

How Do We Understand the Meaning of a Sentence Under the Yogācāra Model of the Mind? On Disputes Among East Asian Yogācāra Thinkers of the Seventh Century

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Abstract Understanding the meaning of a sentence is crucial for Buddhists because they put so much emphasis on understanding the verbal expressions of the Buddha. But this can be problematic under their metaphysical framework of momentariness, and their epistemological framework of multiple consciousnesses. This paper starts by reviewing the theory of five states of mind in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, and then investigates debates among medieval East Asian Yogācāra thinkers about how various consciousnesses work together to understand the meaning of a sentence. The major differences between the various explanations proffered lie in the minimum number of types of consciousnesses involved, and the minimum linguistic marks (sound, syllable, term, sentence and meaning) cognized, in order for one to understand a sentence consisting of four Chinese characters. I show that in these disputes, two points are key: First, the role played by the mental consciousness that arises simultaneously with a sensory consciousness: that is to say, whether a sensory consciousness should still be regarded as essential for understanding, if the simultaneous mental consciousness also cognizes the same mark. Second, whether the syntactic structure of a sentence is taken into consideration: that is to say, whether there is a separate determination of understanding regarding each character, or there is no determination until one has heard two or more characters and takes them as a syntactically meaningful unit.

Keywords Yogācāra · *Yogācārabhūmi* · Theory of Understanding the Meaning of a Sentence · Kuiji 窺基 (632–682 CE) · Wōnch'ŭk 圓測 (613–696 CE) · Huizhao 慧沼 (651–714 CE)

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Introduction

How does one understand the meaning of a sentence? This question is crucial for Buddhists because they put so much emphasis on understanding the verbal expressions of the Buddha in order to reach ultimate liberation. Suppose one has difficulties understanding a sentence, she would not be able to understand what the Buddha taught, and liberation would remain forever unachievable. Understanding the meaning of a sentence may sound like a plain and easy task, but it meets with great difficulties under the ontological framework of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*), which became the mainstream view among Buddhists probably after the fourth century CE.¹ According to the theory of momentariness, every entity is momentary (*kṣaṇika*) because it lasts only for a moment (*kṣaṇa*). A cup exists stably before my eyes, but according to this theory, what happens is actually a stream of $\text{cup}_1 \rightarrow \text{cup}_2 \rightarrow \text{cup}_3 \dots$. Each cup lasts only for a moment and is replaced by the next cup, which, despite looking very similar, is a totally new and different entity. From a different perspective, this theory of momentariness was a fresh way of explicating the Buddha's teaching of "no-self" (*anātman*) from the ontological point of view: since every entity lasts only for a moment, there is no essence (self) that subsists in the stream of $\text{cup}_1 \rightarrow \text{cup}_2 \rightarrow \text{cup}_3$.²

Given this theory of momentariness, understanding the meaning of a sentence becomes problematic. How could one, while hearing the second term of a sentence, grasp the first term that has just ceased to exist? To understand a sentence, the terms must somehow form a unity, which is impossible with various terms that exist at different moments. The only way out would be for the mind to somehow hold all those terms together and understand them as a unity.

Even for the mind, the situation is not straightforward under the Buddhist epistemological framework of multiple consciousnesses. Ear-consciousness³ can pick up the sound of a term but cannot understand its meaning. Only the mental consciousness does this.⁴ For this reason, the understanding of a sentence must rely upon a successful collaboration between sensory consciousnesses (the first five consciousnesses) and mental consciousness (the sixth consciousness). But the issue of momentariness still haunts such collaboration. The Sautrāntika school of the Abhidharma tradition entertained the idea that, with respect to an object existing at t_0 , a sensory consciousness arises at t_1 , and the mental consciousness arises at t_2 , but

¹ Cf. von Rospatt (1995) and Tani (2000).

² One may find something similar or essential (for example, cup-ness) shared by cup_1 , cup_2 , cup_3 , etc., but when the time frame is extended and cup_n becomes, for example, ashes, it would be easier to see that no essence is shared by cup_1 , cup_2 , cup_3 , etc. and ashes.

³ Instead of such translations as "eye-consciousness," "ear-consciousness," etc., some scholars prefer to use "visual perception," "auditory perception," etc. for such Sanskrit terms as *caḥsur-vijñāna*, *śrotra-vijñāna*, etc. In this paper I prefer to use "eye-consciousness" in order to cover the following two senses: (1) eye-consciousness as a specific *type* of mental activity (in this case, visual perception) under the Yogācāra model of eight consciousnesses; (2) eye-consciousness as a particular *episode* of visual perception.

⁴ Precisely how the mental consciousness understands the meaning of a term is not the main issue dealt with in this paper.

then the difficulty was raised as to how the mental consciousness can grasp the object at t_0 since there is a time gap between them. To tackle this issue, the Vaibhāṣika, the mainstream Abhidharma school, holds that, although it is an effect of a sensory consciousness, the mental consciousness actually arises at the same time as the sensory consciousness.⁵ As shown below, similar to the Vaibhāṣikas, later Yogācāra also subscribes to the idea that mental consciousness can function simultaneously with a sensory consciousness.⁶

This paper examines the debates among East Asian Yogācāra scholars in the seventh century about how it is possible to understand the meaning of a sentence under their framework of multiple consciousnesses, with a simple four-term sentence as an example. I shall begin with the interpretation of Kuiji 窺基 (632–682 CE), followed by the Silla monk Wōnch'ŭk's 圓測 (613–696 CE) somewhat different opinion, and then Huizhao's 慧沼 (651–714 CE) criticism of Wōnch'ŭk and his Silla disciple monk Dojeung 道證 (?–692 CE). After reviewing these debates, I give some general observations identifying the main issues that separate these later Yogācāra scholars from earlier Yogācāra texts such as the *Yogācārabhūmi*, and the main issues that divide these later Yogācāra scholars. But before advancing to later Yogācāra, let me first introduce the earlier Yogācāra model of five states of minds, under which the aforementioned East Asian Yogācāra scholars propose their different theories.

The Yogācāra Model of Five States of Minds⁷

The Yogācāra model of five states of minds first appears in the *Pañcaviṅśānākāyaśāstra* portion of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. It divides the mental processes required for a full account of cognition into five distinct states of mind: (1) mind as it occurs directly (*aupanipātika*; *shuai'er* 率爾); (2) mind as it investigates [the object] (*pariyeṣaka*; *xunqiu* 尋求); (3) mind as it settles upon a determination (*niścita*; *jueding* 決定) [about the object]; (4) mind as it is impinged upon by [moral] defilement (*saṃkleśa*; *ran* 染) or purity (*vyavadāna*; *jing* 淨); and (5) mind as it is homogeneous (*naiṣyandika*; *dengliu* 等流), i.e., has the same moral quality as the previous state of mind (4). Although it may sound awkward in English, in this paper I will refer to these five states of mind as “minds,” that is: (1) occurring directly mind; (2) investigating mind; (3) determination mind; (4) moral mind; and (5) homogeneous mind. I will at times also discuss multiple such “minds” that may be experienced by a single sentient being. This choice in wording is made mainly

⁵ For the different views held by the Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika and the disputes between them, see Dhammajoti (2007), Chapters 8–9 in particular.

⁶ In contrast, early Yogācāra sources such as the *Pañcaviṅśānākāyaśāstra* and the *Manobhūmi* hold that only a mental consciousness can serve as an immediately preceding condition (*samanantara-pratyaya*) for a sensory consciousness, and thus, immediately after a sensory consciousness, a mental consciousness must arise in order to serve as the immediately preceding condition for a following sensory consciousness. See Takatsukasa (2016).

⁷ For some general background about the Yogācāra theory of five minds, see Schmithausen (1967), Takatsukasa (2014, 2016) and Kramer (2016).

because in all instances, the primary sources in Chinese explicitly name each state of mind as a ‘[state in the functioning of] mind,’ such as *shuai’er xin* 率爾心, *xunqiu xin* 尋求心, etc.

Moreover, according to the *Pañcaviññānakāyasaṃprayuktabhūmi*, these five states of mind take place in sequence, as the passage reads:

In that case (*tatra*) [that is, regarding the arising of the eye-consciousness with the existence of a sense organ and an object as prerequisites], when the eye-consciousness has arisen, three minds are obtained in sequence: occurring directly (*aupanipātika*) mind, investigating (*paryeṣaka*) mind and determination (*niścita*) mind. And among these (*tatra*) the first [state of mind] is eye-consciousness alone (*eva*), and the [following] two [states of mind] are mental consciousnesses. In that case (*tatra*), after the determination mind [the mind with] defilement (*saṃkleśa*) or purity (*vyavadāna*) is to be seen. Then the eye-consciousness homogeneous with that (*tannaīṣyadika*) also (*api*) goes into action (*pra-√vṛt*; *zhuan* 轉), whether wholesome (*kuśala*) or unwholesome (*akuśala*), but not through the power of its (i.e., eye-consciousness’) own discernment (*svavikalpavaśa*). And as long as the mental consciousness is not diverted towards a different [object], [either] wholesomeness or defilement (*kliṣṭatva*) of the two, i.e., eye-consciousness and the mental consciousness, [continues]. Just as eye-consciousness has arisen, [so the other sensory consciousnesses] down to the body-consciousness should be understood [to be the same case].⁸

⁸ The Sanskrit text reads: *Itatra caḥsurvijñāna utpanne trīṇi cittāny upalabhyante yathā kramam aupanipātikaṃ paryeṣakaṃ niścitaṃ ca / tatra cādyam caḥsurvijñānam eva / dve manovijñāne / tatra niścitāc cittāt paraṃ saṃkleśo vyavadānaṃ ca draṣṭavyam / tatas tan naiṣyandikaṃ / caḥsurvijñānam api kuśalākuśalaṃ pravartate / na tu svavikalpavaśena / tāvac ca dvayor manovijñānacāḥsurvijñānayoh kuśalatvaṃ vā kliṣṭatvaṃ yāvat tan mano nānyatra vikṣipyate // yathā caḥsurvijñāna utpanna evam yāvat kāyavijñānaṃ veditavyam //* Bhattacharya (1957, p. 10, lines 2–7). Xuanzang’s Chinese translation reads: //復次由眼識生三心可得，如其次第。謂率爾心、尋求心、決定心。初是眼識，二在意識。決定心後，方有染淨。此後乃有等流眼識善不善轉，而彼不由自分別力。乃至此意不趣餘境，經爾所時，眼、意二識或善或染相續而轉 如眼識生，乃至身識，應知亦爾// (T1579 (XXX) 280a22–27). Chu’s English translation reads: “In this case, when visual awareness arises, three [types of] thought are attained. [They are] in sequence: (1) spontaneous [thought] (*aupanipātikaṃ*); (2) searching [thought] (*paryeṣakaṃ*); and (3) discerning [thought] (*niścitaṃ*). Of these, the first is none other than visual awareness; the [other] two are mental awareness. Then, subsequent to discerning thought, (4) [thought that is] defilement or purification is to be seen. On account of that (*tatas*), also visual awareness arises as (5) the [thought] uniformly flowing from that (*tannaīṣyandika*), being wholesome or unwholesome, but not due to conceptualization on its own part. So long as this mind (*manas*) is not distracted elsewhere, mental awareness and visual awareness are wholesome or defiled. Just as visual awareness arises, [the other four awarenesses] up to tactile awareness should be thought of in the same way.” See Chu (forthcoming, p. 3). The term “thought” in Chu’s translation of *aupanipātika citta* as “spontaneous [thought]” should be understood in the broader sense of mental activity in general since this refers to sense perception without thought in the narrower sense (i.e., associated exclusively with the mental consciousness).

We may diagram this as follows:

Diagram 1: Five minds in the *Yogācārabhūmi*

	Eye-consciousness	Mental consciousness
t ₀ :	object and sense organ	
t ₁ :	Occurring directly mind	
t ₂ :		Investigating mind
t ₃ :		Determination mind
t ₄ :		Moral mind
t ₅ :	Homogeneous mind	

According to this diagram, the whole process of engaging with an object relies upon collaboration between at least one sensory consciousness and the mental consciousness. At first the sensory consciousness finds itself involuntarily drawn to a particular object. Then the mental consciousness investigates that object. Then the mental consciousness settles upon a determination about what that object is. It is only after this determination that there arises in the mental consciousness either defilement or purity. Finally, there arises the homogeneous sensory consciousness, and, as long as the mental consciousness is not diverted towards something else, both remain of the same moral nature, i.e., either being wholesome (i.e., with purity), unwholesome (i.e., with defilement) or neutral.

It is under this model that later East Asian *Yogācāra* thinkers investigate how understanding of the meaning of a sentence is possible. In what follows, I first introduce the interpretation of Kuiji.

Kuiji's Interpretation

Kuiji begins by asking how understanding of the Buddha's teaching could be possible, and then answers the question by offering the sentence *zhu xing wu chang* 諸行無常 ("All conditioned things lack permanence") as an example showing how understanding is completed in a series of minds. Kuiji's interpretation in Fascicle One of his *Commentary on the Cheng weishi lun* (*Cheng weishi lun shuji* 成唯識論述記; T1830) reads as follows⁹:

⁹ For a similar passage in his *Dasheng fayuan yilin zhang* 大乘法苑義林章 (T1861), see T1861 (VL) 252b5–c8.

Question: since [things] in the past and [things] in the future do not really exist, and it is not the case that a conditioned thing (*saṃskṛta-dharma*) can last after it arises, then how could one, while hearing the teachings, arrive at a composite whole (*juji* 聚集)¹⁰ of [the things heard] and bring about understanding?

Answer: The *Commentary* [on the *Mahāyānasamgraha*] (the *Mahāyānasamgrahopanibandhana*) by Asvabhāva (ca. sixth century CE) says, “The manifestation of the composite whole of direct and indirect speech in the consciousness of a hearer who has fallen in the eight times,¹¹ is taken as the substance (*tixing* 體性) [of understanding].”¹² That is to say, [understanding arises] because, in the consciousness of a hearer in the eight times, there is the manifestation of the composite whole of two kinds of speech, direct or indirect.

For example, Fascicle Eighty-one of the *Yogācārabhūmi* says, “All conditioned things lack permanence, because a thing that comes into being and perishes, after arising, must cease. The cessation of those things is happiness.”¹³ When the syllable *zhu* 諸 (“all”) is said, after the occurring directly mind the investigating mind must arise, continuing the first mind [i.e., the occurring directly mind]. Although it [the investigating mind] lasts for many moments, since its operation and understanding (*xingjie* 行解) is uniform, it is generally named “investigating mind,” because one has not yet settled upon a determination about what *zhu* modifies (*suomu* 所目). As is said in Fascicle Three of the *Yogācārabhūmi*: “Further, just after the moment when [one of] the five [sensory] consciousnesses is born, immediately the mental consciousness must arise.”¹⁴

Further, when *xing* 行 (“conditioned things”) is said, due to the arising of the understanding via the link with prior permeation (*xian xunxi liandai* 先熏習連

¹⁰ The Chinese term *juji* 聚集 in this paper can either refer to a kind of composite whole of the objects cognized by the five minds or to a gathering together of the five minds. I translate it as “a composite whole” under the former context, and as “gathering together” under the latter context.

¹¹ Cf. Huilin’s *Yiqie jing yin yi* 一切經音義 (T2128), where the editor Huilin 慧琳 says that in the west regions (*xiguo* 西國), a day is divided into eight or fifteen hours. See T2128 (LIV) 458a7.

¹² The original Chinese translation of Asvabhāva’s commentary reads: // 隨墮八時間者識上直非直說，聚集顯現以為體性// (T1598 (XXXI) 380b8–9).

¹³ For its occurrence in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, see T1579 (XXX) 750b6–7. This is a verse from the scripture that can be traced, as far as I could, at least to the mainstream *Mahāparinirvānasūtra* and to the *Samyuktāgama*. For the Chinese translation of the former by Faxian 法顯 (337–422), see T7 (I) 204c22–24; for the Chinese translation of the latter by Guṇabhādra 求那跋陀羅 (394–468), T99 (II) 153c11–14. A parallel Pāli text reads: // *aniccā vata saṅkhārā uppādavayadhammino / uppajjivā nirujjhanti tesam vūpasamo sukho* // See *Dīgha Nikāya* Vol. II, p. 157. A parallel Sanskrit text reads: // *anityā vata saṃskārā utpādavyayadharmināḥ / utpadya hi nirudhyante teṣāṃ vyupaśamas sukham*// See Waldschmidt (1950, §44.5, p. 298). Thanks to Michael Radich (via private correspondences) for informing me that this was actually a quote from the scripture and providing useful information for its origin and parallel Pāli and Sanskrit texts.

¹⁴ Here, instead of a literal translation of the extant Sanskrit text, my translation is based on Xuanzang’s Chinese translation: // 又一剎那五識身生已，從此無間必意識生// (T1579 (XXX) 291b2–3). The Sanskrit text from the *Manobhūmi* Portion reads: // *ekakṣaṇotpannānām pañcānām kāyavijñānānām anatarāṃ manovijñānam avāśyam utpadyate* // See Bhattacharya (1957, p. 58, lines 14–15).

帶) [i.e., the permeation of hearing *zhu*], three minds appear, namely, the occurring directly mind, the investigating mind and, next, the determination mind. [The last is so named because] one settles upon a determination that *zhu* modifies all conditioned things. Hence the *Yogācārabhūmi* claims: Immediately after the investigating mind, if the mind does not become distracted (*sanluan* 散亂), then the determination mind arises. If distracted, then it is not necessarily the case that [the determination mind] arises.¹⁵

So far only the self-nature (*zixing* 自性; *svabhāva*)¹⁶ [i.e., the meaning of the first two syllables] is known, but not the meaning (*yi* 義; **artha*) [i.e. of the whole sentence]. In order to cause one to know the meaning [of the whole sentence], the syllables *wu* 無 (“lack”) is added. At this moment, there exist the previous three minds [i.e., three minds associated with *xing*], but regarding the syllable *wu* there are only two of them, namely the occurring directly mind and the investigating mind, because one has not yet settled upon a determination about what is negated by *wu*. Namely, after the determination mind [towards the first two syllables] the investigating mind arises again [even though it is posterior to the determination mind]. This is why the *Śāstra* (i.e., the *Yogācārabhūmi*) only claims as a rule (*dingshuo* 定說) that, after the occurring directly mind, the investigating mind must immediately arise.¹⁷ [It is because the *Yogācārabhūmi*] allows that distraction (*luan* 亂) arises after the investigating mind [and hence the determination mind does not necessarily follow].

Further, when *chang* 常 (“permanence”) is said, the five minds arise altogether, and the meaning of it [i.e., of the whole sentence] is understood. Because the power of the previous syllables repeatedly permeates (*xunxi* 熏習) and links to the syllables that follow, only at the last moment can one understand the meaning, and only then do the moral mind, etc. [namely, together with the homogeneous mind] go into action (*zhuan* 轉; *pra-√vṛt*). Hence although things exist neither in the past nor in the future, the substance of the teaching can be established.

If [one seeks to] understand [the syllables that are] all new, then there is always the occurring directly mind arising [towards each syllable]. Regarding

¹⁵ This is a paraphrase of the passage immediately following the above quotation from Fascicle Three of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, which reads: //從此無間或時散亂，或耳識生，或五識身中隨一識生。若不散亂，必定意識中第二決定心生// (T1579 (XXX) 291b3–5) The Sanskrit text reads: // *tadanantaram kadācid vikṣīpyate / tataḥ śrot ravijñānam vānyatamānyatamad vā pañcānām vijñānakāyānām / sa cen na vikṣīpyate / tato manovijñānam eva nīcitam nāma* // See Bhattacharya (1957, p. 58, lines 15–18). For my English translation, see below under “General Observations.”

¹⁶ The idea that term-group (*nāma-kāya*; *mingshen* 名身) are appellations (*adhivacana*) for the self-nature (*zixing* 自性; *svabhāva*) of dharmas and sentence-group (*pada-kāya*; *jushen* 句身) are appellations (*adhivacana*) for the distinction (*chabie* 差別; *viśeṣa*) of dharmas can be found in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and Sthiramati’s *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*. See Hayashima (2003, Vol. I, pp. 80–81). For Sthiramati’s explanation in his *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*, see Kramer (2013), Part I: Critical edition, pp. 84–85; Part II: Diplomatic edition, pp. 76–77.

¹⁷ This is a paraphrase of the passage quoted above from Fascicle Three of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, see above footnote 14.

each of the four syllables there must arise two minds, namely the occurring directly mind and the investigating mind. At the last moment there are 12 minds gathering together simultaneously. [That is:] Regarding the first [syllable] there arise two minds [occurring directly and investigating]; regarding the second [syllable] there arise three minds [occurring directly, investigating and determination]; regarding the third [syllable] there arise two minds [occurring directly and investigating]; regarding the fourth [syllable] there arise five minds [occurring directly, investigating, determination, moral and homogeneous], and hence 12 altogether. Given that there is the occurring directly mind regarding the first syllable, there are investigating mind and determination mind regarding the following syllables, and at last there are the moral mind, etc. [namely, together with the homogeneous mind] arising. Only when the five minds are all present is it named “gathering together [of minds].”¹⁸

Based on the above passage, I summarize Kuiji’s interpretation as follows: (12 minds in total)

Zhu: occurring directly mind, investigating mind;

Xing: occurring directly mind, investigating mind; determination mind regarding *zhu xing*;

Wu: occurring directly mind, investigating mind;

Chang: occurring directly mind, investigating mind; determination mind, moral mind and homogeneous mind regarding *zhu xing wu chang*;

Now Kuiji claims that all these 12 minds are present at the last moment, but how exactly this is possible is not crystal clear. The key, I suggest, lies in Kuiji’s adoption of the idea of a “link with prior permeation” (*xian xunxi liandai* 先熏習連帶) in his discussion of *xing*. Permeation (*xunxi* 熏習; *vāsanā*) here refers to the main function of the storehouse consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*), that is, to store the karmic force. Namely, upon hearing the syllable *xing*, the sound *zhu* has ceased. But occurring directly mind and investigating mind from hearing *zhu* still subsist due to the hearer’s “link with prior permeation,” so that the determination mind regarding *zhu xing* can arise while hearing *xing* alone. Thus, despite the momentariness of

¹⁸ 問：過去、未來既非實有，非有為法生已便住，如何聽教聚集解生？答《無性釋》云：「隨墮八時聞者識上直、非直說聚集顯現，以為體性。」謂八時中聞者識上有直、非直二種言說聚集現故。

如《瑜伽論》八十一說：「諸行無常，有起盡法生必滅故，彼寂為樂。」如言「諸」字，率爾心已，必起尋求續初心起。雖多剎那，行、解唯一，總名尋求，未決定知「諸」所目故。如《瑜伽論》第三卷說：「又一剎那五識生已，從此無間必意識生故。」

復言「行」時，由先熏習連帶解生，有三心現。謂率爾、尋求、及次決定。決定知「諸」目一切行。故《瑜伽》說：尋求無間若不散亂，決定心生；若散亂時，生即不定。

雖知自性然未知義，為令知故復說「無」字。於此時中有先三心，於「無」字上但有其二。謂率爾。尋求，未決定知無所無故。即從決定後却起尋求。《論》但定說率爾、尋求定無間生，尋求以後許亂起故。

復言「常」時五心并具，其義可解。由前字力展轉熏習連後字生，於最後時方能解義，染淨等心方乃得轉。故雖無過、未，而教體亦成。

若新新解皆有率爾，四字之上皆定有二心，謂率爾、尋求。即於末後有十二心一時聚集。第一有二、第二有三、第三有二、第四有五，故有十二。既於初字有率爾心，於後後字有尋求、決定，末後乃有染淨等生，五心方具名為聚集 (T1830 (XLIII) 231a6–b3)。

both external sounds and internal states of mind, the prior states of mind can subsist and become united with later states of mind due to this “link with prior permeation.”

The simultaneous presence of the 12 minds under Kuiji’s interpretation can be depicted in the following diagram:

Diagram 2: Kuiji’s view of 12 minds

T1	T2	T3	T4	T5	T6	T7	T8	T9	
<i>zhu</i>	Om-z	{Om-z}	{Om-z}	{Om-z}	{Om-z}	{Om-z}	{Om-z}	{Om-z}	
		Im-z	{Im-z}	{Im-z}	{Im-z}	{Im-z}	{Im-z}	{Im-z}	
	<i>xing</i>	Om-x	{Om-x}	{Om-x}	{Om-x}	{Om-x}	{Om-x}	{Om-x}	{Om-x}
			Im-x	{Im-x}	{Im-x}	{Im-x}	{Im-x}	{Im-x}	{Im-x}
		<i>wu</i>	Om-w	Dm-zx	{Dm-zx}	{Dm-zx}	{Dm-zx}	{Dm-zx}	{Dm-zx}
	Im-w			{Im-w}	{Im-w}	{Im-w}	{Im-w}	{Im-w}	{Im-w}
	<i>chang</i>		Om-c	Im-c	{Im-c}	{Im-c}	{Im-c}	{Im-c}	{Im-c}
		Dm-zxwc		{Dm-c}	{Dm-c}	{Dm-c}	{Dm-c}	{Dm-c}	
			Mm-zxwc	{Mm-c}	{Mm-c}				
				Hm-zxwc					

Om: occurring directly mind; Im: investigating mind; Dm: determination mind; Mm: moral mind; Hm: homogeneous mind; z: *zhu*; x: *xing*; w: *wu*; c: *chang*; Om-z: occurring directly mind regarding *zhu*; {} indicate the link with prior permeation

It is due to the link with prior permeation that the occurring directly mind regarding *zhu* can have power all the way to t₉. The same situation applies to other minds as well.

It should be noted here that according to the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the occurring directly mind belongs to the sensory consciousness but the investigating mind belongs to the mental consciousness. But here Kuiji does not explicitly make this identification. Below, when I discuss Huizhao’s criticism of Wōnch’ūk, it will become clear that, here, both the occurring directly mind and the investigating mind must belong to the mental consciousness.

Wōnch’ūk’s Interpretation

In contrast to the above interpretation of Kuiji, in Fascicle One of Wōnch’ūk’s *Commentary on the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra (Jie shenmi jing shu 解深密經疏; X369)* he offers a different interpretation for how the understanding of a sentence is accomplished. Like Kuiji, Wōnch’ūk also begins with a reference to Asvabhāva’s commentary on the *Mahāvāyāsaṃgraha*, explains the term “eight times,” “direct

and indirect speech,” gives a brief review of the five minds, and makes a comment about whether the mental consciousness cognizes the objects at the present time.¹⁹

Then Wōnch’ük uses exactly the same stock example, *zhu xing wu chang* 諸行無常, to explain how understanding is accomplished. In total, Wōnch’ük actually advances or entertains three separate interpretations for the solution of our problem, and his consideration of the third bifurcates again into two subordinate variations. I will consider these interpretations below in turn, labeling them for clarity A, B, C1 and C2. Before broaching this three specific interpretations, he first advances some general considerations as follows:

Here I just rely upon the aforementioned five minds to explain the composite whole (*juji* 聚集) [of the things heard]. To discuss the composite whole, [I shall refer to what] is said in a corresponding scripture²⁰: “All conditioned things lack permanence, because a thing that comes into being and perishes, after arising, must cease. The cessation of those things is happiness.” Explanation: This is the *sūtra*’s (= **āgama*) refutation of permanence by means of an inference (*biliang* 比量; *anumāna*). “All conditioned things lack permanence” is the thesis (*pakṣa* or *pratijñā*). “A thing that comes into being and perishes” is a similar example (*tongfa yu* 同法喻; *sa-pakṣa*), with lamps, etc. as an illustration. “After arising, it must cease” is the reason (*yin* 因; *hetu*). Because of this reasoning, “the cessation of those things,” i.e., *nirvāṇa*, is taken as the supreme happiness.

Now I just take the first sentence to discuss the composite whole. There are four sounds (*sheng* 聲; *śabda*), four syllables (*zi* 字; *akṣara* or *vyañjana*), four terms (*ming* 名; *nāman*), one sentence (*ju* 句; *pada* or *vākya*) and the meaning signified (*suoquan yi* 所詮義; *artha*).²¹ Regarding this issue, masters of the West have made three different interpretations.

Here, Wōnch’ük embarks upon the explication of the first of the three specific interpretations he entertains:

(A) Some claim: when the syllable *zhu* (“all”) is said, the ear-consciousness *qua* occurring directly mind, the simultaneous mental consciousness, and the investigating mind only cognize the mark of a sound (*shengxiang* 聲相) [but not the term]. Why? This is because the mental consciousness simultaneous with the five [sensory consciousnesses] belongs to direct perception (*xianliang* 現量; *pratyakṣa*) and does not cognize terms (*ming* 名; *nāman*), etc. In the case of the investigating mind, it does not cognize terms, etc. because it

¹⁹ X369 (XXI) 175b20–176a4.

²⁰ See above, footnote 13.

²¹ Here my reconstruction of the Sanskrit terms is based on a comparison of Xuanzang’s Chinese translation of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* with its extant Sanskrit text. For *sheng* 聲, *zi* 字, *ming* 名, and *ju* 句, see *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* II.47 (Chn.: T1558 (XXIX) 29a8ff.; Skt.: Pradhan (1967), pp. 80ff.) For *suoquan* 所詮, see *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* II.34 (Chn.: T1558 (XXIX) 21c23–24; Skt.: Pradhan (1967), p. 61). *Sheng* (sound) refers to the audible aspect of a *zi* (syllable). But there are some confusion here about *zi* and *ming* (term) due to the differences between the Sanskrit and the Chinese languages. Originally in Sanskrit, multiple syllables form a term. But since in Chinese just one syllable forms a term, it does not seem useful to distinguish between a syllable and a term.

investigate the objects that are cognized by the five sensory consciousnesses [but not the objects cognized by the mental consciousness]. Thus, despite the fact that terms supervene upon the sounds that are transformed (*bian* 變; *pari-√nam*) from these three consciousnesses [i.e., the ear-consciousness *qua* occurring directly mind regarding *zhu*, the simultaneous mental consciousness, and the investigating mind], just like the marks of arising (*sheng* 生; **utpāda*), etc., because [these three consciousnesses] do not cognize [terms,] we do not claim that this is a composite whole. [Only] after the determination mind are three marks [cognized], namely, sounds, terms and syllables. When *xing* (“conditioned things”) is said, the ear-consciousness *qua* occurring directly mind, the simultaneous mental consciousness, and the investigating mind only cognize the sound of *xing*, just the same as before. [Only] after the determination mind are six marks [cognized], namely, two sounds, two syllables and two terms. When *wu* (“lack”) is said, the ear-consciousness *qua* occurring directly mind, the simultaneous mental consciousness, and the investigating mind only cognize the sound of *wu*, just the same as before.²² The determination mind, etc. also cognize nine [marks, namely, three sounds, three syllables, and three terms] just the same as before. When *chang* (“permanence”) is said, the occurring directly mind, etc. cognize the sound of *chang*, and after the determination mind one cognizes 14 marks, namely, four sounds, four syllables, four terms, one sentence and the meaning signified. Thus in a short period of time, i.e., after 16 minds, it is possible for [the understanding of the sentence *zhu xing wu chang*] be completely established. That is to say, regarding each syllable there arise four minds: the ear-consciousness *qua* occurring directly mind, the simultaneous mental consciousness, the investigating mind and the determination mind. If the mind is not distracted, then the mind with defilement or purity will arise. Logically this should be the way that one thinks [about such issues.]²³

I summarize Wōnch'ük's first interpretation in the following diagram:

²² There are missing parts in our current Chinese text here. The sentences underlined are my reconstruction of what should have been in the original text based on the context.

²³ 此中且依前五種心以明聚集。言「聚集」者，如契經說：「諸行無常，有起盡法生必滅故，彼寂為樂。」解云：此即契經比量破執常者。「諸行無常」宗。「有起盡法」者是同法喻，舉燈光等。「生必滅故」者是因。由是道理，「彼寂」涅槃以為勝樂。

且約初句以辨「聚集」，於中具有四聲、四字、四名、一句及所詮義。於此義中，西方諸師且作三釋。

(A) 有云：說「諸」字時，卒爾耳識、同時意識及尋求心唯有聲相。所以者何？五俱意識是現量故，不緣名等。若尋求心尋五識等所緣境故，不緣名等。雖此三識所變聲上皆有名等，如生等相，而不緣故，不說聚集。決定心後有三種相，謂聲、名、字。至說「行」時，卒爾耳識、同時意識及尋求心唯得「行」聲，准前可知。[missing texts here]決定心等亦得九種，准前可知。說「常」字時，卒爾心等得「常」聲。決定心後得十四種，謂四聲、四字、四名、一句及所詮義。由此極少經十六心乃得具足。由此極少經十六心乃得具足。謂從四字皆有四心，謂卒爾耳識、同時意識、尋求、決定。若不散者，起染淨心，如理應思(X369 (XXI) 176a4–21).

Diagram 3: [First Interpretation (A) according to Wǒnch`ük] 16 minds arising in total, 14 marks cognized in total

T1	T2	T3	T4	T5	T6	T7
<i>zhu</i>	Om = Ear-cons (1) Sml-m-cons (2)	Im (3)	Dm (4)	{Dm} ²⁴	{Dm}	{Dm}
	What is cognized: sound × 1		What is cognized: sound × 1 syllable × 1 term × 1 (3 in total)			
	<i>xing</i>	Om = Ear-cons (5) Sml-m-cons (6)	Im (7)	Dm (8)	{Dm}	{Dm}
		What is cognized: sound × 1		What is cognized: sound × 2 syllable × 2 term × 2 (6 in total)		
		<i>wu</i>	Om = Ear-cons (9) Sml-m-cons (10)	Im (11)	Dm (12)	{Dm}
			What is cognized: sound × 1		What is cognized: sound × 3 syllable × 3 term × 3 (9 in total)	
			<i>chang</i>	Om = Ear-cons (13) Sml-m-cons (14)	Im (15)	Dm (16)
				What is cognized: sound × 1		What is cognized: sound × 4 syllable × 4 term × 4 sentence × 1 meaning × 1 (14 in total)

Om: occurring directly mind; Im: investigating mind; Dm: determination mind; Sml-m-cons: simultaneous mental consciousness; {} indicate the link with prior permeation

Thus far, Wǒnch`ük has been explicating only the first of the three interpretations he entertains. Next, he lays out the second as follows:

²⁴ According to this view, all the ear-consciousness (t_2), simultaneous mental consciousness (t_2), investigating mind (t_3) and determination mind (t_4) can subsist at t_5 via the “link with prior permeation,” but only the determination mind counts for the understanding of the whole sentence. Hence, for the reason of simplicity, I only list determination mind.

(B) [Secondly,] some claim: the ear-consciousness *qua* occurring directly mind and the simultaneous mental consciousness do not cognize terms, etc., as was explained before. This is because [both of them] belong to direct perception. [The minds starting with] the investigating mind do not belong to direct perception, and hence they also cognize sounds, terms, and syllables. The four investigating minds, according to their sequence, cognize three, six, nine and 14 [marks], as was explained before. If we follow this interpretation, then only after 12 minds [can the composite whole] be completely established. [The issue of] how many [marks] the determination mind, etc. cognize can also be known in accordance with the same reasoning.^{25,26}

The main difference between this interpretation and the previous one is that sound, syllable and term are cognized right at the moment of the investigating mind. According to the previous view, this does not happen until the moment of the determination mind. Hence, unlike in the first interpretation where it takes 7 moments to complete the composite whole, in this case it only takes 6 moments.

I summarize Wōnch'ūk's interpretation of the second view in the following diagram:

Diagram 4: [Second View (B) according to Wōnch'ūk]

T1	T2	T3	T4	T5	T6
<i>zhu</i>	Om = Ear-cons (1) Sml-m- cons (2)	Im (3)	{Im} ²⁷	{Im}	{Im}
	What is cognized: sound × 1	What is cognized: sound × 1 syllable × 1 term × 1 (3 in total)			
<i>xing</i>	Om = Ear- cons (4) Sml-m-cons (5)	Im (6)		{Im}	{Im}
	What is cognized: sound × 1	What is cognized: sound × 2 syllable × 2 term × 2 (6 in total)			

²⁵ That is: the number of marks cognized by the determination mind is the same as that cognized by the investigating mind at the previous moment.

²⁶ 有義：卒爾耳識、同時意識不緣名等，義如前說，是現量故。尋求[已>已]去，即非現量，由斯亦得聲、名、字等。四尋求心如其次第，得三、六、九及以十四，准前應知。若依此釋，經十二心，方得具足。決定心等，所得多少，如理應知。(X369 (XXI) 176a21–b2).

²⁷ See above footnote 24.

T1	T2	T3	T4	T5	T6
		<i>wu</i>	Om = Ear-cons (7) Sml-m-cons (8)	Im (9)	{Im}
			What is cognized: sound × 1	What is cognized: sound × 3 syllable × 3 term × 3 (9 in total)	
			<i>chang</i>	Om = Ear-cons (10) Sml-m-cons (11)	Im (12)
				What is cognized: sound × 1	What is cognized: sound × 4 syllable × 4 term × 4 sentence × 1 meaning × 1 (14 in total)

Om: occurring directly mind; Im: investigating mind; Sml-m-cons: simultaneous mental consciousness; {} indicate the link with prior permeation

Next, Wōnch'ūk lays out the third interpretation:

(C) Some claim: the mental consciousness simultaneous with the ear-consciousness also cognizes terms, etc. If this were not the case, then what terms would the investigating mental consciousness investigate? By this reasoning, when the syllable *zhu* is said, the ear-consciousness *qua* occurring directly mind only cognizes the sound *zhu*, and the simultaneous mental consciousness cognizes the sound, the term, etc.

This interpretation is [further] divided into two variations²⁸:

(C1) One interpretation claims: each of the four occurring directly minds [here referring to the simultaneous mental consciousness that arises together with the sensory consciousness *qua* occurring directly mind] only cognizes three [marks, namely, sound, syllable, term of each letter] Why? Because while saying the sound *chang*, the sounds, terms and syllables of *zhu*, etc. are not cognized. This is because all the occurring directly minds [of the mental consciousness] that are simultaneous with the five sensory consciousnesses belong to direct perception. If one were to allow that [such mental consciousness] to cognize [the sounds, terms and syllables of *zhu*, etc. when the term *chang* is said] then [one would have to allow that] a non-concentrated mind (*asamāhita citta*; *sanxin* 散心; i.e., not a meditative state) can cognize an object in the past through direct perception. Thus, only at the moment of

²⁸ That is, what is labeled here as (C1) and (C2). (C2) will be translated and discussed immediately below, after some analysis of (C1).

investigating mind is [the composite whole] accomplished. As for [the issue of] how many [marks] are cognized by the investigating mind, this is determined as per the reasoning of the above second interpretation.²⁹

The point here is that, although this position (C1) holds that the simultaneous mental consciousness cognizes syllables and terms in addition to the sounds that are cognized by sensory consciousnesses, it insists that since the simultaneous mental consciousness constitutes an instance of direct perception, it cannot cognize an object in the past. Hence the simultaneous mental consciousness cognizing the syllable and term of *chang* does not cognize the syllable and term of *zhu*, *xing* and *wu*. Only the mental consciousness *qua* investigating mind subsequent to the simultaneous mental consciousness of *chang* can also cognize *zhu*, etc. Here the “link with prior permeation” is still presupposed. As in the second interpretation above, it also takes six moments for the composite whole to be completed.

I summarize Wōnch’ük’s interpretation of this position (C1) as follows:

Diagram 5: [Third Interpretation, first variation (C1) according to Wōnch’ük]

T1	T2		T3		T4	T5	T6	
<i>zhu</i>	Om = Ear-cons (1)	Sml-m- cons (2)	Im (3)		{Im} ³⁰	{Im}	{Im}	
	What is cognized: sound × 1	What is cognized: sound × 1 syllable × 1 term × 1 (3 in total)	What is cognized: sound × 1 syllable × 1 term × 1 (3 in total)					
<i>xing</i>			Om = Ear-cons (4)	Sml-m- cons (5)	Im (6)	{Im}	{Im}	
			What is cognized: sound × 1	What is cognized: sound × 1 syllable × 1 term × 1 (3 in total)	What is cognized: sound × 2 syllable × 2 term × 2 (6 in total)			
			<i>wu</i>		Om = Ear-cons (7)	Sml-m-cons (8)	Im (9)	{Im}
					What is cognized: sound × 1 syllable × 1 term × 1 (3 in total)	What is cognized: sound × 1 syllable × 1 term × 1 (3 in total)	What is cognized: sound × 3 syllable × 3 term × 3 (9 in total)	

²⁹ 有義：耳識同時意識，亦緣名等。若不爾者，尋求意識尋何等名？由斯道理，說「諸」字時，卒爾耳識唯得「諸」聲，同時意識得聲、名等。

於此義中，分成兩釋。一云：四卒爾心各唯得三。所以者何？說「常」聲時，不緣「諸」等聲及名、字。五識同時卒爾墮心皆現量故。若許緣者，應有散心現量緣過去故。其尋求心方得圓滿。尋求等心所得多少，如第二說。(X369 (XXI) 176b2–8).

³⁰ See above footnote 24.

T1	T2	T3	T4	T5		T6
			<i>chang</i>	Om = Ear-cons (10)	Sml-m- cons (11)	Im (12)
				What is cognized: sound × 1	What is cognized: sound × 1 syllable × 1 term × 1 (3 in total)	What is cognized: sound × 4 syllable × 4 term × 4 sentence × 1 meaning × 1 (14 in total)

Om: occurring directly mind; Im: investigating mind; Sml-m-cons: simultaneous mental consciousness; {} indicate the link with prior permeation

Finally, Wōnch’ük lays out the second variation on his third interpretation, as follows:

(C2) Another claim: the mental consciousness simultaneous with the five sensory consciousnesses can (*rong* 容) also function differently from direct perception, and hence can also take as its objects, terms, etc. in the past. If we follow this interpretation, then exactly this mind [i.e., the mental consciousness simultaneous with the five sensory consciousnesses upon hearing *chang*] completes the composite whole.³¹

This latter position (C2) holds that since the mental consciousness simultaneous with the ear-consciousness can also cognize objects in the past, upon hearing the sound *chang* by the ear-consciousness, the mental consciousness simultaneous with it cognizes the sounds, the syllables and the terms of *zhu*, *xing*, *wu* as well as *chang*. Hence the composite whole is accomplished in five moments immediately upon hearing the sound *chang*. Note that since the mental consciousness simultaneous with the sensory consciousness can also cognize objects in the past, in this case it is not necessary to resort to the “link with prior permeation.”

I summarize Wōnch’ük’s interpretation of this position (C2) as follows:

³¹ 一云：五識同時意識容非現量，故得緣過去名等。若依此釋。即以[Read: 此]心中具足聚集。(X369 (XXI) 176b8–10).

Diagram 6: [Third Interpretation, first variation (C2) according to Wöñch'ük]

T1	T2		T3		T4		T5	
zhu	Om = Ear-cons (1)	Sml-m-cons (2)						
	What is cognized: sound × 1	What is cognized: sound × 1 syllable × 1 term × 1 (3 in total)						
xing			Om = Ear-cons (3)	Sml-m-cons (4)				
			What is cognized: sound × 1	What is cognized: sound × 2 syllable × 2 term × 2 (6 in total)				
			wu		Om = Ear-cons (5)	Sml-m-cons (6)		
					What is cognized: sound × 1	What is cognized: sound × 3 syllable × 3 term × 3 (9 in total)		
					chang		Om = Ear-cons (7)	Sml-m-cons (8)
							What is cognized: sound × 1	What is cognized: sound × 4 syllable × 4 term × 4 sentence × 1 meaning × 1 (14 in total)

Om: occurring directly mind; Sml-m-cons: simultaneous mental consciousness

Finally, after listing all three interpretations, Wöñch'ük gives the following explanation of (C2):

Objection [against the very last position (C2)]: If, as mentioned above [elsewhere], the mental consciousness simultaneous with the five sensory consciousnesses must belong to direct perception, how could it also be held [by (C2)] to cognize terms, etc.? Explanation: (1) [Even if a cognition belongs to] direct perception, it can also cognize terms [to the extent that terms are treated as] particulars (*zixiang* 自相; *sva-lakṣaṇa*). The reason why the *Nyāyamukha* claims that [a cognition belonging to direct perception] does not cognize terms is that [terms are treated as] being tied to (*xiangxi* 相繫) their

objects (*yi* 義; *artha*).³² (2) Alternatively, [one can also claim that the simultaneous mental consciousness can cognize terms, etc.] because it is brought about and becomes manifest by the homogeneous (*naiṣyandika*) ear-consciousness [at a previous moment]. It is not the case that [the simultaneous mental consciousness cognizing terms, etc.] can only be brought about by the ear-consciousness *qua* occurring directly mind, and, that only through that can a composite whole be possible.³³

The second response (2) means that granted that a mental consciousness simultaneous with the ear-consciousness, *qua* occurring directly mind hearing the sound *chang*, can be brought about by the homogeneous ear-consciousness hearing *zhu*, instead of by the ear-consciousness *qua* occurring directly mind hearing *chang*, then the mental consciousness simultaneous with the ear-consciousness hearing *chang* can at the same time cognize the sound *zhu* that is being brought up again via the homogeneous ear-consciousness hearing *zhu*. In this way, the sound *zhu* in the past can be brought back and still qualify as a present object, and hence *zhu* and *chang* can be cognized simultaneously.³⁴

In the above Wōnch'ūk lists three interpretations, with the third interpretation being further divided into two variations. From the above passages, it is not clear which view Wōnch'ūk himself subscribes to. But from Huizhao's criticism below, it looks like interpretation (A) embodies Wōnch'ūk's own position.

Huizhao's Criticism

In Fascicle One of his *Lamp on the Definite Meaning of the Cheng weishi lun* (*Cheng weishi lun liaoyi deng* 成唯識論了義燈; T1832), Huizhao provides a lengthy criticism of Wōnch'ūk, sometimes through the mediation of his criticism of the no more extant *A Summary of the Main Points of the Cheng weishi lun* (*Cheng weishi lun yaoji* 成唯識論要集 (abbreviated as *Yaoji*) by Wōnch'ūk's Silla disciple Dojeung. There, Huizhao starts with a review of Wōnch'ūk's list of three

³² That is to say, when a term is tied or applied to an object, that object would be conceptualized, and, for this reason, the term together with that object cannot be cognized through direct perception, which is devoid of conceptualization according to Dignāga. I had difficulties tracking this point in the *Nyāyamukha*, but I believe this is the point that Dignāga makes in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* verse I.7ab. Hattori's English translation reads: "Even conceptual construction, when it is brought to internal awareness, is admitted [as a type of perception]. However, with regard to the [external] object, [the conceptual construction is] not [admissible as perception], because it conceptualizes [the object]." See Hattori (1968), p. 27.

³³ 問:若如前說,五俱意識定是現量,如何亦說緣名等耶?解云:現量亦然[Read:緣]名等自相。而《因明理門》說不緣名,義相繫故。或有但由等流耳識所列[Read:引]發故而顯現者,未必要待卒爾耳識之所列[Read:引]生方能聚集。(X369 (XXI) 176b10-b14).

³⁴ This theory would seem to suffer from an obvious difficulty: the mental consciousness simultaneous with the ear-consciousness, *qua* occurring directly mind hearing *chang*, can either cognize *zhu* or *chang* but not both at the same moment.

interpretations beginning with *youshi* 有釋 (“There is an interpretation”),³⁵ which agrees completely with the above passages of Wōnch’ük.³⁶ Then Huizhao criticizes Wōnch’ük as follows:

Now I claim that [in addition to the above three interpretations listed by Wōnch’ük] there is yet another interpretation [which I take to be the correct interpretation.] [Now I] just [criticize] the first interpretation [of Wōnch’ük by objecting that] the minds experienced are more but the entities (*fa* 法) in the composite whole are fewer [than they should be]. How so? Why does [the first interpretation require] that [the entities] of the composite whole in the mental consciousness must first pass through the four ear-consciousnesses *qua* occurring directly mind? How could [the first interpretation] allow that mental consciousness does not cognize the object as it is (*benzhi* 本質) but only cognizes the sound that has already been transformed (*suobian* 所變; *pari-√nam*) by [and present in] the ear-consciousness?³⁷ If [the first interpretation] allows that the mental consciousness and the ear-consciousness both simultaneously cognize the object as it is, then [the composite whole of the whole sentence *zhu xing wu chang*] is manifest simply by experiencing 12 minds of the mental consciousness [i.e., the four mental consciousnesses simultaneous with the four ear-consciousnesses *qua* occurring directly mind, the four mental consciousnesses *qua* investigating mind, and the four mental consciousnesses *qua* determination mind] rather than 16 minds [i.e., the four ear-consciousnesses *qua* occurring directly mind in addition to the above 12]. But if [the first interpretation] insists that the four ear-consciousnesses *qua* occurring directly mind must be included, then the four sounds cognized by those four ear-consciousnesses [i.e., not the four sounds cognized by their simultaneous mental consciousnesses] should also be included, and the total number of entities [cognized] should be 18 [instead of 14]. If [the first interpretation] claims that since the four sounds [cognized by those four ear-consciousnesses] are similar [to those four sounds cognized by the four simultaneous mental consciousnesses] and hence the total number of entities should only be 14, then since the [four] minds of ear-consciousness are also similar to the four minds of simultaneous mental consciousnesses [because they both cognize the same object as it is], it [i.e., the first interpretation] should also claim that by only 12 minds [is the composite whole completely established.]

[Huizhao’s own opinion] The interpretation that accords with the reality [is this]: [The composite whole] becomes manifest simply by the 12 minds of mental consciousnesses, excluding the four ear-consciousnesses *qua* occurring

³⁵ In the *Yuishiki gitō zōmōki* 唯識義燈增明記 (T2261) by the Japanese monk Zenju 善珠 (723–797), six interpretations are recorded in the *Cheng weishi lun liaoyi deng* 成唯識論了義燈 under six different headings: *youshuo* 有說 refers to that of Kuiji; *youshi* 有釋 refers to that of Wōnch’ük; *youchao* 有鈔 refers to that of Puguang 普光 (?–664); *youjie* 有解 refers to that of Huiguan 慧觀 (d.u.); *youyun* 有云 refers to that of Xuanfan 玄範 (d.u.); *weixiangjue* 未詳決 refers to that of Uijeok 義寂 (d.u.). See T2261 (LXV) 342a21–b9.

³⁶ Cf. T1832 (XLIII) 663a20–b5.

³⁷ To simplify the complex issues behind this claim, this can simply be taken to mean: Why must the simultaneous mental consciousness take its content from the sensory consciousnesses?

directly mind. The entities in the composite whole include: the four sounds at the four moments, four syllables, four terms, four signifieds (*suoquan* 所詮) of the four terms, namely four self-natures (*zixing* 自性; *svabhāva*), and, further, one sentence and what is signified by that sentence, i.e., the meaning that distinguishes itself from other sentences (*chabie yi* 差別義; **viśeṣārtha*?).³⁸ In total, 18 entities are in the composite whole and become manifest. This [interpretation] above is based on one mark [i.e., one syllable corresponds to one syllable). If in one syllable, etc. there are infinite number of syllables that become manifest,³⁹ then [the total number of] entities [in the composite whole] would become indeterminate.

Regarding the three moral qualities [i.e., wholesome (*kuśala*), unwholesome (*akuśala*) and neutral (*avyākṛta*)] of the various consciousnesses among the five minds, I shall show the right and the wrong interpretations below, in the fifth fascicle.⁴⁰

Further, the root text⁴¹ says that only regarding *xing* and *chang* are there determination minds, [this is because only regarding these two terms] is one settled upon a determination knowing (*jueding zhi* 決定知) that *zhu* (“all”) modifies *xing* (“conditioned things”) that are constantly changing, and there is the *wu* (“lack”) of that *chang* (“permanence”).

There is an interpretation [by Wōnch’ük]: Regarding each of the four syllables, there is a determination mind. [Regarding this interpretation,] the *Yaoji* says: “Without this explanation, the reasoning is not perfect. But even given these various explanations [by Wōnch’ük and by others], it is still not perfectly reasonable. [My, i. e., Dojeung’s, interpretation is:] Suppose a proponent wants to prove impermanence, and against his opponents he establishes an argument [i.e., a thesis (*pakṣa* or *pratijñā*)] saying *zhu xing wu chang*. Even when his opponents have heard the first three [syllables], they have not yet arrived at a definite understanding (*dingjie* 定解) of what is to be established (*sādhya*, i.e., the thesis). Only after the syllable *chang* is said do the opponents arrive at a definite understanding. Hence regarding the first three syllables, there is no determination mind.” And [the *Yaoji*] goes on to say: “Based on the above interpretation, only after [the thesis-holder] has established the reason (*hetu*) and the example (*dṛṣṭānta*) does the determination mind [of his opponents] arise. I also agree with this reasoning and this sense regarding establishing a thesis (*pakṣa*). If one has not arrived at a determination [regarding the thesis], then the determination mind does not arise. The determination mind arises only after the reason and the example [have been given].”

[Huizhao: In respect of] these interpretations [held by Wōnch’ük and *Yaoji*], we should consider [as follows]. To begin with, regarding the interpretation of

³⁸ For *zixing* 自性 and *chabie yi* 差別義 here, cf. above footnote 16.

³⁹ This is somewhat mysterious. I suspect this has to do with certain tantric practices of syllable-mapping.

⁴⁰ Cf. T1832 (XLIII) 750a4ff.

⁴¹ *Ben* 本 (“root text”) here refers either to the *Cheng weishi lun shuji* 成唯識論述記 or to the *Dasheng fayuan yilin zhang* 大乘法苑義林章 (T1861) both by Kuiji. Both texts have similar passages, namely, the passage from Kuiji quoted above and footnote 9.

[the master of the] Ximing 西明 [Temple] [i.e., Wōnch'ük] that regarding each syllable there is a determination mind, [this would imply that] simply by hearing the syllable *zhu*, one knows what it modifies. Now since one does not yet know what entity *zhu*, a plural marker, modifies, how could the determination mind arise? If you claim that the determination mind arises because one settles upon a determination knowing that this sound is that of *zhu*, then while [hearing] the syllable *xing*, two [determination minds] should arise: (1) a determination [mind] knowing *xing*, and (2) another determination [mind] knowing that *zhu* modifies *xing*. This is because if one does not settle upon a determination knowing that *zhu* modifies *xing*, then he would not arrive at an understanding [of *zhu xing*]. The remaining two [syllables, namely, *wu* and *chang*] are also like this. That is to say, there should be in total six determination minds [i.e., three regarding *zhu xing* and three regarding *wu chang*] instead of only four [as is held by Wōnch'ük], and hence [Wōnch'ük] commits the fault of [holding the number of determination minds to be] either more or fewer [than the correct number of determination minds].

What is said by the *Yaoji* is also not perfectly reasonable. In the case of making a thesis against opponents, the situation might be like what is said [in the *Yaoji*]. But in the case when one is simply preaching without proposing an inference (*biliang* 比量; *anumāna*), then how could there be no determination mind [all the way until when one has heard the reason and the example]? Hence the *Fayuan* [namely, the *Dasheng fayuan yilin zhang* 大乘法苑義林章 by Kuiji; T1861] means that regarding (*yue* 約) preaching in general (*tong* 通), the determination mind arises when [the hearer] settles upon a determination knowing what *zhu* modifies, and hence one commits no fault claiming that there are seven minds or 12 minds [arising before reaching an understanding of the whole sentence].⁴²

[The *Fayuan*] does not decide the number of minds based simply on the situation where the hearer has realized the meaning of the whole sentence [i.e., after hearing the thesis, the reason and the example, as claimed by the *Yaoji*].⁴³

⁴² Cf. T1861 (XLV) 252b13–c8.

⁴³ 今謂有餘。且初釋中所經心多聚集法少。何者？意識上聚集何故經耳識四率兩心耶？豈許意識不取本質但緣耳識所變聲耶？既許意識、耳識同時自緣本質，但經意識十二心現，不應十六。若取耳率兩，應取耳緣聲，應成十八法。若以聲相似但說十四法，亦應心相似但說十二心。如實說者：除耳四率兩，但經意識十二心現所集之法：四剎那聲、四個字、四個名、名所詮四、即四自性，又有一句、并句所詮一差別義，合十八法聚集顯現。此據一相，若於一字等現無量字等，法則不定。

說五心中諸識三性，至下第五明其是非。

又《本》所說於「行」、「常」二方有決定，決定知「諸」詮遷流「行」、「無」於彼「常」。有釋：四字皆有決定。《要集》云：「若無此釋於理有關，雖有諸釋仍未盡理。謂立論者欲成無常，對敵論等即立量云『諸行無常』。其敵論等雖聞前三，而於所立未生定解。說『常』字時方生定解，故前三字未有決定。」乃至云「若依此釋，立因、喻後方生決定。亦准此理此意立宗。若未解時未有決定，因、喻、已後方生決定。」

此義應思。且西明釋「於四字上皆決定」者，且聞「諸」字知目於何。既未知「諸」諸於何法，豈生決定？若言決定知是「諸」聲有決定心，說「行」字時應有三[Read: 二]決定：決定知「行」、復決定知「諸」言目「行」，若不定知「諸」言目「行」不生解故。餘二准此，即合念六決定。不應但有四故，亦增減、失。

《要集》所說亦不盡理。對敵立量可知所說，或但說法不立比量可無決定？故《法苑》意：通約說法，決定知彼「諸」言所目，生決定心，說有七心或十二等，故即無過，不唯據悟所說義旨以判多少 (T1832 (XLIII) 663b5–c9).

What Huizhao means towards the end of this passage, when he discusses “twelve minds,” has been indicated above in Kuiji’s passage. Kuiji discusses “seven minds” in his *A Chapter on the Forest of Meaning in the Mahāyāna Garden of Dharmas* (*Dasheng fayuan yilin zhang* 大乘法苑義林章; T1861), as follows:

Regarding the first syllable there are the occurring directly and the investigating minds. Regarding the second syllable, the determination mind is newly born, and hence, in addition to the first two, the total number becomes three [minds]. Regarding the third syllable the investigating mind arises again, and, plus the former three, the total number becomes four. Regarding the fourth syllable, a new determination mind, the mind with defilement or purity [i.e., the moral mind] and the homogeneous mind arise. Altogether there are seven minds gathering together at the same time. Only this can be called the completion of the five minds.⁴⁴

Here, Kuiji claims that one needs seven minds in order to complete the series of five minds as a process of understanding the meaning of a sentence. Two investigating minds arise regarding the first and the third syllables but not regarding the second and the fourth syllables. Two determination minds arise regarding the second and the fourth syllables but not regarding the first and the third syllables. Below I shall provide some general reflections on why this is the case for Kuiji.

It should be clear from Huizhao’s criticism of Wōnch’ük that no matter whether Kuiji and Huizhao talk about 12 minds or seven minds, all these minds belong to the mental consciousness, rather than the sensory consciousnesses. The main reason is that, as pointed out by Huizhao above, that the mental consciousness simultaneous with sensory consciousnesses can cognize the object as it is (*benzhi* 本質) at the same time as the sensory consciousness, and, for this reason, it is not necessary to include sensory consciousnesses in the gathering together of minds.

We can summarize Kuiji-Huizhao’s 12 minds and seven minds versus Wōnch’ük’s 16 minds in the following diagram:

Diagram 7: 16 minds (Wōnch’ük) versus 12/seven minds (Kuiji-Huizhao)

	Wōnch’ük	Kuiji-Huizhao	Kuiji-Huizhao
	Sixteen minds (sensory consciousness plus mental consciousness)	Twelve minds (all mental consciousnesses)	Seven minds (all mental consciousnesses)
<i>zhu</i>	(1) Sensory consciousness <i>qua</i> occurring directly mind (2) Simultaneous mental consciousness (3) Mental consciousness <i>qua</i> investigating mind (4) Mental consciousness <i>qua</i> determination mind	(1) Occurring directly (2) Investigating	(1) Occurring directly (2) Investigating

⁴⁴ 既於初字有率爾尋求，於第二字新生決定，并前為三。第三字中却起尋求，并前為四。第四字時但新決定、染淨、等流三心而起，合有七心一時聚集，如是方名五心具足 (T1861 (XLV) 252c3–7).

	Wōnch'ük	Kuiji-Huizhao	Kuiji-Huizhao
<i>xing</i>	(5) Sensory consciousness <i>qua</i> occurring directly mind	(3) Occurring directly	(3) Determination
	(6) Simultaneous mental consciousness	(4) Investigating	
	(7) Mental consciousness <i>qua</i> investigating mind	(5) Determination	
	(8) Mental consciousness <i>qua</i> determination mind		
<i>wu</i>	(9) Sensory consciousness <i>qua</i> occurring directly mind	(6) Occurring directly	(4) Investigating
	(10) Simultaneous mental consciousness	(7) Investigating	
	(11) Mental consciousness <i>qua</i> investigating mind		
	(12) Mental consciousness <i>qua</i> determination mind		
<i>chang</i>	(13) Sensory consciousness <i>qua</i> occurring directly mind	(8) Occurring directly	(5) Determination
	(14) Simultaneous mental consciousness	(9) Investigating	(6) Moral
	(15) Mental consciousness <i>qua</i> investigating mind	(10) Determination	(7) Homogeneous
	(16) Mental consciousness <i>qua</i> determination mind	(11) Moral	
		(12) Homogeneous	

Huizhao's interpretation, which differs from Wōnch'ük's regarding how many entities are cognized, is summarized in the following diagram:

Diagram 8: 14 entities (Wōnch'ük) vs. 18 entities (Huizhao):

Wōnch'ük	Huizhao
Four sounds	Four sounds
Four syllables	Four syllables
Four terms	Four terms
	Four meanings signified [by each of the four terms]
One sentence	One sentence
One meaning signified [by one sentence]	One meaning signified [by one sentence]

Finally, Huizhao's own interpretation can be summarized in the following diagram:

Diagram 9: Huizhao’s interpretation (based on the model of 12 minds and 18 entities)

T1	T2	T3	T4	T5	T6	T7	T8	T9
zhu	(Ear-cons) Om = Sml-m-cons	Im (2)	{Im}	{Im} ⁴⁶				
	What is cognized: sound × 1 (1)	What is cognized ⁴⁷ : syllable × 1 (2) term × 1 (3) signified × 1 (4)						
xing	(Ear-cons) Om = Sml-m-cons (3)	Im (4)	Dm (5) knowing: zhu modifies xing	{Dm}	{Dm} ⁴⁸			
	What is cognized: sound × 1 (5)	What is cognized: syllable × 1 (6) term × 1 (7) signified × 1 (8)						
		wu	(Ear-cons) Om = Sml-m-cons (6)	Im (7)	{Im}	{Im}		
			What is cognized: sound × 1 (9)	What is cognized: syllable × 1 (10) term × 1 (11) signified × 1 (12)				
			chang	(Ear-cons) Om = Sml-m-cons (8)	Im (9)	Dm (10) knowing: zhu xing wu chang	Mm (11)	Hm (12)
				What is cognized: sound × 1 (13)	What is cognized: syllable × 1 (14) term × 1 (15) signified × 1 (16)			

Om: occurring directly mind; Im: investigating mind; Dm: determination mind; Mm: moral mind; Hm: homogeneous mind; Sml-m-cons: simultaneous mental consciousness; Om-z: occurring directly mind regarding zhu; {} indicate the link with prior permeation

In what follows, I offer some general observations about what is at stake in Huizhao’s criticism of Wōnch’ük.

⁴⁵ As indicated above, the ear-consciousness plays no role in the gathering together among the minds according to Huizhao.

⁴⁶ The permeation of the investigating mind at t_3 must subsist at t_5 because it contributes to the determination mind at t_5 that knows zhu modifies xing.

⁴⁷ Huizhao does not make it clear whether it is the investigating mind or the determination mind that cognizes the syllable, the term and the signified of zhu. But since (1) regarding each syllable, there always arises the investigating mind but not the determination mind; and (2) regarding each of zhu, xing, wu and chang, its syllable, term and signified are all cognized, it makes more sense to claim that it is the investigating mind that cognizes the syllable, the term and the signified of zhu. The same applies to xing, wu and chang. This interpretation here also accords well with Kuiji’s interpretation above.

⁴⁸ The permeation of the determination mind at t_5 must subsist at t_7 because it contributes to the determination mind at t_7 that knows the whole sentence zhu xing wu chang.

General Observations

The major differences between Kuiji-Huizhao and Wōnch'ūk boil down to the following two points. (1) The role played by the mental consciousness simultaneous with sensory consciousness in the process of understanding a sentence; (2) Whether the internal structure of a sentence is taken into account.

Regarding (1), both Kuiji-Huizhao and Wōnch'ūk subscribe to the notion of the mental consciousness simultaneous with the five sensory consciousnesses (*wu ju yishi* 五俱意識 or *tongshi yishi* 同時意識). This refers to the mental consciousness arising simultaneously with one of the five sensory consciousnesses and cognizing the same cognitive object. According to Huizhao, the mental consciousness simultaneous with the ear-consciousness cognizing the sound *zhu* can also cognize the same sound, both do so via direct perception (*pratyakṣa*). After that, the investigating mind and the determination mind of the mental consciousness take over and process the information in a conceptualized manner.

It is noteworthy that this notion does not appear in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. In the model of five minds quoted above, there is no mental consciousness arising simultaneously with a sensory consciousness. In another passage from the *Manobhūmi* portion of the same text, it is also held that mental consciousness arises immediately after a sensory consciousness. This passage was cited by Kuiji above, in two different places. Here is the full passage again:

Immediately after [one of] the five [sensory] consciousnesses comes about in a single moment, the mental consciousness necessarily (*avaśyam*) arises. Immediately after that [moment] (*tad-anantaram*) [i.e., the moment when the mental consciousness arises], it [i.e., sensory consciousness]⁴⁹ is sometimes diverted [elsewhere], and then (*tataḥ*) either ear-consciousness or one of the five [sensory] consciousnesses [arises.] If that (*sa*) [i.e., sensory consciousness]⁵⁰ is not diverted [elsewhere], then just [the second] mental consciousness which is named determination (*niścita*) [mind arises]. And that object is discerned (*vikalpyate*) by the [two] mental consciousnesses—determination and investigating.⁵¹

Here the key is the term *anantaram* (“immediately after”), meaning that immediately after a sensory consciousness the mental consciousness necessarily arises. Here it is clearly pointed out that the mental consciousness does not arise at the same moment as a

⁴⁹ I think “it” here refers to a sensory consciousness. See footnote 50 below.

⁵⁰ I think *sa* here refers to *vijñānakāya*, namely, one of the five sensory consciousnesses. For this reason, I think in the sentence above “Immediately after that, if it is distracted,” “it” should refer to one of the sensory consciousnesses. Takatsukasa avoids the ambiguity by translating “[a mental faculty is] diverted [elsewhere].” See Takatsukasa (2014), p. 185 (L).

⁵¹ Bhattacharya (1957, p. 58, lines 14–19): // *ekakṣaṇotpannānām pañcānām kāyavijñānānām* [Read: *vijñānakāyānām*; see Takatsukasa (2014), footnote 8] *anantaram manovijñānam avaśyam utpadyate/tadanantaram kadācid vikṣipyate / tataḥ śrotavijñānam vānyatamānyatamad vā pañcānām vijñānakāyānām / sa cen na vikṣipyate / tato manovijñānam eva niścitam* [Read: *eva dvitīyaṃ niścitam*; see Takatsukasa (2014), footnote 9] *nāma / tābhyāṃ ca niścitaparyeṣakābhyāṃ manovijñānābhyāṃ sa viṣayo vikalpyate* // For Xuanzang's Chinese translation, see above footnotes 14 and 15.

sensory consciousness. The notion of mental consciousness simultaneous with one of the sensory consciousnesses is nowhere found “in the earliest portion of the *Yogācārabhūmi*”.⁵²

Diagram 1: Five minds in the *Yogācārabhūmi*

	Sense consciousness	Mental consciousness
t ₀ :	object and sense organ	
t ₁ :	Occurring directly mind	
t ₂ :		Investigating mind
t ₃ :		Determination mind
t ₄ :		Moral mind
t ₅ :	Homogeneous mind	

Thus, the model for five minds in the *Yogācārabhūmi* is as Diagram 1 above:

But according to Huizhao, the diagram should be modified by incorporating the notion of the mental consciousness simultaneous with the five sensory consciousnesses, as follows⁵³:

Diagram 10: Five minds according to Kuiji-Huizhao

	Sense consciousness	Mental consciousness
t ₀ :	object and sense organ	
t ₁ :	Occurring directly mind	Simultaneous mental consciousness
t ₂ :		Investigating mind
t ₃ :		Determination mind
t ₄ :		Moral mind
t ₅ :	Homogeneous mind	

⁵² Takatsukasa (2014) and Takatsukasa (2016) point out that, quite different from the Sarvāstivāda-related Abhidharma sources, according to the *Pañcaviññānakāyasamprayuktabhūmi* and the *Manobhūmi*, no two among the six consciousnesses can arise simultaneously.

Another passage that expresses the same idea that the mental consciousness arises at the next moment after a sensory consciousness reads: // *tatra manovijñāne 'nābhoga-vikṣipte śaṣtutālamvane nāsti chandādīnām pravṛtīḥ / tac ca manovijñānam aupanipātikaṃ vaktavyam atītālambanam eva / pañcānām vijñānakāyānām samanantaropannaṃ manaḥ paryeṣakam niścitaṃ vā vartamānaviṣayam eva vaktavyam / tac cet tad viṣayālambanam eva tad bhavati* // See Bhattacharya (1957, p. 59, lines 12–15). Xuanzang's Chinese translation reads: 又意識任運散亂緣不串習境時，無欲等生。爾時意識名率爾墮心，唯緣過去境。五識無間所生意識，或尋求或決定，唯應說緣現在境，若此即緣彼境生 (T1579 (XXX) 291b17–20). “In that case (*tatra*) when the mental consciousness was diverted towards (*vikṣipta*) effortlessly (*anābhoga*) to an unfamiliar cognitive object (*śaṣtutālamvane*), desire, etc. do not arise. And that mental consciousness should be named occurring directly (*aupanipātika*) with its cognitive object (*ālamhana*) only (*eva*) in the past (*atīta*). The mental consciousness that arises immediately after (*samanantaropanna*) the five consciousness-group (*vijñāna-kāya*), either investigating (*paryeṣaka*) or determination (*niścita*), should be named as having a present (*vartamāna*) sense object (*viṣaya*). Why (*tac cet*)? [Because] what arises (*bhavati*) [i.e., mental consciousnesses qua investigating and determination minds] has just (*eva*) the sense object of those [i.e., of sensory consciousness] (*tad-viṣaya*) as its cognitive object (*ālamhana*).” (my translation from Sanskrit).

⁵³ Cf. T1828 (XLII) 333c2–14.

More importantly, according to Huizhao, a mental consciousness can also access the object through direct perception, as long as the mental consciousness operates simultaneously with a sensory consciousness. With the stipulation of this notion of simultaneous mental consciousness, the issue of how the content of the sensory consciousness can be transmitted to the mental consciousness is totally dismissed.

Turning to Wōnch'ūk, he clearly subscribes to the notion of a mental consciousness simultaneous with the five sensory consciousnesses. As in the passage cited above, he claims that there exists a mental consciousness simultaneous with the ear-consciousness *qua* occurring directly mind, and claims that the simultaneous mental consciousness functions via direct perception.⁵⁴ In another passage of his *Commentary on the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra*, he also thinks the image-portion (*xiangfen* 相分; **nimitta-bhāga*?) of the mental consciousness is the same as the object as it is (*benzhi* 本質).⁵⁵ In his *Commentary on the Renwang jing* (*Renwang jing shu* 仁王經疏; T1708), moreover, Wōnch'ūk also claims that there can be a simultaneous mental consciousness that functions via direct perception.⁵⁶ Given that direct perception has an undistorted object, it is clear that Wōnch'ūk agrees that the simultaneous mental consciousness has the same object as that of the sensory consciousness.⁵⁷

It is precisely regarding this point that Huizhao expresses his criticism. In his interpretation of the sentence *zhu xing wu chang*, Wōnch'ūk insists that one needs 16 minds to complete the gathering together of minds. But if the simultaneous mental consciousness has the same object as the sensory consciousness, then the four sensory consciousnesses cognizing the four sounds can be excluded and the whole process of arriving at a composite whole would not need, as was claimed by Wōnch'ūk, 16 minds.⁵⁸

(2) The second major difference between Kuiji-Huizhao and Wōnch'ūk is that they attend differently to the internal structure of the sentence, and it plays a different role in their respective analyses. According to Wōnch'ūk, regarding each of the four syllables, there arises different mental consciousnesses *qua* determination minds. But according to Kuiji and Huizhao, only with respect to the second and the fourth syllables do there arise mental consciousnesses *qua* determination minds. This is because when hearing the first syllable *zhu* ("all"), the target that it modifies remains unknown. Hence no determination mind arises yet regarding it. The same logic also applies to the third syllable, regarding which no determination mind arises.

⁵⁴ Cf. the first interpretation (A) provided by Wonchuk.

⁵⁵ Cf. X369 (XXI) 306b2–16.

⁵⁶ Cf. T1708 (XXXIII) 401b26–27.

⁵⁷ Also cf. the following passages by Wōnch'ūk: X369 (XXI) 218a16–b5; X369 (XXI) 218c15–21; X369 (XXI) 255a1–b5.

⁵⁸ Readers may want to defend Wōnch'ūk by suggesting that for Wōnch'ūk the object of sensory consciousness and the object of the simultaneous mental consciousness are not exactly the same, so that both minds are necessary for a complete gathering together of minds. This might possibly be a way out, but unfortunately, as far as I can trace, Wōnch'ūk himself did not adopt this line of reasoning. In his discussion, he always takes the object of the sensory consciousness to be the same as that of the mental consciousness.

However, we can also challenge Kuiji and Huizhao as follows: When the two syllables *zhu* (“all”) and *xing* (“conditioned things”) have been cognized, one only knows “all conditioned things” to be the subject of the sentence but its predicate remains unknown. Thus, should we claim instead, as suggested by Dojeung, that only at the end of the sentence the determination mind can arise? To further explore this issue, we need to examine how Huizhao analyzes the syntactic structure of a sentence. Unfortunately, in Huizhao’s discussion of how syllables (*zi* 字; *akṣara* or *vyañjana*) or terms (*ming* 名; *nāman*) are combined into a sentence (*ju* 句; *pada* or *vākya*), he mainly relies upon permutation (such as in a sentence of five terms, we can have four two-term clauses; three three-term clauses, two four-term sentences, and one five-term sentence)⁵⁹ rather than syntactical analysis in terms of subject and predicate. Neither does he consider the difference regarding the relation between a syllable and a term in Sanskrit and Chinese languages.⁶⁰

Conclusion: Towards a More Mundane Yogācāra

This paper examines the various interpretations and disputes surrounding the issue of “how do we understand the meaning of a sentence?” In the metaphysical framework of momentariness, each sound constituting a sentence exists just for a moment. It is the mental consciousness that plays the role of retaining the ever-ceasing sounds and “synthesizing” them, so to speak. By examining the various interpretations of Kuiji and Wōnch’ūk, and Huizhao’s criticism of Wōnch’ūk and Dojeung, I conclude that all three thinkers endorse the idea of a mental consciousness simultaneous with the five sensory consciousnesses, and that they incorporate this idea into their theories about understanding. The major differences between Kuiji-Huizhao and Wōnch’ūk lie in two points: (a) Wōnch’ūk thinks the sensory consciousness *qua* occurring directly mind must be included in the process, but Kuiji-Huizhao do not; (b) Wōnch’ūk thinks four determination minds arise regarding each of the four terms in a four-term sentence, but Kuiji-Huizhao claim that no determination mind arises regarding the first and the third terms, due to the syntactical structure of the sentence.

A major contribution of this paper is to show how Yogācāra thinkers explain the way that it is possible to understand the meaning of a sentence under the ontological framework of momentariness and the epistemological model of five minds. As far as I know, this problem has not been previously studied. Dhammajoti (2007) gives a detailed investigation of how sensory consciousnesses and mental consciousness work together under the framework of momentariness in the Sautrāntika tradition.

⁵⁹ For example, see Huizhao’s discussion in the *Cheng weishi lun liaoyi deng* 成唯識論了義燈: T1832 (XLIII) 663c29ff. This way of permutation was based on the Abhidharma framework, which the *Yaoji* traces back to the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. See *ibid.*, 663c10–11.

⁶⁰ According to footnote 13 above, the Sanskrit sentence behind *zhu xing wu chang* is: *llanītyā vata saṃskārā*// Given the very different syntactical structure between the Sanskrit and Chinese languages, an analysis of the composite whole of entities cognized and the gathering together of minds could very well be quite different. Whether Kuiji’s and Wōnch’ūk’s interpretations also work for a sentence in Sanskrit remains to be explored.

But his focus is on the cognition of an individual object, and the issue of understanding the meaning of a sentence is left untouched. Kramer (2016) explores the relation between sense perception and mental perception in various Yogācāra sources, but again, her focus there is on how this issue is related to the proof of the existence of the storehouse consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*).⁶¹ The disputes among four medieval Yogācāra thinkers—Kuiji, Wōnch'ūk, Dojeung and Huizhao—provide an excellent case study of how the daily experience of understanding the meaning of a sentence could be analyzed under Yogācāra philosophical framework. Hopefully, this paper will contribute to a deeper knowledge of Yogācāra Philosophy in general.

More broadly, this paper can also shed light on the relation between Yogācāra and Pramāṇavāda in India. Most extant Indian Yogācāra texts show a preoccupation with supramundane issues such as latent karma and the storehouse consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*); consciousness-only (*vijñaptimātratā*), transformation of the basis (*āśraya-parivṛtti* or *āśraya-parāvṛtti*), the three bodies (*trikāya*) of the Buddha, etc. Relatively little attention has been paid to such mundane issues as how to understand the meaning of a sentence. Surprisingly, however, the great Pramāṇavāda thinkers such as Dignāga and Dharmakīrti devote little discussion to supramundane issues in their major works. This sharp contrast results in a gap between a soteriology-oriented, supramundane Yogācāra vs. a soteriology-disinterested, mundane Pramāṇavāda. This further leads to the question of how to properly understand the contribution of Yogācāra to Pramāṇavāda. Should we play down the influence of Yogācāra and claim that the major input behind the rising of Pramāṇavāda was Sautrāntika? But if so, then how should we explain the clear Yogācāra elements in such works as Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, which seems to be a straightforward defense of Yogācāra metaphysical idealism? The Yogācāra sources preserved in the Chinese language, as discussed in this paper, help to fill this gap, by providing us with rich discussions about mundane epistemology. This might help us re-evaluate the transition from Yogācāra to Pramāṇavāda.

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⁶¹ Kramer (2016), in particular pp. 151–156.

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