The purpose of this work is to differentiate the autonomous `self-compassion' of therapeutic modernist Buddhism from pre-therapeutic Mahâyâna Buddhist practices of refuge, so that refuge itself is not obscured as a fundamental Buddhist orientation that empowers the possibility of compassion for self and other in the first place. The work begins by situating issues of shame and self-aversion sociologically, in order to understand how and why self-aversion became a significant topic of concern during the final quarter of the twentieth century. This discussion allows for a further investigation of shame as it has been addressed first by psychologists, for whom shame is often understood as a form of isolating self-aversion, and then by philosophers such as Bernard Williams and Emmanuel Levinas, for whom shame attunes the person to the moral expectations of a community, and therefore to ethical commands that arise from beyond the individual self. Both psychologists and philosophers are ultimately concerned with problems and possibilities of relationship. These discussions prepare the reader to understand the importance of Buddhist refuge as a form of relationship that structures an integrative rather than destructive self-evaluation. The second chapter of the dissertation closely examines Friedrich Nietzsche's work on shame. In a late note, Nietzsche wrote that "man has lost the faith in his own value when no infinitely valuable whole works through him"; the second chapter argues that Nietzsche's vision of a relatively autonomous will to power cannot fully incorporate this important Nietzschean insight, and helps to drive the kind of self-evaluation typical of modernist `personality culture,' which is likely to become harsh. The third chapter first discusses contemporary therapeutic Buddhist responses to self-aversion, particularly practices of `self-compassion' that claim to be rooted in early Pali canonical and commentarial sources, before developing a commentary on the medieval Tibetan lojong teaching Drive all blames into one. Drive all blames into one, though often discussed in contemporary commentaries as a form of self-blame, should be understood more thoroughly as a simultaneous process of refuge and critique--a process that drives further access to compassion not only for self, but for others as well. Chapter Four discusses mourning and self-reproach in the apophthegmata of the Desert Fathers, showing how `self-hatred' in this context is in a form of irony: the self that is denigrated is not an ultimate reality, and the process of mourning depends upon both an access to love and a clear recognition of our many turns away from that love. In conclusion, I draw attention to the irony of modernist rejections of religious self-critique as supposedly harmful forms of mere shaming, even as the modernist emphasis on autonomy is what enables self-critique to become harsh and damaging.
