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Vasubandhu’s No-Self Causal Theory of Memory=世親基於無我的記憶因果論 |
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| 著者 |
Eihmanis, Kaspars (著)=艾恪 (au.)
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| 出版年月日 | 2023 |
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| ページ | 253 |
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| 出版者 | 國立政治大學哲學系 |
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| 出版サイト |
https://thinker.nccu.edu.tw/
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| 出版地 | 臺北市, 臺灣 [Taipei shih, Taiwan] |
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| 資料の種類 | 博碩士論文=Thesis and Dissertation |
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| 言語 | 英文=English |
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| 学位 | 博士 |
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| 学校 | 國立政治大學 |
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| 学部・学科名 | 哲學系 |
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| 指導教官 | 林鎮國=Lin, Chen-kuo,耿晴=Keng, Ching |
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| 卒業年 | 111 |
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| キーワード | Memory=記憶; Smṛti=念; Abhidharma=阿毘達摩; Sarvāstivāda=一切有部; Vasubandhu=世親; Causal theory=因果論; Self and no-self=神我與無我 |
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| 抄録 | The fundamental thrust of the Buddhist philosophy, its no-self (anātman 無我) doctrine in particular, is to question our commonsense views of subjectivity and strives to explain the functioning of our mental lives without postulating an enduring substantial self. Memory is one such mental faculty that seems to account for our psychological continuity over time, an idea that led some non-Buddhist philosophers in India to take memory to be a quality of an enduring self (ātman). Whereas the self-theorists can easily offload the burden of explaining the unity of experience and the ipseity of memory onto enduring substantial self, the no-self-theorist must account for memory in the absence of an enduring self. In place of a unitary self, we find a motley of mental factors bound together by causal forces, which allow a Buddhist thinker to sidestep the postulation of the self as an owner of memories. This view, namely that I shall name no-self causal theory of memory, accepts the thesis that it is sufficient to postulate causal connections between specific mental factors to render memory plausible.
What interests me in this study is how the Buddhist philosophers defined memory (smṛti 念) without a reference to the self as an agent of remembering and owner of memories. My aim in this dissertation is to defend the plausibility of the no-self causal theory of memory, by tracing its historical connections within the Abhidharma corpus, by probing the relevance of pro et contra arguments for this theory of memory, and by establishing possible links with the contemporary theories in the philosophy of memory. Since smṛti is also oftentimes mentioned in relation to mindfulness, I claim that what we understand it as memory through and through.
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. In the introduction I define the term memory I use, provide an overview of the concept of memory in the Buddhist philosophy, and argue that smṛti 念, understood as mindfulness, should be subsumed under the concept of memory. In the second chapter I follow the definition of smṛti 念 as ‘mind noting clearly’ 心明記性 as it unfolds in the Sarvāstivāda canonical treatises. It is done with the purpose of establishing conceptual connections between the Jñānaprasthāna 發智論, with its immense commentary the Mahāvibhāṣā 大毘婆沙論, and Vasubandhu’s Treatise on the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaviniścaya 破我品) from the ninth chapter of his Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. In the third chapter I discuss the relevance of the Indic no-self and self-theories to understanding the concept of memory. Special attention is devoted to the Naiyāyikas and their insistence that memory is quality of ātman, as well as their contention that memory is not an epistemic instrument pramāṇa. In the fourth and the fifth chapters, I follow Vasubandhu’s memory argument in the Pudgalaviniścaya very closely and provide an in-depth analysis of Vasubandhu’s no-self causal theory of memory and its relevant terms: memory as ‘distinctive mental event’ (cittaviśeṣa), conceptual resemblance (sadṛśa-saṃjñā) and conceptual connection (sambandha-saṃjñā). I restate the significance of the phenomenological reading of memory in understanding smṛti 念 and return to the theory of causality and its importance in explaining no-ownership view of memory. I propose the reasons why we should take Vasubandhu to be the first thinker in the history of philosophy to formulate a robust causal theory of memory. |
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| 目次 | 1. Introduction. 4
1.1. General introduction. 4
1.2. Which memory? 7
1.2.1. Classification of types of memory in contemporary psychology. 8
1.2.2. Personal and impersonal memory. 10
1.3. The concept of memory in the Buddhist philosophy:
smṛti as memory and mindfulness 10
1.3.1. Smṛti as memory and/or mindfulness:
some ancient and modern conundrums. 11
1.3.2. Smṛti and ‘the memory argument’:
self and the question of its ownership. 17
1.3.3. Memory and self-awareness. 20
1.4. Review of scholarship. 21
1.5. Goal, Questions and Methodology. 26
1.6. Chapter Outline. 29
Chapter 2. The inception of the theory of memory. Smṛti in Abhidharma. 31
2.1. Textual sources: early Abhidharma treatises and later manuals. 32
2.2. Smṛti in the early Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma canonical texts. 35
2.2.1. Abhidharma-saṃgītiparyāya-pādaśāstra 阿毘達磨集異門足論. 36
2.2.2. Abhidharma-dharmaskandha-pādaśāstra阿毘達磨法蘊足論.39
2.2.3. Prajñaptiśāstra 施設足論. 42
2.2.4. *Abhidharma-vijñānakāya-pādaśāstra 阿毘達磨識身足論. 43
2.2.5. Abhidharma-dhātukāya-pādaśāstra阿毘達磨界身足論. 47
2.2.6. Abhidharma-prakaraṇapāda-śāstra 阿毘達磨品類足論. 49
2.2.7. Abhidharma-jñānaprasthāna-śāstra 發智論 and its commentary the Mahāvibhāṣa. 53
2.3. The Sarvāstivāda model of memory smṛti. 57
2.3.1. The doctrine of momentariness (kṣaṇikavāda 剎那論).60
2.3.2. The fundamental existents dharma. 70
2.3.3. The causality. 74
2.3.4. Tri-temporality of dharmas. 78
2.3.5. Memory and temporality. 85
2.3.6. Madhyamaka and time. 90
2.3.7. Can consciousness apprehend all dharmas? 92
2.3.8. If pudgala is not obtainable, whence the memory? 94
2.3.9. The power of habituation, cognition of similarity and memory. 97
Chapter 3. Memory and self in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.105
3.1. Setting of the problem. 105
3.1.1. Indian Theories of Self. 107
3.1.2. Theories of self in Indian Buddhism. 108
3.2 The anātman theory in the Āgamas. 109
3.3. The Upaniṣadic ātman. 111
3.4. Buddhist Reductionism and Non-Reductionism. 117
3.5. Naiyāyikas on self and memory as a quality of ātman. 118
3.6. Epistemic instruments pramāṇa. 124
3.6.1. Sources of knowledge in the Western tradition. 126
3.6.2. Sources of knowledge and the Skepticism. 127
3.6.3. The Indian anti-foundationalism: the skepticism of Nāgārjuna. 129
3.6.4. Memory is not an epistemic instrument pramāṇa. 132
3.6.5. The Buddhist Epistemologists: Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. 137
Chapter 4. Vasubadhu’s Master Argument. 144
4.1. Distinctive mental event (cittaviśeṣa). 146
4.2. ‘Bending’ ābhoga as ‘attention.’ 151
4.2.1. *Abhilapana is 明記. 160
4.2.2. Omnipresent character of memory. 161
4.3. Phenomenological analyses of memory.167
4.4. Conceptual resemblance sadṛśa- saṃjñā. 182
4.5. Conceptual connection sambandha-saṃjñā. 186
4.6. Necessary conditions for the memory occurrence:
Causal Theory of Memory (CTM). 188
Chapter 5. Vasubandhu’s No-Self Theory of Memory. 198
5.1. Summary of the criteria for the Causal Theory of Memory. 198
5.2. Habit memory, serial continuity, and recognition. 202
5.3. Causal relations. 204
5.4. If there is no self, who remembers? 207
5.4.1. Dignāga on memory and self-awareness. 208
5.4.2. Mādhyamaka critique of the self-awareness memory argument. 210
5.5. No ownership needed to account for memory. 213
5.6. It is causality all the way down. 218
5.7. No Caitra, no cow: who cognizes? 219
5.8. Parfit’s Reductionism and Memory Criterion. 222
5.9. Some contemporary interpretations of Vasubandhu’s memory argument. 226
Conclusion. 234
Bibliography. 239 |
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| ヒット数 | 203 |
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| 作成日 | 2023.11.17 |
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| 更新日期 | 2023.11.21 |
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