Author Affiliations: Philosophy Faculty, Yale-NUS College
摘要
Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is committed to svataḥ prāmāṇ ya, or the “intrinsic validity” principle, on which agents are entitled to take their cognitions as knowledgeevents unless confronted by defeaters. It is argued that, despite recent work arguing otherwise, this principle—as understood by an important Mīmāṃ sā philosopher, Pārthasārathi Miśra—is not an instance of the KK principle, the idea that if one knows that p one thereby also knows that they know p, nor would Kumārila be commiffed to that principle on other grounds.
目次
I. Pārthasārathi’s Kumārila on svatah. prāmāṇya 396 II. The SP Principle Is Not the KK Principle or KK-pos Principle 400 III. Pārthasārathi and the KK-pos Principle 403 IV. Conclusions 407 Notes 408
