of emptiness in Madhyamaka Philosophy. It shows that not only does this application of logic not violate Dignāga's logic system but it also inherits the methods of Indian logic.
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| 目次 | 第一部分
第一章 導論 3
第一節 研究主題 3
第二節 文獻回顧 8
第三節 章節概述 18
第二章 清辨思想的歷史背景 21
第一節 中觀之空性與緣起 21
第二節 瑜伽行派的興起與影響 27
第三節 印度的論理傳統 34
第三章 清辨的緣起觀與二諦論 43
第一節 清辨的緣起觀 43
第二節 清辨的二諦論 75
第三節 清辨論緣起與空性的關係 91
第四節 依他起的有無與緣起觀的關係 96
第四章 清辨對因明的使用 99
第一節 龍樹對因明的立場 99
第二節 清辨使用因明的立基與目的 105
第三節 簡別勝義的合法性 109
第四節 清辨在《般若燈論》的辯論策略 124
第五節 歸謬法與自立論式 131
第六節 因明使用的範疇 146
第五章 從因明的使用談修行階次 159
第一節 聞思修的脈絡 159
第二節 階梯式的論證 167
第三節 使用因明的究竟意旨 177
第六章 結論 181
參考文獻 193
第二部分：《般若燈論》第一品藏譯本之中譯及
漢、藏譯本之對照與討論 213
兩譯本之比較總結 345 |
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| ヒット数 | 290 |
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| 作成日 | 2022.10.07 |
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| 更新日期 | 2023.01.16 |
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