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

THE CONCEPT OF *ZHEN* 真 IN THE *ZHUANGZI*

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Introduction

The term *zhen* 真 in the *Zhuangzi* 莊子 is commonly associated with the *zhen ren* 真人 or "true person." We find metaphorical descriptions such as that he can go through fire and water unharmed. On the other hand, some scholars would claim that there is a more mystical element to the *Zhuangzi* that is missed if we think that such descriptions are "merely" metaphorical. However, the term *zhen* is not only applied to the *zhen ren,* and this essay has the broader aim of investigating its various meanings and uses in the *Zhuangzi*. We shall situate our understanding of the *zhen ren* within the context of this broader investigation.

Zhen has several applications throughout the text. To begin with, it may be used to affirm that something is truly the case (真是), that someone is truly good, truly dislikes wealth and honor, and so on. Similarly, it could refer to true knowledge (真知).[1] Besides the "true person," there is also reference to the "true master" or "true lord" (真宰 or 真君) in a question about whether the heart-mind (心) is autonomously in control of what the person does (Chen, pp. 51–52).[2] Coming closer to the focus of this essay, *zhen* is also used to describe the true nature of things in general and of human beings in particular. In this regard, it is closely associated with other terms such as *tian* 天 (heaven, nature, the natural), *de* 德 (virtue in the sense of certain original basic capacities), and *xing* 性 (nature of a thing). Together with these, *zhen* refers to the natural state of a thing and what it is natural to do, or, simply, what is natural. In the "Qiwulun" 齊物論 (Equalizing things, or Equalizing discussions on things) chapter there is the question, "How has the *dao* become obscured such that there is *zhen* and *wei*?" (道惡乎隱而有真偽?) (Chen, p. 56). As is well known, *wei* combines a radical denoting a human being and the graph for acting or doing. That is, it refers to what is a result of human action. In certain contexts, human action connotes what is false or artificial. In this regard, *zhen* implicitly contrasts with *wei,* highlighting what is natural, genuine, or authentic.

One important context in which this is manifest is the criticism of the Confucian (儒) rites (禮樂) and morality (仁義).[3] There is a difference between the Inner Chapters ("Nei Pian" 內篇) and the Outer Chapters ("Wai Pian" 外篇) of the *Zhuangzi* in the form that this criticism takes. Some of the Outer Chapters attempt to define a true nature of things or human beings through the use of analogies, such as the craft analogy, where craftsmen are said to destroy the original true nature of the material worked on. Similarly, the sages who had imposed the rites and morality upon human beings are alleged to have destroyed their true nature. In the Inner Chapters, however, definitions of what is true or natural are stated generally and allow for different

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applications. Moreover, these definitions are given independently of any conception of human nature. Thus, for instance, Zhuangzi expresses the general principle that for the true person heaven and human (action) do not overcome one another. This connotes the maintenance of a harmonious balance between human beings and nature. Zhuangzi notes, however, that this demarcation is not always self-evident. But there is one context in which he intimates that certain attitudes and actions would be contrary to *zhen*. This is the context of death, where people conventionally grieve and conduct funeral rites. To Zhuangzi, these attitudes and actions violate the heavenly or natural state of affairs in which the dead person has "returned" to the state of *zhen.* Here, *zhen* is used as a noun denoting a natural state of affairs instead of human nature or as an adjective describing a person, knowledge, and so on.

I have said that Zhuangzi "intimates" that certain attitudes and actions are contrary to *zhen*. This is because in the text, or at least in the Inner Chapters, he never directly makes the point. Instead, *zhen* figures in some fictitious dialogues involving Confucius, his disciples, and some unconventional characters. I shall compare notable features of these dialogues among the Inner, Outer, and Miscellaneous chapters ("Za Pian" 雜篇).[4] For instance, in the Inner Chapters, one gets the sense that Confucius is not being openly attacked. However, in the Outer and Miscellaneous chapters, Confucius could be attacked more openly and vehemently, as others have already noted.[5] This is especially the case in the "Dao Zhi" 盜跖 (Robber Zhi) chapter, where doubt is expressed about the motives of Confucius and ancient sages in preaching morality and the rites. In the "Yu Fu" 漁父 (Old fisherman) chapter, the criticism of Confucius is less strong and there seems to be an attempt to accommodate morality and the rites with the state of *zhen* as being pure and sincere (精誠) in terms of the spontaneous expression of emotions while observing certain rites. Finally, drawing the discussion together, I return to the issue of the *zhen ren* in more detail.

Zhen 真 *and* Tian 天 *in the Inner Chapters*

In the Inner Chapters, *zhen* appears most often in the "Dazongshi" 大宗師 (The great ancestral teacher), especially in descriptions of the *zhen ren*.[6] *Zhen* is closely related to *tian* 天, which literally refers to "heaven." In the *Zhuangzi* this is largely a synonym for "nature," that is, the natural world and its regular phenomena. These are referred to in the "Dazongshi" as what heaven does (天之所為者), without implication of any anthropomorphic entity who brings about these occurrences. Instead, this is meant as a contrast to what humans do (人之所為者) (Chen, p. 178). In other words, the occurrences of natural phenomena are not the result of any action. These natural occurrences are sometimes said to be a matter of what is destined or *ming* 命, as in the statement that "Life and death are a matter of what is destined, they have the constancy of night and day, and this is a matter of heaven. There are things that humans can do nothing about and this is a fact of all things" (死生，命也，其有夜旦之常，天也。人之有所不得與，皆物之情也) (Chen, p. 188).

Despite the distinction between what happens as a result of heaven and what is brought about by humans, however, Zhuangzi asks: "How is it to be known that what

I call heaven is not human? That what is called human is not heaven?" (庸詎知吾所謂天之非人乎？所謂人之非天乎？) (Chen, p. 178). This implies that the distinction between what is regarded as nature on the one hand and human action on the other is not always self-evident, and it remains open how or whether we construe something as belonging to one or the other category. Just before the question above, Zhuangzi had stated that if one knows how to live out the years allotted by nature, then this would be the epitome of knowledge (終其天年而不中道夭者，是知之盛也). However, knowledge is contingent and uncertain (夫知有所待而後當，其所待者特未定也). In view of this, "A true person comes before true knowledge" (且有真人而後有真知) (Chen, p. 178). That is, certain attitudes and states of mind of the true person entitle him to be said to possess true knowledge. This is evident from the series of descriptions of the true person that follows. Let us, pending further discussion, take it that these are metaphorical. Some of these intimate a sense of equanimity such that he or she would feel unharmed no matter what happens. For instance, the true person can "enter water without feeling wet, and enter fire without feeling hot" (入水不濡，入火不熱).[7] Also, "His sleep is dreamless, and while awake he is free from anxiety" (其寢不夢，其覺無憂). The true person's attitude toward life and death is also described. Neither is he pleased to be alive nor does he hate death; he comes and departs without a care. This is referred to as "Not diminishing the *dao* with the heart-mind, not helping heaven with the human" (不以心損道，不以人助天) (Chen, pp. 178–179).

Here, Zhuangzi is questioning the emotional attitudes that are ordinarily taken toward life and death. Thus, "not diminishing the *dao* 道 with the heart-mind" suggests not to be perturbed about death, and "not helping heaven with the human" could mean either not imposing a man-made distinction onto a natural process or not interfering in some way with the natural process. Shortly after, Zhuangzi says:

> 故其好之也一，其弗好之也一。其一也一，其不一也一。其一與天為徒，其不一與人為徒。天與人不相勝也，是之謂真人。
> Thus his liking is one, his disliking is also one. His 'being one' is one, his 'not being one' is also one. His 'being one' means that he is a follower of heaven, his 'not being one' means that he is a follower of the human. Not allowing heaven and the human to overcome one another, this is called the true person. (Chen, p. 180)

To be a "follower of the human" implies behaving in ways that are opposed to heaven or nature. However, the passage seems to be saying, too, that whether we like it or not, human beings are one with nature. Being "one" can be taken to mean that human beings exist as a part of nature, and the person who realizes this fully—the true person—lives in harmony with nature. This notion of harmony is encapsulated within the general principles of "not helping heaven with the human," and "not allowing heaven and the human to overcome one another," which the true person is said to uphold.

The conventional attitude toward death is one context where Zhuangzi thinks that human actions violate the givenness of nature. The following example occurs in the "Dazongshi." Two friends of Zi Sanghu 子桑戶 sing at his funeral, exclaiming that

he has "returned to *zhen*" (反其真), that is, to nature. Confucius' disciple Zigong 子貢 reminds them of the ritual proprieties (*li* 禮) but is unceremoniously laughed at for not himself expressing a knowledge of "ritual propriety." Zigong reports this to Confucius, and the latter describes them as having roamed beyond the boundaries (遊方之外) of ritual. These strange and unconventional people (畸人) are in accord with heaven (侔於天). Confucius concludes with a saying that "Those who are ignoble from the perspective of heaven are deemed noble by men; those who are noble from the perspective of heaven are deemed ignoble by men" (天之小人，人之君子；天之君子，人之小人) (Chen, pp. 204–205).

A feature of this dialogue is that it employs the rhetorical literary device[8] of Confucius himself voicing recognition of a philosophical conception of the natural in the context of life and death and, accordingly, allowing for a spontaneous mode of behavior that disregards ritual conventions. From the standpoint of (man-made) ritual convention, it is absurd and unnatural to sing at a funeral. But from the standpoint of heaven, it is perfectly natural to do so. Note that there is a clever use here of "heaven," which to the Confucians retained an anthropomorphic element.[9]

Zhen 真, De 德, *and* Xing 性 *in the Outer Chapters*

References to *zhen* are scattered throughout the Outer Chapters. Other than its association with *tian* or heaven, *zhen* becomes more noticeably associated with *de* 德 (virtue in the sense of certain basic common capacities) and *xing* 性 (nature of a thing). In this regard, it refers to the original true nature of a thing. The writers of these chapters describe the "true" nature and capacities of certain animals and human beings and what it is to act and live "truly" or naturally. The criticism of the Confucian rites and morality becomes more direct and explicit. Through the concept of *zhen* as meaning a true, originally unspoiled state of nature, the sages admired by the Confucians are accused of having destroyed and corrupted the original true nature of human beings through their imposition of the rites and morality.

In the "Qiushui" 秋水 (Autumn floods) chapter, heaven and the human are defined, respectively, in terms of oxen and horses having four feet (牛馬四足，是謂天) and putting a halter onto a horse's head or piercing an ox's nose (落馬首，穿牛鼻，是謂人). In itself, the distinction between nature and human action has no implication for how one should act. However, this is immediately followed by the injunction that human beings should not destroy nature (無以人滅天) and that this constitutes returning to *zhen* (是謂反其真) (Chen, p. 447).

As we saw, "returning to *zhen*" was mentioned in the "Dazongshi" with reference to death as a natural process. We can understand this perspective even if we do not agree with the non-conventional behavior that is demonstrated. The example of Zi Sanghu's friends does not actually prescribe that we should act in a similar way—we are just given a description of their behavior, and we see that there is a perspective from which it is intelligible.

In the context of the "Qiushui," as mentioned above, however, the idea of "returning to *zhen*" carries a prescription that the non-domestication of animals is part

of a "true" life, one that is in accord with nature. Taken literally, this prescription seems too radical and perhaps we can think of the definition of human action in terms of the non-domestication of animals simply as a reference to the Confucian rites and morality as unnatural impositions. Seen in this regard, there need be no implication about the non-domestication of animals being part of a true, natural life. However, the radical nature of the prescription is further extended to include different crafts. Thus, in the "Mati" 馬蹄 (Horses's hooves) chapter, the sages are compared to horse trainers, carpenters, and potters. These are alleged to destroy the true nature (真性) of horses, wood, and clay by ordering or governing them in some way. Similarly, the sages destroyed human nature and the common basic capacities (同德) of humans by governing them according to the rites and morality. The basic capacities are described as follows. People weave and plow for their clothing and food (織而衣，耕而食). Left alone in their natural state, they do not form separate parties. They would have lived in harmony with other animals and been unaware of the distinctions between being noble and ignoble. Thus, they would have been without desires and remained in a simple, unadorned state (素樸). This is likened to an unspoiled piece of white jade (白玉不毀), instead of a ceremonial jade scepter (珪璋). The writer concludes: "With *dao* and *de* intact (道德不廢), what need is there for morality (仁義)? Without departing from human nature, what use is there for rites and music?" (Chen, pp. 257–260).

The jade analogy assumes the existence of an original human nature. Beside the (relative) lack of desires and living harmoniously, humans are said to possess basic capacities such as weaving and plowing. This original nature is held to be destroyed by the imposition of the rites and morality. But the writer of this chapter does not seem to have realized (or if he did, was not bothered by) the contradiction: weaving and plowing are both crafts. That is, they involve the use of animals and material that, according to the craft analogies (horse trainers, carpenters, potters), destroyed their true nature.[10]

However, let us try to understand the context or contexts under which such statements were made. The idea is that human beings originally led a simple and unadorned life. In this simple state, people had, relatively speaking, few desires. Thus, they were not prone to strife and would have lived together harmoniously. The craft analogy overstates the case since crafts such as plowing and weaving may be necessary to the maintenance of life. The analogy of unspoiled or uncarved jade, on the other hand, can be seen to make the point better. This contrasts with ceremonial jade. The latter not only stands for the rites, it serves as a reminder that the Confucian rites and morality entailed practices calling for a wealth of resources, distinctions of rank, and a reputation for correct moral behavior.[11] The social and political system involving the rites must have developed to a complex state governing all forms of human relations. We can imagine that at the same time, these relations and their associated practices gave rise to more desires of all kinds and hypocritical and corrupt behavior at various levels. Thus, while the Mohists criticized the expansion of ritual practices as luxurious and economically wasteful,[12] some writers of the Outer Chapters, on the other hand, emphasized their corrupting nature. Note that the rites were also associ-

ated with knowledge. These writers accused the Confucian sages of arousing the quest for knowledge and associated this with the motives of seeking for wealth, personal and moral reputation, eminence, power, and so on. In this regard, one accusation against the Confucians is that through the rites they had led the people away from the simple state of life that constitutes being *zhen.* This confounding and corrupting influence of the rites is expressed elsewhere in the phrase *huo qi zhen* 惑其真 (see the later discussion of the "Dao Zhi" or Robber Zhi chapter), where the term *huo* connotes a cognitive dimension that is a source of corruption that has destroyed the simple and authentic state.[13]

Thus, we may better appreciate this concern with the maintenance of a simple and authentic state of *zhen* if we focus not just on the idea of recovering an original human nature through denying the value of crafts, but on the idea of remaining free from the corrupting nature of the system of rites. Some scholars have noted that *zhen* rarely occurs in pre-Qin writings prior to the *Zhuangzi.*[14] If this is correct, our investigation of the term so far shows an important motivation for its expanded use in the *Zhuangzi,* namely the criticism of Confucian rites and morality and their associations with a social and political hierarchy and the attendant trappings of knowledge, wealth, reputation, eminence, power, and so on. We can imagine that a refusal to be enticed by these also involves a concern with maintaining personal integrity. This can be described, too, in terms of the metaphor of unspoiled jade, as we see from an example elsewhere.

In the *Zhanguo ce* 戰國策, King Xuan of Qi (齊宣王) (391–301 B.C.E.) had commanded Yan Chu 顏斶 to come forward. Yan, however, called King Xuan to come forward instead. When asked to explain this breach of propriety, Yan said that if he had obeyed the king's command, it would mean that he was moved by power. On the other hand, the king would be expressing respect for the worthy if he came forward instead (夫斶前為慕勢，王前為趨士). Seemingly impressed, King Xuan asks to be his disciple and offers a luxurious life for him and his family if Yan would be a part of his court. Yan then says: "Jade originating from the mountain is spoiled by being crafted. It is not that it (i.e., the crafted jade) is not precious, but that the original jade stone is no longer intact" (夫玉生於山，制則破焉。非弗寶貴矣，然太璞不完). In other words, he would lose his integrity by accepting the king's offer. The commentary at the end of this episode says: "Chu is contented, indeed! Restoring the true and returning to the state of an (original) jade stone, he will not suffer insult as long as he lives" (斶知足矣！歸真反璞，則終身不辱).[15]

This example shows another sense of what it means to be *zhen.* The context is the maintenance of a life free from the trappings of social and political hierarchical relationships and, in all probability, their compromising or undermining effects on one's personal integrity. Thus, there is a way of understanding the application of the metaphor without reference to the craft analogy, given the problem associated with it mentioned earlier. It might be pointed out that my reference to the *Zhanguo ce* is irrelevant to the *Zhuangzi.* But in fact, the account has a parallel in the latter text. We are reminded of the story of Zhuangzi, who, without turning his head while fishing, dismisses the officials who have come with an invitation from the King of Chu (楚王)

to take office, telling them that he prefers to drag his tail in the mud.[16] The contrast between a live tortoise in its natural muddy environment and a dead and precious ceremonial tortoise in the palace parallels the contrast between an original unspoiled jade and ceremonial jade. Although the word *zhen* is not mentioned in this story, we can describe Zhuangzi as wishing to maintain his *zhen* or personal integrity.

Dialogues Involving Zhen

We now turn our attention to three dialogues, one from the Outer Chapters and two from the Miscellaneous Chapters. These involve Confucius in conversation with solitary figures such as Lao Dan 老聃, the infamous Robber Zhi (Dao Zhi 盜跖), and an Old Fisherman (Yu Fu 漁父). In these dialogues, the Confucian rites and morality are directly criticized. While in the dialogue with Lao Dan we still find reference to a *true* human nature, this time it is the Confucian association of certain moral qualities with human nature that is ridiculed. In the "Robber Zhi" chapter Confucius' own motives are questioned together with the system of morality and rites. In the "Old Fisherman," however, we find a somewhat more ambivalent attitude toward this system.

In the "Tian Dao" 天道 (Heaven's way) of the Outer Chapters, Confucius goes to see the retired librarian Lao Dan for help in depositing some books at the Zhou royal library. When he refuses, Confucius begins to expound the "Twelve Classics."[17] Lao Dan impatiently asks him to just give the gist of it. Confucius says that it is *ren yi,* humaneness and righteousness. Lao Dan asks whether these are the nature of humans. Confucius replies that they are truly so (真人之性).[18] Lao Dan asks for a definition. Confucius mentions universal love and lack of partiality (兼愛無私). Lao Dan criticizes the former as way too remote and the latter as being partiality itself (無私焉，乃私也). He probably means that self-consciousness about not being partial is motivated by a wish for moral reputation and, in that sense, is partial.[19] He then describes the constancy of certain natural phenomena (the brightness of the sun and moon, the flocking together of birds and animals, the standing of trees) and says: "It is enough if you act in accordance with your basic capacities (放德而行) and move along with the *dao.* Why do you have to strive to promote *ren yi,* as if beating a drum in search of a lost child? Ah, you bring confusion to the nature of humans!" (Chen, p. 363). This dialogue from the Outer Chapters is still concerned with the issue of a true human nature, and in this connection both Confucius and Lao Dan mention *xing.* However, Lao Dan counterposes *de* against the *xing* mentioned by Confucius. His description of natural phenomena prior to mentioning *de* suggests that there is a natural way for humans to behave according to certain basic capacities. This description implies that Confucian morality is an unnatural imposition on a true original nature consisting of these capacities.

In the "Dao Zhi" (considered "Miscellaneous") Confucius offers to persuade the various rulers to have a walled city built for the infamous Robber Zhi if he would reform his violent ways and disband his army of bandits. Robber Zhi paints an idyllic picture of a harmonious life in ancient times when the basic virtuous capacities flour-

ished among the people. They lived together with the animals, engaged in weaving and plowing, and did not think of harming one another. (This picture of the simple, unadorned life as it originally was is similar to the one described in the "Mati" chapter.) The sages, however, brought disorder through wars, killing, and the establishment of officials, with the strong prevailing over the weak. It was the sages, in fact, who were the robbers—only on a larger scale. Robber Zhi accuses Confucius of following the ways of these sages: with "deceitful words and artful conduct, you delude all the rulers, seeking wealth and honor" (矯言僞行，以迷惑天下之主，而欲求富貴焉). Even the most esteemed sage, Huangdi, was unable to maintain his natural capacities (不能全德). All the sages have been motivated by personal gain to the extent that they have deluded their *zhen* and have thereby forcibly gone against their nature (皆以利惑其真而強反其情性) (Chen, pp. 796–797). This is followed by a statement of certain facts about the basic tendencies of human beings (人之情). They have the desires of the senses (目欲視色，耳欲聽聲，口欲察味) and ambitions that they seek to maximize (志氣欲盈). They have a relatively short life span; consequently, "No man who is incapable of gratifying his desires and cherishing the years fate has given him can be called a master of the Way"[20] (不能說其志意，養其壽命者，皆非通道者也) (Chen, p. 798). Robber Zhi sends Confucius packing by saying that his *dao* is deceitful and hypocritical (詐巧虛僞). It does not allow a person to keep intact what is *zhen* (非可以全真也) (Chen, p. 798).

We need to compare what is meant by *zhen* here with the earlier accusation that the sages were "motivated by personal gain to the extent that they have deluded their *zhen* and have thereby forcibly gone against their nature." In the latter statement, *zhen* refers to the *de* or basic capacities that make possible a simple, unadorned, and harmonious life, as it originally was. Confucius' teachings have, in this sense, led people astray and deluded them from maintaining the simple natural state. The statement that Confucius' teachings do not allow one "to keep intact what is *zhen*" could also be interpreted the same way. In other words, his teachings do not allow someone to keep intact his or her *de*. However, another reading of *zhen* is also possible. The inability to keep *zhen* intact is mentioned in the context of certain facts about human beings, namely that they are concerned with the maximal satisfaction of desires within a relatively short life span. Taken together with remarks about the deceitfulness and hypocrisy of Confucius and the ancient sages, and other remarks to the effect that the followers of Confucius suffered physical harm, *zhen* can be said to refer to the body. In other words, Confucius' teachings do not allow the person to keep his *body* intact. It is important to do so, since the goal of life is to maximize one's (nonmoral, hedonistic) desires.[21] Life is short, and Confucius' moralistic teachings do not allow one to steer a safe course through a dangerous and violent social and political environment. Confucius and the sages are ultimately only looking out for themselves—their teachings are simply a means toward a good reputation and having influence and power over others. Taken together, Robber Zhi's remarks represent a form of moral skepticism.

In the "Yu Fu" (another "Miscellaneous" chapter), an old fisherman appears when Confucius and his disciples are resting. After Zigong 子貢 gives him some in-

formation about Confucius, the fisherman replies that although there is no doubt he is humane (仁), he is liable to harm himself and to endanger his *zhen* (危其真) by attempting to educate the rulers and the people when he does not hold any office (Chen, p. 834). Confucius goes after him for an explanation. The fisherman details an exhaustive and Confucian-sounding list of the proper measures of government and modes of conduct. He tells the story of the man who, afraid of his own shadow and hating his own footprints, ran until he dropped dead. The point of this is that Confucius is unnecessarily anxious about the affairs of governance, and he is advised to cautiously guard his *zhen* (慎守其真) (Chen, p. 841). This is defined as "the utmost purity and sincerity. Without purity and sincerity, one cannot move others" (真者，精誠之至也。不精不誠，不能動人).[22] A contrast is made between forced emotions and genuine expressions of grief, anger, affection, and so on. As he says, "True sadness though soundless is nonetheless sorrowful, true anger though it does not erupt is nonetheless awesome, true affection though without a smile is nonetheless harmonious" (真悲無聲而哀，真怒未發而威，真親未笑而和). Grief is the important thing in mourning, caring for the comfort of one's parents is the point when serving them, and, instead of worrying over the rites governing a drinking fest, just be merry. Thus, *zhen* is precious because it is internal and is spiritually expressed in these external ways (真在內者，神動於外，是所以貴真也).

When the old fisherman says that Confucius' concern with social, educational, and political affairs while he does not hold office will endanger his *zhen,* the term could refer to the body itself. However, his advice to Confucius to cautiously guard his *zhen* is explained as being pure and sincere. This is illustrated in terms of the spontaneous expression of emotion in various contexts that include performing the rites. The advice is that one should not allow the external proprieties of the rites to affect genuine feeling. The contrast between what is man-made and what is derived from heaven is applied here. Thus, the old fisherman goes on to say that the rites are conventionally made (世俗之所為也) and contrasts them with what is *zhen,* which is received from heaven and "so of itself and cannot be changed" (自然不可易也). Confucius is one of those who do not know how to treasure *zhen,* being simply changed by convention and allowing themselves to be "steeped in human falsity" (湛於人僞) (Chen, pp. 841–842).

The term *de* 德 never occurs in this chapter. *Xing* 性 appears only once but not in the sense of the nature of a thing in general. Instead, it refers to the specific nature of a person's character. Thus, Zigong informs the fisherman that Confucius' nature is such that he is loyal and trustworthy (性服忠信) (Chen, p. 834). Clearly, *zhen* does not mean the "true nature" of human beings in this chapter. Instead, it is used to refer to the genuinely spontaneous expression of emotions. The development of Confucianism must have attained a level in which the rites and morality are seen as forced and hypocritical, and the old fisherman is providing a reminder of the value of spontaneous emotions. Although Confucius is made to take a humble position before the fisherman and even accused of hypocrisy, the criticism here is not as vehement as in the "Dao Zhi."[23] At the same time, there is no tone of moral skepticism. In other words, we are not told that those who impose Confucian rites and morality are sim-

ply acting under the guise of attaining reputation and exercising power over others. Instead, people like Confucius are said to have allowed convention to dictate their behavior. In this regard, they have failed to guard and to exercise their spontaneity. However, it is not categorically stated that Confucian values and spontaneity are mutually exclusive. Instead, we are reminded that one should not forget the emotional point of the practice of the rites. In other words, room is left for the integration of Confucian rites with spontaneity.

The Zhen Ren

We now discuss the issue of what constitutes the *zhen ren* or "true person." Suppose we describe this person in terms of some of the meanings of *zhen* that we have mentioned above. Obviously, what constitutes the *zhen ren* would then vary with the meaning of *zhen.* Thus, if we focus on *zhen* as referring to the "body" in the sense that is taken in the "Dao Zhi," this means that what is valued is the maximization of hedonistic desires within a relatively short life span. But, as most would agree, this is not the concern of the *zhen ren.* Furthermore, such a conception would be at odds with the original simple nature that is the focus of the discussion of *zhen* in the Outer Chapters. In this sense, the *zhen ren* exercises basic capacities that enable a primitive lifestyle and has relatively few desires beyond maintaining a basic livelihood. However, as we have seen, the concern is not to minimize the desires *per se.* Instead, reference to an original simple nature emphasizes the corrupting nature of the system of Confucian morality and rites as symbolized by the analogy of ceremonial jade versus unspoiled jade. Thus, it would be more accurate to say that the *zhen ren* maintains his personal integrity in the face of the corrupting elements arising from his social and political environment. Another facet of the *zhen ren* is revealed from the description of *zhen* in the "Old Fisherman" as being pure and sincere and as manifested in the spontaneous expressions of emotion. These last two conceptions of the *zhen ren* as having integrity and spontaneity, however, have a limited validity. In the "Dazongshi," the *zhen ren* is described in terms that seem to attribute the possession of more general "heavenly" attitudes and, some would even say, powerful abilities. Also, there is the problem of reconciling the spontaneous expression of, say, grief, with the position taken by Zhuangzi in the Inner Chapters (and in the text as a whole) that it goes against heaven, that is, it would be unnatural, to grieve over death.

But let us examine the list of attributes of the true person in the "Dazongshi" in more detail, as well as some of the general principles that Zhuangzi enunciates. This would enable us to support more fully the metaphorical reading of the *zhen ren* and to elaborate upon the way in which he can be said to have a harmonious relationship with heaven. Although we shall repeat some points, this shall enable us to greatly expand the possibilities open to the *zhen ren.* In the "Dazongshi" it is said that the true person

> Is not against having little, does not brag of accomplishments, does not scheme (不逆寡，不雄成，不謨士).

> Would not regret an error (or a missed opportunity) nor be self-contented if he got it right; . . . He would not be frightened if he has climbed high (過而弗悔，當而不自得也；. . . 登高不慄).
>
> Can enter water without feeling wet, enter fire without feeling hot (入水不濡，入火不熱).

and that

> His sleep is dreamless, and while awake he is free from anxiety (其寢不夢，其覺無憂).
>
> His food is plain (其食不甘).
>
> He breathes deeply—the true person breathes with his heels, while the mass of people breathe with their throats (其息深深，真人之息以踵，眾人之息以喉).
>
> [He] knows nothing of being pleased to be alive and knows nothing of hating death (不知說生，不知惡死).[24]

Some scholars think that the sixth attribute of being able to breathe through the heels (息以踵) has been inserted by a much later self-cultivationist school.[25] Others think that this is a legitimate passage. The ability to breathe through the heels together with the third attribute of "not feeling wet and not feeling hot" are indications of a self-cultivationist strand in the original text. They should be taken more literally to refer to mystical powers that result from self-cultivation. We shall discuss this shortly. But first, putting aside the idea that the true person can breathe through his heels, the claim of not feeling wet and not feeling hot can be read metaphorically, as I stated earlier, as having a sense of equanimity such that one does not feel harmed, no matter what happens. The seventh attribute, the carefree attitude toward life and death, is compatible with this sense of equanimity. Similarly with the fourth attribute of having "dreamless sleep," which connotes freedom from anxiety of any kind. The second attribute is that the true person would not be frightened if he has climbed high. Other than a literal reading, this can also mean that if he were to be in high office, he would remain unperturbed despite the dangers of his position. However, the other attributes suggest that he would live a simple life and would more probably not allow himself to be entangled by the trappings of office in the first place. These are the attributes of not being concerned with possessing little (or being poor), not bragging about accomplishments, not scheming, not having regrets or being self-content about right and wrong.

At the end of this list of attributes, it is stated that "This is called not diminishing the *dao* with the heart-mind, not helping heaven with human (actions)." This is followed by another list of attributes of the true person, and, similarly, ends with another statement that "Heaven and human beings do not overcome one another." Earlier, I referred to these as general principles that encapsulate the attitude toward heaven as natural events that are not under the control of human beings, and the harmonious relationship that human beings should have with heaven. Some of the attributes above help to spell out what this attitude and relationship amount to, in practical terms. Besides the principles above, we find at the very beginning of the

"Dazongshi" the following prefatory remarks (appearing just before the list of attributes above), some of which we have already mentioned:

> Knowing what is the result of heaven and knowing what is the result of human (action), that is ultimate (knowledge). Knowing what is the result of heaven means living in accord with heaven. Knowing what is the result of human (action) is to cultivate (further) knowledge from what one already knows and live out the years heaven has given without dying midway—this would be the epitome of knowledge. However, there is still a difficulty. This knowledge is contingent (upon various factors) before it can be considered as correct or appropriate, and what it is contingent upon is never certain. How is it to be known that what I call heaven is not human? That what is called human is not heaven? A true person comes before true knowledge.[26]

It is not "knowledge" *per se* that defines the true person. Instead, certain attitudes must be in place before anyone can be said to have "true" knowledge. We are warned about the contingency of knowledge. This implies that there is no single attribute or set of attributes that makes up the true person. Thus, the general nature of the principles about managing the relation between heaven and human beings allows for greater and more imaginative possibilities than are given by a definition of *zhen* as an original simple nature with a basic set of capacities that was destroyed by sage craftsmen, as claimed in some of the Outer Chapters. These possibilities are in fact suggested by the highly imaginative stories of remarkable craftsmen in the *Zhuangzi,* in both the Inner and (some other) Outer Chapters. They provide us with an understanding of Zhuangzi's remarks about the non-self-evidence of what is the result of heaven and what is the result of human action. In this regard, they go beyond the simple and radical negation of craft in some of the Outer Chapters, as earlier discussed.

For example, Pao Ding 庖丁 has practiced his craft of butchering an ox to the extent that he "connects with his spirit instead of looking with his eyes (以神遇而不以目視); the understanding afforded by the sense organ(s) has come to a halt and the spirit moves as it pleases (官知止而神欲行). [He is] cleaving to the heavenly patterns (依乎天理)."[27] That is, through years of disciplinary practice, he has come to have an intuitive feel of his object—this is what is meant by being able to "connect with his spirit" instead of with his eyes. Thus, he works his way spontaneously through its "heavenly" or natural patterns. At the same time, the power that he manifests while working on the object is no longer describable as dependent upon his sense organs. Instead, it is described in terms of possessing a spiritual desire or *shen yu* 神欲 that enables him to work on the object with remarkable ease, spontaneity, and even beauty. Thus, the notion of possessing a "spirit" here connotes the spontaneous ability to work with the object of one's craft in such a way that both the process and the result are inadequately described as simply a human action, and it cannot simply be attributed to heaven. It should be mentioned that the notion of *shen* or "spirit" in this regard does not refer to a third realm of "spirits" or ghostly beings.

This is clear from the example in the "Da Sheng" 達生 (Fathoming life) chapter of the bell-stand maker Zi Qing 梓慶.[28] To observers, his carved wooden bell stands

seem to have a ghostly/spiritual (鬼神) quality. The Marquis of Lu (魯侯) asks him what (secret) skill or art (術) he has. Zi Qing replies that he is just a workman (工人) and has no such skill. What he does is to fast for several days to concentrate or still his heart-mind (靜心) to the extent that he no longer thinks of rewards, reputation, or skill, and ultimately even forgets about his body. In this concentrated state of mind he enters the forest and observes the heavenly nature (觀天性) of the trees. If he sees something that excellently matches the form of a bell stand (形軀至矣), then he would start working. Otherwise, he would leave it alone. Zi Qing denies that what he does belongs to a skill that taps into some ghostly/spiritual realm. Instead, he is just a craftsman who uses his mind and works with his hands. He attributes the "spirit" involved in his work to a process of concentrating on his material to the extent that he is able to "match heaven with heaven" (以天合天). That is, in his concentrated state of mind, he has an intuitive feel for the natural pattern of his material and is thereby able to work harmoniously with it, and this is perhaps why his products are thought to have a spiritual quality.

There is, however, no universal agreement on how the powers possessed by the *zhen ren* and as illustrated by craftsmen such as Pao Ding are to be described. Here, I shall briefly mention the different views of two authors. The first is Michael Puett, who describes the *shen ren* 神人 or "spirit-man" instead of the *zhen ren.*[29] However, it is clear from his discussion that he would take them to be equivalent. Thus, some passages that he cites are similar to those where the true person is said to be unharmed, no matter what happens. Although these and other passages may seem to attribute great powers to the spirit-man, their significance lies in an attitude of nondependence on things. Ultimately, the spirit-man has a sense of contentment and liberation that comes from accepting the order of heaven and, like Cook Ding (Pao Ding), according with the patterns of heaven. In this regard, Puett distinguishes the spirit-man from the *shen wu* 神巫—the "ritual specialist" or "spirit specialist"—who it seems could control things and foretell the future through magical arts of invoking powers possessed by the spirits, as illustrated by some passages in the *Zhuangzi.* Alternatively, the same aim could be achieved through the cultivation of *qi* 氣, as suggested in the "Nei ye" 內業 chapter of the *Guanzi* 管子, a text considered to be probably slightly earlier than the Inner Chapters of the *Zhuangzi.*[30]

The second author, Rur-bin Yang, holds a very different view.[31] He aligns the *Zhuangzi* with the "Nei Ye" and other Daoist texts and emphasizes what he regards as cultivation practices (修練功夫) as indicated by various passages in these texts, including the *Zhuangzi.* This is not to say that Yang would claim that the *Zhuangzi* promotes the aim of achieving a power and knowledge over things such as being able to prognosticate the life and death of people, as Puett describes some spirit specialists doing. Instead, Yang describes cultivating the spirit (精神) through *qi* or "vital energy" such that it permeates and transforms the sense organs, thus enabling the adept to achieve a deep-level consciousness. Yang takes the ability to "breathe through the heels" and other abilities more literally. Referring to the "True Man" or true person, Yang says:

> Why is it that, in the highest form of human character in Zhuangzi's thought, the cultivation of 'spirit' can actually have such an effect that one does not dream in his sleep, is unaware of flavors while eating, and can even breathe with his heels? Judging by the literal meaning of the words, the relationship of consciousness to the sense organs in the True Man at this time is no longer one of destruction and overcoming but rather of permeation and transformation (滲透轉化感官).[32]

The same literal interpretation of permeation is given of the passage in which Confucius advices Yan Hui 顏回: "Make your will one! Don't listen with your ears, listen with your heart-mind. No, don't listen with your mind, but listen with your vital energy."[33] This is said to be equivalent to "the phenomenon of 'synesthesia' commonly found in religious and artistic experiences," which Yang explains as referring to "precisely the mutual communication and simultaneous emergence of the various types of sense perception."[34] Yang describes Pao Ding's use of his "spiritual desire" instead of his eyes when carving the ox as going beyond the level of technique and transcending perceptual boundaries. His "intuitive understanding penetrates to the deepest levels of human existence and is not something consciousness is capable of controlling" and can be said to belong to the level of heaven itself.[35]

Puett's account of the spirit-man's sense of contentment from accepting the order of heaven is consistent with mine about the true person and his sense of equanimity from living in accordance with the general principles governing the relation between heaven and human beings.[36] On the other hand, we should acknowledge that there can be a different and more literal account of the *zhen ren,* as shown by Yang's essay. I would not deny that, as mentioned in the example of the bell-stand maker Zi Qing, there can be meditative practices that enable the practitioner to "forget" the body or self and therefore to concentrate one's mind with remarkable results. But while some authors have described this in terms of familiar psychological resources, others like Yang have pointed to modes of mystical experience.[37] We should note, however, that there are different accounts of the nature of such experiences, and in this regard it is by no means clear what they are or how they should be described.[38] What I have set out to do, on the other hand, is to lay out the various uses, meanings, and significance of the term *zhen* in the *Zhuangzi.* Thus, the idea of the *zhen ren* is situated much more broadly within the understanding of *zhen* as given in the detailed discussion above of the term and within Zhuangzi's philosophy of the relation between heaven and human beings. I summarize my views in the conclusion below.

Conclusion

In this essay, I have situated the reading of *zhen* and the *zhen ren* in the *Zhuangzi* in terms of the criticism of the Confucian imposition of the rites and morality, and in terms of the general principle of achieving a harmony between heaven and the human. I have examined various uses and meanings of the term *zhen.* Thus, it could refer to what is natural as opposed to human artifice and falsity, and it could be used to refer to a true, original nature, whether of things in general or of human beings.

In these regards, *zhen* is used to criticize the Confucian rites and morality. It has been noted by some scholars that *zhen* is rarely, if ever, found in texts prior to the *Zhuangzi.* Thus, the motivation for the pioneering and pervasive use of *zhen* in this text can be attributed to this critical concern. In the Miscellaneous Chapters (such as "Dao Zhi" and "Yu Fu") we see concern about hypocrisy and falsity. The "Yu Fu" emphasizes the value of spontaneity, while the "Dao Zhi" expresses skepticism about the moral motivations of the ancient sages and Confucius. But the concern goes beyond the claims that Confucian rites and morality are false and artificial, their advocates hypocritical, and that they negate the value of spontaneity. The Outer Chapters (such as "Qiu Shui" and "Mati") evince a deeper concern that the system of rites and morality itself, through its inherent connections with social resources, wealth, power, reputation, position, knowledge, and so on, is fundamentally corrupt and corrupting. The idea of maintaining one's *zhen,* though sometimes put in terms of regaining an original simple nature, can at the same time be seen to incorporate a concern with guarding personal integrity.

In the Inner Chapters, *zhen* is more closely related to the notion of heaven *(tian)* or the natural state of affairs, instead of to an original simple nature. Zhuangzi indirectly scorns grief over death and the conduct of funeral rites as violating what is natural—what belongs to heaven or *zhen.* No actual prescription is made that one should not grieve. Instead, through the use of fictitious dialogue, we are led to see that there is a heavenly perspective from which death need not be mourned. Zhuangzi shows subtlety, too, in his remarks that the distinction between what belongs to heaven and what belongs to the human is not self-evident. We provided an interpretation of this in regard to the concept of the *zhen ren* or "true person." That is, the true person's actions can transcend the distinction between heaven and the human. Someone like Pao Ding, for example, acts powerfully and beautifully with remarkable ease because he accords with the natural patterns of heaven, and thereby it is said that he has a "spiritual desire" *(shen yu)* that enables this. What lesson this holds for everyday practical life is an open question. However, Zhuangzi does mention certain general principles in the "Dazongshi": (1) not diminishing the *dao* with the heart-mind, not helping heaven with the human, and (2) Heaven and human beings not overcoming one another. These encapsulate the general attitude toward natural events as not being under the control of human beings, and the harmonious relationship that human beings should have with heaven. The person who is able to live in accordance with these principles—the *zhen ren*—will have an attitude of equanimity, no matter what happens, as stated metaphorically. However, we note that these general principles are negatively stated. They are therefore open-ended and can be variously applied.

There are also more concrete attributes of the *zhen ren* such as not being concerned with possessing little or being poor, not bragging, not scheming, and not being self-contented about right and wrong. These attributes, too, are negatively stated. But all these negative statements are in fact consistent with the philosophical tenor of the Inner Chapters as a whole, where Zhuangzi warns against holding fixed distinctions and fixed conceptions. One aspect of this, as we have already noted, is that he

has a much more sophisticated understanding of the relation between heaven and the human than some writers of the Outer Chapters who look upon all forms of craft as belonging to the latter only. Zhuangzi shows us how some human agents may blend the two effectively and beautifully through his stories of the skills manifested by some craftsmen.

Notes

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Parenthetical references in the body of this essay to "Chen" are to Chen Gu-ying 陳鼓應, 莊子今註今譯 (台北：台灣商務, 1999). Translations are mine unless otherwise stated. I have consulted 香港中文大學中國文化研究所編 (Chinese University of Hong Kong Institute of Chinese Studies), 莊子逐字索引 (A concordance to the *Zhuangzi*) (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 2000).

1 – In the chapter "Zhi Bei You" 知北遊 (Knowledge wanders north), Zhi 知 (Knowledge) separately asks Wuweiwei 無為謂, Kuangqu 狂屈, and Huangdi 黃帝 about how to know the *dao.* "Wuweiwei" is a composite of *wuwei* 無為 and *wuwei* 無謂, i.e., non-action and non-saying. It could also mean "not knowing what to say." Wuweiwei gives no answer, not because he refuses but because he does not know what to say (非不答，不知答也). Kuangqu is about to answer but stops because he has forgotten what he had wanted to say (忘其所欲言). Huangdi provides an answer: "Don't think, don't reflect" (無思無慮). Zhi asks him: (although) both he and Huangdi know the answer whereas the others do not, therefore who is right (孰是)? Huangdi replies that Wuweiwei is "truly right" (真是也), and Kuangqu appears to be right, while both Zhi and he are nowhere near (終不近也). Thus, one might be tempted to say that it is Wuweiwei who "knows" the *dao.* This seems supported by Huangdi's further statement that "Knowers do not speak, speakers do not know" (夫知者不言，言者不知). However, it is significant that the character who seeks the *dao* is named Zhi or "Knowledge," and both he and Huangdi are "nowhere near it." In other words, the affirmation of *zhen shi* (truly right) in relation to the *dao* is *not* a state of knowledge. This is also intimated by Zhi's question that although both he and Huangdi "know it" (知之), while the other two do not (不知), "who is right?" (其孰是邪?). And the reply that it is Wuweiwei who is "truly right" (真是) can be said to be an emphatic denial of the possession of knowledge as (relevant to) embodying the state of *dao.* In other words, this state has nothing to do with

propositional knowledge. Ordinarily, a criterion of knowledge is the ability to express in some way what one claims to know. Thus, it would be odd to claim to know something but, when asked, be unable to say what it is that one knows. Applying this to Wuweiwei, it is not that he "knows" the *dao.* Instead, he is "truly right" in relation to the *dao* because he does not know the *dao* in any propositional sense, but instead embodies it. This endorsement of Wuweiwei—non-action and non-speaking—implies the value of non-knowledge, non-sophistication, simplicity, a pure state.

2 – 非彼無我，非我無所取。是亦近矣，而不知其所為使。若有真宰，而特不得其朕。可行已信，而不見其形，有情而無形。百骸，九竅，六藏，賅而存焉，吾誰與為親？汝皆說之乎？其有私焉？如是皆有為臣妾乎？其臣妾不足以相治乎？其遞相為君臣乎？其有真君存焉？如求得其情與不得，無益損乎其真 (Chen, p. 52). If we read the *qi zhen* 其真 at the end as referring to the *zhen jun* 真君, then the passage seems to say that there is such a true lord that governs the body. But if we take it to refer to the other parts of the body and the question about whether there is indeed a true lord or something in control, then Zhuangzi is saying that there is no such true lord. I take this latter interpretation, as does Feng Youlan, to mean: "there is no real ruler other than the different parts of the body" (Feng Youlan, trans., *A Taoist Classic: Chuang-tzu* [Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1997], p. 42). These remarks of Zhuangzi's can be made intelligible if we pose them against Xunzi's statement that the heart-mind is "the lord of the body" (心者，形之君也) (李滌生，荀子集釋．解蔽篇 [台北：台北學生書局], p. 488). Some translators take *bi* 彼 to refer to an "Other" against which the *wo* 我 or the "I" or "Self" is contrasted. See, for instance, A. C. Graham, trans., *Chuang-tzŭ: The Seven Inner Chapters and Other Writings from the Book Chuang-tzŭ* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. 53; Victor H. Mair, trans., *Wandering on the Way* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1994), p. 13. But we can take *bi* to refer to a list of emotions or feelings mentioned just before this passage in the context of the interminable debates between the Mohists and the Confucians. Wing-tsit Chan takes this view. His translation adds a parenthesis which makes it explicit: "Without them (the feelings mentioned above) there would not be I" (Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963], p. 181).

3 – *Li yue* 禮樂 refers to an integrated system of rites and music that governs practically every aspect of behavior in personal, social, and political life. *Ren yi* 仁義 means "humaneness and righteousness." I use "rites and morality" for convenience. When necessary, I revert to "humaneness and righteousness."

4 – I shall follow the general consensus that the Inner Chapters were written by Zhuangzi himself. Thus, I mention "Zhuangzi" in discussing passages in these chapters but "writers" when discussing the Outer and Miscellaneous chapters. On authorship, see A. C. Graham, "How Much of *Chuang Tzŭ* Did Chuang Tzŭ

Write?" in *Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature* (Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1986). Also, see Liu Xiaogan, *Classifying the Zhuangzi Chapters* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994). However, we should note that it is by no means settled whether Zhuangzi was responsible only for the Inner Chapters. See, for instance, the introductory chapter of Xu Keqian 徐克謙, 莊子哲學新探 (北京：中華書局, 2005), for disagreement with the views of Liu.

5 – See Shuen-fu Lin, "Confucius in the 'Inner Chapters' of the *Chuang Tzu*," *Tamkang Review* 18 (1989): 1–4.

6 – There are four occurrences of *zhen* in the "Qiwulun," and one in the "Ying Di Wang" 應帝王 (Reply to emperors and kings). In the "Dazongshi" there are fifteen. See *A Concordance to the Zhuangzi.*

7 – In the "Qiushui" 秋水 (Autumn floods), we find 至德者，火弗能熱，水弗能溺 (Chen, p. 445); "When a man has perfect virtue, fire cannot burn him, water cannot drown him" (Burton Watson, trans., *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1968] p. 182). In "Xiaoyao You" 逍遙遊 (Free and easy wandering), similar remarks occur regarding a *shen ren* (神人) or a "spirit person" (Chen, p. 25), which Watson translates as "Holy Man": "There is nothing that can harm this man. . . . [H]e will not drown. . . . [H]e will not be burned" (p. 33). These and other passages throughout the *Zhuangzi* indicate that the *zhi ren* 至人 or "perfect person," the *shen ren* or "spirit person," and the *zhen ren* are interchangeable.

8 – Shuen-fu Lin has described the dialogues in the Inner Chapters as literary devices where Zhuangzi employs "masks" or *personae* (Lin, "Confucius in the 'Inner Chapters' of the *Chuang Tzu,*" pp. 379–401). In using these devices, "Chuang Tzu seldom, if ever, attacks other schools of philosophy directly and bitterly from his own mouth" (p. 380). These devices are instances of the metaphorical *zhong yan* 重言, which is "a sub-category of *yü-yen* [*yu yan* 寓言] because it refers to stories in which wise men whom people respect are used as the author's masks so that his own words in disguise may carry more weight and authority" (p. 383).

9 – See Kwong-loi Shun, *Mencius and Early Chinese Thought* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 209.

10 – One can point out further problems. The "Pian Mu" 駢拇 (Webbed toes) chapter asks: "Webbed toes and branched (extra) fingers, are they the result of the nature (of a human being)?" (駢拇枝指，出乎性哉?). The answer is that they are superfluous to the basic capacities (侈於德). The Confucian virtue of *ren* is likened to a superfluous finger said to obstruct the original nature of the person (塞性). The passage concludes that webbed toes and extra fingers are not universal correct standards (非天下之至正也). That is, the Confucian virtues do not constitute such standards (Chen, pp. 243–244). However, the analogy shifts. It is stated that "The correct standard does not deviate from the facts of the nature of a

thing and its destiny. Thus what is joined does not constitute being webbed, while extra fingers do not constitute being superfluous; what is long does not constitute excess, what is short does not constitute insufficiency" (彼至正者，不失其性命之情。故合者不為駢，而枝者不為岐；長者不為有餘，短者不為不足) (Chen, p. 247). It is now held that webbed toes and extra fingers are perfectly natural in themselves. By analogy, human nature needs no interference from the moralists. The imposition of *ren* violates the basic human capacities (侵其德) and causes the loss of what is "constant of itself" (失其常然) or natural (Chen, p. 250). Thus, although the writer intends to highlight an original nature, his shift in the use of the analogy shows that webbed toes and extra fingers may be regarded as either natural or unnatural.

11 – One is reminded of Confucius' approval of Zigong's citation of the *Odes*: "Like bone cut, like horn polished, Like jade carved, like horn polished." This was in response to Confucius' remark, "Poor yet delighting in the Way, wealthy yet observant of the rites" (D. C. Lau, trans., *Confucius: The Analects* [Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1992], p. 7, passage 1.15).

12 – See 節用上, 節用中, in 孫詒讓, 墨子閒詁 (北京：中華書局, 1986), and Yi-pao Mei, trans., *The Works of Motze* (Taibei: Wenzhi Chubanshe, 1977), Book 6, "Economy of Expenditures I and II." Scott Cook gives a very good account of the wealth of resources required in maintaining the rites (Scott Cook, "Xunzi on Ritual and Music," *Monumenta Serica* 45 [1997]: 1–38).

13 – I thank a reviewer for making this point about the cognitive dimension of *huo.*

14 – See Xu Keqian 徐克謙, 莊子哲學新探 (北京：中華書局, 2005), p. 64. Also, Hall and Ames: "The earliest occurrence of *zhen* would seem to be in the *Daodejing* and *Zhuangzi* texts from which it was popularized as a special Daoist term" (David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, *Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture* [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998], p. 163). Xu Keqian cites three occurrences of *zhen* in the *Daodejing* or *Laozi,* chaps. 21, 41, and 54. He believes that the *Laozi* should be dated after the *Zhuangzi* (Xu Keqian, 莊子哲學新探, p. 65).

15 –〔西漢〕劉向集錄；范祥雍箋證、范邦瑾協校, 戰國策箋證 (上海：上海古籍出版社, 2008), pp. 639–641.

16 – This story is in the "Qiushui" or Autumn Floods. See Chen, p. 459 and Watson, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu,* pp. 187–188.

17 – Chen has changed the original "Twelve Classics" (十二經) to "Six Classics" (六經). See Chen, p. 364 n. 2, for an explanation.

18 – Note that the use of *zhen* here is simply an emphasis that the nature of human beings rests in being humane and righteous. But the whole phrase could also be read as "the nature of the true person."

19 – Hektor Yan discusses the possibility that "the Confucian explicit attention to the virtues, according to Laozi, raises problems about moral motivation, and this

can be morally corrupting" (Hektor K. T. Yan, "A Paradox of Virtue: The *Daodejing* on Virtue and Moral Philosophy," *Philosophy East and West* 59 [2] [April 2009]: 174).

20 – Watson, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu,* pp. 330–331. The metaphor for a short life span is the passing of a swift horse glimpsed through a crack in the wall (騏驥之馳過隙也) (Chen, p. 798). A similar metaphor is in "Zhi Bei You" 知北遊 (Knowledge wandered north): "Man's life between heaven and earth is like the passing of a white colt glimpsed through a crack in the wall—whoosh!—and that's the end" (人生天地之間，若白駒之過郤，忽然而已) (Chen, p. 587). See also Watson, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu,* p. 240.

21 – A. C. Graham identifies the "Dao Zhi" as written by "Individualist" followers of Yang Zhu 楊朱. If I am correct in reading 全真 here as a hedonistic concern with the maximal satisfaction of desires, then it does not seem to neatly fit the Yangist philosophy. Graham describes this philosophy in terms of the following tenets in the *Huainanzi* 淮南子: "Yang Chu preached the doctrines of 'keeping one's life/nature intact' (全性, a phrase often written 全生; in either case it refers to caring for the body's potentiality to last out man's natural term of life in good health); 'protecting one's genuineness' (保真); and 'not involving the body in ties for the sake of other things' (不以物累形), not risking life and health for the sake of material possessions" (Graham, "How Much of *Chuang Tzu* Did Chuang Tzu Write?" p. 309). In the "Dao Zhi," the statement that Confucius' teachings do not allow one to keep one's *zhen* intact comes after another about the fact that life is short and that therefore one should maximally satisfy one's desires, including the desires of the senses. If the philosophy of Yang Zhu involves living out one's years prudently in good health and not risking one's life for material possessions, it is unclear whether Robber Zhi's hedonism is compatible with this philosophy. Furthermore, Robber Zhi is an utterly rough and violent character. He shows a quick temper and threatens to kill Confucius and have his liver for a meal. This violent temperament does not seem to be in accord with the more peaceful picture that we find of the Yangists, where they are said to prefer a prudent and retiring private life. See Graham, "Retreat to Private Life: The Yangists," in *Disputers of the Tao* (La Salle: Open Court, 1989), pp. 53–64. In the "Yang Zhu" chapter of the *Liezi* 列子, however, we do find a hedonistic philosophy similar to Robber Zhi's description: life is short, with the prospect of pain, sickness, and so on, and the recommendation that one should find happiness in "fine clothes and good food, music and beautiful women." See Graham, trans., *The Book of Lieh-tzŭ* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

22 – Both Kwong-loi Shun and Masayuki Sato have said to me that *zhen* is closely connected to *cheng* 誠. See Xu Keqian, 莊子哲學新探, pp. 66–70, for a discussion.

23 – Shuen-fu Lin says that Zhuangzi, as the author of the Inner Chapters, "never attacked Confucius or the Confucians in the same savage manner as Bandit

Chih 盜跖 does" (Lin, "Confucius in the 'Inner Chapters' of the *Chuang Tzu,*" p. 397).

24 – I have taken this list of attributes from pp. 178–179 of Chen. It begins: 古之真人，不逆寡 and ends with 不知說生，不知惡死. Watson says: "The True Man of ancient times did not rebel against want[,] . . . knew nothing of loving life, knew nothing of hating death" (Watson, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu,* pp. 77–78). The next few lines repeat this last point in different ways and end with the principle 不以人助天 or "not helping heaven with human (actions)." After a few more lines, we find the passage beginning 古之聖人之用兵 until 而不自適其適者也. According to Chen, this passage is alien to the text and should be excised (Chen, p. 182 n. 15). In Watson, this is the passage "Therefore, when the sage calls out the troops . . . but could not find joy in any joy of their own" (Watson, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu,* p. 78). Another long list of attributes of the *zhen ren* comes after this, starting with "his bearing was lofty and did not crumble; he appeared to lack but accepted nothing," and ending with the principle "Heaven and human beings do not overcome one another."

25 – See Chen, p. 181 n. 7.

26 – For comparison, see Watson, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu,* p. 77. For the original Chinese, see Chen, p. 178.

27 – See "Yang Sheng Zhu" 養生主 (The secret of caring for life) (Chen, pp. 104–105; also see Watson, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu,* pp. 50–51).

28 – See Chen, p. 508. I follow Graham's translation of the title (Graham, *Chuang-tzŭ,* p. 135). Watson translates this as "Mastering Life." Victor Mair has "Understanding Life" (*Wandering on the Way*).

29 – Michael Puett, "'Nothing Can Overcome Heaven': The Notion of Spirit in the *Zhuangzi,*" in Scott Cook, ed., *Hiding the World in the World: Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003). I thank a reviewer for referring me to this paper.

30 – See Puett, "'Nothing Can Overcome Heaven'," pp. 251–253. Puett repeatedly differentiates the practices of the ritual or spirit specialist from the practitioner of the "Nei Ye." However, both are said to share the same goal. In the case of the latter, reliance on *qi* enables the practitioner to "attain the powers that spirit specialists can only achieve through magical arts of working with spirits. In other words, one can have direct access to those powers of controlling phenomena and foretelling the future that are possessed by spirits and that spirit specialists can only achieve through magical arts." Similarly, "the end result would be the same: both the spirit specialist and the practitioner described in the 'Nei ye' are seeking power over and knowledge about things *(wu).*" Importantly, for Puett, this common aim is *not* shared by the spirit-man (or its equivalent the *zhen ren*) of the *Zhuangzi.* Thus, he says: "Whereas the potency of the spirit-man in the *Zhuangzi* is described as serving to allow things to be as they

naturally ought, the 'Nei ye' claims that the adept can possesses *[sic]* direct control over things." In this regard, I think Puett holds a very different view from Harold D. Roth, who would align the core aims and practices of the *Zhuangzi* much more closely with that of the "Nei Ye." See Harold Roth, *Original Tao: Inward Training and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

31 – Rur-bin Yang, "From 'Merging the Body with the Mind' to 'Wandering in Unitary *Qi* 氣': A Discussion of Zhuangzi's Realm of the True Man and Its Corporeal Basis," in Scott Cook, ed., *Hiding the World in the World*. This paper was translated by Cook from the Chinese original: 楊儒賓,〈「以體合心」到「遊乎一氣」~論莊子真人境界的形體基礎〉,第一屆中國思想史研討會論文集—先秦儒法道之交融及其影響 (台中：東海大學文學院, 1989). I thank Yang and Mark Csikszentmihalyi for alerting me to consider mystical views of the *Zhuangzi* when I read earlier versions of this essay in Taiwan and Hong Kong.

32 – Yang, "From 'Merging the Body with the Mind'," p. 94.

33 – See chap. 4 of the *Zhuangzi,* "Renjianshi" 人間世 (In the world of men) (see Chen, p. 126).

34 – Yang, "From 'Merging the Body with the Mind'," p. 97.

35 – Ibid., p. 107.

36 – See also Hall and Ames' discussion of the *zhen ren* or what they refer to as the "genuine person," in Hall and Ames, *Thinking from the Han.* Referring to the genuine (or "transforming") person: he has "a calmness and imperturbability that comes with nonattachment. Existing beyond the plethora of disintegrative dualisms . . . the genuine person achieves a kind of immortality—not by escaping to some purer realm, but by realizing himself in the concrete and persistent here and now" (p. 167). Also, mentioning later Daoist cultivationist practices, they say: "the pursuit of personal immortality through elixirs and breathing exercises conflicts with the *Zhuangzi's* notion of comprehending the synergistic continuity of the human experience, thereby overcoming any severe distinction between life and death" (p. 163). Here, they are also referring to the *Shuowen jiezi* 說文解字 definition of *zhen* as "the immortals undergoing physical transformation and ascending to the heavens." Xu Keqian also doubts that this is what *zhen* originally means (Xu, 莊子哲學新探, p. 71).

37 – Although Lee Yearley refers to the skills involved as representing an "ultimate spiritual state" that is "a form of intraworldly mysticism" (Lee Yearley, "Zhuangzi's Understanding of Skillfulness and the Ultimate Spiritual State," in Paul Kjellberg and Philip J. Ivanhoe, eds., *Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi* [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996], p. 160), I think that his description of the "transcendental drives" that give rise to such skills can be accommodated within more familiar psychological resources. Thus, he distinguishes between a "process" defined by the pursuit of a goal, and a "perfor-

mance" where there is "effortless concentration, lack of fatigue, quick passage of time, and a disinterest in doing anything other than what is now being done" (p. 168). J. David Velleman describes in psychological terms an experience of "flow" with regard to Cook Ding (Pao Ding) (J. David Velleman, "The Way of the Wanton," SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1006893, August 13, 2007). Velleman refers especially to the work of Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, *Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience* (New York: Harper and Row, 1990).

38 – Compare Yang's paper with, e.g., Harold D. Roth, *Original Tao—Inward Training and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism,* esp. chap. 4, where Roth also provides a discussion of various descriptions of mystical experience. See also Roth's "Bimodal Mystical Experience in the 'Qiwulun 齊物論' Chapter of the *Zhuangzi* 莊子," in Scott, *Hiding the World in the World.* Compare these with Benjamin Schwartz, *The World of Thought in Ancient China* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), chap. 6, "The Ways of Taoism," which, too, discusses various senses of mysticism. Instead of a mysticism of meditational techniques, Schwartz thinks that in both the *Zhuangzi* and the *Laozi,* we find "paradoxical efforts to convey the indescribable in words" (pp. 198–199).