Buddhist No-Self, the Person Convention, and the Metaphysics Of Moral Practice: Is Hayashi's Emergentist Account Of Vasubandhu's Ontology Of Persons Explanatorily Self-Defeating?
Author Affiliations: Department of Philosophy and Religion Studies, Coastal Carolina University
目次
1. Anglophone Buddhist Studies and Analytic Metaphysics 303 1.1 The Explanatory Framework 304 1.2 Moral Practice, Buddhist No-Self, and the Person Convention 306 2. Motivating Persons as (Weak) Emergents within Vasubandhu’s Mereologically Oriented Metaphysics 310 3. Hayashi’s Account of Persons as “Weakly” Emergent 315 3.1 The Epiphenomenalist Move: Making Persons Ontologically Excludable Hayashi states: 316 3.2 The Weak Epistemic Emergentist Move: Introducing a Dual-Domain Framework 318 3.3 The Representational-Cognitive Emergentist Move 321 4. The Argument from Explanatory Superiority 322 5. Hayashi’s Weak Emergentism: Explanatorily Superior or Self-Defeating? 327 6. Conclusion 331 Acknowledgments 332