There has been much discussion about the question whether or not human rights can be accommodated within a Buddhist framework. The first aim this paper will be to show that this issue can be handled more productively if it is approached at the level of theories of human rights. I will suggest that there are two fundamental theories of natural rights. Both these theories developed in medieval Europe, within a Christian theological framework. Neither these theories of natural rights can be accommodated within Buddhism. The second aim of the paper is to argue that this may be less problematic (for Buddhists) than may seem at first glance. One obvious reason is that Buddhism has been able to cope with the ethical problems that are addressed by the language of human rights, without having recourse to the language of human rights. More important, however, is the fact that the two theories of natural rights also have disadvantages. In both cases, these difficulties are so serious that we are better off without these theories, or so I shall argue. Of course, the language of human rights may be used without relying on theories of natural rights. However, even if the difficulties with these theories may not persuade us to discard the language of human rights altogether, recognizing the relevant difficulties in the underpinning has practical consequences. I shall point to some of these. Finally, a sound theoretical foundation for human rights will take a consequentialist form. I shall briefly indicate how Buddhist insights in the nature of human psychology may prove useful in overcoming difficulties in welfarist theories.
