

gh. This means that there may be more than one entry for certain words, as is pointed out in the Introduction to this Index.

The proof-reading of Chalmers' volumes, in particular, seems to have left a lot to be desired, and when Volume II was reprinted in 2004 an attempt was made to eradicate as many errors as possible, although at least one new error was introduced, as this Index points out, s.v. *ārame*. In the preparation of this reprint the decorative lines which both editors had inserted as dividers between *suttas*, and which the computer counted as lines, were omitted. Readers who are using the original version of Volume II will therefore find that on such pages the line numbers in the Index will differ from those in their texts.

This index also includes a list of corrections for all three volumes of the Pali Text Society's edition of the *Majjhima-nikāya*, where a comparison with the Burmese and Sinhalese printed editions shows that the PTS readings are errors, rather than genuine variant readings.

Despite its shortcomings, this volume will prove to be a more than adequate replacement for the earlier index (published as Vol. IV of the PTS edition of the *Majjhima-nikāya*) which, as Mrs Rhys Davids acknowledged in the Introduction to that volume, was anything but complete and was, in fact, 'a very inadequate index'.

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The Notion of Diṭṭhi in Theravāda Buddhism: The Point of View, Paul Fuller
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According to Paul Fuller, the concept of view (*diṭṭhi*) as an obstacle to 'seeing the way things actually are' is central to the Theravāda *Nikāyas*. Scholars have argued that these Buddhist texts contain two conflicting understandings of views. First, there is the 'opposition understanding' according to which right-views (*sammā-diṭṭhi*) are propositions stating, for example, the four truths, that oppose and *correct* wrong propositions about how things really are. Second, there is a 'no-views understanding', evident mainly in the *Aṭṭhakkavagga* and *Pārāyanavagga* of the *Sutta-nipāta* that rejects all views, even right-views, as a hindrance to the goal of complete non-attachment. However, Fuller's central thesis is that both these interpretations of the *Nikāyas* are misguided. Contrary to the opposition understanding, right-view is not a belief in a correct proposition but a 'detached order of seeing' that transforms one's behaviour. Right-view is realised when one acts without attachment. Fuller wishes to emphasise that the person who genuinely has right-view is affectively changed. Contrary to the no-views interpretation, the *Aṭṭhakkavagga* and *Pārāyanavagga* do not literally reject all views but advise the elimination of all craving for and attachment to views. Nowhere in the *Nikāyas* is it claimed that all views are false.

Chapter 1 provides an account of the various types of wrong-view (*micchā-diṭṭhi*) explained in the *Nikāyas*. Chapter 2 does the same for right-views. Fuller identifies two broad categories of wrong-views: views that deny *kamma* and views about the self. He argues that, according to the *Nikāyas*, 'a view is not right which states that there is no self. This is as much a form of greed and attachment as one that states there is a self'. To deny the existence of the self is to fall into the extreme of annihilationism whereas the eternalist extreme view posits the existence of a self. Conversely, in Chapter 2 Fuller explains that right view includes various views that affirm that actions have consequences as well as views that entail an understanding of the four truths and dependent origination. Although Fuller does not say so, it seems to follow that the ontological

middle way between the extremes of annihilationalism and eternalism is the position that there is a self, but one that is dependently originating, changing and impermanent. Fuller claims that the 'is-ought' dichotomy is a modern phenomenon, and that right-views are therefore an expression of both fact and value. Right-views are 'soteriologically transformative', engendering wholesome actions. By contrast, wrong-views see things as they are not and lead to the continuation of suffering. Fuller contends that, in formulae such as the ten wholesome courses of action (*dasa kusala-kamma-pathā*), the *Nikāyas* recognise the reciprocal, mutually assisting nature of thought and action: 'The way we think affects our actions, and the way we act affects the way we think'. Right view 'admits of differences of degree' and its cultivation 'begins with the purification of body, speech and mind', leading to progressive levels of insight that 'cannot be separated from the transformation of action'.

Chapters 3 and 4 look at the way wrong-views and right-views function respectively. Fuller thinks that the tendency of views to become objects of craving is highly significant. Holding to a correct proposition with attachment would, according to Fuller, still be wrong-view. By contrast, right-view 'knows how to know how things are', that is, it is knowledge coupled with a detached, calm attitude. Fuller argues that the stream-attainer is described as accomplished in view (*ditṭhi-sampanna*) but there is a purification (*visuddhi*) of this insight with the progressive eradication of subtle forms of attachment that occurs on the higher paths of the Once-returner, Never-returner and *Arahant*. Only at the stage of the *Arahant* does right-view fully eradicate conceit (*māna*).

In Chapters 5 and 6, Fuller argues that right-view is not simply the assent to a proposition; it is 'a knowledge of the four truths and dependent origination without attachment', causing one to see and behave in the world in a radically different manner. Right-view is the 'transcendence of all views', in the sense that it goes beyond all attachment to propositions, correct or incorrect.

Fuller's position that the opposition understanding and no views understandings are both incorrect, and that the *Nikāyas* present a unified epistemology, is well argued and plausible, though not conclusive. An alternative reading still seems possible according to which, in disagreement with most of the Pāli Canon, the *Aṭṭhakavagga* presents a radical rejection of *all* views, a perspective that arguably re-emerges in the thinking of Nāgārjuna and is perhaps akin to classical Greek and Roman scepticism.

Fuller is surely right to emphasise the connection between right-views and non-attachment, the cognitive and the affective. Furthermore, as the raft analogy indicates, the *Dhamma* itself should not be made an object of attachment. Aggressively and proudly asserting any view, even one that one knows or believes to be correct, causes quarrels and vexation. Wrong-views are 'the grasping, attached, obstinate side of the cognitive process'. However, his focus on this theme does become a little repetitive, as it is reiterated in each chapter. Moreover, he occasionally overstates his case, appearing to neglect or downplay that right-view must have a propositional content. Usually, however, his analysis seems more balanced, and the point appears to be that right-view includes the realisation of truths that can be expressed propositionally, but also has essential non-cognitive aspects.

Fuller is also correct to point out that fact and value are not distinguished in the Theravāda texts. However, are these Buddhist sources right not to distinguish an 'ought' from an 'is'? Is non-attachment necessarily the correct moral response to an impermanent and unsatisfactory world? And is the Buddhist understanding of reality convincing? The *Nikāyas* express a vision of how things really are, inextricably linked to a view about how one ought to act, but it seems legitimate to question both their ontology and ethics.

Fuller does not address these concerns and, to be fair, it is not his intention to provide an assessment of his sources' philosophical assumptions.

This review cannot do justice to the wealth of textual analysis that Fuller provides to support his argument. He gives much detailed evidence from the *Nikāyas* and from the later *Abhidhamma* literature. He also refers extensively to previous academic discussions about *ditṭhi* in the works of Anderson, Gomez, Gethin, Hamilton, Jayatilke and others. As a work of careful and intelligent exegesis, Fuller's book is a welcome and valuable contribution to Buddhist Studies.

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Mipham's Dialectics and the Debates on Emptiness: To Be, Not to Be or Neither,
Karma Phuntsho (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 304 pp. £65.00 (Hb).
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Karma Phuntsho is a Bhutanese scholar who is already well known in the Tibetan monastic colleges of India, Nepal and Bhutan as a teacher and also as the author of some widely used and well respected text books. It was only after completing his training and graduating with the highest degree of *Khanpo* (*mkhan po*) from Namdrol Ling, the leading rNying ma pa monastic college in India, that Karma Phuntsho began his second academic career as a graduate student at Oxford. This book is the outcome of his DPhil thesis written there, under the supervision of Professor David Seyfort Ruegg, the leading Western academic scholar of Madhyamaka. This book therefore combines the intellectual influences of the very best of contemporary rNying ma pa monastic learning, from Namdrol Ling, with the very best of Western academic scholarship on Madhyamaka, from Professor Ruegg.

The outcome is a book of outstanding authority and clarity that seamlessly bridges East and West while maintaining a consistently high level of intellectual sophistication in both traditions. In particular, it shows a remarkable mastery of the technical terms of both traditions. In fact, Karma Phuntsho's grasp and skilful usage of Western philosophical technical language certainly exceeds that of most Western authors on Madhyamaka, who too often seem to retain one foot in the culture of the Dharma Centre. Above all, as his authorship of popular Tibetan-language scholastic textbooks would suggest, Karma Phuntsho is a gifted communicator who can convey complex philosophical ideas, in both Western and Tibetan idiom, with a deceptively easy clarity and simplicity. In fact, if one looks at other volumes on the subject of Madhyamaka, one can see that such simplicity and clarity is not at all easy to achieve, so we must count this volume as an unusually valuable contribution to the understanding of Tibetan Buddhist philosophy in the West. Its particular strong point, then, is its clarity and reliability of presentation: while Karma Phuntsho makes no attempt to produce an entirely original or previously unheard of contribution to philosophy on his own account, nor any radical new reinterpretation of Mipham, he does achieve a remarkably mature, subtle, contextualised and well-balanced synthesis of his difficult subject matter. This is not as simple as it might seem, since Mipham's Madhyamaka thought is scattered over several of his works, which Karma Phuntsho has therefore had to draw together. In fact, it might even be that Mipham's various writings specifically on Madhyamaka have never before been brought together