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Allowing Spontaneity: Practice, Theory, and Ethical Cultivation in Longchenpa's Great Perfection Philosophy of Action |
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| 作者 |
Lobel, Adam S. (撰)
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| 出版日期 | 2018 |
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| 頁次 | 371 |
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| 出版者 | Harvard University |
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| 出版者網址 |
https://www.harvard.edu/
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| 出版地 | Cambridge, MA, US [劍橋, 麻薩諸塞州, 美國] |
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| 資料類型 | 博碩士論文=Thesis and Dissertation |
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| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
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| 學位類別 | 博士 |
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| 校院名稱 | Harvard University |
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| 系所名稱 | Committee on the Study of Religion |
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| 指導教授 | Gyatso, Janet |
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| 畢業年度 | 2018 |
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| 關鍵詞 | Philosophy |
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| 摘要 | This is a study of the philosophy of practical action in the Great Perfection poetry and spiritual exercises of the fourteenth century Tibetan author, Longchen Rabjampa Drime Ozer (klong chen rab 'byams pa dri med 'od zer 1308-1364). I inquire into his claim that practices may be completely spontaneous, uncaused, and effortless and what this claim might reveal about the conditions of possibility for action. Although I am interested in how Longchenpa understands spontaneous practices, I also question whether the very categories of practice and theory are useful for interpreting his writings. In taking up these questions, I maintain that Longchenpa’s texts can contribute to inquiries into the nature of human practices and action that is relevant today. It is my aspiration that this dissertation may facilitate engagement with Longchenpa’s reflections on the nature of liberative practice by thinkers in post-Heideggerian continental philosophy, especially in relation to conceptions of intentionality, causality, agency, ethics, and free will. The study begins with the historical context for issues of spontaneous practice relevant for Longchenpa’s Great Perfection tradition in fourteenth century Tibet. Following from this context, I then present four different interpretations of causal action, which I call the “four configurations.” Comprising the second part of the study, my examination of each of these configurations will consist in an exploration of what I argue are four primary ways to construe the nature of practice in terms of intentionality, theories, and causality. The first configuration addresses spiritual exercises that begin with theoretical views that are deliberately applied in actions. The second configuration focuses on methods that begin with embodied practices. The third configuration explores metaphysical foundations for actions. The fourth configuration looks to tacit social practices and networks of relationships as conditions for methods of ethical self-cultivation. Yet each of these characterizations fall short of what I will argue is Longchenpa’s understanding of practical action. Each of these configurations fail to provide the most satisfying, and in the end accurate, model of the process by which human beings perform freedom. The central chapters of the thesis bring together the history of Buddhist spiritual exercises, Longchenpa’s writings, and selected issues from contemporary philosophy and sociology of practice. I will show how Longchenpa’s spontaneous practice theory challenges some of the most basic assumptions about practices, and questions whether even well-meaning techniques or manipulations can lead to freedom. In the process of this critical reading, I will also be able to glean affirmative aspects of Longchenpa’s approach. Once we suspend the first configuration we can see Longchenpa’s phenomenology of knowledge. Going beyond the second configuration allows me to point to his conceptions of time and an effortlessness style in his instructions for spiritual exercises, which, I argue, is distinct from many interpretations of “sudden” conceptions of Buddhist practice. Going beyond the third configuration allows us to garner a sense of groundless potentiality in actions. And finally, interrupting the fourth configuration provides an opportunity to discern Longchenpa’s spontaneous ontological ethics. My primary thesis is that if practices are preconceived to be causal, teleological, and intentional, they will be predetermined in terms of an imperative to produce effects. Some form of willfulness becomes necessary to mediate between theory, action, and agency. Therefore, to allow for spontaneous practices, there can be neither a theoretical nor a practical a priori foundation and they must be freed from causality and object-directedness. This observation calls into question the entire metaphysics in which the western apparatus of practice and ethics is thinkable. I would like to put the meanings of pr |
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| 目次 | Introduction 1
I. Longchenpa and Spontaneity in Buddhist Practice
II. Spontaneous Practice in the History of Philosophy, Study of Religion, and Study of Tibetan Buddhism
III. Conceptual and Methodological Issues: Is Practice Still a Question?
IV. Four Configurations and Overview of the Chapters
SECTION I: THE BACKGROUND OF GREAT PERFECTION PRACTICE
Chapter 1: Causal Action, Great Perfection Practices, and Tibetan Historical Context 46
I. Causal Action
II. The First Dissemination of Teachings and the Imperial Period
III. The Early Great Perfection as an Approach to Practice
IV. From the Mind Series to the Seminal Essence: The Discovery of Treasures
V. History of the Seminal Essence Through the Fourteenth Century
Chapter 2: Longchenpa’s Life and Works 87
I. Longchenpa’s Biography
II. Longchenpa’s Body of Writings
SECTION II: BEYOND THE CAUSAL COMPLEX
Chapter 3: Awakened Phenomenology: Beyond Configuration One 121
Part 1: Configuration One
I. Theory-Caused, Intentional Practice
II. Examples of Configuration One: Pedagogy in the Causal Vehicles
III. Learning Practices
Part 2: Longchenpa’s Awakened Phenomenology
IV. Phenomenological Practice
V. Cutting Through as Phenomenological Practice
Chapter 4: Endless, Effortless Action: Beyond Configuration Two 160
Part 1: Configuration Two
I. Practice-caused, Intentional Practice
II. Examples of Configuration Two: Tantric Technologies of the Self
III. Longchenpa’s Critique
Part 2: Spontaneous Time and Teleology
IV. Practices of Time and Timelessness
V. Effortlessness
Chapter 5: Beginningless, Anarchic Action: Beyond Configuration Three 201
Part 1: Configuration Three
I. Theory-caused, Unintentional Practice
II. Example of Configuration Three: The Ground
III. The Ground in Practice: The Ground and its Presencing
Part 2: The Anarchic Ground in Action
IV. Philosophical Presentation: The Ground is not Spontaneous
V. Impotentiality and the Anarchic Ground: Non-Action in Practice
Chapter 6: Spontaneous Ethics: Beyond Configuration Four 253
Part 1: Configuration Four
I. Practice-Caused, Unintentional Practice
II. Examples of Configuration Four: The Teacher-Student Relationship and the Student’s Potential
III. The Pedagogical Universe as Social Site
Part 2: Spontaneous Ethics
IV. From Social Practices to Ontology
V. Spontaneous Ethical Commitments in the Way of Abiding
VI. Everyday Spontaneous Conduct
Conclusion: Spontaneous Practice in our Technological Age 320
Appendix: Does Longchenpa Reject Cause and Effect? The Great Perfection and the Cārvāka School 334
Bibliography 340
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| 點閱次數 | 547 |
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| 建檔日期 | 2021.12.14 |
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