After Hoornaert published his translation of Bhāviveka’s Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā and its commentary Tarkajvālā from 1999 to 2003, scholars start to noticing that Bhāviveka also has his own theory of apoha. Nevertheless, the mainstream of Bhāviveka studies is still focused on his theory of two truths and his usage of valid arguments (hetuvidyā). It is widely accepted that Bhāviveka subdivided the ultimate truth into primary and secondary ultimate truths, and that he uses valid arguments in the scope of the secondary ultimate truth.
Tamura (2011) is the first to bring Bhāviveka’s theory of apoha to the mainstream study, arguing that Bhāviveka uses the theory of apoha in the scope of the conventional truth. I will argue, however, since the theory of apoha is about understanding the meaning of words correctly, it should be nature to pair it with Bhāviveka’s usage of valid arguments, which he argues is the correct way to express the ultimate truth. This also reveals two characteristics of the language used in the scope of the secondary ultimate truth: 1. that on the surface it is just the same as the ordinary language people used every day, 2. but it is without conceptualization.
With all that established, I will put my theory into practice: reading the arguments Bhāviveka used in his The Treatise on the Jewel in the Hand with his theory of apoha. That is, how the meaning of words used in the arguments should be understood with his theory of apoha. With this paper, I hope to provide a ground for piecing together three important theories of Bhāviveka: that of two truths, valid argument and apoha.
