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Cartesian Intuitions, Humean Puzzles, and the Buddhist Conception of the Self |
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| 著者 |
Tomhave, Alan
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| 掲載誌 |
Philosophy East and West
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| 巻号 | v.60 n.4 |
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| 出版年月日 | 2010.10 |
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| ページ | 443 - 457 |
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| 出版者 | University of Hawaii Press |
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| 出版サイト |
https://uhpress.hawaii.edu/
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| 出版地 | Honolulu, HI, US [檀香山, 夏威夷州, 美國] |
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| 資料の種類 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
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| 言語 | 英文=English |
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| 抄録 | The Cartesian conception of the self is of an essentially thinking thing, a robust "I," one that wills, feels, et cetera. This Cartesian self is often taken as opposed to the Buddhist conception of the self, which includes the doctrine of anatta, or "no soul." The Cartesian robust "I" is open to a criticism that, as opposed to one essential thinking thing, there actually exists a group of things being held together somehow, which constitutes the "I." This criticism is closely related to the Humean conception of the self as a bundle of perceptions and the Buddhist conception of the self as being made up of the five skandhas. However, there remains, even after the Humean and Buddhist critique, what I call the "Cartesian Intuition." This is simply the idea that if there is action taking place, there must be something performing the action. I argue that while the Humean conception violates this Cartesian Intuition, the Buddhist conception maintains it. Thus, while the Cartesian and Buddhist views of the self are usually seen as inconsistent, there is a very important sense in which they are compatible: they both maintain the Cartesian Intuition. |
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| ISSN | 00318221 (P); 15291898 (E) |
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| DOI | 10.1353/pew.2010.0008 |
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| ヒット数 | 1325 |
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| 作成日 | 2011.01.04 |
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| 更新日期 | 2019.05.17 |
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