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寂護與蓮華戒的唯識立場：以《攝真實論疏》（Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā）〈考察外部對象品〉（Bahirarthaparīkṣā）對妙護（Śubhagupta）的回應為線索=A Study on the Consciousness-only Doctrine of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla: With Focus on Their Refutations to Śubhagupta in the Bahirarthaparīkṣā of Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā |
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| 著者 |
茅宇凡 (著)=Mao, Yu-Fan (au.)
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| 掲載誌 |
臺大佛學研究=Taiwan Journal of Buddhist Studies
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| 巻号 | n.29 |
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| 出版年月日 | 2015.06 |
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| ページ | 65 - 118 |
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| 出版者 | 國立臺灣大學佛學研究中心=The Center for Buddhist Studies, National Taiwan University |
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| 出版サイト |
http://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~ntucbs/
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| 出版地 | 臺北市, 臺灣 [Taipei shih, Taiwan] |
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| 資料の種類 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
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| 言語 | 中文=Chinese |
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| ノート | 作者為香港中文大學哲學系博士候選人。
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| キーワード | 寂護=Śāntarakṣita; 蓮華戒=Kamalaśīla; 妙護=Śubhagupta; 唯識=Consciousnessonly (vijñaptimātratā); 無所緣=non-object (nirālambana) |
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| 抄録 | 本文以《攝真實論疏》第23 章〈考察外部對象品〉中寂護與蓮華戒對妙護的駁斥作為文獻依據，探討寂護—蓮華戒的唯識立場。為了批評妙護外部對象實在論的主張，寂護—蓮華戒討論了包括識的自我證知就是識別性、青相與青知的共同了知限定、第一性及第二性的認知無法緣取外部對象以及勝義無所緣等議題。在這些論辯中，寂護—蓮華戒從未使用過有相唯識派的立場，一律都以離二取、無二的自我認識，即無相唯識論作為基調，但也不能就此簡單把他們的觀點等同於形象完全不存在的知識論。他們所謂的「無二」就是識的自我證知，它如同明照性，沒有所取—能取的分別，方便說為認知的識別性。其次，他們承認青等形象與青之知是「共同了知」，二者一體不離；對青相的知就是自我證知，不需要依賴認識緣取對象的認知模式，認識內也沒有作為認知對象的部分（所取分）。像這樣，識是自證的，對同體的青等形象的證知就是識自身，它不需要依賴能—所因果關係，也不會緣取任何外在或內在的對象，所以究竟來說（勝義）無所緣。
In the current paper, I have discussed some arguments between Śāntarakṣita-Kamalaśīla and Śubhagupta in the Chapter 23 (Bahirarthaparīkṣā) of Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā in order to find out the main point of view of consciousness-only theory held by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. In these debates, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla have never advocated the theory that a cognition arises with a form (sākārajñānavāda). However, this does not mean that they can be simply labeled as advocators of the cognition without any form (nirākārajñānavāda). In fact, they claim that the cognition is non-dual and it is self-cognizing without subjective and objective aspects. The cognition cognizes itself just like a light illuminates itself. It does not grasp any object outside itself. The illumination is the determinate nature (paricchedarūpa) of the cognition. According to this basic idea, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla criticize Śubhagupta’s
realism. They argue that the blue form and the cognition of the blue form are definitely perceived together (sahopalambhaniyama). They are not separated from each other. The cognition of the blue form is not a cognition that realizes the object aspect, but a cognition that realizes itself. Thus, the cognition itself does not rely on any causality such as the relationship between the grasping and grasped aspects. It cognizes neither the external object nor the internal object. Ultimately, the cognition is without any object-support (nirālambana). |
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| 目次 | 一、引言—關於「有形象」與「無形象」知識論的界定 67
二、寂護、蓮華戒唯識說的基調—識自我證知（自證） 74
三、TSP 中寂護—蓮華戒與妙護的爭論 78
（一） 對妙護「識別性（pariccheda）」的批判 78
（二） 對青相與青知「共同了知限定（sahopalambhaniyama）」的辯護 82
（三） 第一性（mukhya）的認知和第二性／譬喻性（gauṇa，bhākta）的認知 89
（四）唯識的成立與勝義無所緣 100
四、結論 108
引用書目 111 |
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| ISSN | 10271112 (P) |
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| ヒット数 | 1102 |
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| 作成日 | 2015.08.10 |
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| 更新日期 | 2017.07.07 |
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