235 頁

         Absolute  fear would then be the first encounter  of
         the  other  as other: as other  than  I and as other
         than itself. I can answer the threat of the other as
         other (than I) only by transforming  it into another
         (than   itself),  through   alternating   it  in  my
         imagination, my fear, or my desire.

                                       Jacques Derrida( 註 1)

         The  history  of society  and  culture  is, in large
         measure,  a  history   of  the  struggle   with  the
         endlessly   complex  problems   of  difference   and
         otherness.   Never  have  the  questions   posed  by
         difference  and otherness  been more  pressing  than
         they are today.

                                        Mark C. Taylor( 註 2)


        ──────────────
        (註1)  Jacques Derrida , Of Grammatology , trans . by
               Gayatri C.Spivak, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
               University Press, 1976, p. 277.
        (註2)  Mark C.Taylor,Altarity,Chicago: The University
               of Chicago Press, 1987, p. xxi.


                                236 頁

                                  1

            The  pressing  of the  philosophical  problem  of
        otherness  and  difference  is now  evidenced  in all
        minority discourses.  For the oppressed subjects in a
        long   history,  such   as  woman,  Jews,  subaltern,
        (post-)colonial  cultures, and  so on, the  time  has
        come to rewrite and rediscover  their own identities.
        However,  in  their  efforts   to  do  so,  they  are
        inevitably trapped in a paradoxical situation.  Their
        search  for  a new  identity  through  reversing  the
        relationship  between  master  and  slave,  as  Hegel
        suggests, would  not  escape  the  dominating  desire
        embedded  in the same centric logic.  The reclamation
        of subjectivity  is always  done  at the  expense  of
        distorting   the  previous   other.   The   political
        ambiguity (and guilt) as the result of constructing a
        reversed  other therefore  never  stops haunting  the
        souls  who long for liberation.  For this reason, the
        questions  need  to  be  readdressed  for  those  who
        consider  "encounter"   to  be  the  task  free  from
        distortion  and  domination: What  is  other? Is  the
        other reducible  to something  other than itself? How
        could   the   other   be  properly   understood   and
        confronted?
            As an Oriental response  to these questions, this
        paper   deliberately   takes   a   Buddhist   stance,
        particularly  that  of the Yogacara  school.  How  is
        other viewed in Yogacara  philosophy? Although modern
        studies  have  been  devoted  to the  epistemological
        issue about the existence  of other  minds raised  by
        Yogacara philosophers  Vasubandhu (fifth century) and
        Dharmakirti   (seventh  century),  the  critical--yet
        still implicit--relevance of the problem of otherness
        in Buddhism to the post-modern  situation has not yet
        been   elaborated.(   註  3)  It   is   strategically
        necessary, as this  paper  attempts  to do, to  place
        Yogacara conception  of otherness under the highlight
        of the post-modern discourse.
        ──────────────

        (註3)  Thomas E . Wood provides a detail study on the
               Yogacara ' s doctrine of other minds . See his
               Mind  Only :  A  Philosophical  and  Doctrinal
               Analysis of the Vijbanavada (Honolulu:
               University of Hawaii Press, 1991).


                                237 頁


            Before directly going into Buddhist meditation on
        this  issue, a  brief  scan  of  the  problematic  of
        otherness in the modern context could be helpful. The
        problem  of other  can  be seen  in  the  conflicting
        contrast between the notion of "system" emphasized by
        the  structualists  and  the  notion  of "difference"
        favored   by  the  post-structuralists.   While   the
        structuralists    are   much   concerned   with   the
        inclusiveness  and regularity  of system, ( 註 4) the
        post-structuralists  are  rather  worried  about  the
        totalizing  and oppressive  character of system.  For
        the  post-structuralists   or  the  so-called  "post-
        modernists", to defend the irreducibility of other is
        inseparable from their ethical and political concern.
        They do not want  to see that  everything  is, in the
        final  analysis, reduced  to  or  "swallowed  up"  by
        system.  In order to justify  their  ethico-political
        stance, they are forced to go further to provide  the
        epistemological or phenomenological  analysis for the
        question, "How is it possible for other to be thought
        or perceived?"
            In  their   inquiry,  however,  they  trace   the
        difficulty  of  problem  back  to  the  philosophical
        predicament  of Cartesian  dualism  and solipsism: No
        difference  is conceivable  in identity.  The various
        efforts   done  later  by  the  "hermeneuticians   of
        suspicion" --  Nietzsche, Freud, Marx -- are for this
        reason directed to rescuing difference  and otherness
        from the metaphysics  of identity.  They take  either
        genealogy,  psychoanalysis,  or   politico-economical
        analysis, as a deconstructive tool to bring down this
        metaphysics.  The reason  for them to do this is that
        "violence",  as  Derrida  calls  it,  occurs  in  the
        metaphysics  of identity for its domination of nature
        and man.( 註 5) To disclose  the
        ──────────────
        (註4)  See Todd G. May,"The System and Its Fractures:
               Gilles Deleuze on Otherness",in Journal of the
               British Society for Phenomenology, 24.1, 1993,
               3-14.
        (註5)  Jacques  Derrida  makes this point through his
               reading of Levinas. See Derrida, "Violence and
               Metaphysics", in Writing and Difference, trans.
               by Alan Bass,Chicago:The University of Chicago
               Press,1978.Also see John McGowan,Postmodernism
               and Its Critics , Ithaca : Cornell  University
               Press, 1991, p. 91.

                                238 頁

        metaphysical  making of sameness is hence required as
        the first step for us to truly  recognize  the other.
            In  the  Western   history   of  metaphysics,  as
        Heidegger  contends, this  "sameness"  has been given
        different  names: Physis, Logos, En,  Idea, Enargeia,
        Substantiality, Objectivity, Subjectivity, the  Will,
        the Will to Power, the Will  to Will, and so on.(  註
        6)  When  we look  to  the  East, we  find  a similar
        development  parallel  to  the  West.  In the  Indian
        history  of orthodox  metaphysics, this  sameness  or
        identity   is  called  Brahman,  Rta,  Atman  (Self),
        svabhava (self- nature), prakrti (primordial nature),
        etc..   According   to   Buddhist   philosophy,  this
        conception  of sameness  is nothing  but  an illusive
        fabrication  that causes sentient beings falling into
        the  suffering  cycle  of  life-and-death  (sajsara).
        Suffering   and  metaphysics   of  sameness   are  as
        inseparable  for Buddhism  as for Adorno and Derrida.
        (註7)
            However, the Buddhist critique of the metaphysics
        of the  sameness  does  not necessarily  lead  to the
        conclusion the Western thinkers have arrived, namely,
        affirming the existence of the irreducible other. For
        Buddhism, this  notion  of "irreducible  other"  also
        needs to be examined carefully.

                                  2

            From the beginning, Buddhist considers "other" as
        that which is desired and constructed for the purpose
        of appropriation.  This view is clearly stated in the
        Sajyukta-Agama 12.38:( 註 8)
        ──────────────
        (註6)  Martin Heidegger,Identity and Difference,trans.
               by Joan Stambaugh, New York: Harper & Row, 1969,
               p. 66.
        (註7)  Theodor W.Adorno says ,"Auschwitz confirmed the
               philosophy  of  pure  identity  as death" . See
               Negative Dialectics,trans. by E. B. Ashton, New
               York: Continuum, 1983, p.262.
        (註8)  As Noritoshi Aramaki (荒牧典俊) has pointed out,
               a  three-or  four-link  formula   of  depending
               origination(pratityasamutpada) is given in this
               Agama: consciousness, birth,


                                239 頁


              That   which   is   intended    (ceteti)    and
              imaginatively  constructed  (pakappeti) becomes
              the object (alambana)  upon which consciousness
              abides  to persist.  The  object  being  there,
              there  comes to be a station  of consciousness.
              Consciousness   being  stationed  and  growing,
              rebirth of renewed existence takes place in the
              future, and from there  birth, decay-and-death,
              grief,   lamenting,   suffering,   sorrow,  and
              despair  come to pass.  Such is the arising  of
              this entire conglomeration of suffering.( 註 9)

        In this passage, several points need to be noted: (1)
        In  the  world  of  life-and-  death,  everything  is
        structured  intertextually  and  inter-conditionedly.
        This is called "depending     origination" (pratitya-
        samutpada) .  (2)  Between  consciousness   and   its
        object  there  is  no  exception  to the principle of
        depending origination.  Both of them must be mutually
        conditioned. In other words, "consciousness" does not
        exist autonomously  without confronting  something as
        its  "object",  and  vice  versa.   (3)  Furthermore,
        "object"  (alambana)   results  from  intention   and
        imaginative  construction.  This is equal  to say, as
        Mahayanists claim later, that object is empty because
        it is necessitated  by the  intention  and desire  of
        consciousness.
            It also  needs  to note  that  in early  Buddhism
        consciousness is characterized as something nourished
        by "foods" (ahara): solid food, contact, volition and
        consciousness.  This view is radically different from
        the  Cartesian  conception  of consciousness  as  the
        attribute  of  a substantial  mind.  On the  side  of
        Buddhism, consciousness is metaphorically depicted as
        being appetitive,
        ──────────────
        decay-and-death,or consciousness,name-form (namarupa),
        birth, decay-and-death. See  Noritoshi  Aramaki,  "On
        the  Formation of  a  Short Prose  Pratitya-samutpada
        Sutra",in《雲井昭善博士古稀記念:佛教シ異宗教》,Kyoto:
        Heirakuji Shoten, 1985, 87-122.

        (註9)  See Mrs Rhys Davids, trans . , The Book of the
               Kindred  Sayings, part II, p. 45.
               The translation   is  slightly  modified  with
               consulting the Tsa a-han ching (  雜阿含經  ),
               T.2.100.a-b.



                                240 頁

        arising  from and growing  in the context of physical
        contact  and ideological  pursuit.  Consciousness  is
        understood  as something always in need of constantly
        consuming  "other",  and  conversely   the  other  is
        constructed as an object for consumption.
            This   appetitive   character   of  consciousness
        introduces  us to see how desire  or Eros (trsna)  is
        accompanied  by consciousness.  Desire, as stated  in
        Four Noble Truths as the cause of samsaric suffering,
        plays a decisive role in rebirth.  In the twelve-link
        formula  of depending  origination, desire is said to
        incite  the  arising   of  appropriation   (upadana);
        appropriation   goes  on  to  cause  the  arising  of
        becoming  (bhava), birth, decay and death.  This is a
        soteriological    explanation   of   the   cycle   of
        life- and-death  in early Buddhism.  According  to the
        same formula of dependent origination, the arising of
        desire  is preceded  by  the  process  of  cognition:
        feeling, sensory contact, senses, the embryonic  form
        of mind-body  (nama-rupa), consciousness, and  so on.
        This   explanation    also   makes    a   point    in
        de-substantializing  the notion of desire.  If desire
        is conditioned  by something else for its arising and
        hence  empty  by  nature, it  must  be  subjected  to
        elimination.    But   in   reading    this   dogmatic
        explanation, we should  not overlook  the dialectical
        relationship  between desire and cognition: desire is
        conditioned  by (defiled)  cognition, and  conversely
        cognition is also conditioned by desire. This is seen
        in the chain of the second  link, sajskara  (volition
        and    karma),   and   the   third    link,   vijbana
        (consciousness).(  註 10) Consciousness is said to be
        the embodiment  of one's previous karmas which can in
        turn be traced back to appropriation and desire.
            Instead  of grounding  the whole  world  upon the
        Transcendental  Mind  as an Archimedean  point, Early
        Buddhists rather conceive consciousness as that which
        is intertextually  conditioned by the past.  This way
        of thinking leads us
        ──────────────

        (註10)  Sajskara, derived from √kr (do, make, create)
                with prefix sam, means " predispositions , the
                effect  of   past   deeds  and  experience  as
                conditioning  a  new   state ;  conditionings,
                conditioned  states ,  which  is also meant by
                sajskrta . " See  Franklin  Edgerton ,Buddhist
                Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar  and  Dictionary ,Vol.
                II, pp. 542-543.


                                241 頁


        to   disclose   the   genetic   structure    of   the
        intentionality  of consciousness  in order to see the
        essence  of object  in cognition.  They  are  clearly
        aware  of the fact that  the object  of cognition  is
        always already something manifested in the horizon of
        consciousness.  Accordingly, the contemplation  of an
        object must be preceded  by analyzing  the horizon of
        consciousness as genetically constituted by sajskara.
        However, Early Buddhists are not saying here that the
        essence  of object  can  be perceived  in the realist
        manner if the genetic structure of consciousness  has
        been  laid bare.  On the contrary, they rather  argue
        that the essence of object is nothing  but the result
        of the objectification  of consciousness  embodied in
        sajskara. Put in other words, for Early Buddhists the
        "other"  encountered  in the horizon of consciousness
        is  merely  a  construction  of  intentionality;   to
        encounter  an "other"  is therefore  the  same  as to
        encounter  one's own past.  The "other" standing  out
        there is nothing but the "other" coming from within.

                                 3

            How is the other encountered  from within? How is
        the  other  perceived  as  an  other  out  there?  In
        responding   to   these   questions,   the   Yogacara
        philosophers in the fourth and fifth centuries turned
        to the investigation  of the depth  of consciousness.
        They found that the dualistic  schema  of the knowing
        subject  and the known  object, which  is assumed  in
        realist   epistemology,  is  in  fact  based  on  and
        effected  by  an inaccessible, subliminal  matrix  of
        consciousness.   They   call  edit   alaya   -vijbana
        (storehouse-consciousness),ana-vijbana (appropriating
        -consciousness)or  sarvabijakavijbana  (consciousness
        -containing-all-seeds). They claimed that all sources
        of knowledge  subsumed  under  the categories  of the
        knowing "I " and the known "things" genetically arise
        from the storehouse-consciousness. Our perception and
        knowledge   are   merely   representation    of   the
        storehouse-consciousness.

                                242 頁

            The   notion   of  storehouse-consciousness   was
        originally   employed  by  the  early  Yogacarins  to
        account  for the continuity  of "personal"  existence
        during  the  meditative   state  of  nirodhasamapatti
        (cessation  of all kinds of mind and mental factors).
        Later  the  notion  was  used  by the  Yogacarins  to
        explain the karmic continuity of "personal' existence
        in rebirth.  The question  they asked  is: Why is the
        sentient  being born in this life-world  rather  than
        that  life-world? The  main  cause  is  "karma".  But
        through  what  vehicle  and  in what  form  is  karma
        transmitted  to next  life? Since  the  six kinds  of
        sensory  and  apperceptive   consciousness   are  not
        qualified  as  the  receptacle  of  karmas, they  are
        forced  to  excavate  the  underlying   structure  of
        consciousness  which  is inaccessible  to reflection.
        (  註 11)This  finally  leads  to  the  discovery  of
        alayavijbana.
            The discovery has its significance  in disclosing
        the  archaeological  and  semiological  structure  of
        subject.  No  longer  able  to  hold  its  autonomous
        status, the knowing subject  is now claimed to result
        from  the  linguistic   and  karmic   matrix  of  the
        alayavijbana.  The  crucial  questions  for  Yogacara
        philosophers  are: What  are the characteristics  and
        structure  of  alayavijbana? How  do  we  know  them?
        According to The Sajdhinirmocana Sutra, the structure
        of  alayavijbana   is  shown   in  the  "stuffs"   it
        appropriates (upadana): (1) the sense-  faculties and
        their  bases,  and  (2)  the  sediments  (vasana)  of
        discursive  world (prapabca) and language (vyavahara)
        which are constituted  through  cognition  (vikalpa),
        signifier  (nama)  and signified  (nimitta).(  註 12)
        That   means,
        ──────────────
        (註11)  Lambert  Schmithausen  provides  an excellent
                textual-exegetical  study  on this issue. See
                his Alayavijbana: On the Origin and the Early
                Development of a Central Concept  of Yogacara
                Philosophy,Tokyo: The International Institute
                for Buddhist Studies,1987.Also cf.,William S.
                Waldron,"How  Innovative is the Alayavijbana?",
                Part I & II, Journal of Indian  Philosophy 22:
                199-258, 1994; 23: 9-51, 1995.
        (註12)  Chieh shen-mi ching(解深密經),T.16.692.b. Also
                cf., Schmithausen's translation:"[Alayavijbana]
                is  based  on  a twofold upadana: 1) upadana of
                (or:consisting of) the [subtle] material sense-
                faculties together with their [gross] bases and
                2) upadana of



                                243 頁


        alayavijbana  biologically  clings to physical  body,
        taking  body as its base, and serving  as the support
        of body, while it appropriates the sediments/seeds of
        language and discursive  world as its contents.  This
        second characteristic  gives us an important  clue to
        discern the linguistic structure of alayavijbana.
            How  is  the  alayavijbana   structured  linguis-
        tically?  As   mentioned   above,   this   subliminal
        consciousness    is   also   called   "consciousness-
        containing-all-seeds". The notion of "seed" (bija) in
        this context  refers  to the cause  of both existence
        and cognition.  In addition to the biological "seeds"
        which  cause  the arising  of the physical  body, two
        other  kinds  of  seeds  are  also  included  in  the
        alayavijbana: seeds of karma  and seeds  of language.
        The seeds of karma result from the maturation of past
        karmas, while the seeds of language  result  from the
        delight in "discursive world" (prapabca).(  註 13) It
        is particularly  due to the  latter  (the  linguistic
        sediments  of  discursive  world)  that  an other  is
        fabricated as an other.
            Here we have to clarify  the concept  of prapabca
        before we go on analyzing  the Yogacara's  conception
        of cognition  as the  effect  of language.  The  term
        prapabca has different renderings by modern scholars:
        "the manifold of named things", ( 註 14) "Plurality",
        ( 註 15)"verbal elaboration, the
        ──────────────
        (or: consisting of the Impression of the diversity of
        (/proliferous involvement in ) the  everyday usage of
        phenomena,names,and conceptions(*nimitta-nama-vikalpa-
        vyavahara-prapabca)". See, Alayavijbana, p. 71.

        (註13)  In   the  Basic   Section  of  Yogacarabhumi,
                alayavijbana is taken  as  the bijawraya (the
                basis  in  the  form  of  seed )  of  sensory
                perceptions .It is understood as the basis of
                apropriations  as  well  as the maturation of
                karma. See Yogacarabhumi  (瑜伽師地論．本地分
                五識身相應地)：「種子依謂即此一切種子執受所依
                異熟所攝阿賴耶識。...一切種子識謂無始時來樂著
                戲論熏習為因所生一切種子異熟識 。 」T.30.279.
                a-b. Also cf. Schmithausen, Alayavijbana,Part
                I, p. 110.
        (註14)  In  the  Prasannapada  , Candrakirti  gives a
                lengthy exposition for the notion of prapabca:
                "Thus karmic action and  the afflictions arise
                from   hypostatizing  thought  . Hypostatizing
                thought  springs  from  the  manifold of named
                things (prapabca), i.e., from the


                                244 頁


        phenomenal  world"(  註  16), "vain  talk,  diffusive
        trivial  reasoning", ( 註 17) and so on.  Among these
        expositions, Lambert Schmithausen's interpretation is
        most worthy of note:

              `Prapabca'  is used  both  in the sense  of the
              process of proliferation, especially conceptual
              proliferation,   or   even    of   (emotionally
              involved)    proliferating    or   diversifying
              conceptual activity, as also in that of what is
              the result of such a process  ("diversity")  or
              the object of such an activity.( 註18)

        According   to  this   interpretation,  prapabca   is
        synonymous   of  sajvrti  (conventional   world)  and
        sajsara  (the world of life-and-death), both of which
        refer to the world fabricated  by linguistic  act and
        cognition.( 註 19) In
        ──────────────
        beginninglessly recurring  cycle  of birth and death,
        which consists of knowledge and objects of knowledge,
        words and their meanings,agents and action, means and
        act, pot and cloth , diadem and chariots, objects and
        feelings, female and male , gain and lose , happiness
        and misery , beauty and ugliness , blame and praise."
        See Mervyn Sprung, Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way,
        Boulder: Prajna Press (1979),p.172.Nagarjuna declares
        in the opening verse of the Madhyamakakarika that the
        complete cessation of the prapabca is called nirvana.
        See ibid. p. 33.

        (註15)  Th. Stcherbatsky took a monist interpretation
                in  his   translation  of  Prasannapada  that
                Nagarjuna's notion of nirvana is"characterized
                as the bliss of Quiescence of every Plurality".
                See The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, Delhi:
                Motilal Banarsidass, reprint, 1989, p. 88.
        (註16)  T.R.V.Murti,The Central Philosophy of Buddhism,
                London: Geroge Allen & Unwin, 1955, p. 348.
        (註17)  D.T.Suzuki,Studies in the The Lavkavatara Sutra,
                Boulder: Prajna Press, reprint, 1981 (1930), pp.
                137, 433.
        (註18)  Lambert Schmithausen,Alayavijbana, Part II, note
                510 (p. 356).
        (註19)  The   linguistic  ,  cognitive  and  imaginative
                character of prapanca is seen in Kumarajiva's


                                245 頁


        Yogacara  Buddhism, this  world  is also called  "the
        fabricated" (parikalpita), the life- world with which
        we live and interact.  It is further  explained  that
        the fabricated world is constituted  in the structure
        of the grasping  subject  (grahaka)(  註 20 ) and the
        grasped  object  (grahya).  Both  subject  and object
        interact    with   each   other   in   this   psycho-
        lingusitically  fabricated  world.
            In the discursive  world, the subject  grasps the
        object  and  the  signifier   (nama)  signifies   the
        signified (nimitta). But what is the signified? Those
        which are signified arise from the transformation  of
        the "seeds"  in alayavijbana.  Like the magic show on
        the  street, the  audience  does  see  a  "lion", for
        example, and says  that "I do see a lion", though  in
        fact it is nothing but the illusory  image fabricated
        with  stuffs  and  trick.  The  image  of "lion", for
        example, is signified  by the word  "lion".  And this
        image as the signified is actualized  by the seeds of
        alayavijbana   which   in  turn   result   from   the
        "perfuming"   effect   (vasana)   of   language   and
        discourse. Between discourse and alayavijbana (seeds)
        there  exists   causal  circularity.
            According   to  Yogacara, consciousness   is  the
        consciousness-perfumed  -by-language.  But how is the
        consciousness "perfumed"? Obviously, "perfuming" as a
        metaphoric expression can not be clearly defined. One
        of  the  possible  interpretations   is  to  construe
        "perfuming"  as "encoding" in the semiological  sense
        and to construe "actualizing"  or "transforming"  the
        seeds into the perceptual image as a reverse process,
        namely, "decoding". However,
        ──────────────
        Chinese rendering, 戲論, which literally means "drama
        discourse" or "the fabricated world in play".

        (註20)  Yogacarabhumi(瑜伽師地論．本地分):「復次，依有
                情世間及器世間，有兩種法能攝一切諸戲論事，謂能
                取法與彼所依所取之法。」T.30.347.b. Also see
                Yokoyama Koitsu (橫山紘一) , 〈アシタシ種子〉,
               《平川彰博士古稀記念論集 ： 佛教思想ソ諸問題》,
                Tokyo: Shunju-sha, 1985, p. 179. In the paper,
                Yokoyama takes a textual - historical approach
                to explore the process in which the notions of
                "words"  (abhilapa)  and "seed" (bija) come to
                combine as one concept. 言說熏習心. T.16.694.c.


                                246 頁


        this encoding-decoding model could be oversimplified,
        because  it  fails  to  see  the  complexity  in  the
        metaphoric  and metonymic  process (condensation  and
        dispalcement)  operating  in between language and the
        Unconscious.(  註 22) On the other hand, the Lacanian
        project   of  discovering   the  metaphoric-metonymic
        structure  of the Unconscious  seems  foreign  to the
        Yogacara tradition. On the contrary, Yogacara takes a
        rather literal and pragmatic approach.
            According  to the Sajdhinirmocana  Sutra  and the
        Yogacarabhumi-sastra,( 註 23) the effect  of language
        is working  on two states of consciousness: the awake
        state and the dormant  state.  In the awake state  of
        consciousness,  language   arises   with   perception
        simultaneously.(   註  24)  For  example,  when   one
        perceives a table, one knows that "it is a table". In
        the  dormant   state  of  consciousness,  one  merely
        perceives  something  without  conception  and verbal
        expression.(  註 25) The examples  given  by Yogacara
        are those who are incapable  of verbal communication,
        such as animals  and babies.  According  to Yogacara,
        consciousness  can never be regarded  as tabula rasa.
        Even  a  baby's   consciousness   is  always  already
        embodied  of the  past  karmas  and  language.  It is
        therefore  important  in Yogacara practice to discern
        the function of language not only in the structure of
        consciousness,  but  also  in  the  pre-structure  of
        consciousness.
        ──────────────
        (註22)  It is not easy  to  summarize  Lacan's  theory.
                Here I simply borrow Samuel Weber's exposition:
                "...[B]oth metonymy and metaphor are "functions
                of a uniform movement of the signifier," which,
                on  the  one  hand , can  only  function in and
                through its concatenation, and on the other, is
                always dependent upon what  is not part  of the
                chain, the signifier to which it refers...[A]nd
                this would   seem  to  suggest  a  priority  of
                metonymy over metaphor." Samuel Weber,Return to
                Freud  :  Jacques   Lacan  ' s  Dislocation  of
                Psychoanalysis, New York : Cambridge University
                Press, 1991, pp. 66-67.
        (註23)  Yogacarabhumi (瑜伽師地論), T.30.701.a.
        (註24)  言說隨覺(*vyavahara-anubodha).
        (註25)  言說隨眠(*vyavahara-anuwaya). See Chen-kuo Lin,
                The  Sajdhinirmocana  Sutra  :  A   Liberating
                Hermeneutic,Unpublished Ph.D.Dissertation,
                Temple University, 1991, pp. 144-148.


                                247 頁


            The  language  in the  preconscious/preconceptual
        state   is  also  called   manojalpa,  "preconscious/
        preconceptual  language".( 註 26) Yogacara argues, it
        is  due  to the  conceptualization  of "preconscious/
        preconceptual    language"    that   the   "identity"
        (svabhava) of any perceived object is asserted.  Only
        if  this  process   of  conceptualization   is  fully
        discerned  and disclosed, one is able to realize  the
        emptiness of "identity"  and consequently  eliminates
        his clinging and ignorance. In the Yogacara manual of
        mecditation,   the   disclosure   of   "preconscious/
        preconceptual  language"  becomes a methodic entrance
        to enlightenment.( 註 27)
            It  is  important  to  see  that,  according   to
        Yogacara, there  is a correlative  and  corresponding
        relationship  between  the  structure  of  "conscious
        language"   and   the   structure   of  "preconscious
        language".  The  former  is 0 usually  listed  in  the
        standard Yogacara taxonomy  of hundred dharmas.  This
        doctrine   sounds  like  psycho-linguistic   atomism,
        claiming that all states of affairs can be reduced to
        the  corresponding  structure  of language, which  is
        further  divided into two levels: conscious  language
        and preconscious language.  But how is this theory of
        correspondence  justified? To Yogacara, theory  shall
        be  verified  by  practice  only, not  by  any  other
        theory.  When a Yogacara student practices meditation
        of calming (wamatha) and discerning (vipawyana), s/he
        is instructed to meditate upon an object-image or any
        state of affair  in order to realize  that all states
        of     affairs      are     nothing-but-consciousness
        (vijbaptimatra  ), nothing-but-preconscious-language"
        (manojalpamatra) or nothing-but- designation
        ──────────────
        (註26)  The Chinese translation of manojalpa is 意言.
                Hayashima  Osamu (早島理) offers an excellent
                analysis  and textual sources on this  issue.
                See 早島理,〈唯識　實踐〉,平川彰等編 ,《講座．
                大乘佛教－唯識思想》, Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1982,
                pp. 161-174.
        (註27) 《攝大乘論．入所知相分第四》: 「由何云何而得悟
                入? 由聞熏習種類、 如理作意所攝、似法似義有見
                意言。」 T.30.142.c.


                                248 頁


        (prajbaptimatra).(   註  28)   The   workability   of
        meditation  is taken by Yogacara  as the criteria  to
        verify their doctrine.

                                    4

            In  gazing   at  the  face   of  other,  Yogacara
        Buddhists   are  directed  inwards  to  the  pscycho-
        linguistic  intertextuality  and inter-conditionality
        which determines  our ways of gazing and acting.  For
        them, the others we encounter  in mundane  experience
        are mere object-images  hypostatized from the pyscho-
        linguistic   factors   which  are  embedded   in  the
        storehouse-consciousness.  They argue  that the other
        and   its   reverse   side,   subject,  are   psycho-
        linguistically  fabricated.  To disclose  the psycho-
        linguisticality  of other  is the  tantamount  to the
        same disclosure of subject, and hence gazing at other
        is  the  same  as gazing  at oneself.
            But is there  something  called  the real "Other"
        left  when the fabricated  other  and self  have been
        disillusioned? Could  we  reach  at  the  real  Other
        insofar  as  we  have  attended  enlightenment? These
        questions    are   concerned   with   the   practical
        implication  of Yogacara  philosophy.  In contrast to
        the postmodernist's  efforts  to save the irreducible
        Other, Yogacara thinkers rather propose an/other  way
        of  gazing  at  the  other: meta-gazing  (paramartha-
        satya).  Instead  of being  the  path  to secure  the
        ontological   status   of   the   other,   Yogacara's
        meta-gazing  is  taken  to  discern  and  purify  the
        psycho-linguistically  embodied mechanism  of mundane
        gazing (samvrti-satya).  This concealed mechanism  of
        mundane  gazing is the real "Other"  that needs to be
        disclosed. For all Yogacara thinkers and Buddhists in
        general,   the   so-called   "Absolute    Other"   or
        "Transcendental Other" in the onto-theological  sense
        does  not exist.  The reality  of the real is nothing
        but the fabricationality  of the fabricated.  Thus it
        is said in the Diamond  Sutra:
        ──────────────
        (註28)  橫山紘一,〈アシタシ種子〉, p. 187.


                                249 頁


              As stars, a fault  of vision, as a lamp,
              A mock show, dew drops, or a bubble,
              A dream, a lightning flash, or cloud,
              So should one view what is conditioned.( 註 29)

        This is the reality  all we have.
            But still  there  is difference  between  mundane
        gazing  and  meta-gazing:  To  the  former,  mingling
        language  with  desire  leads  one to fall  into  the
        unhappy  cycle  of life-and-death, but to the  latter
        the detachment of desire from language makes possible
        the  playful  prapabca  (discursive  world).  As  the
        problematic  of other is concerned, the other appears
        to the Yogacara like the mirror reflecting  all sorts
        of discursive  networks without mutual hindrance  and
        clinging  when  it is encountered  with  meta-gazing.
        This is called "freedom", "liberation", or "truth".
        ──────────────
        (註29)  Edward Conze , Buddhist Wisdom Books , London:
                Unwin, 1958 (1988), p. 68.


                                250 頁


        Abstract

            The  pressing  of the  philosophical  problem  of
        otherness  and  difference  is now  evidenced  in all
        minority discourses.  For the oppressed subjects in a
        long   history,  such   as  woman,  Jews,  subaltern,
        (post-)colonial  cultures, and  so on, the  time  has
        come   to  rewrite   and   re(dis)cover   their   own
        identities.  However, in their efforts to do so, they
        are inevitably  trapped  in a paradoxical  situation:
        Their search for a new identity through reversing the
        relationship  between  master  and  slave,  as  Hegel
        suggests, would  not  escape  the  dominating  desire
        embedded  in the same centric logic.  The reclamation
        of subjectivity  is always  done  at the  expense  of
        distorting   the  previous   other.   The   political
        ambiguity (and guilt) as the result of constructing a
        reversed  other  therefore  never stops  hunting  the
        souls  who long for liberation.  For this reason, the
        questions  need  to  be  readdressed  for  those  who
        consider  "encounter"   to  be  the  task  free  from
        distortion  and  domination: What  is  other? Is  the
        other  reducible? How  could  the  other  be properly
        understood and confronted? As an Oriental response to
        these  questions, this  paper  deliberately  takes  a
        Buddhist  stance, particularly  that  of the Yogacara
        school, to see how  other  is viewed  in the Yogacara
        tradition.
            This paper concludes  that, in gazing at the face
        of other, the Yogacara Buddhists are directed inwards
        to   the   pscycho-linguistic   intertextuality   and
        inter-conditionality  which  determines  our ways  of
        gazing and acting.  For them, the others we encounter
        in  mundane   experience   are   mere   object-images
        hypostatized from the pyscho-linguistic factors which
        are embedded  in the  storehouse-consciousness.  They
        argue  that the other and its reverse  side, subject,
        are psycho-linguistically fabricated. To disclose the
        psycho- linguisticality of other is the tantamount to
        the same disclosure  of subject, and hence gazing  at
        other is the same as gazing at self.