Analyzed here are the virtue-theoretic and feminist arguments for moral anger as appropriate in response to injustice. A Buddhist response is offered to these accounts and it is argued that Buddhist ethics neither obligates nor forbids anger on moral grounds, but instead characterizes anger as an affliction of the mind that should be overcome for the sake of the agent's own well-being. It is argued that compassion can offer some of the same moral benefits we expect from moral anger without compromising well-being, and this leaves open the possibility that there are other similarly non-destructive and morally efficacious attitudes toward injustice.
目次
I. Introduction 24 II. Moral Anger as Appropriate Anger 25 III. Tessman’s Dilemma and Appropriate Anger 28 IV. Approaching the Dilemma from a Buddhist Perspective 29 V. A Buddhist Analysis of Anger 32 Notes 41 References 41
