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護法《成唯識寶生論》論知覺及其所緣:兼與當代理論交涉=Dharmapala on Perception and alambana in the Cheng weishi baosheng lun: Enagaging with Contemporary Philosophy of Perception |
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| 著者 |
胡志強 (著)=Hu, Chih-chiang (au.)
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| 掲載誌 |
正觀雜誌=Satyabhisamaya: A Buddhist Studies Quarterly
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| 巻号 | n.89 |
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| 出版年月日 | 2019.06.25 |
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| ページ | 71 - 135 |
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| 出版者 | 正觀雜誌社 |
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| 出版サイト |
http://www.tt034.org.tw/
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| 出版地 | 南投縣, 臺灣 [Nantou hsien, Taiwan] |
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| 資料の種類 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
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| 言語 | 中文=Chinese |
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| ノート | 作者單位:國立政治大學哲學系研究中心博士後研究員。Postdoctoral Research,Center for Buddhist Philosophy,Department of Philosophy,National Chengchi University. |
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| キーワード | 護法=Dharmapala; 所緣=alambana; 成唯識寶生論=Cheng weishi baosheng lun; 知覺因果論=the casual theory of perception; 非此即彼論=disjunctivisim |
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| 抄録 | 護法《成唯識寶生論》是是親《唯識二十論》的重要註釋書。按照護法的詮釋《二十論》的開頭先引經證、而後立量理證，其中瞖眼
人的知覺識論證中的重要實例(喻依)，瞖眼人的眼識有如同毛髮樣的顯現，然其所現毛髮等物是不存在的。瞖眼人此例，《寶生論》中的論敵給出一實在論的因果說明，認為是透過白色網膜縫隙的光明分造成瞖眼人見法的錯覺，瞖眼人的知覺並非沒有外境。對此質疑，護法訴諸陳那在《觀所緣論》所提(alambana)(認識對象)的二個條件來批評論敵。作為所緣的必要條件之一(C1)，就是在感官識中顯現，亦即感官識要有所緣的相(akara)。所緣的必要條件之二(C2)，就是具有讓認識(對該所緣的知覺)生起的因果作用，即便設許論敵的說明符合C2條件，但因缺乏C1的條件，因此瞖眼人所緣並非外境。針對餓鬼們同膿河的例子，雙方也有類似的交鋒。
分析護法論證的合理性的策略之一，是與當代議題交涉或對話。大致上我們可以說，當代知覺因果論(the causual theory off perception)的基本要點類似於前述之所緣二條件C1與C2，不僅如此，知覺因果論者均同意，在某人X面前沒有某事Y時，對X而言看起來好像有某個Y仍是可能的，如同世親與護法所言，前面沒有法、膿河，仍有可能有髮、膿河的知覺經驗。也就是說，非正常知覺與正常知覺可具有共同要素(例如顯現)，此觀點正式支持實在論的非此即彼(disjunctivisim)所極力反對的。本文對非此即彼論提出嘗試性的批評，以支持護法與知覺因果論。
The Cheng weishi baosheng lun is Dharmapala's commentary on Vasubandhu's Vimsika-vrtti. According to Dharmapala, in the beginning of the Vimsika, Vasubandhu cites the scripture and then presents his argument, in which the visual of taimirikas is important example(drstanta),i.e. there are appearances of hairs, etc.in the visual consciousness although those external objects of hairs,etc. are not existent.Regarding this example, the opponent in the Baosheng lun gives a seeing hairs is caused by the split of light passing through thee white-net membrane on the eye,and therefore it's not the case that there are no external objects for that kind of illusion. In Dharmapala's response,the two criteria of alambana(cognitive object)in Dignaga's Alambanapariksa-vrtti are employed. The first (C1) is that the object must be that which appears in the cognition. In other words, a sensory cognition arises with the akara of the object. The second (C2) is that the object must be the cause of its cognition. Dharmapala points out that even if he had accepted that in opponent's explanation C2 is met, the objects is not met.Regarding another example of the pus river seen by hungry ghosts, the debate between Dharmapala and his opponent is similar.
This paper on Buddhist philosophy also tries to engage with contemporary philosophy of the perception. Roughly speaking, the basic points of the casual theory of perception are similar to C1 and C2. Furthermore, the casual theory of perception suggests that it is possible that it seems as if there is Y for a person X even though there is not Y,like the examples of the illusions of seeing hairs, pus rivers used by Vasubandhu and Dharmapala. That is to common element,which is rejected by the disjunctivists in favor of realism.This paper provides some tentative arguments against the Basheng lun. Hopefully it shows that the theory of consciousness-only is not so easily dismissed. |
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| 目次 | 摘要 71
前言 73
1.「所緣」二條件之簡述 76
2.護法《成唯識寶生論》如何援引「所緣」之條件以批評論敵 84
3.與當代知覺問題之交涉:知覺因果論與非此即彼論 98
3.1知覺因果論 98
3.1.1對洛克的詮釋 98
3.1.2當代的知覺因果論及其相關議題 104
3.2知覺之非此即彼論 112
3.2.1 M.G.F.Martin的論點簡述與筆者的嘗試回應 112
3.2.2 Bill Brewer的論點簡述與筆者的常識回應 120
結語 124
參考文獻 128
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| ISSN | 16099575 (P) |
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| ヒット数 | 1094 |
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| 作成日 | 2019.09.17 |
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| 更新日期 | 2019.09.20 |
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