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Protecting Oneself and Others Through Mindfulness – The Acrobat Simile in the *Samyukta-āgama*

Bhikkhu Anālayo

The present article offers a translation of the *Samyukta-āgama* parallel to the *Sedaka-sutta* of the *Samyutta-nikāya* (SN 47.19), followed by a study of the acrobat simile found in this discourse, which illustrates how the practice of mindfulness becomes the way to protect oneself as well as others.

INTRODUCTION

With this paper I continue a theme already broached in a previous study, in which I had examined the need to balance dedication to one's own inner development with concern for the welfare of others. My earlier study had been based on a comparison of the qualities stipulated in the *Mahā-gopālaka-sutta* and its parallels as requirements for being able to come to growth in the Buddha's dispensation. A quality found in all versions of this discourse mentions the four establishments of mindfulness, *satipaṭ-thāna*.¹

The way these four establishments of mindfulness relate to concern for others is described in the discourse that is the topic of my present investigation: the *Sedaka-sutta* of the *Samyutta-nikāya*.² This discourse delivers a simile that depicts two acrobats who perform with the help of a bamboo pole. In what follows, I translate the *Samyukta-āgama* parallel to the *Sedaka-sutta*, followed by examining the significance of this simile. Besides this *Samyukta-āgama* parallel, which with considerable probability stems from the Mūlasarvāstivāda tradition,³ another parallel to the *Sedaka-sutta* has been preserved as a discourse quotation in the *Bhaiṣajya-vastu* of the Mūlasarvāstivāda *Vinaya*.⁴

TRANSLATION⁵

[Discourse on the Simile of the Pole Acrobat]⁶

Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was dwelling among the Kosalans, in a *siṃsapā* grove north of the town of Sedaka.⁷ At that time, the Blessed One said to the monks:

"In former times, there was a teacher of acrobatics done in dependence on a pole. He placed the pole straight up on his shoulder and told his disciple:⁸ 'Getting up and down on the pole,⁹ you protect me and I will

also protect you. Protecting each other we will put on a show and gain much wealth.'

Then the disciple of acrobatics said to the teacher of acrobatics: 'It won't do, as you said. Instead, we should each take care to protect ourselves. [Like this] we will put on a show and gain much wealth. We will be physically at ease and yet I will get down safely.'

The teacher of acrobatics said: 'As you said, we will take care to protect ourselves, this is correct and is also the meaning of what I said'.¹⁰

[The Buddha said]:¹¹ "Having protected oneself, one right away protects the other; when protecting the other and oneself, this is protection indeed."¹²

[How does protecting oneself protect others]?¹³ Becoming familiar with one's own mind,¹⁴ developing it, protecting it accordingly and attaining realization — this is called 'protecting oneself protects others'.

How does protecting others protect oneself? By the gift of fearlessness, the gift of non-violation, the gift of harmlessness,¹⁵ by having a mind of benevolence and empathy for the other — this is called 'protecting others protects oneself'.

For this reason, monks, you should train yourself like this:¹⁶ 'Protecting myself I will develop the four spheres of mindfulness, protecting others I will develop the four spheres of mindfulness.'¹⁷

When the Buddha had spoken this discourse, the monks, who had heard what the Buddha had said, were delighted and received it respectfully.¹⁸

STUDY

In what follows, I first study the situation described in the simile in order to appreciate its significance. Then I examine in what way mindfulness protects oneself and thereby benefits others; followed by examining the reverse case, where protecting others benefits oneself. In the final part of my study, I turn to the four *satipaṭṭhānas*, trying to ascertain what aspect of their development is particularly related to protecting oneself as well as others.

1) The Acrobat Simile

For the two acrobats to successfully perform their feat, the teacher would have to keep the pole firmly straight up and the disciple would have to maintain balance while being on top of the pole.¹⁹ In view of this need for cooperation, the suggestion made by the teacher that "you protect me and I will also protect you" seems quite meaningful. It appears to imply that he wishes to protect the disciple by keeping the pole firmly upright. At the same time, he hopes that the disciple will protect him by avoiding any jerky movement that upsets the balance of the pole and makes it difficult to keep the pole up straight. The teacher's concern would also be that, whether he makes a mistake or the disciple makes a mistake, in both cases the one who falls down and risks injury is the disciple. Hence as the teacher and with a natural attitude of concern, he expresses himself in terms of protecting the other.

The disapproval voiced by the disciple: "It won't do, as you said" comes somewhat unexpected in view of the fact that the simile introduces her as the disciple.²⁰ The actual perspective introduced by the disciple that "we should each take care to protect ourselves" brings a refinement to the basic principle of harmonious cooperation, indicating that each of them should not give all priority to protecting the other. This indication would not imply a rejection of the need for both to be concerned about the other. Rather, it introduces the proper perspective for achieving smooth cooperation, namely being first of all centred oneself.

If the teacher were to excessively worry about the disciple, this might distract his attention from the need to keep his own balance and result in knocking over the whole set up. Similarly, the disciple should not be overly concerned about the teacher, but needs to first of all pay attention to her own maintenance of balance, otherwise she might get distracted from the need to keep her own balance and risks falling off the pole.

At this point of the simile, a significant difference occurs between the Pāli and Chinese versions. In the Pāli version in the *Samyutta-nikāya*, the Buddha simply acknowledges that the remark made by the disciple is the right method.²¹ In the *Samyukta-āgama* version, however, the teacher himself acknowledges the correctness of what the disciple has said, after which he adds that this "is also the meaning of what I said", that is, this much was anyway implicit in his presentation. This in itself minor difference results in the two protagonists of the simile appearing in quite a different light.

The impression that the Pāli version of the simile gives is that the teacher needed to be corrected by his disciple. This is surprising, since he would be the one who taught the disciple the trade of acrobatics. Hence his un-

derstanding of the basic principles of this trade should be better than those of his disciple. In this way, on reading the Pāli version one has the impression that this teacher was not really up to the position of teaching that he had assumed, since in relation to so fundamental a matter as how to perform properly, he needed to get the priorities clarified by his own disciple.

In contrast, in the *Samyukta-āgama* version the teacher indicates that he had already been aware of the point made by the disciple. Even though his concern for the disciple had let him to express his advice in terms of protecting the other, it was implicit in his presentation that they both need to protect themselves by keeping their own balance. In this way, the manner in which the two protagonists interact in the *Samyukta-āgama* version fits the roles given to them better. The disciple's remark does not imply any ignorance on the side of the teacher, but only has the function of throwing into relief a principle that is implicit in the teacher's proposal to protect each other.

In spite of this difference, however, the Pāli and Chinese versions agree on the basic message of the simile, in that for the two acrobats to be able to properly perform their feat, they first of all need to make sure that they are centred themselves. Only based on having in such a way protected themselves will they be able to protect each other.

2) Protecting Oneself

The notion that mindfulness has a protective function is not confined to the present discourse, as it recurs in other passages, according to which mindfulness is the one factor to guard and protect the mind.²² The same nuance of protection can be found, for example, in the context of a simile that illustrates progress on the path with the example of a chariot, where mindfulness corresponds to the shielding function afforded by the canopy of the chariot.²³

Ñāṇaponika (1968/1986: 35 and 23) explains: "Just as certain reflex movements automatically protect the body, similarly the mind needs spontaneous spiritual and moral self-protection. The practice of bare attention will provide this vital function". "The non-violent procedure of bare attention endows the meditator with the light but sure touch so essential for handling the ... evasive and refractory nature of the mind. It also enables him to deal smoothly with the various difficult situations and obstacles met with in daily life".

In other words, mindfulness makes one aware of what is happening in the mind. It is based on such recognition that something can be done about the arising of unwholesome reactions or the presence of detrimental states of mind. Unless recognition through mindfulness is established, greed, anger and delusion will have free range to work havoc in the mind, hiding under any of the various pretences and excuses they are capable of assuming so as to disguise their true nature. Mindfulness, however, enables seeing through these different disguises and rationalizations. By detecting the presence of mental defilements, established mindfulness can counteract one's innate unwillingness to admit to oneself that one is angry, greedy or confused. Whatever diversionary manoeuvre the mental impurities have staged to avoid being detected, bare attention unmasks these and reveals the actual condition of one's own mental household. In this way, mindfulness can indeed become a real protection.

The successful achievement of such self-protection through mindfulness finds illustration in another simile, which compares *sati* to a careful charioteer.²⁴ The implications of this simile are self-evident, as without the presence of mindfulness an 'accident' is prone to happen. Applying the indications given in the *Sedaka-sutta* to this simile, a careful charioteer is one who by maintaining awareness while driving through life's vicissitudes does the needful to avoid an accident, whereby he protects not only himself, but also others.

The protective function of mindfulness receives another illustration in a simile that describes the gatekeeper of a town in a border district. According to a version of the respective discourse found in the *Madhyama-āgama* preserved in Chinese translation,²⁵ the simile runs like this:

"It is just as if in the king's border town a chief officer is appointed as gatekeeper,²⁶ one who is sharp-witted and wise in making decisions, brave and resolute, of excellent counsel, who allows entry to the good and keeps out the bad, in order to ensure peace within and control outside enemies.²⁷ In the same way, the noble disciple continuously practices mindfulness, achieves right mindfulness, always recalling and not forgetting what was done or heard long ago. This is reckoned to be the noble disciple's gaining of the 'gate-keeping chief officer' of mindfulness, which removes what is evil and unwholesome and develops wholesome states."²⁸

The simile of mindfulness as a gatekeeper recurs in another discourse,²⁹ where its task is to show the way to the two 'messengers' of tranquillity and insight so that they can deliver the 'message' of Nirvāṇa to consciousness.

These two similes can be seen to highlight two complementary aspects of the protective function of the gatekeeper of mindfulness. The first simile shows mindfulness in its more general task of preventing the intrusion of evil and encouraging what is wholesome in the mind. The second simile is more specifically addressed to higher levels of insight, where mindfulness protects by guiding the two chief aspects of mental cultivation – tranquillity and insight – in such a way that they lead to their final purpose: liberation.

The gate-keeping function of mindfulness comes up again in another discourse from the *Madhyama-āgama* in the context of a description of sense-restraint. According to the indications given in this discourse, to restrain the senses requires to be "guarding and protecting the mind with mindfulness and becoming accomplished [in such protection]".³⁰ Although in this case the Pāli parallel does not mention the protective role of mindfulness,³¹ the same is explicitly related to sense-restraint in another Pāli discourse found in the *Aṅguttara-nikāya*.³²

The *Indriyabhāvanā-sutta* and its *Samyukta-āgama* parallel confirm that to deal appropriately with the senses is a task that requires some form of inner protection, clarifying that simply to block out sensory input is not the way how mental cultivation should be undertaken. They report that the Buddha, somewhat tongue in cheek, told a contemporary Brahmin practitioner that, if the solution were simply to avoid seeing and hearing in principle, then the blind and the deaf must be reckoned highly accomplished practitioners.³³

The above passages indicate in what way through mindfulness one can "become familiar with one's own mind, develop it, protect it accordingly and attain realization", as suggested by the *Samyukta-āgama* parallel to the *Sedaka-sutta*. The two parallel versions agree in proposing that by protecting oneself in such a way one also protects others.³⁴ According to the Pāli commentary on the *Sedaka-sutta*, the implication of this dictum can be seen when a monk successfully develops his practice until he becomes an arahant. Others who see him become inspired and, because of having aroused faith in him, are reborn in heaven.³⁵

This seems a somewhat narrow interpretation of the simile, which in a way restricts the efficacy of protecting others through self-protection to the case of arahants, or at least to those who are so well advanced that the inspiration they provide will lead others to rebirth in heaven. One might also wonder if the protection to be given to others is just about a heavenly rebirth, since the inspiration gained from witnessing accomplished

practitioners would be more fruitful if it leads to developing one's own meditation practice.

In a short study dedicated to the *Sedaka-sutta*, Ñāṇaponika (1967/1990: 5–7) envisages a considerably broader scope of implications for the effects of self-protection on others. He explains that, in particular from an ethical perspective, "self-protection will safeguard others, individuals and society, against our own unrestrained passions and selfish impulses ... they will be safe from our reckless greed for possessions and power, from our unrestrained lust and sensuality, from our envy and jealousy; safe from the disruptive consequences of our hate and enmity".

In contrast, "if we ourselves think of nothing else than to crave and grasp ... then we may rouse or strengthen these possessive instincts in others ... our own conduct may induce others to join us in the common satisfaction of rapacious desires; or we may arouse in them feelings of resentment and competitiveness." In the end, "greed and hate are, indeed, like contagious diseases. If we protect ourselves against these evil infections, we shall to some extent at least also protect others."

Hence protecting oneself through mindfulness can have a rather broad range of possible benefits for others, even if one has not yet become an arahant. In sum, in the words of Ñāṇaponika (1967/1990: 8), "he who earnestly devotes himself to moral self-improvement and spiritual self-development will be a strong and active force for good in the world", a succinct statement with wide ramifications.

3) Protecting Others

The commentary on the *Sedaka-sutta* illustrates how protecting others leads to protecting oneself with the example of a monk who gains the four *jhānas* through practice of the *brahmavihāras* and, having made *jhāna* the basis for reviewing formations, develops insight and becomes an arahant.³⁶ This commentarial explanation again seems to present a somewhat narrow perspective.

Ñāṇaponika (1967/1990: 11f) explains that someone who is patient and forbearing towards others "will protect himself better than he could with physical strength or with any mighty weapon". "He who does not resort to force or coercion will, under normal conditions, rarely become an object of violence himself ... and if he should encounter violence, he will bring it to an early end as he will not perpetuate hostility through vengeance".³⁷

Hence, even without having developed the *brahmavihāras* up to *jhāna* level and then using this to develop insight and become an arahant, there seems to be considerable scope for protection of others to benefit oneself. As the *Samyukta-āgama* parallel to the *Sedaka-sutta* points out, one who protects others gives them "the gift of fearlessness, the gift of non-violation, the gift of harmlessness". Making the '*dāna*' preparations required to be able to offer such gifts will immediately have considerable wholesome repercussions on one's own mind. Such form of '*dāna*' involves a training and educating of the mind in wholesomeness that has its own intrinsic value, independent of whoever may eventually be the recipients of these gifts.

Here it is perhaps also noteworthy that the so-called *Metta-sutta* of the *Sutta-nipāta* refers to mindfulness. After describing the radiation of benevolence in all directions without any obstruction, which involves a pervasion of the whole world with benevolence that should be maintained in any bodily posture, the discourse continues by enjoining that "one should practise this mindfulness".³⁸ This expression hints at a close relationship between the practice of mindfulness and the opening of the heart achieved through such boundless meditative cultivation of benevolence.

As the disciple in the *Sedaka-sutta* and its *Samyukta-āgama* parallel clarifies, protecting others needs to have a firm foundation in self-protection. The same requirement is illustrated in the *Sallekha-sutta* with the example of drowning in a quagmire. The *Madhyama-āgama* parallel to the *Sallekha-sutta* presents this simile as follows:

"For one who is untamed himself to tame others who are untamed – this is impossible. For one who is drowning himself to rescue others who are drowning – this is impossible ... [However], for one who is tamed himself to tame others who are untamed – this is possible. For one who is not drowning himself to rescue others who are drowning – this is possible."³⁹

Ñāṇaponika (1967/1990: 8) explains that "if we leave unresolved the actual or potential sources of social evil within ourselves, our external social activity will be either futile or markedly incomplete. Therefore, if we are moved by a spirit of social responsibility, we must not shirk the hard task of moral and spiritual self-development. Preoccupation with social activities must not be made an excuse or escape from the first duty, to tidy up one's own house first."

The same conclusion suggests itself also from a study of the *Mahāgopālaka-sutta* and its parallels. While this discourse clearly highlights the

importance of concern for others as an integral aspect of growth in the Dharma, at the same time it puts such concern for others into proper perspective by subordinating it to the principal task of progress towards liberation.⁴⁰

4) The Four *Satipaṭṭhānas*

The *Sedaka-sutta* and its parallel conclude with the Buddha recommending the practice of the four establishments of mindfulness as the way to protect oneself and others. This points to the way such self protection and protecting of others should be practically implemented. Here the question may be asked if any particular aspect of the development of the four *satipaṭṭhānas* could be specifically related to this interrelation between protecting oneself and others.

Now according to the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta* and its parallels, the practice of mindfulness should be undertaken "internally", "externally" and "internally and externally".⁴¹ The same specification is associated with *satipaṭṭhāna* in a range of other texts, for example in Abhidharma works like the *Dharmaskandha* and the *Śāriputrābhidharma*,⁴² or in the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*,⁴³ as well as in *Prajñāpāramitā* literature.⁴⁴ Thus, this injunction can safely be taken to represent a key aspect of *satipaṭṭhāna* practice recognized in various Buddhist traditions.

A discourse in the *Samyutta-nikāya* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel report an instruction to a monk who had requested the Buddha for a brief teaching that would enable him to engage in intensive practice. The instruction he received was that he should practise the four *satipaṭṭhānas* internally, externally and internally-and-externally.⁴⁵ The *Samyutta-nikāya* discourse explicitly specifies that this instruction is about a three-fold mode of practice, *tividha*. In other words, practice of *satipaṭṭhāna* in this way evolves through three distinct levels. These begin with internal mindfulness as a foundation and then proceed to mindfulness directed externally, which eventually culminates in a mode of practice that is internal-and-external. Moreover, such practice is explicitly recommended to someone who wishes to strive earnestly for progress towards liberation, indicating that externally developed mindfulness is as much required for such progress as its internal counterpart.

According to an indication provided in the *Janavasabha-sutta* and its *Dīrgha-āgama* parallel, contemplating internally refers to developing mindfulness in regard to oneself, while to undertake external contemplation involves awareness of the same phenomena in others.⁴⁶ This suggests that mindfulness practice undertaken according to the

scheme of the four *satipaṭṭhānas* can also include directing awareness to others.⁴⁷ Elsewhere I have discussed in more detail that such awareness need not be taken to require supernatural powers, but can be implemented by becoming aware of the feelings and mental states of another through carefully observation of their facial expression, tone of voice and physical posture.⁴⁸

Practice undertaken in this way would require continuity of mindfulness during activities and thus is obviously not confined to formal sitting, where in fact the opportunities to observe another would be rather limited. Needless to say, this three-level approach is clearly based on first of all establishing mindfulness internally, for which formal meditation, ideally undertaken periodically under strict retreat conditions, provides the necessary foundation. But based on having laid and maintained such foundation, mindfulness could then continue to observe those phenomena, which have already been seen with awareness within oneself, as and when they manifest in others.

In this way, awareness of a particular condition within oneself would naturally lead to becoming aware of and eventually developing empathy for the same condition when it occurs within others. In turn, empathy developed for others makes it easier to maintain a balanced state of observation when the same happens within oneself, without immediately reacting and trying to suppress, or else avoiding recognition of what takes place in order to safeguard one's self esteem. This eventually leads to a level of practice where, whatever happens within oneself and within others, is seen concurrently and in its reciprocal conditioning relationship.⁴⁹

Although awareness of oneself and others would be the result of a natural evolution, the fact that the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta* devotes explicit instructions on these three modes makes it clear that such natural evolution needs to be consciously encouraged. That is, one who is too much concerned with contemplating internally needs to make a conscious effort to extend practice to external phenomena, just as one who is too much given to the external needs to strengthen formal practice undertaken internally. As a result of such practice, eventually introversion and extroversion could be brought into a harmonious balance.⁵⁰

Protecting oneself and others through *satipaṭṭhāna* in this way does not appear to be an extraneous addition to mindfulness practice, whose real purpose is something different. Instead, the acrobat simile seems to point to an essential and intrinsic part of properly undertaken mindfulness

practice. If developed in this balanced manner, mindfulness meditation, while giving clear priority to self development, concurrently fosters the benefit of others and of society at large.⁵¹

"Those streams that are in the world,
Are held in check by mindfulness".⁵²

ABBREVIATIONS

- AN *Aṅguttara-nikāya*
B^e Burmese edition
C^e Ceylonese edition
D Derge edition
DĀ *Dīrgha-āgama* (T 1)
DN *Dīgha-nikāya*
EĀ *Ekottarika-āgama* (T 125)
MĀ *Madhyama-āgama* (T 26)
MN *Majjhima-nikāya*
Mp *Manorathapūraṇī*
Pj *Paramatthajotikā*
Q Peking edition
S^e Siamese edition
SĀ *Samyukta-āgama* (T 99)
SĀ² 'other' *Samyukta-āgama* (T 100)
SN *Samyutta-nikāya*
Sn *Sutta-nipāta*
Spk *Sāratthappakāsinī*
Sv *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*
T Taishō (CBETA)
[] text has been supplemented

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NOTES

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- ¹ Cf. Anālayo 2010: 7.
- ² SN 47.19 at SN V 168 to 169; studies of the significance of this discourse can be found in Debes 1964 and Ñāṇaponika 1967/1990.
- ³ Cf. e.g. Lü 1963: 242, Waldschmidt 1980: 136, Mayeda 1985: 99, Enomoto 1986: 23, Schmithausen 1987: 306, Choong 2000: 6 note 18, Hiraoka 2000, Harrison 2002: 1, Oberlies 2003: 64, Bucknell 2006: 685, and Glass 2010.
- ⁴ T 1448 at T XXIV 32b9 to 32c1, noted as a parallel to SĀ 619 by Chung 2008: 157. The corresponding part in the Tibetan translation of the *Bhaiṣaj-yavastu* is abbreviated and only gives the title of the discourse.
- ⁵ SĀ 619 at T II 173b5 to 173b19. For ease of comparison, in my translation I employ Pāli terminology, without thereby intending to take a position on the original language of the *Samyukta-āgama* manuscript used for translation, which according to de Jong 1981: 108 would have been Sanskrit.
- ⁶ The *Samyukta-āgama* does not give a title, hence I adopt the title given in a reference to this discourse in D 1 *kha* 62a7 or Q 1030 *ge* 57b8 as *shing 'dzeg gi shing lta bu 'i mdo*, literally: "the discourse on the simile of the pole of [one] who climbs up a pole".
- ⁷ SĀ 619 at T II 173b6: 私伽陀, identified as corresponding to Sedaka or Setaka by Akanuma 1930/1994: 608. SN 47.19 at SN V 168,16 locates Sedaka among the Sumbhas (Spk III 226,6 explains that Sumbha is the name of a *janapada*), the same village is also mentioned, e.g., in SN 46.30

at SN V 89,8 (B^c, C^c and S^c: Setaka) and SN 47.20 at SN V 169,26. While SN 47.19 does not give any indication regarding the grove in which the Buddha was dwelling, the otherwise unrelated DN 23 at DN II 316,6 refers to a *siṃsapā* grove (*Dalbergia sisu*) north of a town in Kosala, although in this case the name of the town is Setavyā.

⁸ SN 47.19 at SN V 168,18 does not give further specification about where the pole was put; the *Bhaisajyavastu* version, T 1448 at T XXIV 32b11, also reports that it was placed on the shoulder.

⁹ SN 47.19 does not specify that the protecting of each other should be done while getting up and down the pole, in fact in its account the teacher at first told the disciple to get up on his shoulders, which the latter then did, so that in SN 47.19 their discussion takes place with the disciple already standing on the shoulders of his teacher.

¹⁰ SN 47.19 at SN V 169,9 does not have a reply by the teacher, continuing only with a brief remark: "that is the method", *so tattha nāyo*. While Woodward 1930/1979: 149 takes this to be still part of the disciple's speech, Bodhi 2000: 1648 translates it as part of the explanation subsequently given by the Buddha. The passage in question reads: ... *orohissāmā ti, so tattha nāyo ti bhagavā avoca* (C^c: *orohessāmā*, B^c: *bhagavā etad avoca*). Since the first *ti* would conclude the disciple's remark, the subsequent section would indeed be part of the Buddha's explanation. In the *Bhaisajyavastu* version, T 1448 at T XXIV 32b19, no reply by the teacher is found, instead of which the Buddha comments that the indications made by the disciple are the correct method.

¹¹ In SĀ 619 it is not clear at what point the speech of the teacher ends and the comment by the Buddha starts. My assumption that this occurs at the present junction is based on the parallel versions. Judging from the narrative flow in SĀ 619, it could alternatively be the teacher who draws this general conclusion, in which case the Buddha's comment would only start with the remark regarding becoming familiar with one's own mind.

¹² In SN 47.19 at SN V 169,11 the Buddha at first recommends the practice of *satipaṭṭhāna* to protect oneself and to protect another, followed by indicating that protecting oneself one protects others and protecting others one protects oneself, *attānam, bhikkhave, rakkhanto paraṃ rakkhati, paraṃ rakkhanto attānaṃ rakkhatī ti*. The corresponding passage in the *Bhaisajyavastu*, T 1448 at T XXIV 32b20, differs: "If one is able to protect oneself, one is able to protect others. If one [just] has the wish to protect others, one is in turn not able to protect oneself", 若能守護自身, 即能守護於他, 若欲守護於他, 即便不能自守. In evaluating this difference, it needs to be taken into account that the intrusion of negations into a context where they were not originally found is not an unusual occurrence in the early discourses, cf. Anālayo 2007: 40 and Anālayo 2009: 14, so that it is possible that the final part of the present passage in the *Bhaisajyavastu* is the result of a similar type of error and that the reading should rather be, in closer correspondence to the parallels: "If one has the wish to protect others, one is in turn able to protect oneself".

- ¹³ The supplementation of this query suggests itself from the context and the parallel versions, SN 47.19 at SN V 169,¹⁵ and T 1448 at T XXIV 32b22, where such a query serves as introduction to the corresponding explanation.
- ¹⁴ SN 47.19 at SN V 169,¹⁶ does not explicitly specify that the mind is the object of development, reading (in reply to the Buddha's question on how one protects oneself): "by practising, developing and making much of it", *āsevanāya bhāvanāya bahulīkammena*, which according to the commentarial explanation, Spk III 227,2, refers to one's meditation practice in particular, *kammaṭṭhānāsevanāya*. The *Bhaisajyavastu* version, T 1448 at T XXIV 32b22, also does not mention becoming familiar with the mind.
- ¹⁵ Instead of these three, SN 47.19 at SN V 169,¹⁹ speaks only of patience and harmlessness, *khantiyā avihimsāya*. The *Bhaisajyavastu* version, T 1448 at T XXIV 32b24, mentions not annoying, not angering and not harming another, 由不惱他, 亦不瞋他, 并不損害. The three versions agree that one protects others through benevolence and empathy.
- ¹⁶ An injunction to the monks that they should train themselves like this is not found in SN 47.19. The *Bhaisajyavastu* version, T 1448 at T XXIV 32b26 and 32c1, has such an injunction twice, before and after the statement according to which, in order to protect oneself and to protect another, one should practice the four *satipaṭṭhānas*.
- ¹⁷ The *Bhaisajyavastu* version, T 1448 at T XXIV 32b29, continues by briefly listing the four *satipaṭṭhānas* (body, feelings, mental states and dharmas), 所謂身受心法念等住處.
- ¹⁸ Such a standard conclusion to the discourse is not found in SN 47.19.
- ¹⁹ Olendzki 2010: 127f explains that the image of the acrobat needing to pay attention to his or her own physical sense of balance mirrors the task of a meditator, in that "the acrobat, like the meditator, is bringing conscious awareness to a process that is always occurring but is generally overlooked". The simile thus exemplifies that "mindfulness is a tool for looking inward, adjusting our balance".
- ²⁰ Whereas SĀ 619 does not mention the name of the disciple or make any further indications, SN 47.19 at SN V 168,²⁴ gives the disciple's name as Medhakathālikā, where the feminine ending gives the impression that the disciple would have been a girl. This is, however, not the position taken in the commentary, Spk III 226,7, which explains *itthilingavasena laddhanāmaṃ* and then refers to Medhakathālikā as *antevāsiko*, and thus as a male disciple; cf. also Bodhi 2000: 1925 note 167. Hecker 2003: 303 follows the indication in the discourse and refers to Medhakathālikā as "Gehilfin", i.e., a female assistant. According to the *Bhaisajyavastu* version, T 1448 at T XXIV 32b12, the task of the disciple was to get on top of the pole and do a "dancing spectacle", 舞戲. Based on the information from these two canonical sources, it seems that the performance perhaps combined an acrobatic feat with a display of female charms, something fairly common in acrobatic performances.
- ²¹ Cf. above note 10.
- ²² DN 33 at DN III 269,²⁷: *bhikkhu satārakkhena cetasā sammannāgato hoti, evaṃ kho, āvuso, bhikkhu ekārakkho hoti*; cf. also AN 10.20 at AN V 30,²⁴.

A brief reference to what appears to be the same quality in DĀ 10 at T I 57b1 does not spell out the implications. A counterpart to AN 10.20, EĀ 46.2 at T II 775c28, only speaks of protecting the mind, without bringing in the role of mindfulness in this respect. Sv III 1051,15 and Mp V 8,11 understand the above passage in DN 33 and AN 10.20 to imply that an arahant will be protected at any time by mindfulness in regard to the three pathways of action.

²³ SN 1.46 (1.5.6) at SN I 33,11, with parallels in SĀ 587 at T II 156a20 and SĀ² 171 at T II 437a22.

²⁴ SN 45.4 at SN V 6,10: *sati ārakkhasārathi* (C^e: *ārakkhasārathī*). The parallel version SĀ 769 at T II 201a4 indicates that the imagery of the skilled driver stands for "being well protected by right mindfulness", 正念善護持.

²⁵ According to modern scholarship, the *Madhyama-āgama* preserved in Chinese translation can probably be attributed to a Sarvāstivāda line of transmission; cf. e.g. Lü 1963: 242, Waldschmidt 1980: 136, Enomoto 1984, Mayeda 1985: 98, Minh Chau 1991: 27 and Oberlies 2003: 48, with a recent contribution in Chung 2011: 13–34 and a reply in Anālayo 2012: 516–521.

²⁶ MĀ 3 at T I 423c14: 大將; Hirakawa 1997: 392 gives, as equivalents for 將, such terms as *pariṇāyaka*, *vināyaka*, *senāpati*. The version of this simile found in AN 7.63 at AN IV 110,29 does not have a comparable specification of the gatekeeper.

²⁷ A reference to ensuring peace within and controlling outside enemies is not found in the parallel AN 7.63.

²⁸ AN 7.63 at AN IV 111,5 adds that, besides overcoming what is unwholesome and faulty and developing what is wholesome and faultless, the noble disciple in this way also preserves himself in purity, *suddham attānaṃ pariharati*. Other instances of this simile can be found in the *Ekottarika-āgama*, EĀ 39.4 at T II 730b6, and in an *Udāna* collection preserved in Chinese translation, T 212 at T IV 652c9.

²⁹ SN 35.204 at SN IV 194,34 identifies mindfulness as the gatekeeper, whereas the parallel version SĀ 1175 at T II 316a3 speaks of four gatekeepers which then illustrate the four *satipaṭṭhānas*, 四守門者, 謂四念處. In a parallel preserved as a discourse quotation in Śamathadeva's compendium of discourse quotations from the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, D 4094 *nyu* 43b4 or Q 5595 *thu* 83a2, the gatekeeper represents mindfulness of the body, *lus su gtogs pa'i dran pa*, equivalent to the Pāli term *kāyagatāsati*.

³⁰ MĀ 144 at T I 652b11: 守護念心而得成就. Another parallel, T 70 at T I 875b12, recommends to "protect one's own mind [by] protecting the mind [through] mindfulness", 自護其意護意念.

³¹ MN 107 at MN III 2,13.

³² Yit 2004: 185 points out that AN 5.114 at AN III 138,20 also associates sense-restraint with "protective mindfulness", *ārakkhasatino*, and speaks of being "endowed with a mind protected by mindfulness", *satārakkhena cetāsā samannāgata*, a nuance of protection found in relation to sense-restraint also in the *Mahāvastu*, Senart 1897: 52,4: *ārakṣāsmṛti ... araktena cetasa samanvāgataḥ*, and in the *Saṅghabhedavastu*, Gnoli 1978: 240,20: *gupta-*

smṛtimānasaḥ; cf. also the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, Śrāvakabhūmi Study Group 1998: 100,8+18 and 101,2, with its Chinese counterpart in T 1579 at T XXX 406b24 and 406c3+10, which gives a detailed exposition on the implications of *āraḥṣitasmṛti*/防守正念, *nīpakasmṛti*/委正念, and *smṛtyāraḥṣitamānasa*/念防護意, under the heading of *indriyasamvara*.

³³ Whereas MN 152 at MN III 298,¹⁷ reports that the Buddha mentioned the blind and the deaf, according to SĀ 282 at T II 78b1 he only referred to someone who is blind, the case of someone who is deaf then being brought up by Ānanda. That the remark about the deaf was made by Ānanda is also recorded in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 729b6; cf. also T 1546 at T XXVIII 271a18 (Buddhavarman) and T 1547 at T XXVIII 439c19 (Saṅghabhūti). Bronkhorst 1993/2000: x sees a contradiction between this criticism of the "development of the faculties" through avoiding sights and sounds on the one hand and the approving attitude shown in other discourses towards deeper states of concentration during which sights or sounds are no longer experienced on the other hand, e.g., in DN 16 at DN II 131,²⁰. Yet, the present passage does not imply a criticism of deeper stages of concentration during which sensory experience is absent, but rather a criticism of attempting to deal with sensory impact during daily life by simply trying to avoid it, instead of developing equanimity towards whatever is experienced. In fact, the theme of MN 152 at MN III 298,⁸ is *indriyabhāvanā*, the "development of the faculties", a formulation that clearly points to a close relationship of the discourse's topic with *indriyasamvara*, "sense-restraint". For a critical review of Bronkhorst's argument cf. also Pāsādika 2009: 92f.

³⁴ Cf. above note 12.

³⁵ Spk III 227,3: *yo bhikkhu ... mūlakammaṭṭhānaṃ asevento bhāvento arahattaṃ pāpuṇāti, atha naṃ paro disvā ... tasmim cittaṃ pasādetvā sagga-parāyano hoti – ayaṃ attānaṃ rakkhanto paraṃ rakkhati nāma.*

³⁶ Spk III 227,13: *yo bhikkhu ... brahmavihāresu tika-catukka-jhānāni nibbatetvā, jhānaṃ pādakaṃ katvā, saṅkhāre sammāsanto vipassanaṃ vaḍḍhetvā arahattaṃ pāpuṇāti – ayaṃ paraṃ rakkhanto attānaṃ rakkhati nāma ti veditabbaṃ.*

³⁷ Cf. also Debvedi 1990: 42f, who speaks of using "our practice to improve the world, by training to see it in a more skillful way ... one who practises like this practices correctly in relation to oneself and also ... practises in the world in such a way as to be helpful, not harmful. Helping others also helps us to develop good qualities in ourselves ... in this way the practitioner sees the relationship between his own personal practice and the practice of relating to the world".

³⁸ Translation by Norman 1992: 17 of Sn 151: *etaṃ satim adhiṭṭheyya*; cf. also Bodhi 2011: 26. Maithrimurthi 2004: 177 additionally mentions SN 42.8 at SN IV 322,4 and AN 8.1 at AN IV 150,16 as instances where the practice of *mettā* is related to being mindful, *patissata*. Sn 151 continues by indicating that being determined on this [form of] mindfulness is said to be [one's] divine abode, *brahman etaṃ vihāraṃ idha-m-āhu*. Kuan 2008: 56 comments that Sn 151 "probably does not mean that loving-kindness itself is a

kind of *sati*, but it implies that the process of developing loving-kindness involves *sati*".

- ³⁹ MĀ 91 at T I 574b2, parallel to MN 8 at MN I 45,3, which indicates that the predicament in question is sinking in a quagmire; for another parallel cf. EĀ 47.9 at T II 784a20. A discourse quotation thematizing the need to tame oneself before taming others, apparently from the present discourse, can be found in T 212 at T IV 712c9, which at T IV 723b17 also quotes the simile of pulling someone out of the mud. Mahāsi 1981/2006: 34f explains that "only the man who has disciplined himself ... and extinguished the fires of defilements will be able to help another man in regard to discipline ... and extinction of defilements", "just as a fire cannot be used for putting out another fire, so also a defilement cannot neutralize another defilement".
- ⁴⁰ Cf. Anālayo 2010: 10.
- ⁴¹ DN 22 at DN II 292,1, MN 10 at MN I 56,27, MĀ 98 at T I 582b27 and EĀ 12.1 at T II 568a11. MĀ 98 differs from the other versions in so far as it does not speak of contemplating "internally-and-externally", in addition to contemplating "internally" and contemplating "externally". In regard to other aspects of *satipaṭṭhāna*, the expositions in MĀ 98 and EĀ 12.1 show considerable variations when compared to DN 22 and MN 10; cf. also Kuan 2008 and Anālayo 2013.
- ⁴² T 1537 at T XXVI 475c28 and T 1548 at T XXVIII 613a11.
- ⁴³ Rahder 1926: 38,17: '*dhyātmaṃ kāye kāyānudarśī viharaty ... bahirdhā kāye ... adyātmaṃ bahirdhā kāye*, etc.
- ⁴⁴ Cf., e.g., Dutt 1934/2000: 204,2; cf. also Lamotte 1970: 1122.
- ⁴⁵ SN 47.3 at SN V 143,11 and MĀ 76 at T I 543c12.
- ⁴⁶ DN 18 at DN II 216,15 speaks of practising *satipaṭṭhāna* "externally in relation to the bodies of others ... the dharmas of others", *bahiddhā parakāye ... bahiddhā paradhammesu*, something to be undertaken based on having at first contemplated internally and thereby developed proficiency in concentration. The parallel DĀ 4 at T I 36a1 instructs: "having contemplated the body internally, one arouses knowledge of the bodies of others; having contemplated feelings internally, one arouses knowledge of the feelings of others; having contemplated mental states internally, one arouses knowledge of the mental states of others; having contemplated dharmas internally, one arouses knowledge of the dharmas of others", □身觀已, 生他身智, □觀受已, 生他受智, □觀意已, 生他意智, □觀法已, 生他法智. This passage is preceded by distinguishing between internal and external contemplation, indicating that its implications would be similar to DN 18. Another instance reflecting this understanding can be found in a recently discovered Chinese manuscript, possibly a text by Ān Shìgāo (安世高), which explicitly speaks of undertaking *satipaṭṭhāna* contemplation in regard to oneself, 觀自, and in regard to others, 觀他人, cf. Zacchetti 2003: 255f. EĀ 12.1 at T II 568a11, however, relates the qualification "oneself" to internal and to external contemplation, reading: 內自觀 and 外自觀.
- ⁴⁷ E.g. MN 141 at MN III 252,5.

- ⁴⁸ Anālayo 2003: 96; cf. also Anālayo 2013. For a detailed examination of interpretations of internal and external mindfulness cf. Schmithausen 2012.
- ⁴⁹ On the significance of this internal-and-external practice cf. also Anālayo 2003: 98.
- ⁵⁰ Cf. in more detail Ñāṇaponika 1951.
- ⁵¹ For a case study of the effects of the internal development undertaken by the monks described in MN 31 on their environment cf. Ariyaratne 2010.
- ⁵² Sn 1035: *yāni sotāni lokasmiṃ, sati tesam nivāraṇaṃ*; Pj II 586,8 explains that the 'streams' stand for craving, etc.; on this verse cf. also Ñāṇananda 1973/1984: 29f. A similarly worded parallel can be found in the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, cf. Enomoto 1989: 34 (edited together with a survey of parallel occurrences, to which now could be added Zieme 1997: 751): *yāni srotāṃsi lokasya, smṛtiḥ teṣāṃ nivāraṇaṃ*; the Chinese parallel in T 1579 at T XXX 386b21 reads: "all the streams that flow in the world, mindfulness is able to stop their flowing", 世間諸流漏, 是漏念能止; D 4035 *tshi* 257b7 or Q 5536 *dsi* 299b7: "whatever flows there are in the world, mindfulness restrains them", 'jig rten rgyun ni gang yin pa, de dag bzlog par dran pa ste; cf. also Wayman 1989: 208. The same verse is quoted in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 230b23: "all the flowing torrents in the world, right mindfulness is able to hold them in check", 世間諸瀑流, 正念能防護, with a somewhat different formulation in the same work at T XXVII 379b14: "wherever streams are about to leak out, right mindfulness is able to restrain them", 諸處將流泄, 正念能制防; cf. also T 1546 at T XXVIII 285b16 (Buddhavarman): "any streams in the world, they should be restrained with right mindfulness", 世間所有流, 當以正念制, and T 1547 at T XXVIII 455a1 (Saṅghabhūti): "all the streams in what is called the world, mindfulness restrains these streams", 謂世諸流, 念者制流. The query about how the streams should be kept in check, which precedes Sn 1035, occurs also in the Jain *Isibhāsiyāiṃ* 29.1, Schubring 1969: 532: *savanti savvato sotā, kiṃ ṇa soto-nivāraṇaṃ? puṭṭhe muṇī āikkhe, kaḥaṃ soto pihijjati?* This question receives a detailed reply on how to restrain the five senses, which does not mention mindfulness. This is remarkable in view of the considerable degree of parallelism between the early Buddhist and Jain traditions, as well as the acquaintance with Jain doctrine and tenets reflected in Buddhist texts, on which cf., e.g., Jacobi 1880, Bohn 1921: 25–32, Jain 1926, Bapat 1928, von Glasenapp 1951, Jain 1966, Jain 1972, Jaini 1974, Tatia 1980, Nakamura 1983, Tatia 1983, Norman 1989/1993, Bronkhorst 1993/2000, Tatia 1993, Chaudhary 1994, Gombrich 1994, Bronkhorst 1999, Balbir 2000, Caillat 2003, Jaini 2003, Watanabe 2003. This difference highlights the significance of the role accorded to mindfulness in Sn 1035 and in other discourses, discussed in the present paper, as part of a distinctly Buddhist approach to liberation.

The Buddha as an Economic Adviser

Chandima Wijebandara

There is an increasing interest, mainly among Western writers, to make economists self-critical and rethink their stand among social sciences. In their attempt to find a philosophical insight, they have focused on the Buddha's teachings pertaining to economic conduct of people. Their diagnosis of the present malaise of world economy has highlighted three poisons, i.e., greed, hatred and ignorance. Misguided by such disastrous motives, modern economics has done more harm than benefit to the world. With this mistrust they have attempted to identify the potential of the teachings of the Buddha in providing critical and constructive insights to re-examine the values and readjust the attitudes to money, wealth, needs and wants. Buddhism will be instrumental in integrating right view with right livelihood, emphasising the importance of living happy and successful lives. It will prescribe wholesome life goals and ways and means of achieving them.

Gone are the days that someone might say in disbelief "How funny?" at the suggestion that a businessman should have the Buddha as his economic adviser. Not any more. More and more people in the world today are recognising the economic wisdom of the Buddha. For instance, in 2007, Lloyd M. Field argued in his book titled "*Business and the Buddha*" that some basic problems modern economics have not had with regard to insights were well perceived by the Buddha. He has even suggested that the Buddha must be represented by an image in every boardroom.¹ E.F. Schumacher, who first created an awareness among the English readers on the possibility of getting economic insights from the Buddha devoted a whole chapter on Buddhist Economics in his book, "*Small is Beautiful*" He argues that what we need is a system of Economics developed as if people mattered. Professor Glen Alexandrine, who teaches Economics in the US, writing an article to *Planning Review* published in Canada, has stated that traditional economics is limited to materialistic assumptions like utility and profit maximisation, competitive behaviour etc. and therefore, we should have to adopt the insights of Buddhist economists. "A Buddhist economist", he has explained, "...is not a teacher of ethics or moral philosophy. His job, on the one hand, is to encourage the planner to foresee and to create an appropriate future for his company, industry, work force, nation and the world, and, on the other hand to supply and co-ordinate, in an

understandable, comprehensive and technically intelligent way, all the insights he has.” Lloyd M. Field, referring to Adam Smith, the father of modern capitalist economics, has blamed him for ignoring the ‘individual’s physical, mental and spiritual well-being.’² Materialist Economics has failed in bringing a sense of balance to profit motivated people or institutions. Many people today are convinced that we should bring a human based value philosophy to value-neutral economic culture.

Economics is defined as the study of the way in which money, industry and trade are organised in a society. According to Collins English Dictionary, Economics is “the social science concerned with the production and consumption of goods and services and the analysis of the commercial activities of a society.” As Joseph Pears observes, this definition lacks any emphasis on the human element. According to this definition, it is not people, but goods and services and commercial activities that matter.³ Not the way Schumacher wanted it; a system in which people mattered.

Economists are willing to define their discipline as dealing with the problem of allocation of scarce means towards alternative ends, assuming that the human needs, wants and desires are infinite. Lionel Robins, a British economist, for instance, at the beginning of the 20th century, defined Economics in the following manner: “Economics is a science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses”⁴ It is exactly there that we may find Buddhism can shed some light on the issues that economists are trying to solve. Chapela wrote: “...behind the rationality of modern economic theory, and its mathematical-behavioural models, there lies a psychological ‘explanatory pattern’ for human economic behaviour, whether called hedonism, utilitarianism, rational economic man etc., which is not more than a prescription of how individuals and the ‘sum’ of them should behave in a market society.”⁵ The Buddha was concerned not only with how wealth is acquired and utilised but also with the ways in which individuals become attached to it.

It is true that the Buddha did not compile a treatise on economics. It is, of course, futile to find parallel analytical concepts in relation to production, distribution and consumption in Buddhism as if the Buddha were another economist. He was not. The Buddha was a religious teacher and a philosopher par excellence. His teachings contain a world view, a theory of knowledge, a system of ethics and a social philosophy. The Buddhist religion is based on this holistic philosophy which recommends a way of life. There is reason, then, for us to turn to him for an ‘economic philosophy’, as suggested by Schumacher which can provide the missing

link. Moreover, we should not forget that even Adam Smith, the father of modern economics, was originally a philosopher. Schumacher suggested the possibility of conceptualising a 'Buddhist Economics' stating "A Buddhist way of life would call for Buddhist economics as just the modern materialist way of life that has brought forth modern economics." Buddhist economics is the *Middle Way* of development, aiming to achieve maximum well-being with minimum consumption. ⁶

"Buddhist Economics may bring back sense into this greed ridden, mismanaged crazy world of business." says Glen Alexandrine: "What then can a Buddhist economist say personally to a strategic planner? Be idealistic. To be moral, ethical, selfless and giving may take more effort but it can also be 'good businesses. Be rational; keep accounts and calculate. But recognise that no matter how much of a system you take into account there is a greater part that is left out; you are human with many jobs to do and you can do but a percentage of each one." Buddhist Economics incorporates the values of middle path, compassion and balanced life into the pursuit of economic activity. It reminds us to observe reality in its totality; not to be led solely by our materialist paradigms and prejudices.

The universities all over the world have produced brilliant economists and governments have employed them as economic advisors, planners, operators and managers. The Banks and other business organisations are run by expert managers. How is it that even when things were handled by such capable and expert people the world economy has come down to this disastrous situation? How come that economics has failed to deliver the goods? British economist Maynard Keynes said "It would be splendid if economists could manage to get themselves thought of as humble competent people on a level with dentists." Andy Mukherjee, a senior journalist in Straits Times of Singapore, finds the analogy has not worked that way. While dentistry has stuck to its professional duty of practically helping people with real problems the economists have not. They were not "content with filling cavities in the job market and soothing inflationary swellings of the economy". "These policy tasks could not be the destination of an academic discipline, they reasoned. A loftier ideal, Keynes' successors would say would be to raise economics to the pedestal of physics." Adds Mukherjee: "The inquiry shifted to the mythical Homo Economicus – a self-seeking, forward-looking, utility-maximising individual with impressive computing power in his head and enormous willpower in his mind." Thus the practical issues were compromised and economists were becoming scientists and academics. President Barak Obama is in a hot seat struggling with many problems, even being surrounded by economists with the highest qualifications.

High rate of unemployment is appalling. Recently there was the biggest ever problem of banks and insurance companies on the verge of collapse. Many people were indebted and not paying back their debts. Banks and insurance companies have to generate money by lending and investing. So they lure people for borrowing. Development companies had taken the opportunity to borrow money and build houses to be sold on instalment basis. When people who bought them, agreeing to pay monthly or quarterly, fail to pay owing to problems, genuine or otherwise, encountered by them, then the lenders are at difficulty and a series of problems arise which get increasingly complicated. So, has the time come for leaders like Obama to ignore 'the common sense made difficult' and use real common sense, trust his gut feeling, like Roosevelt, and act aggressively, as Mukherjee has suggested.⁷

It looks like many right thinking people have come to the point of asking whether we can trust economists any more as people friendly scientists? The economists are arguing about their theories while people keep on suffering from economic ills. Says Mukherjee "The global economy is seriously ill, and the doctors are debating whether John Maynard Keynes was right to assume that consumption was a function of current income or whether Milton Friedman's intuition that consumption depends on a consumer's sense of her 'permanent income' is a better theory. The society at large has to express its disappointment: The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel ...must be axed, it will not be, but it should."⁸

In the competitively consumerist environment people are bombarded with new products and services which keep on advertising 'cannot do without; must have' things and services. This has created a society where people keep on acquiring endlessly and paying endlessly. When you start working you can purchase a house, a car, luxurious furniture, ultra modern entertainment and communication gadgets, and all sorts of modern sophisticated equipment in addition to designer clothes and Jewellery etc. What a princely life! When it comes to paying at the end of the month or the quarter, you may just use the credit card. Only a small percentage you pay and the rest gets accumulated with the interest. When one card exceeds the credit limit you use the other card. Banks keep on canvassing for new clients and offer attractive incentives too. Some people acquire many credit cards and keep on 'rolling' until the point of halt comes. Many people, even in the developing world, resort to such practices and think that they are very smart until the unexpected calamity takes place. Suddenly you fall ill and cannot work. Some unexpectedly lose their job owing to the company down-sizing or closing down. You have become redundant. Retrenchment or dismissal!

Anything might happen. Then all your instalments fall due and the items bought on credit, one by one, have to go. Lending companies will remove them and you cannot stop that since you have signed that long document printed in tiny letters that you did not bother reading at the time of signing. Many such people who lived on 'inflated' affluence either have committed suicide or declared bankruptcy. Sending such non paying clients behind bars will not help the banks or other financial institutions. They need money back to move ahead.

When the money cannot be recovered they might write off the debts and keep on luring some more people to borrow offering more incentives. This seems to be the reality in many societies today. In some cases people working in financial institutions, especially those in the managerial positions do not report the reality until it is too late. They enjoy all their perks even at the point of the institution's collapse. Has not the staff of one of the recently fallen financial giants held a multi-million tamasha even after they announced that they were at the verge of collapse? Are not they responsible for what has happened? And what AIG has done? From what the government has given them to save it from bankruptcy they have pocketed a big sum as their unpaid bonuses. Bonuses should be given to managers only when they have managed the company well and made good profit; not when they have brought the company to ruin. But these officers have taken their bonuses for the last bad years too from the money given as bail out. Recently the chairman of a privately owned Austrian bank, Meindl Bank, was arrested on suspicions of fraud and breach of trust.

Viewed from the Buddhist point of view it appears very clearly that three basic causes, among others, could be identified as the main culprits. The first is uncontrolled human greed. Second is hatred causing unreasonable competition leading to dirty tricks. The third is ignorance of reality and indiscriminate behaviour. All these lead to gross mismanagement and dishonesty. The world was thinking the American economic philosophy as infallible and America as the role model. We were all becoming global and our big boss was not going wrong.

Economics will never be able to find a solution for the gap between the needs and resources, though perceptive of it. The Buddha was not only perceptive of the problem but recommended a philosophical solution which seems to be the only rational and practical solution we can think of. "The world is always lacking, unsatisfied and slave to craving" (*ūno loko atitto taṇhādāso*), as the Buddha has rightly observed. And people never find satisfaction in sensual pleasures (*Kāmesu loke na hi atthi titti*). "Even with a shower of gold coins satisfaction of desire will not be

achieved,”⁹ observed the Buddha. If saturation point in sensual pleasures is never to be found, and also if the nature will never be able to provide enough for the greed of human beings (as Gandhi ones claimed emphatically), is there any meaning in trying to attain the impossible? On the other hand, greed is seen as the root cause of all suffering. The cause of rebirth and all suffering is seen as greed (*tanhā*).¹⁰ Rational solution, then, will be to find a way to limit our greed to a reasonable level. Buddhist economic philosophy recommends just that; obtaining satisfaction through a balanced and righteous way. Satisfaction, according to the Buddha, is the greatest wealth one can think of.¹¹ However, while economics stands to find a way of satisfying the needs in full it does not focus on the greed factor behind the needs people keep on creating one after the other. Buddhism is aware that people who are motivated by incessant greed continue to be unsatisfied and therefore propose to ‘civilise’ it until total elimination of greed could be achieved.

The departure point, then, should be a re-examination of the values and readjusting the attitude to money, wealth, needs and wants. However there will be a problem here since economists, as scientists, may be reluctant to allow value concerns to enter into their domain. Can the pursuit of wealth be adjusted to value concerns? Are not the money and wealth themselves real values? Are not they desirable ends themselves? There may be many people who think they are ends themselves and reluctant in accepting value concerns in economic matters. In Schumacher’s words: “Economists themselves, like most specialists, normally suffer from a kind of metaphysical blindness, assuming that theirs is a science of absolute and invariable truths without any presuppositions. Some go as far as to claim that economic laws are as free from ‘metaphysics’ or ‘values’ as the law of gravitation.”¹² Observes Dr Leonardo Chapela: “When the western Age of Enlightenment began (XVII century), economics was still a branch of ethics and ethics of theology. All human activities were treated as falling within a single scheme, whose character was determined by the ‘spiritual destiny’ of mankind. The secularization of political thought, which was to be the word for the next two centuries, resulted in a dualism which regarded the secular and religious aspects of life as a parallel and independent province. And later, in the development of the industrial civilization (after the XIX century), the formation of reasons gradually emptied it of its normative contents; this is true of a good deal of modern social theory and thought.”¹³

Man cannot live without values. Normative foundation is an essential aspect of human culture. That is why Field thinks that “We should bring a human-based value philosophy to a value-neutral economic culture.”¹⁴

Modern economics cannot offer any insight in this as it has accepted from the beginning that values cannot solve the problem. Adam Smith, the father of modern economics has admitted that man is incapable of restraining his own passions. He argued the competition will reduce disruptive effects of blind obedience to one's own passions. He was only thinking of keeping price levels down of commodities and not on the benefit of culture and quality of human life. History has proven that value free economics has failed to curb exploitation and selfish men have manipulated the business world to their gain and disaster of others.

Buddhism is very rich in providing insights in this regard. It has provided a way of life based on values derived from a rational and scientific inquiry into reality. Therefore, Buddhist economics or, to be more accurate, Buddhist economic philosophy, should be able to integrate right view with right livelihood in emphasising the importance of living a happy and successful life in a social context. The Buddhist concept of the Middle Way avoids the extremes of self indulgence and self mortification and helps people to generate desirable social consciousness replacing ignorance with knowledge, greed with generosity.

In Buddhist economics, the life goals of sane people are carefully and respectfully identified. As social beings we have to set our goals that could be materialised not depriving or harming our fellow beings. If our goals clash with those of others it is unlikely for any of us to reach them in our life time. Therefore, positive and wholesome attitudes like love, compassion, sympathetic joy must guide our goal orientations if we are to be successful at our pursuance of happiness. An exemplary Buddhist during the time of the Buddha confessed that he had the following as his life goals:

1. Wealth accrued by righteous means.
2. Fame and recognition as a good man among kinsmen and teachers
3. A long life
4. Rebirth in a heaven after death.

This really indicates that wealth earned by righteous means is fundamental to successful lay life. Achieving any of the other goals might be difficult if the first is not achieved. The Buddha considers a man who has no insight on this fact as blind in one eye, the other eye being the insight into morally good and bad actions. One needs to have both eyes to be a perfect person.¹⁵ The Buddha, in fact, approved of these goals and added that in order to realise these goals one has to be

endowed with faith, morality, generosity and wisdom.¹⁶ In contrast to many misrepresentations of Buddhism by some Western writers as a world denying, ascetic religion which lacks the ability to generate development consciousness among the followers, we can notice here the Buddha's recognition of economic goals with due importance.

Poverty, in fact, was never glorified by the Buddha. He even claimed it as suffering for lay people.¹⁷ "Poverty and getting indebted are woeful" he said.¹⁸ Poverty is seen as one of the major reasons for criminal behaviour.¹⁹ The Buddha encouraged people to get rich and live a successful life. He made economic concerns of people stand on a correct footing and gave a new meaning to affluence. The Buddha did not condemn riches but associated with many rich people of the day. He enlightened them of the good things in life and made them humanitarian, religious and positive members of society. Yet we have to emphasise here that Buddhism, even though it advises people to become rich, adds the condition that moral values must guide the means to riches. Even though modern economics have done away with this condition nine out of ten people on the earth today are poor.

The Buddha explained that money or wealth is not in itself a goal. It is a means to a goal. With money people can live and make themselves happy and make others also happy. Happiness, therefore, should never be betrayed for the sake of money. Though he did not consider money as the root of all evil, he pointed at the dangers of misusing it. It can bring degeneration to ascetic life but the proper handling of it can bring blessings to a layman.

Money can bring evil to a lay man only if he pursues money in an unwholesome manner or if he misuses it. So, the Buddha instructs people to handle money and wealth without greed, longing or infatuation, heedful of the dangers and possessed of the insight that sustains spiritual freedom. (*agathito, amucchito, anajjhāpanno, ādinavadassāvi*). The Buddha was not only concerned with how wealth is acquired and the ways in which individuals become attached to it. He has said that wealth destroys the foolish, but not those who search for the real goals of life.²⁰

"There are three ways", the Buddha says, "that people handle their wealth. Some people hoard without spending for one's ease and pleasure, without sharing it with others or spending on meritorious deeds. Some others spend on one's ease and pleasure, without sharing it with others or spending on meritorious deeds. Yet there are people who spend on their ease and pleasure, share with others and spend on meritorious deeds. Even within this group, there are some who, although they do enjoy and

share their wealth, are guilty of heedlessness, infatuation and being blind to salvation, while others are heedful, sane and alive to their salvation". Money and wealth is there for people to use not to hoard and crave.

The Buddha has shown that there are four types of happiness that one can obtain with the proper engagement in economic affairs.

1. *Atthi Sukha* – happiness of being economically successful with wealth accrued by righteous means.
2. *Bhoga Sukha* – happiness of being able to enjoy his wealth with relations, guests and friends while performing religious duties and paying income tax.
3. *Anaṇa Sukha* – happiness of being able live without getting indebted to anyone.
4. *Anavajja Sukha* – happiness generated when one reflects on his immaculate economic conduct where he had not resorted to unjust ways of getting rich.

Thus, it becomes clear that Buddhism encourages people to become rich the right way and enjoy what one has earned according to dhamma. Yet, there may be people who do not get encouragement owing to a misunderstanding of the teaching of kamma. If it is a matter of kamma that we are rich or poor by birth how could one, even with striving, become affluent? This is not a view a Buddhist should adopt since the Buddhist kamma is not a deterministic concept. We can defeat kamma if it is the reason that we are poor. On the other hand, Buddhism never claims that everything is due to past kamma.

There are encouraging stories told by the Buddha on how some people became rich without having a cent to invest except for their intelligence. The main thing that a poor person has to realise is that poverty, as every thing else, is impermanent, and therefore, can be changed. He should never passively accept his poverty ascribing it to kamma or fate. He must realise that in his personality there are elements called *ārabha-dhātu* (element of initiation) and *parakkama dhātu* (element of strength). With such confidence one has to use his intelligence and available resources to wrestle against poverty. The Buddha says, if one possesses the following four endowments one can become economically successful.

1. Industriousness (*uṭṭhāna sampadā*)
2. Watchfulness and conservation (*ārakkha sampadā*)
3. Good friends (*Kalyāṇa mittatā*)
4. Balanced livelihood (*samajīvikatā*)²¹

If one has these at hand, wealth accrues to him as the beehive of industrious bees or anthill of white ants.

One has to choose a rightful occupation, trade or industry and engage in it with diligence. Schumacher remarks: “The Buddhist point of view takes the function of work to be at least triple: to give a man a chance to utilize and develop his faculties; to enable him to overcome his ego-centeredness by joining with other people in a common task; and to bring forth the goods and services needed for a becoming existence...”²² The recommended ways of earning money, according to the Buddhist Suttas, are

1) Agriculture *kasi* 2) Keeping cattle *gorakkha*, 3) State service *rajaporisa* 4) Crafts and Industry *sippaññatara* and 6) Trade *vanijja*. Among trades, however there are types of trades that are not approved, i.e., Selling living beings *satta vanijjā*, selling weapons *sattha vanijja*, Selling poison *visa vanijjā*, Selling meat *mamsa vanijjā*, Selling intoxicants *majja vanijjā*.

In addition to these, four kinds of investments are recommended: 1) *Thavara* (immovable property) 2) *Jangama* (movables like vehicles) 3) *Angasama* (education) 4) *Anugāmika* (that which follow one after his death)

Buddhism has no ‘ceiling and floor’ as such for affluence. It does not mean that Buddhism supports unqualified capitalism. Buddhism encourages righteous people to become as rich as it is possible only in the righteous manner. This automatically sets ceiling and floor and allows every one a good slice of happiness. Enough moral advice is provided to avoid exploitation and dishonesty. Every step is guided with moral consideration and value orientation is introduced both for production and consumption.

When he explains the consumption of wealth one has accrued to himself, the Buddha has seen five advantages in being reasonably affluent. One can make 1) oneself, 2) parents, 3) wife, children and workers, 4) and colleagues happy and joyful and 5) extend generosity to monks and priests (*samana brāhmaṇa*).²³ Elsewhere, (in *Pattakamma-sutta*), the Buddha adds with regard to the category of that one can make happy the first four groups, and that a person should make arrangements to secure himself against misfortunes from such hazards as fire, water, confiscation of property by the king, actions of robbers, or undesirable persons. And also he should make (almost religious) offerings (*bali*) to relatives, guests, departed souls, the king (tax), gods, and extend gifts to

monks and priests. He declares that only if all these duties are properly performed could wealth be said to have ‘seized its opportunity, turned to merit and is fittingly made use of’.²⁴

The ethics of earning and consumption taught in Buddhism aims at making life happy not only for an individual but also for his social contacts; the relations, friends, guests, etc. Buddhist laymen is not selfishly aiming at alleviation of his suffering of poverty only, he thinks of helping others also to come out of suffering and share happiness. “The Buddhist world view” as Field has observed, “is a holistic one; it finds that what relieves our suffering also relieves the suffering of others. By gradually disentangling ourselves from the three poisons and the excesses they bring to our practice of free enterprise, we begin to create a healthier and happier community for ourselves, our business, and society.”²⁵

Buddhism advocates that one has to live a balanced life not becoming either a ‘fig eater’ (*udumbarakkhādika*) or ‘starveling’ (*ajaddhumaraṇa*)²⁶ The fig eaters shake the tree or break the branches and waste a lot of unripe fruit and over consumption and waste of resources is likened to that. On the contrary some people even when they can afford to eat well do not eat as they are stingy. The Buddha advises people not to go into any of the two extremes and live a balanced life. This philosophy of balanced consumption would not only make ethical quality of our life improved but also help our attempt of conserving natural resources which are becoming rare owing to over-consumption and abuse by human beings.

Buddhist Economics may bring back sense into this greed ridden, mismanaged crazy world of business. Says Glen Alexandrine: “What then can a Buddhist economist say personally to a strategic planner? Be idealistic. To be moral, ethical, selfless and giving may take more effort but it can also be ‘good business’. Be rational; keep accounts and calculate. But recognise that no matter how much of a system you take into account there is a greater part that is left out; you are human with many jobs to do and you can do but a percentage of each one.” Buddhist Economics incorporates the values of middle path, compassion and balanced life into the pursuit of economic activity. It reminds us to observe reality in its totality; not to be led solely by our materialist paradigms and prejudices.

Some Sri Lankans recently have shown themselves to be living examples of uncontrolled greed by becoming victims of unscrupulous financial concerns who guaranteed unrealistic interests. They found it a good

means to avoid income tax also. With uncontrolled and immoral greed many people invest in unapproved risky ventures. They were simply lured by bigger interests and the joy of avoiding income tax. If people knew the beauty of the ethics of *appicchatā* and *santuṭṭhitā* they would have been happier to live having their money invested in a tax paying registered firm or a bank. Buddhism encourages investment and savings and the same time teaches it is nothing but right to be righteous and pay income tax,

Three years ago at the Tokyo University, I happened to read an article contributed to Asahi Shim bun (4th April 2009) by David Brooks. Brooks has explained the financial down turn many developed countries experienced as caused by nothing but Greed and Stupidity. He asks “What happened to the global economy?” and explains: “We seemed to be chugging along, enjoying moderate business cycles and unprecedented global growth. All of a sudden, all hell broke loose.” Stating that there are many theories about what happened he says that only two general narratives seem to be gaining prominence, which we may call the greed narrative and the stupidity narrative. Referring to the analysis presented by Simon Johnson in the “The Quiet Coup” Brooks sums up how Wall Street got huge, growing in prestige and political power. “The U.S economy got finance-heavy and finance-mad, and finally collapsed. ...In short ... the U.S financial crisis is a bigger version of the crisis that has afflicted emerging market nations for decades. An oligarchy takes control of the nation. The oligarchs get carried away and build an empire on mountains of debt. The whole things come crashing down.”

Commenting on the second narrative, Brooks writes “The second, and, to me, more persuasive theory revolves around ignorance and uncertainty. The primary problem is not the greed of a giant oligarchy. It is that overconfident bankers did not know what they were doing.” As Jerry Z Muller said “Banks got too big to manage. Instruments got too complex to understand. Too many people were good at math but ignorant of history” All this boils down to the fact that the traders around the world were playing a high stakes game they didn’t understand!

As the Buddha has rightly advised, too much greed must be seen as immoral and needs to be controlled. Problems encountered by many Sri Lankan investors, including monks who claimed to know better the ill effects of greed, are eloquent examples of greed leading to disaster. Ignorance and greed, when together cloud our sense of judgement, does not allow us to practise what we have learned. The present economic tsunami or financial melt down, whatever name you would like to call, it

is good cause for us to rethink the value of Buddhist wisdom in economic conduct.

If a person can acquire their wealth solely by scrupulous means, and if they can manage to derive pleasure from that wealth, while at the same time disbursing their wealth for others and donating it for meritorious work, and also having the insight to see the harm of sense-desire and the importance of extricating oneself from it, this is the *crème-de-la-crème* of wholesome attitudes to economic conduct.

ABBREVIATIONS:

- A *Āṅguttara-nikāya* (PTS Edition)
D *Dīgha-nikāya* (PTS Edition)

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- 6 Schumacher, E.F. *Small Is Still Beautiful* (1973) p.2-4
- 7 *The Straits Times* Sept 08 2011 p.A2
- 8 *The Straits Times* Oct 06 2011 p. A2
- 9 *Na kahapana vassena titti kāmesu vijjati - Dhammapada* vs 251
- 10 *Yāyaṃ tanha ponobhavika* Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta, *Vinaya* I.p.10
- 11 *Dhammapada* verse 204 “*Santuṭṭhi paramam dhanam*”
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- 14 Field, Lloyd M., *Business and the Buddha* (2007 Boston) p.5
- 15 A.I.128
- 16 A II 65
- 17 A.III.350 “*Dāliddiyaṃ Bhikkhave dukkhaṃ lokasmiṃ gihino kāmahogino*”.
- 18 A.III.352
- 19 D.III.68
- 20 Riches ruin only the foolish., not those in quest of the beyond. By craving for riches the witless man ruins himself as well as others. *Dhammapada* 355
- 21 *Vyagghapajja sutta* A.IV.281ff
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Modernity in the Ancient Methods of Resolving Monastic Conflicts: A Study of the *Sāmagāma-sutta*

G. A. Somaratne

The *Sāmagāma-sutta*¹ of the *Majjhima-nikāya* introduces to the early Buddhist monastic community seven methods for resolving their individual and group conflicts, and it is the aim of this article to examine their universal applicability as modern conflict resolution methods. To achieve this aim, Buddhist definitions of conflict and the methods of resolving them will also be highlighted in relation to the modern understandings of conflict and the methods of conflict resolution.

The *sutta* takes into account a conflict that arose among the followers of Jainism after the death of Mahāvīra, the leader, and prepares the Buddhist monastic community not to fall into a similar situation after the death of the Buddha.² As the *sutta* has it, with the death of the leader, a conflict arose among the Jain monastic disciples over doctrine and discipline. Divided and split into two, the disciples had “taken to quarrelling and brawling and were deep in disputes, stabbing each other with verbal daggers.” Seeing this battle, the white-clothed lay disciples became disgusted, dismayed, and disappointed. The news was eventually brought to the Buddha by his disciple Ananda to obtain his vision in order to check similar occurrences in the Buddhist religion with the demise of the Master.³ Being informed, the Buddha inquired from Ananda whether there existed any conflict among his disciples with reference to the fundamental Buddhist teachings. “What do you think, Ananda? These things that I have taught you after directly knowing them – that is, the four foundations of mindfulness, the four right kinds of striving, the four bases for spiritual power, the five faculties, the five powers, the seven enlightenment factors, the Noble Eightfold Path⁴ – do you see even two monks who make differing assertions about these things?” Ananda assured him that there were none with regard to the fundamental teachings. But he cautioned that some monks who lived with a seeming deference towards the Buddha might, after his *parinibbāna*, create conflicts in the community about livelihood and about the disciplinary rules. The Buddha’s reply was: “A dispute about livelihood or about the disciplinary rules would be trifling. But should a dispute arise in the monastic community about the path (*magga*) and the way (*paṭipadā*), such a dispute would be for the harm and unhappiness of many, for the loss, harm, and suffering of gods and humans.” The

Buddha then began to expound the roots of conflicts and the methods for resolving them.

The *Sāmagāma-sutta* highlights six psychological roots of conflict⁵ as follows:

- One who is angry and resentful lives with a root of conflict,
- One who is contemptuous and insolent lives with a root of dispute,
- One who is envious and avaricious lives with a root of dispute,
- One who is deceitful and fraudulent lives with a root of dispute,
- One who is with evil wishes and wrong views lives with a root of dispute,
- One who adheres to one's own views, holds on to them tenaciously, and relinquishes them with difficulty lives with a root of dispute.

Each is discussed with the following stereotyped paragraph:

Such a bhikkhu dwells disrespectful and undeferential towards the Teacher, the teaching, and the community, and he does not fulfill the training. A bhikkhu who dwells disrespectful and undeferential towards the Teacher, the teaching, and the community, and who does not fulfill the training, creates a dispute in the community, which would be for the harm and unhappiness of many, for the loss, harm, and suffering of gods and humans. Now if you see any such root of dispute either in yourselves or externally, you should strive to abandon that same evil root of dispute. And if you do not see any such root of dispute either in yourselves or externally, you should practise in such a way that that same evil root of dispute does not erupt in the future. Thus there is the abandoning of that evil root of dispute; thus there is the non-eruption of that evil root of dispute in the future.

Though given to the monastic community, the modernity and universality of these roots of conflicts could be affirmed when compared with modern conflicts. Where leaders are not respected, where law and order are violated, these roots of conflict are visible. Not being properly dealt with, the roots of conflicts generate major conflicts causing harm and unhappiness to many. Therefore, the Buddha advises, when one sees the roots of conflict in oneself or externally, he should strive to abandon them. When one does not see the roots of conflict either in oneself or

externally, he should practise in such a way the evil roots of conflict do not arise in the future.

‘Conflict’ and ‘dispute’ are used in this article, more or less, synonymously to mean the perception or the actual occurrence of diverging, opposing, competing or incompatible differences between two or more people as well as the unfriendly situations produced when those competing interests damage relationships, or escalate to rights or power based resolutions. In the Buddhist texts conflict, rather dispute and violence, are defined in relation to its opposite, peace. Peace is to live without hate, hostility or enmity; conflict is to live in hate, harming one another, in hostility and enmity.⁶ As a text has it, conflicting parties embrace the badly proclaimed and badly expounded law and order, which is un-emancipating, un-conducive to peace, expounded by those not wise.⁷ The disputants take up clubs and weapons; they fight, quarrel, dispute, insult and slander.⁸ They become inopportune, untruthful, irrelevant, unrighteous and undisciplined. They consider ‘might is right’ (*balavamhi balavattho*). Under false pretext, they inflict suffering upon each other by way of killing, imprisonment, confiscation of property, false accusations, or expulsion. The irony is that both parties of the conflict, though they really do not wish such effects, have to live in sorrow, harassed, un-freed from life’s fret and fever.⁹ As Buddhism perceives, conflicts show the ignorance of the people as they create conflicts, intending to live in peace and happiness. As it is expressed in a sutta, “though people wish to live without hate, harming, hostility, though they wish to live in peace, yet they live in hate, harming one another, hostile, and as enemies”.¹⁰

As implied by the Buddhist texts on morality, a conflict originates and evolves in stages.¹¹ First it arises in the individual’s mind as mental agitation. Then it manifests verbally and grows into a verbal dispute. Finally it turns into a physical fight. Physical violent acts of killing, theft, and rape represent a conflict in the violent stage. Verbal acts of lying, tale-bearing, harsh speech, and foolish babble represent a conflict in the dispute stage. Mental acts of greed, ill-will and wrong views represent the agitation stage of a conflict. A conflict begins in mind, as pointed out in our *sutta* as “roots of conflict”. As worded differently in another text, the elaborated perceptions and notions cause thinking; thinking causes desire; the desire causes liking and disliking; the liking and disliking cause envy and niggardliness; the envy and niggardliness cause conflicts.¹²

From the Buddhist point of view, a conflict is a human creation, a product, something that has given rise to. Both the past and the present

causes, be seen or not be seen now, have contributed, rather have been contributing to the conflict that we attempt to resolve at present. Hence, in conflict resolution, the history and background as well as the present conditionings of the conflict have to be understood. Since a conflict is a conditioned phenomenon, it is subject to impermanence, is unsatisfactory and unsubstantial in its very nature. Hence, a conflict cannot persist in the same way as it began. A conflict that has arisen 25 years ago, for example, if it were to still continue, should definitely be different from its origins.

Buddhist texts view that a conflict has the potential of finding its own solution; but, that natural solution could be disastrous; it could be the total destruction of all stakeholders involved and caught up in the conflict. Both the conflict and the causes that give rise to it are to be reckoned adhamma, unlawful, unrighteous, unjust, and not fitting with the law of peace; they represent the ill intended human interference with the law of dhamma, justice, righteousness, peace. The law of justice that applies to adhamma is that adhamma leads to further adhamma. Being adhamma, a conflict itself is destructive and harmful, if not handled properly, always grows into further clashes. Ultimately, it destroys everyone caught up in the vicious cycle of adhamma. This is the natural solution that will be brought by the dhamma law concerning adhamma.

If we were to stop the disaster caused by a conflict, intervention or mediation is mandatory. Adhamma could be transformed into dhamma by way of practising righteousness. When righteous causes are assembled, the result is dharmic, that is, peace, harmony, justice, and prosperity. But the worldly solution brought to a conflict is also conditioned and carries with it its impermanent and unsubstantial character; hence no permanent solutions to social and global human conflicts are found; as long as humans are born and die in the world of action conflicts will emerge. Therefore, methods of conflict resolutions should always be set in place. As adhamma implies chaos and disorder and dhamma implies order and peace, to bring back the order to the world, an orderly process, a formal method, should be applied. The parties involved in the conflict themselves are the best to resolve their own conflict. But it is unlikely they understand this or know the process to do this, when they are caught up in a conflict. Hence, a mediator must be there to assist them.

As the *Sāmagāma-sutta* records, the following four conflict types are best resolved by way of a formal process (*adhikaraṇa*), to use a broader term, via mediation. The four are:¹³

- Conflict due to a verbal dispute (*vivāda*): A good example for a verbal dispute could be where monks dispute about the doctrine and discipline; such a dispute should be settled by way of a formal process.
- Conflict due to an accusation (*anuvāda*): An example for such a conflict is the occasion where monks accuse another monk of committing a transgression of the monastic rules. Such a conflict should also be resolved through a formal process.
- Conflict due to an offence (*āpatti*): When a monk who has committed a transgression seeks to exonerate himself from it, a formal conflict resolution method should be applied.
- Conflict due to proceedings (*kicca*): The conflicts that take place when enacting formal functions of the monastic community must be resolved through a formal conflict resolution method.

In the modern context, ‘conflict resolution’ stands for a wide range of methods of resolving conflicts and disputes between two parties. Among these methods are the negotiation (self resolution), mediation (third party assistance), arbitration (third party decision making), conciliation (third party proposing a non-binding solution), and diplomacy. In line with these methods, such names as third party, negotiator, mediator, arbitrator, conciliator, and diplomat are used to identify the party who assists in resolving conflicts. It is believed that one who assists people to prevent, manage or resolve conflicts should be impartial, free from conflict of interest, and perform according to the recommended standards of conduct.

Among these methods, mediation is the most popular form of conflict resolution. It is so called because it involves the appointment of a mediator, a neutral and impartial individual who acts as a facilitator assisting the conflicting parties in communicating, essentially negotiating a settlement. The mediator actively assists parties in working towards a negotiated agreement of a dispute, with the parties in ultimate control of the decision to settle the terms of resolution. The presence of a mediator itself is the key distinguishing feature of this process. In addition, mediation has a structure, timetable and dynamics that ordinary negotiation lacks; it is private and confidential. Mediators use various techniques to open, or improve, dialogue between disputants. As such

much depends on the mediator's skill and training. Therefore, mediators are expected to have thorough training, competency, and continuing education.

Mediation differs from arbitration, so does the mediator and the arbitrator. A mediator does not impose a solution on the parties, whereas an arbitrator does. Mediation is a diplomatic procedure whereas arbitration could be considered as a judicial procedure. The parties to the dispute are thus not bound to accept the mediator's recommendation. The mediator thus assists the parties to negotiate their own settlement. In the arbitration process, the parties to a dispute submit their differences to the judgment of an impartial person or group appointed by mutual consent or statutory provision. As such arbitration is the process of resolving a dispute or a grievance outside a court system by presenting it for decision to an impartial third party. Both sides in the dispute usually must agree in advance to the choice of arbitrator and certify that they will abide by the arbitrator's decision. The procedures differ from those used in the courts, especially regarding burden of proof and presentation of evidence. Arbitration avoids costly litigation and offers a relatively speedy resolution as well as privacy for the disputants. The main disadvantage is that setting guidelines is difficult; therefore the outcome is often less predictable than a court decision. Litigation is the process of bringing forward or defending a case before a judge or administrative tribunal.

Conciliation is another form of conflict resolution, and it is neither arbitration nor mediation. In this process, a neutral third-party hears both sides and then issues a non-binding suggested resolution. In other words, the conflicting parties choose an independent third party who hears both sides, either privately or together, and then prepares a compromise which the conciliator believes is a fair disposition of the matter. In some cases, he may express a view on what might be a fair or reasonable settlement, generally where all the parties agree that the mediator may do so. The conciliator's report or conclusions are then put to both sides, who may agree or disagree with it. It is not binding nor is it enforceable unless the parties adopt it. Compared to mediation, conciliation tends to be a more evaluative than facilitative process.

Buddhism has also adopted mediation, conciliation, perhaps also arbitration. Examples could be drawn by examining the discourses of the Buddha and the conflicts in the monastic community where the Buddha and his disciples intervened.¹⁴ Considering these, Buddhist disciples could be considered as the best mediators, facilitators, or conciliators in resolving conflicts. As it is said, Buddhas show the way, it is up to

people to walk along it and find solutions. There is a dhammic responsibility for understanding Buddhists to intervene and to serve as mediators, facilitators and conciliators in resolving conflicts and bringing peace to individuals, families, and communities. For this they should prepare and practice appropriate guidelines (*dhamma-netti*). This is also evident from the *Sāmagāma-sutta*, in which monks are asked to apply their own guidelines prepared in conformity with the dhamma.

The *sutta* presents seven formal conflict resolution methods (*adhikaraṇa-samatha*)¹⁵:

1. Conflict resolution by confrontation
2. Conflict resolution on account of memory
3. Conflict resolution on account of past insanity
4. Conflict resolution by the effecting of acknowledgement of an offence
5. Conflict resolution by the opinion of the majority
6. Conflict resolution by the pronouncement of bad character against someone
7. Conflict resolution by covering over with grass

Model 1: Conflict Resolution by Confrontation

Text:¹⁶

Here bhikkhus are disputing: ‘It is dhamma,’ or ‘It is not dhamma,’ or ‘It is Discipline,’ or ‘It is not Discipline.’¹⁷ Those *bhikkhus* should all meet together in concord. Then, having met together, the guidelines of the dhamma (*dhamma-netti*) should be drawn out. Once the guidelines of the dhamma have been drawn out, that dispute should be settled in a way that accords with them. Such is the conflict resolution by confrontation. And so there comes to be the settlement of some conflicts here by conflict resolution by confrontation (*sammukhā-vinayo*).¹⁸

Modernity:

- ⊙ A conflict takes place between two parties >> Conflicting parties (CPs) meet together in concord >>CPs draw out the guidelines of the Dhamma >> CPs settle the conflict in accordance with the guidelines >>Peace/ conflict resolution is achieved.

Two conflicting parties, who meet in concord, during their initial meetings, draw out the guidelines. Then the conflict should be settled in

accordance with the guidelines. The beauty of this method is that the settlement is arrived at by the conflicting parties themselves. In the modern method of mediation this is emphasized.

Model 2: Conflict Resolution by Majority Opinion

Text:

If those *bhikkhus* cannot settle that conflict in that dwelling place, they should go to a dwelling place where there is a greater number of *bhikkhus*. There they should all meet together in concord. Then, having met together, the guidelines of the Dhamma should be drawn out. Once the guidelines of the Dhamma have been drawn out, the conflict should be settled in a way that accords with them. Such is the opinion of a majority. And so there comes to be the settlement of some conflicts here by the opinion of a majority (*yebhuyyasikā*).

Modernity:

- A conflict takes place between two parties. >> CPs go to a larger third party. >> All meet together in concord. >> All draw out guidelines of the Dhamma. >> All settle the conflict in accordance with the guidelines. >> Peace / conflict resolution is achieved.

In this system, the third party assistant is clearly sought to meet in concord and draw the guidelines. It is also interesting to see that the parties move to a third location to discuss and settle their conflict.

Model 3: Conflict Resolution on Account of Memory

Text:

Here one *bhikkhu* reproves another *bhikkhu* for such and such a grave offence, one involving defeat or bordering on defeat: “Does the venerable one remember having committed such and such a grave offence, one involving defeat or bordering on defeat?” He says: “I do not, friends, remember having committed such and such a grave offence, one involving defeat or bordering on defeat.” In his case conflict resolution on account of memory should be pronounced. Such is the conflict resolution on account of memory. And so there comes to be the settlement of some

conflicts here by conflict resolution on account of memory (*sativinayo*).¹⁹

Modernity:

- ⊙ A conflict takes place between two individuals. >> One accuses another of wrong doing. >> The accused cannot recall any wrong doing due to loss of memory. >> Peace / conflict resolution is achieved.

The settlement is arrived at by directly talking to the other and realizing that he is now normal and used to do things wrong when he was out of mind.

Model 4: Conflict Resolution on Account of Past Insanity

Text:

Here one *bhikkhu* reproves another *bhikkhu* for such and such a grave offence one involving defeat or bordering on defeat: “Does the venerable one remember having committed such and such a grave offence, one involving defeat or bordering on defeat?” He says: “I do not, friends, remember having committed such and such a grave offence, one involving defeat or bordering on defeat.” Despite the denial, the former presses the latter further: Surely the venerable one must know quite well if he remembers having committed such and such a grave offence, one involving defeat or bordering on defeat? He says: I had gone mad, friend, I was out of my mind, and when I was mad I said and did many things improper for a recluse. I do not remember, I was mad when I did that.’ In his case conflict resolution on account of past insanity should be pronounced. Such is the conflict resolution on account of past insanity. And so there comes to be the settlement of some conflicts here by conflict resolution on account of past insanity (*amūlḥavinayo*).

Modernity:

- ⊙ A conflict takes place between two individuals. >> One accuses another of wrong doing. >> The accused cannot recall. >> The accuser presses on. >> The accused confesses his wrong doing is due to his being mad. >> Peace / conflict resolution is arrived at.

As it is evident, this method of conflict resolution is realized when a monk has committed offences due to madness. His madness is determined by considering his inability to recollect his behavior during the period in question.

Model 5: Conflict Resolution by effecting acknowledgement of an offence

Text:

Here a *bhikkhu*, whether reprovved or not reprovved, remembers an offence, reveals it, and discloses it. He should go to a senior *bhikkhu*, and after arranging his robe on one shoulder, he should pay homage at his feet. Then, sitting on his heels, he should raise his hands palms together and say: “Venerable sir, I have committed such and such an offence; I confess it.” The other says: “Do you see?” “Yes, I see.” “Will you practice restraint in the future?” “I will practice restraint in the future.” Such is the effecting of acknowledgement of an offence. And so there comes to be the settlement of some conflicts here by the effecting of acknowledgement of an offence (*paṭiññāta-karaṇaṃ*).

Modernity:

- A conflict takes place within an individual. >> The individual confesses committing an offence to a senior and promises not to commit such offence in future. >> Peace / conflict resolution is achieved.

Buddhism encourages an awareness of conflicts within, and one who confronts such a conflict should seek the help of a mediator.

Model 6: Conflict Resolution by the Pronouncement of Bad Character against someone

Text:

Here one *bhikkhu* reprovves another for such and such a grave offence, one involving defeat or bordering on defeat: “Does the venerable one remember having committed such and such a grave offence, one involving defeat or bordering on defeat?” He says: I do not, friends, remember having committed such and

such a grave offence, one involving defeat or bordering on defeat. Despite the denial, the former presses the latter further: Surely the venerable one must know quite well if he remembers having committed such and such a grave offence, one involving defeat or bordering on defeat? He says: I do not, friends, remember having committed such and such a grave offence, one involving defeat or bordering on defeat; But I remember having committed such and such a minor offence. Despite the denial, the former presses the latter further: Surely the venerable one must know quite well if he remembers having committed such and such a grave offence, one involving defeat or bordering on defeat? He says: Friends, when not asked I acknowledge having committed this minor offence; so when asked, why shouldn't I acknowledge having committed such and such a grave offence, one involving defeat or bordering on defeat? The other says: Friend, if you had not been asked, you would not have acknowledged committing this minor offence; so why, when asked, would you acknowledge having committed such and such a grave offence, one involving defeat or bordering on defeat? Surely the venerable one must know quite well if he remembers having committed such and such a grave offence, one involving defeat or bordering on defeat? He says: I remember, friends, having committed such and such a grave offence, one involving defeat or bordering on defeat. I was joking, I was raving, when I said that I did not remember having committed such and such a grave offence, one involving defeat or bordering on defeat. Such is the pronouncement of bad character against someone. And so there comes to be the settlement of some conflicts here by the pronouncement of bad character against someone (*pāpiyyasikā*).

Modernity:

- ◎ A conflict takes place between two individuals. >> One accuses another for committing an offence. >> The accused first denies; but when pressed he accepts his committing a minor offence. >> When pressed further he accepts having committed a major offence. >> Peace / Conflict resolution is achieved.

It is said that a monk who creates strife and quarrels in the monastic community, who is ignorant and full of offences, or who lives in unbecoming association with householders is to be dealt with by applying this method of conflict resolution.

Model 7: Conflict Resolution by Covering Over with Grass

Text:

Here, when *bhikkhus* have taken to quarreling and brawling and are deep in disputes, they may have said and done many things improper for a recluse. Those *bhikkhus* should all meet together in concord. When they have met together, a wise *bhikkhu* among the *bhikkhus* who side together on the one party should rise from his seat, and after arranging his robe on one shoulder, he should raise his hands, palms together, and call for an enactment of the *Sangha* thus: “Let the venerable *Sangha* hear me. When we took to quarreling and brawling and were deep in disputes, we said and did many things improper for a recluse. If it is approved by the *Sangha*, then for the good of these venerable ones and for my own good, in the midst of the *Sangha* I shall confess, by the method of covering over with grass, any offences of these venerable ones and any offences of my own, except for those which call for serious censure and those connected with the laity.” Then a wise *bhikkhu* among the *bhikkhus* who side together on the other party should rise from his seat, and after arranging his robe on one shoulder, he should raise his hands, palms together, and call for an enactment of the *Sangha* thus: “Let the venerable *Sangha* hear me. When we took to quarreling and brawling and were deep in disputes, we said and did many things improper for a recluse. If it is approved by the *Sangha*, then for the good of these venerable ones and for my own good, in the midst of the *Sangha* I shall confess, by the method of covering over with grass, any offences of these venerable ones and any offences of my own, except for those which call for serious censure and those connected with the laity.” Such is the covering over with grass. And so there comes to be the settlement of some conflicts here by the covering over with grass (*tīṇa-vatthāraka*).

Modernity:

- ◎ CPs meet together in concord. >> A wise person from one party formally requests for the wellbeing of both parties to forget and forgive all wrong doings done by the members of that party during the conflict. >> Similar request comes from the other party. >> Peace / conflict resolution is achieved.

This method of conflict resolution is resorted to when the monastic community has been involved in a dispute in the course of which the monks committed many minor offences. If charges are to be pursued for such minor offences, the conflict might prolong, so the conflicting parties agree to forget and forgive. In this context too, the involvement of a mediator is obvious.

In conclusion, the *sutta* presents six principles of cordiality.²⁰ As it is said, each helps in creating love and respect, and conduces to cohesion, to non-dispute, to concord, and to unity:

1. One maintains bodily acts of loving-kindness both in public and in private towards his companions in the holy life.
2. One maintains verbal acts of loving-kindness both in public and in private toward his companions in the holy life.
3. One maintains mental acts of loving-kindness both in public and in private toward his companions in the holy life.
4. One enjoys things in common with his virtuous companions in the holy life; without making reservations, he shares with them any righteous gain that has been obtained in a righteous way, including even the mere content of his alms bowl.
5. One dwells both in public and in private possessing in common with his companions in the holy life those virtues that are unbroken, untorn, unblemished, unmottled, freeing, praised by the wise, ungrasped, leading to concentration.
6. One dwells both in public and in private possessing in common with his companions in the holy life that view that is noble and emancipating, and leads the one who practices in accordance with it to the complete destruction of suffering.

Those who undertake and maintain these six principles of cordiality, the *sutta* confirms, could endure any course of speech, trivial or gross, which in turn leads to their welfare and happiness for a long time. In such an ideal Buddhist monastic community, we could assume, conflicts will not occur, and conflict resolution methods will not be required. But, in the *Sāmagāma-sutta*, anticipating conflicts to take place in the monastic community in his absence, the Buddha presented the seven methods of conflict resolution, which bear universal applicability and also compatibility with the modern methods of conflict resolution.

NOTES

- ¹ MN II 243—251 (The references given to Pāli texts are those published by PTS).
- ² The opening of the *sutta* is the same as that of the *Pāsādika-sutta* (DN III 117—141).
- ³ It seems that Ānanda was well aware of the dispute that had broken out among the monastic community at Kosambī, see the *Kosambiya-sutta* of the *Majjhima-nikāya*.
- ⁴ These seven sets in early Buddhism, identified in post-canonical Buddhist literature as *bodhipakkhiyā dhammā*, represent the core of the Buddha's teaching. See for the best study on the topic, *The Buddhist Path to Awakening: A Study of the Bodhi-Pakkhiyā Dhammā* by R.M.L. Gethin, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1992.
- ⁵ MN II 245—247.
- ⁶ DN II 276—277.
- ⁷ MN II 243—251.
- ⁸ DN II 58.
- ⁹ AN I 201—202.
- ¹⁰ DN II 276—277.
- ¹¹ This could clearly be seen in the listing of physical, verbal, and mental unwholesome acts.
- ¹² DN II 276—277.
- ¹³ Bhikkhu Bodhi translates the word *adhikaraṇa* as “litigation,” and Horner as “legal questions.” For detailed explanation, see Vin II 88—93. These seven methods are so recognized that they form the last seven rules for the monastic disciples (*pātimokkha*). See C. Prebish, *Monastic Discipline*, Pennsylvania, 1975, pp. 106—109.
- ¹⁴ The *Kinti-sutta* (MN II 238—243) which precedes the *Sāmagāma-sutta* is the best discourse on the Buddhist methods of conflict resolution.
- ¹⁵ See also, Vin II 93—104.
- ¹⁶ Translations of the quoted paragraphs of this article have been either directly or indirectly taken from *The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Majjhima Nikāya*, translated by Bhikkhu Ñānamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, Wisdom Publications, 1995.
- ¹⁷ This evidently comes under the first conflict type whose settlement requires the use of a formal method as introduced here.
- ¹⁸ See also, Vin II 93.
- ¹⁹ See also the discussion at Vin II 80.
- ²⁰ MN II 250—251.

Relational Buddhism: A Psychology of Loving-kindness Carved in Stone at the Borobudur

Maurits G.T. Kwee

This essay discusses the history of The Borobudur and the psychological perspective which unfolds while virtually and actually touring this majestic *stupa*-like pyramidal construction. The Borobudur dates from about the year 800 and is located between two twin volcanoes on Java-island. Its significance is testified by the immense building itself which conveys Javanese Buddhism as revealed by its premier interpreter: Dharmarakshita Suvarnadivpa. It is surmised that the lava-stone “Mahayana wonder” served as a ceremonial place where the Sailendra kings were crowned as *Bodhisattvas* and also, as it does today, a place of pilgrimage for devotion to glorify Buddhism. Definitely, it was and still is an educational centre, an “open university”, and a royal gift to the people. Ascension of The Borobudur can be instrumental in realizing an awakening in one lifetime. Ascending it up to the pinnacle is said to extinguish craving (*Nirvāna*) and to awaken motivation (*absolute bodhicitta*). Descending back to the secular world (*relative bodhicitta*) is said to liberate all beings from the cycle of psychological malaise (*Samsāra*) as one learns to embody and exude loving-kindness in mindful speech. The *Gaṇḍavyūha Sūtra* is carved on The Borobudur’s upper reliefs and apex, exhorting pilgrims to the realization that the formless world is an “empty bubble”. This is a practice-oriented view which goes beyond the *Abhidharma* philosophy in that it depicts a psychology of “Relational Buddhism” wherein meaning and happiness are derived from *interpersonal* care in *intrapersonal* balance. These depictions accentuate the “linguaging” dimension of the Body/Speech/Mind karmic triad, and in this sense they embrace a postmodern social constructionist vista of the Buddhist message, illuminating the emptiness of “Transcendental Truths” and elucidating “Relational-Interbeing in-Between-Non-Selves”. The Borobudur conveys a deep and lasting relational harmony which is achievable through imbibing the interpersonal values and qualities of loving kindness. Loving-kindness itself is

rendered as full of empathic compassion, sympathetic joy, and relational equanimity. This essay also reviews recent social psychological studies which corroborate some of the essence of The Borobudur's spirit.


INTRODUCTION

Javanese Buddhism is relatively unknown by Buddhists around the world because it has been relatively extinct for 10 centuries. Some villages in remote areas have remained Buddhist since the Mahayana heydays on Java island until now (Kustiani, 2010; pers. comm.). Its spirit may live on as long as The Borobudur, the biggest Buddhist structure to date, remains a UNESCO protected heritage. Surfing on the wave of a global revival of interest in Buddhism, there is increasing attention by “newborn” Buddhists in The Borobudur. However, many Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike question what this *mandala*-based pyramid in *stupa*-like form is actually all about.¹ This brings us to the function of this mysterious building which, although built in a *stupa* form, does not contain any relics. Based on the literature and my own research *in situ*, I surmise that the Borobudur was not only a ceremonial site for the dynasty's crowning, but was also a dynasty's gift to the people as an “open university” in the framework of a royal action on the rulers' wholesome Body/Speech/Mind Karma.

The Borobudur, a huge Mahayana Buddhist construction (c.55.000 cubic meters) located near Magelang in Central Java, stems from about the year 800 and was erected between two twin volcanoes: mounts Sundoro and Sumbing in the North West and mounts Merbabu and Merapi in the North East. To be exact, on its 10 floors the lava-stone structure has a tower, 72 *stupas* (domes), 504 Buddha-statues in lotus sitting posture (conspicuously, no reclining or standing statues), and 1460 bas relief story-telling panels. The name “Borobudur” is derived from the Sanskrit “*vihāra*”, meaning sanctuary and pronounced in Javanese as “*biara*” or “*boro*” located on the hill, “*bidur*” or “*budur*”, thus “*borobudur*” and its function has been traditionally designated by the local people as the “mountain of the Bodhisattva's 10 developmental phases”. These phases correspond with the 10 floors of The Borobudur. Thus, one climbs 10 floors corresponding to the 10 perfections of the *Bodhisattva* (Buddha-to-be) as narrated in the *Supreme Crown Sūtra*. On each floor there are relational scenarios of being generous, righteous, forbearing, endeavoring, meditative, wise, skillful, balanced, educated, and awakened. In effect, it emerges that the major function of The Borobudur is both to metaphorically house and to physically illustrate the *Supreme*

Crown Sūtra, so that it seems that this story is cast there in stone to educate visitors in emptiness and loving-kindness through experiencing it as they ascend and descend.

Magnificent parts of the building, panels, statues, and domes have been robbed, damaged or partly damaged by vandals rather than by nature's violence. It was probably abandoned and forgotten around the time of Mt. Merapi's 11th century volcanic eruptions and remained covered until 1814. After locals pointed it out to Sir Thomas Raffles during the short British rule of Java (1811-1816), The Borobudur was freed from a jungle strangle in 45 days by 200 men. Missing parts of The Borobudur can be found, for instance, in a museum in Leiden, Holland, as well as in Thailand. In 1896, King Chulalongkorn was given eight train wagon loads of the finest panels and statues, by the Dutch colonial government (Davisakd Puaksom, 2007).



In the first photograph of The Borobudur, taken in 1873 by Isidore van Kinsbergen,² the antesite structure has, not only a tower, domes, and statues, although this is not as clearly visible, but also circumambulating corridors of more than 5 km long. These corridors are flanked on the left-hand and right-hand side by bas reliefs which are each one meter in height and two meters in width.³ Roughly half of the approximately 3000 panels refer to five Buddhist books, while the other half are meant as embellishment (Soekmono, 1976). At the time of The Borobudur's construction, reading all Buddhist scriptures would have taken more than

a lifetime, if one could in fact read, and it would probably have been an impossible task in any case, as there was no book-printing.⁴

This practical guide, depicted in enchanting scenes, teaches how to nurture the psychological qualities attendant upon and growing out of loving-kindness. They are derived from the following books, considered relevant in Javanese Buddhism: (1) *Karmavibhaṅga Sūtra* (on the working of *kāma* and Karma), (2) *Jātaka Stories* (on the Buddha's lives as a *Bodhisattva*), (3) *Avadāna Stories* (on historical Buddhists' noteworthy deeds), (4) *Lalitavistara Sūtra* (on the unfolding play of the Siddharta's life until awakening), and (5) as alluded to above: the *Gaṇḍavyūha Sūtra*. The first four books are preludes which lead to the last book via a Mahayana "gimmick": instead of discoursing, the Buddha tells the story of Good Wealth. At the end of the *Lalitavistara* the Buddha set the "wheel of teaching" in motion (cf. *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta*) by narrating Sudhana's quest. Like the Tathāgata, Sudhana is a wealthy young prince who, satiated by material luxuries, looks for life's meaning and inner wealth. Seemingly, this kind of seeking by affluent young men is an archetypal pattern in the Buddhist lore throughout Asia during those days. It leaves no doubt that the last book was considered to be the most relevant by the constructors and principals, the ruling kings and queens who also aspired to be adorned as *Bodhisattvas*. Thus it seems that we are actually looking at a huge comic book of Buddhist educational stories.

Story-telling is in line with the narrative tradition of Asia and apparently these stories were so appealing that they were considered worthy of being carved in stone. One third of the panels are dedicated to the last of five books, the *Gaṇḍavyūha* (supreme crown) *Sūtra*,⁵ which is the 39th and final volume of the *Avataṃsaka* (flower adornment) *Sūtra* (Cleary, 1993). The *Supreme Crown Sūtra* is a tale about a young man by the name of Sudhana, an allegorical name meaning "Good Wealth", because he was a descendent of a wealthy noble family. Good Wealth started a quest of "kingliness without and sageliness within" which ended up in the pinnacle of the Buddhist experience: emptiness, to be filled and overflow by the nectar of loving-kindness.

REFLECTING ON BODY/SPEECH/MIND

Practical and accessible guidance for attaining the psychological stages in the karmic domains of Body/Speech/Mind (*kāya/vāk/citta*) are depicted on successive panels, or "books", covering enchanting scenes displaying: (1) lust/pleasure and intentional (inter)action (*kāma* and *karma*), (2) the Buddha's previous lives as a *Bodhisattva*, (3) noteworthy

deeds of renowned Buddhists, (4) Siddharta Gautama's life until he attained Buddhahood (*bodhi*/awakening), and (5) the *Gaṇḍavyūha Sūtra* on Good Wealth's travels toward *Bodhi* guided by "Wisdom" (the cosmic *Bodhisattva* Mañjuśrī) and counseled by 52 other teachers, particularly "Virtue" (the cosmic *Bodhisattva* Samantabhadra) and "Lovingkindness" (the cosmic *Bodhisattva* Maitreya).

Good Wealth learned to meditate to reach the highest goal, which is depicted by his entering the "Tower of Infinite Light", Vairocana Buddha's abode of "emptiness". However, he could only step into it accompanied by Loving-kindness, his "admission ticket", which can only be earned after a long and winding road of self-purification, i.e. *karma* transformation (modifying intention/cognition and action/behaviour) or what we nowadays would call "psychotherapy". Thus, in Buddhist psychological terms, he attained a state free from clinging to illusions of self, free from grasping to delusions of god(s), and free from craving greed and hatred. To this end, ignorance of how the mind works, the ignorance which is the 4 root cause of emotional suffering, needed to be alleviated. Good Wealth went through a process of meeting 53 guru-friends, leading to "full emptiness".

Today, the student who ascends the Borobudur in the footsteps of Good Wealth learns to meditate via the pictorial instructions on the way up. According to the *Supreme Crown Sūtra*, insight into "the empty" is not a goal in itself but a reset point and springboard to improve the practice of the social meditations of loving-kindness, empathic compassion, sympathetic joy, and relational equanimity. Once "liberating emptiness" is understood, one starts on a humane mission to fulfill "*antara-ātman/antarātman*" a term stemming from Javanese Buddhism (Brandes, 1913),⁶ which means "in-between-selves" and which is equivalent to what Thich Nhat Hanh calls "Interbeing" (Thich, 1998), by disseminating these pro-social values and qualities in a descending journey back to the mundane world "in the market place".

Gaṇḍavyūha's Vairocana Tower is the delightful abode of meditative insights into the meaning of the "formless" (*dharmadhātu* or *arūpadhātu*), that is, in the (un)becoming of things in "Dependent Origination", in their ubiquitous and pervasive emptiness (cf. *Mahasuññatā Sutta*), and in the non-obstructive-interpenetrating-interconnectedness of the human race (cf. *Ariya-pariyesana Sutta*). The very essence of these texts repudiates the self and soul which implies a message of non-individuality, that is, that there is no self, there are only provisional selves in interrelatedness. This latter message is readily translatable into "Social Construction", a postmodern offshoot of

mainstream social psychology, whose collaborative practice is poignantly captured by Gergen in his adage "I am linked therefore I am" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenneth_J._Gergen) as an answer to Descartes' view "I think, therefore I am". In effect, *to act* means *to interact* and *to be* means *to be related* and *to inter-be*. The implication of these inspirational ideas will be highlighted below (Kwee, 1990, 2010ab, 2011ab, and Kwee, Gergen, & Koshikawa, 2006).

Each of the carved books adapts to the reader's developmental phase. Thus, the first two books are apt for an elementary level, the third and fourth book for an intermediate level, and the last book, leading up to the summit, for an advanced level. This division corresponds with the three realms of the two lowest floors of body (craving/*kāmadhātu*), the five middle floors of speech (form/*rūpadhātu*), and the three upper floors of domes wherein Buddha statues (formless/*arūpadhātu*) are placed. This threefold arrangement can be traced back to the Buddha's basic teaching on *karma*. The origin of unwholesome *karma* is threefold: greed, hatred, and ignorance (on how the mind works, the illusion of self, and the delusion of god/s). It manifests itself as the intentional/relational action emerging from Dependent Origination and impacting interpersonal relationships. It is a causality hypothesis which needs to be verified/falsified by oneself and which refers to cause and effect in the domains of Body/Speech/Mind (*Kamma Nidāna Sutta*).⁷As *karma*'s effect and cause start and end in and affect Body/Speech/Mind, The Borobudur must somehow reflect this tripartition. Note that the Buddha's tripartite root metaphor of Body/Speech/Mind transcends Descartes' dual mind- body artifact; the inclusion of speech is a reminder that Buddhism strives at lifting the fictive boundaries created by the self-illusion and the soul-delusion to work toward the reality of non-individuality that accompanies the practice of loving-kindness.

ROYAL CONTEXT AND LOCATION

Located on the Kedu plain, The Borobudur is aligned with three other relatively smaller shrines (*candis*, an Indonesian term that might refer to any ancient construction). They are placed on the same plain in one straight line to the East of The Borobudur. As tradition has it, they were connected by a road in the old days. Candi Ngawen is the furthest away from the Borobudur (8 km), the next is Candi Mendut (3 km), and the closest is Candi Pawon (2 km). Candi Ngawen, whose existence was noted in 824 AD, consists of five small shrines, a number which might well allude to the Mahayana "cosmology of five", which is explained below. As two of them have four guarding lion-shapes, it might be surmised that this much destroyed little complex (there is only one



damaged *candi* left) was a formal gate to enter the “educational tour” up to Borobudur’s top. It seems that the Ngawen shrines may have also functioned as a testimony of gratefulness to the donors as evidenced by their images being displayed on the walls (Moens, 1951).

Candi Mendut, which probably already existed in c.750 as a Brahmin shrine, contains three huge statues. In the middle, the historical Buddha Shakyamuni is seated on a chair (in a western way on a chair) with hands in the setting-the-wheel-of-teaching *mudra* (posture). He is flanked on his right hand by the cosmic *Bodhisattva* Avalokiteshvara (Compassion) and on his left hand the cosmic *Bodhisattva* Vajrapani (Joy/Power). These figureheads augur five cosmic (*dhyani*) Buddhas as described in an ancient Javanese Mahayana *tantra* (text), the *Sang Hyang Kamahayanikan Mantrayana*,⁸ which was written in Q&A form and meant to inaugurate the neophyte. It renders The Borobudur’s wisdom. The latest authority it cites is the champion of Buddhist logic and reason Dinnāga (c.480-540, a student of the great Yogacara epistemologist Vasubandhu; c.320-380), who discerned that inference and perception are two different processes and that perception is pure sensation (Eliot, 1921).⁹

Candi Pawon, in the village Bajranalan, is a stop on the way to the Borobudur, as indicated by the Javanese meaning of the word *pawon*, meaning *kitchen*. This function explains why there is only one square

chamber inside which is void, or rather devoid of cooking equipment, and contains a square (washing) basin in the centre. The rectangular small windows were necessary for ventilation when preparing food. It is plausible that it was well used during ceremonies, royal or otherwise, and during other processions. The name of the village, Bajranalan, derives from the word *bajra* which is a corruption of the word *vajra* which might mean thunder, diamond, or adamantine, like in Vajrayana, a vehicle of Buddhism practiced nowadays in the Himalayas, which applies a ritualistic “five pronged teaching tool of wisdom” (known for its being used by the 8th century guru Padmasambhava to conquer the non-Buddhist deities of Tibet). The second part of the village’s word, *analan*, means *flame* or *passion for wisdom*. Unlike in Tibet, the *vajra* was known but not particularly emphasized on Java. The walls of the Pawon *candi* are decorated by the main *Bodhisattva* gurus depicted later on the Borobudur: the guide Wisdom (Mañjuśrī) and the acting teachers, Loving-kindness (Maitreya), and Virtue (Samantabhadra). Other decorations refer to males and females dressed as human *Bodhisattvas*, the royalty known to have built The Borobudur.

The Borobudur was financed by the Sailendra dynasty (c.750-832). The Sailendras were indigenous Javanese rulers. Their name is derived from “mountain” (*caila*) and “king” (*Indra*). The Sailendras, who were Buddhists, co-existed peacefully with the Sanjayas of Mataram, who adhered to Brahmanism and whose King, Panangkaran (reigned in c.746-784), apparently authorized the building (under his aegis) of Buddhist sanctuaries, *candis*, and sculptures on the Kedu plain “in honour of Tara”, revered in Brahmanism as well as in Buddhism.¹⁰ Apparently due to one Bengali Buddhist teacher, highly venerated by Panangkaran, there was a constructing spree around 800 resulting in more than a dozen Buddhist *candis* in Central Java. The Sailendras were rice cultivators as well as seafaring merchants who shared their thalassocratic power with the Srivijaya dynasty from Sumatra. Together they dominated the maritime spice route between China and India, and traded and raided the Malay Peninsula, Cambodia, and SW-Kalimantan. Their ties in matrimony and in Buddhism with the Srivijayas, are evidenced by for instance the similarity of the diadems in Mendut, Pawon, and Palembang on Sumatra island. The Borobudur construction was finished under the reign of the Sailendra King Samaratunga, who reigned over Java until c.832 as well as over Sumatra as a Srivijaya King (c.792-835), because he was married to a Srivijaya princess: Dewi Tara. The Borobudur was probably used to crown them as *Bodhisattvas* and later to celebrate the marriage of their daughter with the Sanjaya Crown Prince, Rakai Pikatan, who toppled his father-in-law on Java and later defeated the Sailendra Prince Balaputra (c.856), who eventually retreated to Sumatra

and succeeded his father as a Srivijaya king in Palembang. The Srivijaya Buddhist dynasty thrived as a great maritime and colonizing power up until the 14th century (Soekmono, 1973).

JAVANESE BUDDHISM

The construction workers of this majestic *candi* which is held together like Lego blocks, were headed by architects led in the beginning by master-mind Gunadharma. Despite his Sanskrit name, he was probably a Javanese indigenous genius. There are many much older *candis* around built in the same peculiar style, so that the architectural skill, even if once imported from India, inevitably has become Javanese by the time The Borobudur was built. Assuming it was built between c.770-840, three to four generations of constructors must have worked on it after Gunadharma.¹¹

The question: “why was The Borobudur constructed in *stupa* form if there were no human remains whatsoever”, lingers on. Small spaces have been found at the centre on two levels reserved for boxes wherein noble metals, treasured seeds, and precious stones were kept, which in the Mahayana lore symbolize Body/Speech/Mind respectively. In a centre-base pit, there was a box with metals and over the pit, in a small room with a crowned statue in a stone superstructure, there was a second box with seeds. Most probably these “symbolic relics” had been used during a *Bodhisattva* coronation, whereby ritually the gems of loving-kindness descended from the highest tower, Vairocana’s Tower, into the boxes imbuing *Bodhisattva*-hood. Considering the royal history, this function was likely to have been used once. Following this, the Buddhist-Brahmin syncretism probably warranted the educational use of the Borobudur until its demise in the 11th century. Whatever function the Borobudur might have served, central to its function is the teaching it reveals, which can be denoted as Javanese Buddhism. The earlier mentioned principal text on Javanese Buddhism, “the devotion of the formless according to the Mantrayana of Mahayana”, explains that Shakyamuni transforms into Loving-kindness (Vairocana Buddha of the Centre), Avalokiteshvara transforms into Compassion (Amitabha Buddha of the West) and Benevolence (Amoghasiddhi Buddha of the North), and Vajrapani transforms into Joy (Akshobhya Buddha of the East) and Equanimity (Ratnasambhava Buddha of the South). This implies that the education is toward the cultivation of these five human values or personality qualities which bring about relatively lasting happiness: *Loving-kindness*, *Compassion*, *Joy*, *Equanimity*, and *Benevolence*. The Mahayana pantheon originated not only these psychological states or traits, but also an extended “cosmology of five”, like Buddhas, *Bodhisattvas*, elements,

colors, senses, hallowed syllables or *mantras*,¹² *skandhas* (psychological modalities of Body/Speech/Mind, sensation, perception, cognition, conation, emotion, and interaction), and so forth.

There are several peculiarities in Javanese Buddhism when it is compared to the Mahayana denominations known in the literature. One peculiarity is that the self-originating and self-emanating primordial principle of the Adhi-Buddha¹³ or Nondual-Advaya is said to bring forth the three conquerors (*jinās*) of the three poisons: greed (conquered by Avalokiteshvara/compassion), hatred (by Vajrapani/joy-power), and ignorance (by Shakyamuni/loving-kindness). These three bodies (*trikāya*)¹⁴ originate the five *dhyani* Buddhas. Secondly, in addition to the types of selves in Mahayana, there are five types of self in Javanese Buddhism. These are: self/*ātman*, low-self/*cetanātman*, higher-self/*parātman*, fluid-self/*nirātman*, and between-selves/*antarātman*. The Javanese Buddhists underscored the meaning of the Sanskrit word *antara* which is “between”, in relation to the word *atman* which means “self”. Thus we have in Javanese Buddhism the concept of “in-between-selves”. This directly highlights the concept of *Inter-being*, a social constructionist idea of particular interest today (Gergen, 2009a). Another peculiarity is that we find the typical Javanese mix of Buddhism and Brahmanism: out of Vairocana springs the Zenith the creating force, Brahma, to the Nadir the annihilating force Shiva, and to the Centre on the same level as Vairocana we meet Vishnu, the maintaining force. This is in line with the Brahmin idea that Shakyamuni is a reincarnation of Vishnu. In this way Buddhism and Brahmanism existed side-by-side on Java for many centuries and eventually became fused into a Buddhist-Brahmin syncretistic system as from the 11th century. Most probably this fusion was a reaction to the Islamic conquest of the island which took place gradually and incessantly, without blood-shed but which gained momentum as from c.1200. This resulted in that in c.1515 the Javanese Brahmin-Buddhist upper class fled to Bali where the syncretistic faith survives to this day (Brandes, 1913).

DHARMARAKSHITA SUVARNADVIPA

Any discussion of Javanese Buddhism is incomplete without going into its practice as disseminated by a widely celebrated 10/11th century eminent prince/guru: Dharmarakshita Suvarnadvipa (an ancient name which means “from Sumatra Island”). Related to the Srivijaya dynasty, he was as much Javanese as Sumatranese, and considering his *bodhicitta* and *karma* teaching, he had the Borobudur that reveres *bodhicitta* (awakened motivation) as his intellectual mainstay. He was a student and scholar at Odantapuri in Bihar, India,¹⁵ who wrote on *karma* (relational

intention/interpersonal action) as a boomerang and on heartfelt *bodhicitta*. Dharmarakshita originated the healing meditation of loving-kindness and compassion by “*terima*” (receiving) and “*kasih*” (offering), known in Tibetan as *tonglen*, which is the contemplative congenial/gluing practice of *antarātman*. This technique, a component of an extensive, seven point mind training toward karmic wholesomeness, is nowadays due to the Tibetan diaspora practised daily world-wide along with the 14th Dalai Lama. Dharmarakshita has been revered up until today in Tibet, where he is called Serlingpa, as the teacher of Dipankara Shrijnana, known as Atisha in Tibet (c.980-1054), who was a Bengali prince/guru. After studying with renowned Indian teachers, Atisha was eventually advised to go to the most outstanding teacher of his time in Palembang, where he arrived after a journey of a year. There he studied with Dharmarakshita and allegedly must also have visited The Borobudur, the pinnacle of *bodhicitta* teaching. At the end of a 12 year stay with his teacher (c.1012-1024), he was encouraged to go to the “land of snows”, which he eventually did in 1039. In Tibet, Atisha became a key figure in four out of the five Tibetan schools, so that Dharmarakshita’s teachings and reputation not only survived, but continued to play a pivotal role for eleven centuries up to this day. Leaving the archipelago, Dharmarakshita gave Dipankara scripts containing the revered teaching on *bodhicitta* with the cardinal message that it should come from deep within the heart.

As a scholar Dharmarakshita reviewed the literature on *bodhicitta* and made it easy to understand by his clear-cut interpretation of the writings of illustrious predecessors, from the Buddha to Shantideva. In fact, the main theme of The Borobudur is *bodhicitta*, the intrinsic motivation to awaken toward Nirvana when ascending the Borobudur in order to benefit all beings who are trapped in the cycle of suffering (*Samsāra*). This benefitting is done during the descent of The Borobudur. The person whose activities are motivated by heartfelt *bodhicitta* is called a *Bodhisattva* whose path is conveyed/depicted on the 10 floors of the Borobudur. As depicted on the outer wall of Pawon, the *Bodhisattva*’s *bodhicitta* is linked to Samantabhadra (who formulates the vow of the virtues/perfections), to Mañjuśrī (who represents wisdom by carrying a sword to root out craving), and to Maitreya (who represents loving-kindness which is conditioned by compassion and joy). In effect, the awakened mind of *bodhicitta* comprises the union of compassion and wisdom, which can be discovered whilst ascending and descending this sanctuary on the mountain.

Ascending the Borobudur, *bodhicitta* is “absolute”; that is, the *Bodhisattva* strives at attaining Nirvana, the extinction of craving, and

the highest of wisdom: emptiness (*śūnyata*) as elucidated in the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra* (“Perfection of Wisdom *Sūtras*“ or its shortened versions: the *Diamond Sūtra* and the *Heart Sūtra*), which was commented on by Nagarjuna in the 2nd century. Descending the Borobudur, *bodhicitta* is “relative”; that is, the *Bodhisattva*, who has realized *antarātman*, loving-kindness in-between-selves, works at saving all beings who suffer due to existence itself (birth, aging, illness, and death) and due to the poisons of greed, hatred, and ignorance. This suffering is by nature psychological and throughout relational/interpersonal in its emanation and manifestation. The combination of relative and absolute *bodhicitta* is a Middle Way, balancing the individual in the context of the social, displayed on one panel as rafting oneself and others to the other shore. Dharmarakshita emphasized heartfelt *bodhicitta* which is a non-manipulative helping by visualizing the people to be saved as one’s mother: her past care is gratefully reciprocated. This is in line with the 10 *Bodhisattva* vows (*Bhadracari*), as depicted on the highest panel walls. Traditionally this boils down to practicing the cherished “Four Social Meditations” the pursuit of which is to immeasurably multiply kindness, compassion, joy, and relational equanimity. These are four divine qualities of experiencing as denoted by its name, the *Brahmaviharas* (where the “gods” dwell), that make the *Bodhisattva* feel “godly” which is different from being or becoming a god: after all Buddhism is non-theistic.

KARMA AS RELATIONALLY INTENDED ACTION

Dharmarakshita (1981) innovated not only the social contemplation of “*terima* and *kasih*”,¹⁶ but also dealt with interpersonal or “relational Karma”. His poetic work “*The sharp blade wheel hitting the enemy’s heart*”, explains how *karma* plays out in interpersonal life as cause and effect. Evidently, it is about Mañjuśrī’s razor sharp sword used to cut off the root of craving in a heart that breeds greed and hatred toward others. By proliferating interactive feelings and thoughts of enmity and being ignorant about the working of relational mind and *karma*, one is one’s own enemy. In effect, what is thrown out in greed or hatred, for example, dumping emotional garbage on the other person, will cut oneself by the other’s reciprocating action. This “boomerang effect” is caused by one’s own unwholesome action, so that the advice is to be mindful of Maitreya’s loving-kindness and Avalokiteshvara’s empathic compassion in order to prevent and abolish the inflammation and escalation of interpersonal pain and suffering, and to instead powerfully install Vajrapani’s reciprocal joy, thus eventually dwelling in happiness. To be sure, the Borobudur is on *karma*: cause and effect as emerging out of and as manifesting qua outcome in Body/Speech/Mind which is embedded in

a network of relationships and thus social psychology has some relevance.

Social psychology aims at explaining how thought, feeling and behaviour are influenced, directly or indirectly, by people within their culture. Research can be quantitative in the laboratory or qualitative as collaborative action in the field and is typically focused on attitudes, social influence, social cognition, and social affect (like greed and hatred). The stance taken here is that the results of quantitative and qualitative studies complement each other. However, rather than viewing language as a mirror of reality, the quantitative project, the present bias from which to view language as a game in the Wittgensteinian sense, i.e. as a form of life. Adhering to the idea that what something “is” depends on one’s approach and to which social group one belongs. Reality is constructed together in ongoing dialogues, negotiations, agreements, comparisons, and so on. Although this premise is simple and straightforward, its impact is far-reaching. It requires re-thinking of virtually everything that has been taken for granted. If reality is socially constructed, (including Buddhism and Social Construction itself) then nothing can be real in, by and of itself. This reasoning corresponds with the Buddhist practice of mindfulness meditation leading to the insight on the nonexistence of inherent existence or self-nature of things (*svabhāva*), which is represented in the *summum bonum* of the Borobudur, the summit of Buddhist wisdom: the baffling emptiness experience of Vairocana’s Tower. In Buddhism, working on decreasing suffering and increasing happiness amidst existential adversity is not a matter of earning merit for an individual ticket to an after-life paradise in the beyond. Instead, and thankfully, it is a matter of making “here now” wholesome choices and engaging in intentional actions which emerge in the context of and within relational meaning which can be designated as karmic.

Such a view of emptiness is in accord with the social psychology of Social Construction as championed by Gergen (2009b) who offers a radical picture of the mind and the human condition which surprisingly coincides with the Buddhist vision as offered by The Borobudur. The mind is “inter-mind”, not located inside the skin behind the eyeballs within the skull in-between the ears, but arising in Dependent Origination¹⁷ in-between people. The result is “Relational Being” (Gergen, 2009a) which corresponds with *antarātman* of Javanese Buddhism as depicted on the Borobudur. Both views appreciate the experience of “Interbeing” as depicted in *Gaṇḍavyūha*’s “Indra’s Jewel Net” as a root metaphor that narrates how people are interrelated and interconnected as gems at each crossing of the net which mirror each

other in infinite mutual interpenetration, thereby merging subject and object in non-duality, which is a 4th century Mahayana practice of the Yogacāra denomination (based on the “Buddha Womb *Sūtras*” that emphasize a *Brahmavihara* filling in of the emptiness expounded in the “Perfection of Wisdom *Sūtras*“ which have left many Buddhist adherents in a *horror vacuum*).

RELATIONAL BUDDHISM

“Relational Buddhism”, the central viewpoint from which the *suttas* and *Sūtras* are interpreted here, is grounded in the axiom that *there is nothing which can be perceived or thought of, conceived and imagined that is not socially constructed*. Relational Buddhism is an amalgam of the practices of Social Construction and Buddhism which share the basic idea that “we can’t share brain, but we can’t but share mind”. It centres round the meta-composite term “Relational Interbeing”, a concept which denotes loving-kindness “in-between-non-selves”, is an advanced state of being that understands the wisdom of emptiness and the futility of “Transcendental Truths” and that is ready to start a journey of descending the Borobudur toward the market place. Derived from the awareness that human beings are interconnected this state suggests that the real, the reasonable, and the good are enshrined in socio-cultural process. All that we know is embedded, not in the bounded mind of the individual, but inter-between vast communal cultures. Mind conceived as “inter-mind” is an intersection of multiple relationships. Before we were born, the socio-cultural was. Thus, individual minds are socialized through participation in the culture one lives by, not the other way around. Thus, the private mind inside the skull full of hidden meanings is not as intimate as one traditionally might assume.

Relational Buddhism proposes that meaning and meaningfulness do not exist in a solipsistic manner but in an acculturated way through a process of co-action. Apparently, what is considered to be separate in the private mind (perception, thought, and affect) arises in interrelationships and is meaningless outside the context of collaborative practice. In effect, although carried out privately, self-talk is only intelligible, even for oneself, as *socialized* speech. This same is true for action: even dancing alone is a social performance. In the same vein one might consider the five hand postures (*mudras*) of “meditation”, “fear-not”, “generosity”, “grounding”, and “teaching” as displayed by the 504 *dhyāni* Buddhas of the Borobudur as making the relational, which inhere in these qualities, explicit in their depiction. As the Borobudur is traversed, one questions the affective states inside the individual heads and bodies and one asks what can be done to overcome greed and hatred. Having located the

origin of meaning in interpersonal exchange, one discovers that emotions are not solely bodily reactions belonging to the private domain but instead are components of the relational. This implies a shift in experiencing “my” act of kindness, compassion, joy, and equanimity into “our” activity for the betterment of us all. The understanding and transformation of greed or hatred is enlarged, when the view from a “natural given” of these affective states is translated into scenarios of interpersonal interaction. Sudhana’s quest, which comprises meetings with 53 guru-friends, is basically a narrative of such transformative relationships and of dialogues that deliver.

Speech is the third Buddhist assignment in the “8-Fold Balancing Practice”, a practice that walks the talk toward balanced views, intentions, *speech*, actions, living, effort, awareness, and attention. Taking into consideration the striking correspondence of Social Construction and Buddhism, the rendering of Relational Buddhism is obvious and not farfetched. By discarding “Transcendental Truths”, Relational Buddhism is not a belief system whatsoever, but an invitation to dialogue ways of understanding which coincides with the Buddhist charter of free inquiry as delineated in the *Kālāma Sutta*.

THE SPIRIT OF FREE INQUIRY

Relational Buddhism includes evidence-based psychological research which informs practice. Interestingly, some of the concepts, values and qualities highlighted on The Borobudur’s depictions are recently the subject of social psychological research. Illustrative is that “intentional activity” was re-discovered in “Positive Psychology” (Lyubomirsky, 2008), apparently without being aware of the Buddhist meaning of Karma. Evidence was found that sustainable happiness is determined by a genetic set-point (50%), circumstantial factors (10%), and intentional activity (40%) (Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, & Schkade, 2005). Human beings are equipped by an idiosyncratic genetic set-point like for weight or length, which is hardly modifiable. People with high set-points will find it easier to be happy; people with low set-points will have to work harder to achieve or maintain happiness under similar conditions. Happy people do not just sit around being happy but make things happen. This activity spins off a by-product which is happiness over and above the genetic set range and life circumstances. Long term overall circumstances include demographic data (age, health, education, money, country, religion, and marital status).

Two studies have been conducted specifically on loving-kindness. The first study (Fredrickson, Cohn, Coffey, Pek, & Finkel, 2008) was a

longitudinal field experiment with working adults (n=139) randomly assigned to either a wait-list control condition or to beg in an hour or so a week of loving-kindness meditation which cultivates warmth and caring for self and others. Evidently, this meditation practice had a gradual and cumulative positive effect on people's experiencing of positive emotions. This resulted in building on a wide range of personal resources (e.g. increased mindfulness and awareness, stronger sense of purpose in life, increased positive relations with other people, and decreased illness symptoms). These increments predicted increased life satisfaction and reduction in depression. A second study on loving-kindness examined whether the fundamental human motive of social connection could be engendered toward strangers in a controlled laboratory setting (Hutcherson, Seppala, & Gross 2008). A few minutes of self-engendered loving-kindness increased feelings of social connectivity/positivity toward unknown people. These studies show that brief practice of an easily implemented meditation is helpful for increasing positive social affect and for decreasing irrational feelings of isolation.

A number of recent studies touch upon the human interdependence and unconditional happiness aspects of the Buddhist experience. In one study (Jaremka, Gabriel, & Cavallo, 2010) compelling evidence was found that people's best and worst moments occur within relationships. It is the interaction with other people and the fulfillment of social connection rather than the individual accomplishment, the award, or the completion of a task, which marks life's ups or downs. People feel best in sharing success and feel worst when failing in the presence of others. Evidently, social networks shape lives and lifestyles, whether obesity or smoking. Moreover: happiness is contagious. Another study (Christakis & Fowler, 2009) reported that each happy friend increases the likelihood of happiness by 9% and each unhappy friend decreases it by 7%. Finally, Kahneman and Deaton (2010) analyzed the Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index (GHWBI) reports from 450,000 US residents to discover that money buys happiness only to a certain degree. Happiness or emotional well-being refers to experiences of joy, fascination, anxiety, sadness, anger, stress, worry, and affection that make life un/pleasant. In effect, more money does not necessarily buy more happiness, but less money is associated with emotional suffering. The happiness threshold in 2008 was \$75,000, \$3,500 more than the median household income. Above this, income no longer improves one's ability to do what matters most to happiness, that is, spend time with people one likes, avoid pain and disease, and enjoy leisure.



IN CLOSING

The Buddhist way of life as modeled in the Buddha's life story and as narrated in the Borobudur's allegory of Good Wealth, provides us with an archetypal template illustrating that leading an affluent life paves the way to entering a quest for life's meaning. Living in relative comfort, or even perhaps in "princely" circumstances, middle class people all over the world are in principle ready to seek and learn what life is about and to start on a profound inner journey of discovery. Travelling the Borobudur might be helpful for Buddhists, and for everyone, to comprehensively find what they seek, as the record expectantly shows in this article. It has been a long journey up and down The Borobudur from ascending in the awe of accumulating wonderful AHA-insights, reaching a reset point of emptiness, and descending in the contentment of HAHA-joyfulness while acquiring *bodhicitta*, a specialty of Javanese Buddhism. All of these provide a springboard to leap onto Relational Buddhism. Eventually, the journey has been one of discovery via postmodern Social Construction and social psychological research. In effect it is an attempt to narrow a gap of the Buddhist approach to human experience lasting some 1200 years during which no-one has a claim or mandate on "Transcendental Truths" and emptiness is still considered to be the highest wisdom, a reset point, and starting block to disseminate loving-kindness from deep inside. Adhering to the message of The Borobudur,

Relational Buddhism submits that sustainable happiness amidst adversity is largely an interpersonal equilibrating experience “within” and an epiphenomenon of harmonious relationships “without”.

Buddhist wisdom, savvy, and sagacity necessitate us to adhere to the relational scenarios of being genuinely kind, compassionate, and joyful in a mutually balanced togetherness. In effect, this is realizing harmony “in-between-selves” in the pursuit of gluing relationships. Individuals do not exist independently from one another, but instead rely on interconnectedness and interdependence for their very survival.

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SCRIPTURES

www.metta.lk (*suttas*) and www.e-sangha.com (*Sūtras*).

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NOTES

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- ¹ A *mandala* is geometrical sacred form consisting of circles and squares and a *stupa* is usually a dome- or mound-like structure containing a relic (Wayman, 1981). The first two floors (the foot, hidden for constructional purposes) represent the sphere of lust (*kāmadātu*), the next four floors, square platforms, represent the sphere of form (*rūpadhātu*), and the last four floors, three circular platforms plus the main dome, represent the sphere of the formless (*arūpadhātu*).
- ² Copyrights of the three photographs in this essay are expired.
- ³ This allows *parikrama* devotional circumambulating meditation around the centre of the *maṇḍala* which symbolizes the mythical Mt. Meru.
- ⁴ Mahayana scriptures plus the associated ancient commentaries are about 50 times the Bible in length, being approximately 62,000 pages.
- ⁵ The *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* consists of 39 relatively separate books most probably written in the year 0 until the end of the 4th century and compiled in Central Asia where Gandhāra sculptural art flourished.
- ⁶ It is noteworthy to mention that a Mahayana variant of Buddhism entered Sumatra and Java as from the early 5th century, while Brahmanism was already there for two centuries. Despite contrary speculation, there is no evidence that Theravada Buddhism had a strong presence on these islands. Furthermore, it is plausible that Mahayana came from ancient India (Kalinga and Bengal) and Cambodia, via the trade route to Sumatra and Java. A prince/guru from Kashmir, Gunavarman (367-431), was recorded in Chinese annals to have stayed and spread Buddhism on Sumatra and Java, perhaps for two decades, until 424 when he started a mission to China on imperial invitation (Zürcher, 1972).
- ⁷ These happen to be the subjects of study in 21st century “biopsychosocial” science and practice. The body, particularly the connection between brain and behaviour, is the subject matter of neuropsychology. The connection of unwholesome perception/thought/feeling/interaction and behaviour is accentuated in clinical psychology, while the connection of speech and interpersonal behaviour is attended to in social psychology and its exponent: Social Construction.
- ⁸ This Javanese title refers to the “dedication of” (*Sang* or *semba*) “the unseen/formless” (*Hyangor hilang*) “as in the *Mahayanistic Mantrayana*”; Brandes (1913) listed other Javanese Buddhist works: the *Sutasoma*, *Vighnotsava*, *Kunjarakarna*, and *Buddhapamutus*, which do not differ from pre-tantric Mahayana as known in India.

Neither the Borobudur, nor the *Kamahayanikan* conveys the tantric use of “sexual images” for meditation suggesting that Javanese Buddhism stems from an early Vajrayana period, which in India was in c.600-700.

- ⁹ Dignaga was the before last of the great Buddhist thinkers. No reference was made to the last great Buddhist thinker, the 7th century epistemologist/cognitivist Dharmakirti (c.600-660), who wrote extensively on valid/non-valid (*de facto*: rational/irrational) cognitions. This seems to imply that Javanese Buddhism did not tap from this latest development.
- ¹⁰ While the Brahmin Tara represents a deity (wisdom star), the Buddhist Tara is a cosmic *Bodhisattva* who is a transformation of Avalokiteshvara’s tears of compassion: she is able to hear the cries of everybody who suffers and she may appear in the five cosmic colours representing a variety of virtues and actions leading to liberation.
- ¹¹ According to experts, the Borobudur influenced Angkor Wat, built 300 years later; also one might want to bear in mind that the Borobudur was erected 300 years before the European cathedrals were built.
- ¹² Evidently, *mantras* are of great importance in a Mahayana variety called Mantrayana which emphasizes the use of *mantras* during meditation; the sacred sound of Java is “aah”.
- ¹³ To adhere to Indonesian constitution that warrants freedom of religion, present-day Buddhists in Indonesia, among whom indigenous adherents who for centuries (or maybe for about a millennium) live in several Buddhist villages on Java, elevate the Adhi-Buddha as their creator-god (Kustiani, 2010; pers. comm.).
- ¹⁴ *Kamahayanikan*’*strikāya* is reflected in the Body/Speech/Mind triad: body-craving (*dharmakāya*), speech form (*sambhogakāya*), and mind-formless (*nirmānakāya*).
- ¹⁵ Odantapuri is the second oldest Buddhist educational centre (as from the 7th century) neighbouring the famous Nalanda on the Indian subcontinent. It could accommodate 1000 students among whom many Tibetan scholars. Many Vajrayana texts were composed there. Unfortunately it was destroyed by Muslim invaders in c.1193.
- ¹⁶ Log on to www.taosinstitute.net/manuscripts-for-downloading
- ¹⁷ Dependent Origination is the Buddha’s causality hypothesis that describes the arising and ceasing of Karma triggered by craving and traversing through Body/Speech/Mind (by sensing/feeling, thinking, conating, emoting, and interacting) resulting in grasping and clinging (cf. *Paṭicca-samuppāda Vibhaṅga Sutta*).

Economic Management: An Interpretation from the Buddhist Perspective

Arvind Kumar Singh

“Buddhist Economics” is a model that supports the conventional forces and a free market and competition without destroying either nature or a human society. The world today is in a state of turmoil; valuable ethics are being upturned. The forces of materialistic skepticism have turned their dissecting blades on the traditional concepts of what are considered humane qualities. According to Buddhism, wealth is not evil. The important thing is how it is made and used. Yet, even if wealth is made in a moral way, and used to benefit oneself and others, one should not have a greedy attitude towards it. For Buddhism, the true wealth is not necessarily money in the bank, real estate, dwellings, gold, or silver, all of which are prey to rulers, thieves, flood, fire, and wasteful children. True wealth is the *dhamma*, faith, compassion, satisfaction, joy, modesty, satisfactory personal relations, safety, health, wisdom, determination to strive for enlightenment, and the liberation of all sentient beings. From this point of view Economic Management is considered as an important strategy for ensuring a good standard of living for all beings in the present world scenario and the aim of Buddhism is to achieve emancipation from *samsaric* existence by realizing Nibbāna. In this proposed paper, I try to highlight the meaning of wealth, economics and management in the light of Buddha’s teachings in the present world situation through many of his *sutta-[s]* which can be called the Buddhist philosophy of economic management and material success.

Economic Management is considered as an important strategy for ensuring a good standard of living for all beings in the present world scenario. The aim of Buddhism is to achieve emancipation from *samsaric* existence by realizing *Nibbāna*. Therefore, Buddhism is mainly meant for those who have given up all worldly possessions and attachments and become recluses (*śramaṇas*). The Buddha was not interested very much in secular affairs like economics and polity. But the aspirations of the lay community were different from that of monks who did not want to realize *Nibbāna* in this life and who wanted to have material success, happy life, economic development, family management

and so forth in this life and in the life to come. When they visited the Buddha they indicated their household problems and wanted to have some advice conducive to material development rather than spiritual. In this respect the Buddha preached many *sutta-[s]* to them in the form of ethics. The contents of these *Sutta-[s]* can be called the Buddhist philosophy of economic management and material success.

The Pāli term for management is *sanvidhāna*. In the *Vyāghhapajja-sutta* of the *Aṅguttara-nikāya*, *sanvidhātuṃ* is used in the sense of the economic management whereas *sanvidhāhati* means systematic and proper management of the economic system. It is preceded by *ālaṃkātuṃ* (capable of doing). Other words very closely related to *sanvidhātuṃ* are *dakkho* (clever and efficient) and *analo* (diligent). All these words are used in Pāli texts in the sense of management.¹ The Pāli term for profession or livelihood is *kammaṭṭhāna* or *kammanta*, which literally means industry.²

The term *economy* connotes the management and administration of the material resources of the individual, community and country.³ Economics is the science of household management.⁴ Buddhism being primarily a religion that emphasizes emancipation from *samsāric* existence as such, the Buddha did not deal very much with secular affairs. Therefore, we do not find much emphasis laid on systematic financial management. However, there are some discourses delivered by the Buddha to lay people in the form of ethics which entails the management of household, earnings, expenditure and other secular affairs.⁵

The standard of living in modern economics is measured on the basis of annual consumption. The disciplined or moderate consumption is considered to be good in Buddhist economics which is known as *appicchatā* (desiring little). But in the present world economic scenario, if we go by the philosophy of moderate consumption then economic growth will become slow and create economic recession. Probably the Buddha did not think in term of economic growth and may have thought in terms of management of income and expenditure as an art of happy living. The Buddha advised people to balance income and expenditure. In other words, one should not spend more than what one earns.⁶ In addition, the Buddha recommended simple living and high thinking (*sallahukavutti*)⁷ for both monks and lay people. The foundation of Buddhist economics is the Middle Way (*Majjhimāpaṭipadā*) which is the doctrine of maintaining a delicate balance between eschatology and utopia. The term *Middle Path* has been used by the Buddha in a wider connotation which covers the whole gamut of human life i.e. mundane,

supra-mundane and spiritual. The Buddha always advised his disciples to be contented with the minimum, it is an important principle of monastic as well as household economic management.

With regard to necessities like the four requisites, the Buddha recommended a very simple way of management for the Saṅgha. There was already an established way of living followed by other *śramaṇas* (recluses) in India during the sixth century BCE. The Buddha thought that the existing scheme was the best and the model for the Saṅgha. The philosophy behind this practice of management is that the Saṅgha should not become a burden to anybody in society. As homeless wanderers, they had no practice of collecting material things and had to subsist on food collected from house to house and to wear robes made of cloths picked up from charnel grounds and heaps of dust. Monks slept under trees, in caves forests and assembly halls and took medicine prepared with cow urine and herbs.⁸

The economic philosophy behind this management is that Saṅgha should not depend too much on lay community for food, clothes and other necessities. In this respect, the Buddha took into consideration the bee theory. The *Bee theory means that when a bee is sucking honey from a flower it does not hurt the flower*. Likewise, the Saṅgha is expected to receive a little food from a house when they go for alms. This practice was not a burden to lay people. Regarding shelter, they did not like to depend on anybody, as there were plenty of trees.⁹ When the Saṅgha evolved from original asceticism into a monastic system, this practice was modified. They were allowed to accept food, clothing, shelter and medicine offered to them by lay people as additional gains. The Buddha advised Saṅgha to reflect and retrospect often that the life of monks (*Bhikkhus*) is dependent on others in society.¹⁰ The Buddha had to accept invitations for alms by lay community. Moreover, he had to accept robes prepared by lay people and monasteries and medicine offered by them. The Buddha said that these are additional gains.¹¹ Regarding food the *Saṅgha* even today in countries like Sri Lanka, Thailand, Burma, Laos and Cambodia follows these practices. In later ascetic practices (*Dhutaṅga*) monks, who observed going for alms round for food for lifetime, did not accept invitation¹² as they did not want to break their firm commitment to the special *Dhutaṅga* (ascetic) practice.

In the management of robes, the Buddha very clearly mentioned that Saṅgha should follow the practice of wearing robes made up of cast off soiled cloths. The management principle followed in this regard is that of moderate consumption. It is a very pragmatic principle with regard to the Buddhist Saṅgha community. If the robes are more than what is required,

the Saṅgha should return them to storage. When the problem of disposing of old robes came up, the Buddha had a naive idea of recycling old and unwearable robes (*cīvara*). The Buddha advised monks to make bed covers, pillowcases, foot towels, floor mops and finally it should be mixed with mud and use the mixture to plaster the walls of their cells (*kūṭī*). In this respect, the economic principle introduced by the Buddha is the maximum utility of consumer goods and recycling.¹³

In the community of the Saṅgha there was no ownership. The Buddha very well understood that ownership creates many problems like hindrances to spiritual development, such as less time for meditation and other spiritual pursuits. This practice is very much closer to the socialist and communist system of common property and non-ownership. Monasteries and properties were dedicated to the whole body of the Saṅgha. This is an early ideal of common property system in the Saṅgha. The Saṅgha has no problem in this respect. The Buddha thought that Saṅgha should not fight over properties.¹⁴

Right action is the fourth factor of the *Noble Eightfold Path* (*Aṭṭhaṅgikomaṅga*) where it is recommended for both the Buddhist order of monks as well as the lay community. Right action indicates that there is a kind of management of one's physical actions. Right livelihood (*Sammāājīva*) is the fifth factor of the *Noble Eightfold Path* which stands for the renunciants' ideal of striving for the realization of *Nibbāna*. It is a basic requirement for both lay as well as monks to pursue an honest and harmless livelihood. Selling animals, humans, drugs, liquor, toxic substances etc., are considered unethical in Buddhism. Therefore, some Buddhist economic principles cannot be accommodated in modern economics as they clash with modern economic theories. This means that one has to give up wrong action and livelihood.¹⁵

Labour (*kammanta*) is the key factor of economic development. In the case of the Buddhist Saṅgha refraining from what is not appropriate for renunciants is the management of their life style as required by the community of the Saṅgha called restraint (*samyama*). A lengthy exposition of management of one's life under *sīla* is found in the *Sīlakkhandhavagga* of the *Dīgha-nikāya*.¹⁶ The function of *sīla* is to manage one's behavior. Therefore, *sīla* can be considered as consisting of Buddhist management principles recommended for both monks and laity.

Another important factor of management is *sallahukavutti*¹⁷ means to live a life of simplicity, which is recommended for both monks as well as lay community. For monks as well as lay people, being *subhara* (easily manageable) and *santussaka*¹⁸ (satisfied with the minimum) is an

important factor of management of their lives. Buddhist economic philosophy advises people not to go for too much material gains as it generates many problems like suffering and unsatisfactoriness (*Dukkha*). Suffering (*Dukkha*) is the *First Noble Truth* expounded by the Buddha in his first sermon (*Turning of the wheel or Dhammacakkapavattana-sutta*) delivered to the group of five ascetics (*Pancavaggiyabhikkhū*). It is very important to be simple and satisfied with the minimum and try to manage life with minimum necessities (*Santussako*).

In Buddhist economics, the Buddha has not mentioned the two basic economic factors of supply and demand. Both supply and demand are key factors of modern economics that control the economy of any country. If the production and supply are low and the demand is high, this will create economic chaos. It will lead to an economic recession, inflation, rationing, price control, black market, etc. It is to be noted here that during the time of the Buddha probably there was no short supply of goods unless of course the country was affected by a famine.

In the *Jātaka* stories we read of a well-organized practice of trade by caravans. Merchants used to go to remote cities to sell their merchandises in groups of *caravans*.¹⁹ According to the *Jātakas*, some of these *caravans* included five hundred carts full of merchandise, food, water and other necessary requisites for the group of merchants travelling along desert routes for several weeks. Even though these stories do not record systematic economic theories, we can derive from them some elements pertaining to economic principles. For example, the *Apannaka-Jātaka*, which explains primarily of price determination of merchandise. In this respect modern economic theories of pricing like cost of production, cost of marketing and so forth are not taken into consideration. The strategy of pricing in this episode depends upon the merchant's free choice and business ethics. The *Bodhisattva* who was a merchant in one of his previous lives let his friend go first to sell his merchandise after seeing many advantages of going later. The one who goes first has to determine the price of his merchandise. So the person who goes later has no problem of pricing them as the first person had already priced them. Depending on those guidelines of pricing the person who goes later can sell his items.²⁰

According to Buddhist economic ethics, it is not right to bargain over merchandise when buying. The Buddha considered it as a kind of exploitation that is unethical. If the buyer is offering a very low price for an item, which is costly, he is deviating from economic ethics. The *Serivānija-Jātaka*²¹ records such an incident where a merchant went to a house of an old woman and her granddaughter to trade bangles in exchange for a gold vessel. The merchant offered the lowest possible

price to the old woman who refused the offer and went away. The second merchant came and gave a handsome price for the gold vessel. From this transaction, what we learn is that people should not exploit customers ruthlessly. The Buddha always talked about fair deals.

According to Buddhism, there are no hereditary classes or castes and the economic factor of it is the division of labour. The *Aggañña-sutta* of the *Dīgha-nikāya* says that at an early stage how human beings divided labour into four categories based on specialization.²² In production, it is very important to make use of one's specialization. In this respect, many factors like efficiency, quality control and so forth are taken into consideration. The basic theory of the division of labour is to utilize one's skill properly and meaningfully to produce and market a quality product. Very early in the history of humankind, people were accustomed to the usefulness of this practice of specialization.²³ In the *Vāsettha-sutta* of the *Sutta-nipāta*, *kamma* means profession or livelihood and in this context, there is no ethical or metaphysical implication. The Buddha said that due to *kamma* one becomes a farmer (*kassakohotikammanā*). In addition, one becomes a soldier due to his *kamma* or profession (*yodhajivopikamma*).²⁴ This indicates a kind of specialization. The person who is a farmer by profession is a specialist in agriculture. He knows very well the rainy season, the science of seeds, how to plough and to get the maximum possible harvest. This *Sutta* mentions a long list of professions pursued by people during the time of the Buddha. It is an old practice to give a second identity to a person depending on the vocation followed by him. We can see this practice still existing in some societies in the world even today. In the *Majjhima-nikāya*, a person called Ganakamoggallāna was very popular as an accountant. The name is the second identity given to him by society due to his specialization. Likewise, there were many specializations mentioned by the Buddha in the *Vāsettha-sutta* of the *Sutta-nipāta*.²⁵

The Buddha did not talk about economic prosperity in relation to large scale production and distribution. Moreover, he did not have a pessimistic attitude to one's material prosperity acquired through righteous means (*dhammena*). The Buddha had two different schemes for laity and monks. Monks who gave up everything in order to become recluses did not derive happiness from material gains. Their happiness was derived from mental development. On the other hand, the lay community derived happiness from material prosperity. The Buddha was not against material success of lay people even though he emphatically said that life is suffering and unsatisfactory.²⁶ The Buddha was of the view that happiness is one of the byproducts of material success which is different from spiritual happiness. But the Buddha also emphasized that

both material as well as spiritual development are necessary factors of human life.

The Buddha talks about four kinds of happiness derived from material endeavors: *Atthi-sukha* (happiness of ownership), *Bhoga-sukha* (happiness of being prosperous), *Anaṇa-sukha* (happiness of being debtless) and *Anavajja-sukha* (happiness of being blameless).²⁷ According to Buddhist management principles, one should not overspend what he has earned and be able to balance the income and expenditure. The householder does not enjoy his wealth by himself. He spends money on charity and does meritorious deeds, charitable works, etc. One enjoys and receives happiness and satisfaction out of philanthropic work. One also derives happiness and satisfaction being debtless and blameless and he does not follow blameworthy means of earning money.

The *Sigālovāda-sutta* of the *Dīgha-nikāya*²⁸ presents extremely valuable principles of economic management which explains many ways of dissipation of wealth due to overindulgence in drinking, gambling, frequenting streets at night, music, singing and idleness. In order to safeguard the wealth one has to get rid of these vices. In the context of management of economy, the Buddha has pointed out four important management principles: diligence (*utthānasampadā*), safeguarding what has been earned (*ārakkhasampadā*), association with good companions and friends (*kalyānamittatā*) and balancing of income and expenditure (*samajīvikatā*). In addition to these principles, the economic management has been expounded by the Buddha in relation to the individual and family in the form of ethics through the *Sigālovāda-sutta*. In this *sutta*, family includes parents, householder, his wife, children, servants and work people. This is a kind of joint family, in which at least three generations used to live in harmony and happiness. Management of this household has been explained in the form of reciprocal ethics. It has been clearly pointed out by the Buddha that for a smooth running of society these duties and obligations have to be observed properly. If the social system collapses completely, then there will be chaos and anarchy. This has been clarified in the simile of the pins of a cart. As long as wheels of a cart are secured by pins, the cart can run. If the pins are not placed properly, the cart cannot run and will collapse.²⁹

The management ethics in the *Sigālovāda-sutta* has been presented in the form of duty and obligation. Each member of a family has a definite role to play which has been defined in relation to other members of the family. Taking the householder as the key figure of the family the Buddha clarified the relationship between members of the family and the householder. The householder is the son in relation to his parents,

husband in relation to wife, father in relation to his children and master in relation to his work people. In relation to teachers, the householder is a student (*antevāsika*). In relation to neighbors, he is a neighbor and friend (*Mittā-maccā*). In relation to religious teachers (*Samāna* and *Brāhmaṇa*) he is a devotee.³⁰ For better management of life, one should perform his/her duties and obligations to parents, teachers, and children, wife, friends, neighbors, servants and religious teachers. *Sigālovada-sutta* presents some management principles with regard to family in the form of ethics. Taken the householder as the central figure of the family these ethical principles have been expounded by the Buddha. The relationship between husband and wife should be amiable and courteous. The wife should be treated by husband with respect and honor and should be faithful to her. This is the key element in family management according to Buddhism. She should be well looked after by providing necessary requisites such as clothes, jewelry and so forth. She should be granted the authority to manage household affairs. Husband is the bread earner of the family and wife is the one who manages the house. He should not despise her. The Buddha mentioned that wife is the closest friend of the husband,³¹ advisor and helper in household management. Manu mentions that '*mutual fidelity till death is the essence of the highest dharma for the husband and wife*'. Manu further says that *a man's half is the wife; wife is husband's best friend; she is source of dharma, artha, kāma and also mokṣa*. In Buddhist texts, also we find similar ideas regarding the relationship of wife and husband. According to the *sutta* there are five principles of family management pertaining to the duties of a wife: Systematic management of household (*Susanvihitakammanta*), caring treatment of house hold work people and servants (*Sañgahītaparijanā*), faithfulness to husband (*Anaticārinī*), taking care of what is brought by husband (*Saūbhataūcānurakkhati*) and cleverness and diligence in household affairs (*Dakkhā ca hoti analasā sabbakiccesu*)³². Both husband and wife do manage family members, servants and work people.

In the management of household work people as well as employees, the master should be astute and efficient. Buddhism advises masters to be sympathetic and compassionate towards employees and servants. When assigning duties, master should know the strength and expertise of his employees. The Buddha advised that duties should be assigned depending on the individual's strength and expertise. The commentary to *Dīgha-nikāya* elucidates this strategy in the following words. Master should not ask old people to do hard work that should be done by younger men. Moreover, women should not be given hard work.³³ In order to maintain a good and amiable relationship master should treat them well. He should provide wages and meals (*Bhattavetana*). He should treat them kindly, not employ them if sick and provide medical

facilities, etc. There is no doubt that the Buddha was the first person to propose employee medical care system.³⁴ Regarding economic management, the Buddha has devised a scheme for the householder or lay community, whose earnings have to be divided into four parts and out of that one fourth should be utilized for food. Half of the income should be invested in business (*kammanta*) and the rest should be saved to be used in case of distress.³⁵ Probably this scheme of management of earnings may not be suitable for some individuals like those who do not run business. The Buddha did not like people to exhaust all what they earned. The Buddha encouraged people to set aside a portion of their earnings as savings.

The Buddha has expounded golden rules for management which are relevant even today such as: *Be humorous and keep a smile on your face; avoid hasty and harsh reactions; treat others leniently and give them respect and credit; take responsibility when something goes wrong; put aside any personal gain or loss and go forward; let communication flow freely and strive for agreement; serve others, keep your own word; adjust and adapt and be considerate of others; pay respect to others' opinions and coordination.* Strong group dynamics synchronize the steps of upper management and operational employees, ensuring the formation of consensus and shared values necessary to achieve the organizational mission and goals.³⁶

Cultivation of restraint (*Samyama*) and self-control are key factors of the Buddhist philosophy of management. One should be wise and strategic in managing household, income and expenditure. At least the householder should have the common sense to know the perils of economic deterioration. Over-infatuation and addiction to bad habits are hindrances to economic development and management. In the management of monetary and family matters, one should be aware of certain bad habits that may create chaos and disorder regarding the management of economy. The *Sigālovāda-sutta* mentions six ways of dissipating income and wealth if the householder is addicted to any of the following vices: Addiction to intoxicating drinks, frequenting the streets at untimely hours, haunting fairs, being infatuated by gambling, association with evil companions and the habit of idleness.³⁷ Addiction to gambling (*Jūtapamādatthānānuyoga*) is considered as a serious social and economic evil. The Buddha pointed out that gambling destroys one's wealth and property very fast,³⁸ he is not trusted, friends and relatives despise him and no one would like to give a girl in marriage to him, etc. Bad companions are another channel of dissipating wealth and can destroy not only his hard earned wealth but also his whole career.³⁹

In the *Vyāgghapajja-sutta* of the *Āṅguttara-nikāya*, the Buddha praised the usefulness of balancing one's income and expenditure where it is clearly mentioned that expenditure should not exceed one's income. If somebody's expenditure is more than his income, he cannot balance his budget. Whatever he earns is exhausted and is unable to manage his household. Such a person is always having a deficit and running into debts. This situation was well exemplified by the Buddha in a simile. This is very similar to a pond that has four openings, which are kept open; the pond cannot hold its water any more.⁴⁰ The person who spends all what he earns is not wise and he is ignorant of the management of his income. According to the Buddha, such persons are like fig-tree gluttons. One of the principles of economic management in Buddhism is *Samajīvikatā* (evenness of income and expenditure)⁴¹.

Management and eradication of poverty can be considered as an important aspect of Buddhist economics. This has to be done by the government or such organizations in a systematic manner. The *Cakkavattisīhanāda-sutta*⁴² records an incident of theft for which the king punished severely the culprit by imprisonment. In this respect, the Buddha said that before imposing a punishment, the king should investigate into the cause of theft. If someone has no means of income, he cannot support his family. Such people are called *adhana* (people without an income) or *dalidda* (poor) in Pāli texts. The Pāli term for poverty is *daliddatā*. According to *Cakkavattisīhanāda-sutta*,⁴³ this is a kind of desperate situation, which leads people to steal. Due to the increase of stealing, handling of weapons increases. Due to the handling of weapons, killing increases. The principle of management of poverty emphasized by the Buddha in this *sutta* is to look into the cause of theft and to take appropriate remedial measures to eradicate poverty.

According to Buddhist management ethics, one should be righteous (*dhammiko*) in his dealings and earning money. It is often mentioned in Buddhist *sutta[s]* that fair earning is what is acquired by shedding sweat (*sedavakkhittā*), by the strength of arms (*bāhābala-paricitā*), by righteous means (*dhammikādhammaladdhā*).⁴⁴ The Buddha knew about borrowing and investing money in industries and self, employment projects. Many *sutta[s]* of the *Sutta Piṭaka* mention this economic practice followed by people in ancient India. When there is no capital to invest in business or a self-employment project, people used to borrow money from wealthy people called *setṭhis*. Lending money was a big business during the time of the Buddha. In Pāli, the word `ina' (Skt: *ṛṇa*) means `loan' or `debt'. In this respect modern day people borrow money from banks and invest in their business. A man having borrowed money

and invested in industry, got success and settled all his debts from the earned profit (*Avasitthaii*) and managed to live a comfortable family life and was very happy about his success.⁴⁵ We saw the same practice recommended by the Buddha to eradicate poverty in the *Cakkavattisīhanāda Sutta*. The Buddha said that it is very unethical if somebody does not settle loans borrowed from lenders and calls him a *Vasala* (bad).⁴⁶

To sum up, one can say that the present world economies can no longer be sustained even though most people continue to subscribe to a theory of happiness based upon material accumulation and control whereas credibility and viability of this have never seemed so tenuous. There is growing evidence that this path leads to neither healthy, sustainable world economies nor growth in individual and community well-being. In this paper, I have tried my best to explain how the Buddha and his teachings have contributed to the envisioning and implementation of more sustainable economies that truly enhance well-being in present world scenario. It is clear that Buddhist way of economic management is very different from the economic management of modern economies based on materialism. The materialist world economy is mainly interested in goods while the Buddhist economic management is mainly interested in liberation.

ABBREVIATIONS

D	Dīghanikāya (Pāli Text Society, London)
A	Āṅguttaranikāya (Pāli Text Society, London)
Sn.	Suttanipāta (Pāli Text Society, London)
Vin.	Vinaya Piṭaka (Pāli Text Society, London)
J	Jātaka (Pāli Text Society, London)
SBB	Sacred Books of The Buddhists
S	Samyuttanikāya (Pāli Text Society, London)

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NOTES

- 1 D. III. 190.
- 2 A. IV. 281.
- 3 Chambers' Twentieth Century Dictionary, p. 396.
- 4 Ibid., p. 396.
- 5 Warnasuriya, Kottegoda, *His Lai Journal of Humanistic Buddhism*, editor: Guruge, A.W.P., p. 158.
- 6 Warnasuriya, Kottegoda, Op. Cit., pp. 158-159.
- 7 Sn. 144.
- 8 Vin. I. 58.
- 9 Warnasuriya, Kottegoda, Op. Cit., p. 159.
- 10 *Dasadhammasutta, Suttasaṅgaha*, p. 325.
- 11 Vin. I. 96.
- 12 <http://www.abhidhamma.org/visuddhimagga%20Chapter%2010.htm>
- 13 Warnasuriya, Kottegoda, Op. Cit., p. 160
- 14 Ibid., p. 160.
- 15 E. F. Schumacher, Op. Cit., p. 53.
- 16 D.I. (*Sīlakkhandhavagga*).
- 17 Sn. 144.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 J. I. 98. (*Apannaka, Vannupatha and SerivanijaJātaka[s]*)
- 20 J. I. 98. (*Apannaka-jātaka*)
- 21 J. I. 110-114. (*Serivānija-jātaka*)
- 22 SBB.II. 106, *Aggañña-sutta of Dīgha-nikāya*.
- 23 Warnasuriya, Kottegoda, Op. Cit., p. 162.
- 24 Sn. 617.
- 25 Sn. verses 612- 619.
- 26 Vin. I. 10- 12. (*Dhammacakkapavattana-sutta*)
- 27 A. II. 68.
- 28 D. III. 180- 193.
- 29 D. III. 192.
- 30 Warnasuriya, Kottegoda, Op. Cit., p. 165.
- 31 S. I. 37.
- 32 D. III. 190.
- 33 DA.964.
- 34 D. III. 191.
- 35 D. III. 61.
- 36 Kimball, Richard L., Guruge, A.W.P. ed. *His Lai Journal of Humanistic Buddhism*, Vol.7 p. 241.
- 37 D. III. 182.
- 38 D. III. 184.
- 39 Warnasuriya, Kottegoda, Op. Cit., p. 167.
- 40 A. IV. 284.

- 41 A. IV. 281.
- 42 D. III. 65.
- 43 A. III. 68.
- 44 A. IV. 282.
- 45 D.I. 71.
- 46 Sn. 180.

Mind Only or Ideation Only? An Examination of *Yogācāra* Philosophy and Its Chinese Interpretation

Medawachchye Dhammajothi

Yogācāra is one of the main Buddhist philosophical schools originated in India which later on, spread to China and Tibet. It emphasized the function of *Vijñāna* which was taken as negating the existence of the outside world. On account of this, *Yogācāra* tradition is known as *Vijñānavāda* or idealism. Many scholars are of the view that *Yogācāra Vijñānavāda* has been misunderstood as idealism found in the West. Professor Kalupahana is one of the first scholars to point this out. According to these scholars, this misunderstanding is found even in some of the *Yogācāra* commentaries in India. Later on, this misunderstanding spread to China and Tibet with the Chinese and Tibetan translations of Sanskrit *Yogācāra* works. Most of these *Yogācāra* works in Sanskrit, like many other Buddhist sources, have disappeared in their original form and some of them are only preserved as Chinese or Tibetan translations. When these sources were restored into Sanskrit language by modern scholars, they totally depended on these Chinese and Tibetan translations. As a result, the idea of *Yogācāra* philosophy as idealism similar to Western idealism was established and consequently, *Yogācāra* philosophy was understood as a mind only philosophy and *Yogācāra* tradition was known as the Mind only School of thought.

The aim of this paper is to examine as some modern scholars have pointed out, whether Chinese translators had misunderstood the *Yogācāra* philosophy as an idealism found in the West or not. In this research, not only the contents of *Yogācāra* sources in Sanskrit but also in Chinese translations will be examined. In addition the facts which lead to the misunderstanding of *Yogācāra* philosophy as an idealism as known in the West, will be discussed. The crux of this article is to point out that *Yogācāra* philosophy has two. They are i. The outside world is only an ideation created by the inner mind, but it does not mean the real non-existence of the outside world, ii. The real existence and functioning of the mind is a fact. Chinese translators leaned more to the second thesis and they preferred the term *wei shi* which mean mind only. The causes behind the preference of the *wei shi* by Chinese translators in *Yogācāra* philosophy are discussed in this paper.

INTRODUCTION

There are many sources for the study of *Yogācāra* Buddhist philosophy. These can be divided into two main groups. The first includes certain *sūtras* from which *Yogācāra* philosophy draws its inspiration which began to appear in the third century A.D. Among them are: The *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, the *Mahāyāna-abhidharmaśāstra*, and the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, etc. The second includes the commentaries and the compendiums, written by Asanga and Vasubandhu who were the founders of the *Yogācāra* school. Asanga wrote among other things, the *Mahāyāna Saṃgraha* the *Abhidharma Samuccaya* and a Commentary on the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*. The important works of Vasubandhu include the *Twenty-Verse Treatise*, (*Viṃśatikā*) the *Thirty-Verse Treatise* (*Triṃśatikākā*) and the Commentary to the *Twenty-Verse Treatise*, (*Viṃśatikākārikā*).

Today, there are many secondary books dealing with the *Yogācāra* School and its philosophy. Among them D. J. Kalupahana's book *Buddha Darsana Itihasaya* written in Sinhala is important because he puts forward new views on the *Yogācāra* philosophy and some of its sources.¹ Similar views can be found in his English book *The Principles of Buddhist Psychology*.² According to Kalupahana the *Viñaptimātratāsiddhi* of Vasubandhu has been mistranslated into Chinese and Tibetan languages. He says: it is rather ironical to see that the term *viñaptimātra* of Vasubandhu's *Viñaptimātratāsiddhi*, has been translated wrongly as "vijñāna-mātra". The term "vijñaptimātra" means "ideation only" and "vijñāna-mātra" means "mind only". According to him this is a grave mistake made by Chinese and Tibetan translators, and also it contributed to the misunderstanding of Vasubandhu's philosophical concept of "ideation only" as "mind only". This also resulted in the misunderstanding of the *Yogācāra* tradition as idealism (*Vijñānavāda*).

Kalupahana further says that this situation became more confused because some part of the *Viñaptimātratāsiddhi* has been changed by Sylvan Levi when he edited the text again in Sanskrit.³ The text has two parts: one is *Twenty-Verse Treatise* (*Viṃśatikā*) and the second *Thirty-Verse-Treatise* (*Triṃśatikā*). As Kalupahana pointed out the first chapter of the original Sanskrit text of the *Twenty-Verse-Treatise* has disappeared and it was restored into Sanskrit by Sylvan Levi basing on Chinese and Tibetan translations. Sylvan Levi's edition has injected more idealistic sense to Vasubandhu and *Yogācāra* School. This leads to the misunderstanding of the whole *Yogācāra* philosophy as idealism or

“mind only” (*vijñānavāda*). Kalupahana quoted first few sentences of the Sylvan Levi’s Sanskrit edition of *Twenty two-Verse- Treatise* as follows:

*mahāyāne tridhātuka vijñaptimātraṃ vyavasthāpyate,
cittamātraṃ bho jina putrā yadūta tridhātukamiti sūtrāt, cittaṃ
mano vijñānaṃ vijñaptisceti paryāyā / cittamātra
sasamprayogamiti, mātramityarthaṃ pratiśedharthaṃ.*⁴

Kalupahana pointed out that the same misinterpretations can be seen in Vasubandhu’s pupil, Sthiramati’s commentary on *Thirty-Verse-Treatise* (*Triṃśatikākārikā*). This commentary too has explained Vasubandhu’s *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* in a more idealistic manner.

So the aim of this article is to examine the Yogācāra philosophy and attempt to see whether it focuses on “mind only” or “ideation only”. At the same time, an effort will be made to examine whether Yogācāra philosophy emphasizes both these facets of “*vijñāna*”.

PHILOSOPHIC BACKGROUND OF THE YOGĀCĀRA

The main factor that caused the origin of Buddhist traditions is the effort made by various Buddhist monk-scholars to reinterpret early Buddhism. They explained early Buddhist teachings according to their understanding. They faced the problem that if all conditioned phenomena in the world are impermanent and if there is no soul how could things exist and migrate from this life to the next life. It was necessary for them to answer this question according to early Buddhist point of view. So, various Buddhist monks came up with their own interpretations and this led to the mushrooming of different groups or traditions. They adopted logic and reasoning to answer these issues and this gave rise to many views that were mutually opposing. In this process of philosophic interpretations these groups influenced one another. Yogācāra philosophy was influenced by Mādhyamaka philosophy of “emptiness” (*śūnyatā*). Though, Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Mādhyamika tradition, explained and strongly emphasized that the “emptiness” is not nihilism or annihilationism, but meant *no-thingness*. However, ācārya Nāgārjuna’s concept of “emptiness” was taken as meaning nothingness. This situation was seen by another group of monks as a misinterpretation of Buddhism. These monks wanted to rescue Buddhism from this nihilistic point of view and they tried to explain early Buddhist teachings in a more positive perspective. These monks later came to be labeled as Yogācārins. So, it is in response to the concept of emptiness put forward by the Mādhyamika tradition that Yogācāra School originated.⁵

YOGĀCĀRA PHILOSOPHY AND ITS TWO EMPHASES

The philosophers of the *Abhidharma* schools taught that consciousness arises when the senses are in contact with objects. Yogācāra turns this commonsense *Abhidharma* position upside down. What Yogācāra claims is that consciousness actually produces the experience of sensations and their objects. It is not that a subject and an object come together to produce conscious experience, as in the *Abhidharma* model. Rather, for Yogācāra, there is a fundamental process of consciousness that produces one's experience of subjective selfhood on the one hand and the objective world on the other. One's experience of both oneself and the world arise dependently from a more fundamental process of consciousness. Traditionally, scholars of Buddhism have accepted this view as a form of Idealism, the theory that the world is a product of the mind. Today, this interpretation is being debated.

Another interpretation claims that the world as we know it is produced by the mind; what the world is in itself we have no way of knowing. Related to this view is an interpretation that approaches the matter from a non dualistic point of view, where the subject and the objects of experience arise together. In any case, for Yogācāra, one's experience of self and world is certainly generated by the mind. Given this position, the philosophical task for Yogācāra was to explain how consciousness can be the basis for both these subjective and objective aspects of experience.

To begin with, they claim that all the mental and physical elements (*dharmas*) in experience are arising dependently within a more fundamental process of consciousness. While Mādhyamika emphasized the emptiness of this dependent arising, Yogācāra goes a step further and claims that consciousness is the causal force behind such dependent arising. Consciousness forms itself into the six senses (including the mental faculty that "senses" thought objects) and the objects of these senses. As the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* says, consciousness is like water forming itself into waves.⁶ These six senses and their objects arise dependently from consciousness, accounting for the mental and physical elements of one's experience through a process that Yogācāra calls "ideation only" (*viññaptimātra*).

Behind this ideation process of the six sense-consciousnesses is, according to Yogācāra, a seventh form of consciousness that they call "mind" (*manas*).⁷ They claim that this more unitary faculty of consciousness is the basis of both inner reflection and self-awareness.

Self-awareness arises in the mind as it reflects on, or "follows", the dependent arising of the six senses and their objects. Because of this self-awareness, the mind concludes that it exists as an independent self, apart from the objects it experiences. But in fact, both one's self and the world are two dependently arisen aspects of an experiential process that is being produced by consciousness-by ideation only.

Yogācārin's also claim that behind the mind of self-awareness and reflection is the ultimate source of this whole ideation process. They call this eighth and final level of consciousness the "storehouse consciousness" (*ālaya-vijñāna*).⁸ In the storehouse consciousness is the fundamental unity of consciousness that is prior to all its forms. In its use of the above water and waves metaphor, the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* also says that storehouse consciousness generates from itself all forms of experience like the ocean whose water takes form as waves. In other words, out of its "storehouse", consciousness constructs the subjective experience of one's mind and senses, as well as the objective world of their experience. While one's self and the world seem to be so distinct from each other in experience, they are really just dependently arisen formations from the storehouse consciousness.

Yogācāra claims that the storehouse consciousness contains the karmic "seeds" deposited in it to form the process of conscious experience.⁹ These seeds influence the storehouse's ongoing construction of experience and account for its continuity. The seeds are influenced or "perfumed" (*vāsanā*) by one's positive and negative attitudes. For example, one's negative dispositions, such as the Three Roots of Evil (hatred, greed, and delusion), condition the seeds of future experience within the storehouse consciousness in ways that often lead to unwholesome thoughts, words, and actions. These unhealthy thoughts, words, and actions then produce new negative karmic seeds in the storehouse consciousness that, in turn, will affect one's future experience. Therefore, the storehouse consciousness accounts not only for one's experience of oneself and the world but also for the moral and spiritual qualities of that experience. This being the case, Yogācāra taught that one must change the karmic condition of the storehouse consciousness by the practice of the Six Perfections. These perfections cultivate "pure seeds" within the depths of the storehouse consciousness itself.

On the bodhisattva's Great Journey, mental defilements and afflictions are gradually eliminated, pure qualities are cultivated, and the mind is stilled by mediation. Then, when the inner conditions are right, at the very foundation of consciousness there is a sudden "conversion of the basis" (*āśrata-parvṛtti*). One's ordinary processes of consciousness stop,

and one gains an intuitive insight into the storehouse consciousness at its basis. Thereby, one attains freedom from all conditioned states of consciousness, Awakening, and Nirvāṇa.

Yogācāra's presentation of this radical and sudden turning over of the basis of consciousness greatly influenced East Asian Buddhism. Some East Asian Buddhist writers read Yogācāra as agreeing with the *Tathāgata-garbha* Literature. These writers believed that both traditions taught that the purity of spiritual life comes from the inherent luminous Buddha-qualities found within one's deepest center. The sudden turning over of the basis of consciousness was thought to reveal a non-dual *nirvāṇic* nature of luminous and pure consciousness, the unlimited Dharma-body, which is the essence of Awakening and Nirvāṇa. As we shall see, other Buddhist writers disagreed with this interpretation of Yogācāra, and this issue became important to the development of East Asian Buddhism.

Returning now to early Indian Yogācāra, besides its theory of consciousness, the school also presented what are called the Three Natures (*tri-sva-bhāva*) of experience.¹⁰ First is the "imagined" (*parikalpita*) nature of experience. That is, in one's ordinary experience, the self and the objects of that experience are seen to be independent entities, when, in fact, this independent nature of things in one's experience is made by *prapañca*. For Yogācāra, the imagined nature of experience is generated by the karmic seeds in the storehouse consciousness, along with the ego awareness of the mind.

Second is the "interdependent" (*paratantra*) nature of experience. Here, we find the Mādhyamaka "ultimate truth" that all entities are arising dependently or interdependently and are, therefore empty of "own-being". Yogācāra points out that this interdependent nature of the self and entities of experience is produced by consciousness. That is, while people "imagine" that they and the objects of their experience are independent, in fact, they arise in experience interdependently from the processes of consciousness. However, since ignorance leads people to imagine that oneself and the objects of the world are independent, one develops attachments, defilements, and *dukkha*. Thereby, unwholesome seeds are planted in the storehouse consciousness, which, in turn, play a part in this dependent arising of experience. Therefore, the "interdependent" nature of experience is pure and impure; good and evil. Because of attachment to the imagined independent things of ordinary experience and the resulting impurity of the interdependent nature of experience, Yogācāra posits a third nature. It does so to stress the need to purify oneself from the ignorance that is superimposing the imagined

fabrication of independence onto the interdependent nature of things. By this purification, one can cease making this superimposition, see the truth about the dependent arising of experience, and become free from attachment and the defiling of experience. One does so by following the Bodhisattva Path. The result of this purification is the third nature, which is called the "perfected" (*pariniṣpanna*) nature of experience. This perfected nature of experience is ultimately attained by the realization of Awakening, wherein one sees that all ordinary experience is a product of "ideation only" (*viññaptimātra*). With enlightened wisdom, one realizes Nirvana.

According to the above explanation it is clear that Yogācāra philosophy has several facets. The one is that the outside world is only ideation which is created by the inner mind. This interpretation also has two sides, one is the outside world is really non-existent but only the mind does exist. The other is both mind and outside world are really existent, but without functioning and contacting of the mind there is no way to experience the outside world, and in that sense outside world does not exist; what only exist, is the mind.

The first idea is closer to the idealism in Brahmanism and Western philosophy. These philosophies posit metaphysical and transcendental idealism which negates the existence of the outside world. This Buddhist "*viññānavāda*" should not be categorized into that group because it is more psychological than metaphysical and transcendental. Kalupahana very accurately expresses this idea as: "...then *viññānavāda* needs not necessarily mean "idealism" in a metaphysical sense. It could be psychology ("*viññāna*"=psyche, *vāda* =logos) as well".¹¹

The second view lays more emphasis on the existence and the functioning of the mind. Perhaps, it may be close to early Buddhist explanation of mind.¹² As this tradition highly emphasizes the existence of "*viññāna*" even today many scholars are of the view that this tradition should be named as "*Viññānavāda*". For instance Kapila Abhayawansa says: "so, *outside experiential thing is only an ideation (cittāmatra) and a mind (viññaptimātra) which is created by the mind. In that way the outside experiential world is confined into a ideation and this philosophy is known as a ideation only (viññaptimātra)*".¹³

CHINESE INTERPRETATION OF YOGĀCĀRA PHILOSOPHY

With the translation of Buddhist texts into Chinese language, Chinese scholasticism started to discuss Buddhist philosophy. Yogācāra tradition and books were translated into Chinese language on three occasions by

three famous teachers: They are Bodhiruci, Paramārtha, and Xuan Zhuang. The first is Bodhiruci's translation of Vasubandhu's *Vimśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (*Wei Shi Er Shi Lun*) into Chinese language and named as “*Wei shi Lun*” 《唯识论》. Though the original text has twenty two verses, in his translation there are twenty three verses. The second is Paramārtha's translation of the same text, but its name changed to *Mahāyāna Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (*Da Cheng Wei shi Lun*) 《大乘唯识论》 and it has twenty four verses. The third is Xuan Zhuang's translation of the same text, but it has only twenty one verses. He named it as “*Wei shi Ershi Lun*”. 《唯识二十论》.

All these three translators used the term “wei shi” (唯识) which means “mind only” (*vijñānamātratā*) for “Vasubandhu's term “*vijñaptimātra*” which means ideation only (*Wei liao bie* - 唯了别). Xuan Zhuang's (596-664 A.D.) translation records it as follows: “又为开示谬执我法，迷唯识者，令达二空，于唯识论如实知故。复有迷谬唯识理者，或执外境如识非无，或执内识如境非有，或执诸识用别体同，或执离心无别心所：为遮此等种种异执，令于唯识深妙理中得如实解，故作斯论”。 (*Cheng Wei Shi Lun*, 卷一).¹⁴ Explaining this quotation of ancient text of Xuan Zhuang, Lai Yong Hai says that this interpretation puts forward the view that the real truth of “wei shi” (mind only) means “outside world is non-existent, only exist is the mind” (“外境”之“无”，“内识”之“有”). Xuan Zhuang's disciple Kui Ji (632-682 A.D) in his commentary (*成唯识论述记* - *Cheng Wei Shi Lun Shu ji*) on *Cheng Wei Shi Lun* also explains Yogācāra philosophy in a meaning similar to his teacher, Xuan Zhuang as follows: “唯谓简别，遮无外境。识谓能了，诠有内心。识体即唯，持业释也。识性识相，皆不离心。心所心王，以识为主。归心泯相，总言唯识。唯遮境有，执有者 其真；识简心空，滞空者乖其实”。 (卷一). Explaining this Lai Yong Hai says that mind only teaching (*wei shi*) has been analyzed by Kui Ji in two ways: one is denial of the outside world and the second is affirmation of the inside “*vijñāna*”. Inside world and all its empirical things are not out of “*vijñāna*”. In this way, Kui Ji emphasized “outside world is non-existent, what exists is only the mind”. (“唯识”的根本意义有两个方面，一是否定外境，二是肯定内识。一切性相离不开心识。这样，他就强调“无境有识”。)¹⁵.

In this regard, Chinese scholar Zhou Gui Hua has written a very important article “Difference between ‘Mind only and Ideation only’: Re-annotation of the Fundamental Question of Yogācāra Studies” 《唯识与唯了别---“唯识学”的一个基本问题的再诠释》.¹⁶ In this article,

he pointed out that this mistranslation and misunderstanding of Vasubandhu's standpoint of Yogācāra philosophy (*vijñaptimātratā*) was done by Chinese translators found by Chinese scholar, Cheng (吕) about one thousand years after Xuan Zhuang. It is said that being influenced by the views of Japanese and Western scholars he started to examine the original Sanskrit texts and found this mistake. But, he was reluctant to popularize it because he thought that it goes against the great teachers who translated the original texts into Chinese. So, he kept silent. Later on, in 70th and 80th decades two Chinese scholars: one from Beijing "Han Jing Qing", and one from Hong Kong "Huo Tao Hui" raised this issue again and discussed the difference between "wei shi" (唯识 - "*vijñāna-mātra*") and "wei liao bie" (唯了别 - "*vijñaptimātratā*")

So, the important question is why great teachers like Xuan Zhuang and other translators understood and used "*vijñaptimātratā*" ("wei liao bie" - 唯了别). as "*vijñāna-mātratā*" ("wei shi" - 唯识) ? , is it really a mistake or not? So, it is also necessary to understand why Chinese scholars emphasize non-existence of the outside world?

In this regard I wish to draw attention to important facts. One is that in China four terms "xin" 心 (*citta*), "yi" 意 (*manas*), "shi" 识 (*vijñāna*), "liao" 了 (*vijñapti*), are considered as basically same in meaning. More or less, the same interpretation can be seen in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*.¹⁷ So, Chinese translator Xuan Zhuang and others may have thought that these four terms are interchangeable. Hence, the problem is not in the terms but the interpretation given by them. They explained Vasubandhu's Yogācāra philosophy as which negate the existence of the outside world and emphasize the existence of mind or *vijñāna* only. In this regard Chinese researcher Zhou Gui Hua has pointed out very important facts that why Chinese ancient scholastics translated the Sanskrit term "*vijñaptimātratā*" as "wei shi"? He says that as Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy is totally against the concept of substance in both mind and matter (*dharmānairātmyatā*) put forward by sectarian Buddhism, so, there is no way to understand "*vijñāna*" in a eternalistic perspective as idealism understood in the West. Another fact he pointed out is that the terms "xin" 心 (*citta*), "yi" 意 (*manas*), "shi" 识 (*vijñāna*), "liao" 了 (*vijñapti*), are different as designation but same in meaning. As evidence he pointed out the three Chinese translations of early Sanskrit Yogācāra books namely *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* 《瑜伽师地论》、*Madhyantavibhaṅga* 《辨中边论》、*Māhāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* 《大乘庄严经论》 have used two terms "*citta*" and "*vijñāna*" to discuss "*vijñāna-mātra*". They did not use the term "*vijñaptimātratā*" to discuss

“*viññāna-mātra*” because they understood that “*viññāna-mātra*” represents the same meaning of “*viññaptimātra*”.¹⁸

CONCLUSION

As mentioned above the Yogācāra philosophy has two facets: one is emphasis of the continual process of “*viññāna*”, second the emphasis on non-existence of the outside world since it is understood through the “*viññāna*” it is only an ideation (*viññaptimātra*). Vasubandhu emphasizes this second view of Yogācāra philosophy. Chinese scholars prefer the first emphasis of Yogācāra philosophy and so they used the term “*viññāna-mātra*” (“*wei shi*” - 唯识) instead of “*viññaptimātra*” (*wei liao bie*”-唯了别) of Vasubandhu.

It is clear that Chinese scholars deny the existence of the outside world and emphasize the process of “*viññāna*” without resorting to eternalism. This view is similar to the early Yogācārins. Though Chinese scholars used the term “*viññāna-mātra*” (mind only) they did not misinterpret Yogācāra philosophy as idealism (*viññānavāda*) in the west. They prefer to use the term “*viññāna-mātra*” (mind only) perhaps, they have thought it is the most important facet of Yogācāra philosophy. Therefore, it is not reasonable to accuse Chinese scholars of misinterpreting early Yogācāra philosophy.

ABBREVIATIONS

Lanka	<i>Laṅkāvatārasūtra</i> .
Trims	<i>Triṃśatikā</i>
Vims	<i>Viṃśatikā</i>
VMS	<i>Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi</i>

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- ¹ Kalupahana, D.J., (2003) *Bauddha Darsana Itihasaya*, p.189-190 .
- ² Kalupahana, D.J., (1987) *Principles of Buddhist Psychology*, p.134.
- ³ Kalupahana, D.J., (2003) *History of Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 189-190.
- ⁴ Kalupahana, D.J., (2003) *Bauddha Darsana Itihasaya*, p. 189-190.
- ⁵ Nagao, Gadjin M., (1992) *Mādhyamika and Yogācāra*, p 214.
- ⁶ *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* , śloka, 99-100.
taramgā hyudadheryadvatpavanapratyayeritāḥ |
nṛtyamānāḥ pravartante vyucchedaśca na vidyate || 99 ||
ālayaughastathā nityam viṣayapavaneritaḥ |
citraistaramgavijñānairnṛtyamānaḥ pravartate || 100 ||
- ⁷ *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* , śloka, 102.
na cānyena ca nānanyena taramgā hyudadhermatāḥ |
vijñānāni tathā sapta cittena saha samyutāḥ || 102 ||
- ⁸ *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* , śloka, 104.
cittam manaśca vijñānam lakṣaṇārtham prakalpyate |
abhinnalakṣaṇā hyaṣṭau na lakṣyā na ca lakṣaṇam || 104 ||
- ⁹ *Trīṃśikā*, śloka 18.
sarvabijam hi vijñānam pariṇāmastathā tathā|
yātyanyo'nyavaśād yena vikalpaḥ sa sa jāyate||18||
- ¹⁰ *Trīṃśikā*, śloka, 23.
trividhasya svabhāvasya trividhām niḥsvabhāvatām|
sandhāya sarvadharmāṇām deśitā niḥsvabhāvatā||23||
- ¹¹ Kalupahana, D. J., (1987) *Principles of Buddhist Psychology*, p. 127.
- ¹² Abhayawansa, Kapila, (1999) *Bauddha Adhyayana* , p. 74-86.
- ¹³ Pannakitti, Hiripitiye, (2003) *Bauddha Vijñanavadaya*, Preface, xi .
- ¹⁴ 赖永海. (2000) 《中国佛教百科全书 - 宗教卷》 P.183.
- ¹⁵ 赖永海. (2000) 《中国佛教百科全书 - 宗教卷》 P.184.
- ¹⁶ 周贵华. 《唯识与唯了别——“唯识学”的一个基本问题的再诠释》, 哲学研究, 2004年第 期.

¹⁷ *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, śloka, 104.

*cittaṃ manaśca vijñānaṃ lakṣaṇārthaṃ prakalpyate /
abhinnaalakṣaṇā hyaṣṭau na lakṣyā na ca lakṣaṇam // 104 //*

¹⁸ 在原始、部派佛教那里，识有其自体性，而了别是识相，是识对境的认识功能，显然，了别与识二者有体、相之别。但大乘佛教否定诸法的自性，诸法由缘起而生的相（功能）就成为法之体性，即体、相二者可同义使用。在此意义上，则不能说识有自性，此时，识别或了别亦即识的体性，识与识别、了别同义。所以，《唯识二十论》说：“心、意、识、了（即了别），名之差别”。（《大正藏》三十一册）即认为识与了别义一，只是名异而已。而且在瑜伽行派的早期文献如《瑜伽师地论》、《辨中边论》、《大乘庄严经论》等中，基本还是从心、识而非从“了别”角度谈“唯识”义。因此，用“唯识”代表“唯了别”甚至全体唯识学，也不是没有依据的。

A Comparative Study of *Samādhi* in the *Visuddhimagga* and in the *Yoga Sutra*

Soorakkulame Pematatana

The *Visuddhimagga* and the *Yoga Sutra* are two classical texts which represent on the one hand, Theravada Buddhist tradition and on the other, one of the classical Hindu traditions. Both these texts explain the meditative state of *samādhi*. This paper provides a comparative analysis of definitions and the gradual stages of *samādhi* as presented in the two texts. It is evident that though these two texts use different terminologies in their presentations, they interestingly seem to refer to similar meditative experiences showing striking parallels. Since each text emphasizes different aspects of meditative experiences, a comparative study of these texts can shed light on each other enabling a better understanding of *samādhi*. However, the two texts are situated in the doctrinal context of the tradition to which they belong. Each text offers its presentation of *samādhi* relying on the concepts and terms, which are derived from its doctrinal background. Therefore, explanation of *samādhi* in one text cannot be considered as simply analogous to the other. Still a comparative analysis of the two texts shows that they can function as complementary texts which together enhance our understanding of meditative states.

INTRODUCTION

Samādhi is a highly acclaimed meditative state expounded both in the *Visuddhimagga* and the *Yoga Sutra* which represent Theravada Buddhist tradition on the one hand and on the other hand, one of the classical Hindu traditions. Both of these texts admit that *samādhi* is an intensely focused and unwavering state of mind, which is indispensable to achieve the ultimate liberation (*mokṣa*). Each text provides specific definitions, gradual stages of *samādhi* and techniques to achieve it. Though these two texts use different terminologies in their presentations, they interestingly seem to refer to the similar meditative experiences showing striking parallels. However, the two texts are situated in the doctrinal context of the tradition to which they belong. Each text offers its presentation of *samādhi* relying on the concepts and terms, which are derived from its doctrinal background.

This paper aims to provide a comparative analysis of definitions and gradual stages of *samādhi* as presented in the two texts. First, the paper examines the parallels between different stages of *samādhi* found in the two texts and then shows how the terminologies and explanations of each text shed light on the other text enabling a better understanding of the notions. Secondly, the paper will analyze how, despite close parallels, understanding of meditative experiences are ultimately bound to the doctrinal framework of each tradition.

DEFINITION OF *SAMĀDHI*

The Visuddhimagga is a post-canonical text of Theravāda Buddhism composed by a venerated Buddhist monk, Buddhaghosa in 5th century A.D. (Ñānamoli, 1956: ix). Though the text was written in the 5th century, it basically summarizes and interprets the teaching of the Pāli canon (*Tipitaka*) which belongs to a much earlier period. The Yoga Sutra is one of the earliest systematic treatises of meditative practices in Indian culture. Though there is no scholarly consensus on the authorship and the time of composition of this text, the majority of scholars consider it to have been composed by Patanjali who lived around the 3rd century A.D. (Miller, 1995: 6). While the Yoga Sutra remains an essential text in classical Hindu philosophy and meditation practice, the Visuddhimagga stands as the principal non-canonical authority of the practice of meditation and the doctrine of Theravada Buddhism.

In both the Yoga Sutra (YS) and the Visuddhimagga (Vism), *samādhi* appears as a paradigmatic concept in their presentation of the process of meditation. In the classical Yoga tradition, *samādhi* appears as the last item of the eight limbs of Yoga (*Aṣṭāṅgayoga*). The eight limbs of Yoga present the gradual steps that a yogi would follow in his yogic development. These eight limbs include moral observances (*yama*), restrictions (*niyama*), posture (*āsana*), breathing technique (*prānāyāma*), sensory withdrawal (*pratyāhāra*), fixation (*dhāraṇa*), meditation (*dhyāna*) and then *samādhi* as the culmination of this practice (YS II, 29). In the Buddhist context, *samādhi* stands as the sixth of the seven factors of enlightenment (*Satta-bojjhanga*) which are to be cultivated in the process of attaining enlightenment. These factors are mindfulness (*sati*), investigation of mental states (*dhamma-vicaya*), energy (*virīya*), happiness (*pīti*), tranquility (*passaddhi*), *samādhi* and equanimity (*upekkhā*) (Vism IV, 51f). In the noble eightfold path (*ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo*), *samādhi* (with the qualification of *sammā*, right) appears as the last one together with right view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort and right mindfulness. In the context

of classical Yoga, *samādhi* has been translated by different scholars in a number of ways such as “contemplation,” “concentration,” and “meditative absorption.” In Theravāda Buddhist context, *samādhi* is usually rendered as “concentration.” However, profundity of the concept of *samādhi* poses a challenge for scholars to render it by a single term.

Both texts maintain a technical clarity of each concept they use throughout their respective presentation. It is fruitful to see how these texts define *samādhi* in the beginning of this comparative study. The first of four sections of YS is titled, *samādhipāda* as it deals with techniques and structure of *samādhi*. There, YS characterizes *samādhi* in the following way:

In one whose modifications of mind (*citta vṛtti*) have been annihilated, the mind becomes transparent, and, like a clear crystal, takes the color of what it rests on, whether it be the cognizer, the act of cognition or the cognized (YS I, 41).¹

In this definition, two important aspects of *samādhi* are revealed. The first is its unwavering and settled nature which is free from fluctuations. The second is that it is fully occupied with the given object. The first aspect refers to the framework of *samādhi* and the second aspect refers to the constituent of *samādhi*. The simile used in YS here is very helpful. A crystal due to its freedom from defects and color can fully reflect what it rests on. The transparency of crystal and its fully resting on a single object makes it possible for crystal to take the color of that object. In *samādhi* state, the mind in its framework is free from modifications (*vṛtti*) and, in its contents, is fully assimilated by the object of meditation. This second aspect is prominent in another definition of *samādhi*. “The same [contemplation] when there is consciousness only of the object of meditation and not of itself [the mind] is *samādhi*” (YS III, 3). The mind’s assimilation by the object of meditation is sharpened to the extent that mind’s awareness of itself is lost. The mind’s awareness of itself here probably refers to subjectivity. According to YS, *samādhi* is a state in which subjectivity is transcended.

Vism devotes one of its three major sections to *samādhi* and explains basic characteristics, different levels and developing techniques of *samādhi* throughout 11 chapters within the relevant section. Vism defines *samādhi* as “unification of mind” (*Cittass’ekaggatā*).² It further says, “It is *Samādhi* in the sense of concentrating (*samādhāna*). It is the centering of consciousness and consciousness-concomitants evenly and rightly on a single object” (Vism. III, 3). This definition refers to

unification of mind and mental factors to a state of one-pointedness and evenly placing it on a chosen object. Not only placing but also maintaining this focus is also meant here. Vism reiterates,

So it is the state, in virtue of which consciousness and its concomitants remain evenly and rightly on a single object undistracted and unscarred, that should be understood as *samādhi* (Vism III, 3).

The Buddhist analysis points out that the basic function of unifying the mind occurs in every sensory experience ensuring that mind takes only one object in a given moment. However, when such one-pointedness is maintained beyond bare stabilizing of mind on an object to a higher degree of steadiness and non-distraction of mind, then it is termed as *samādhi* (Gunaratana, 1985:9).

Two definitions of *samādhi* offered by these two texts appear very similar. Interestingly, both definitions refer to the same two aspects of *samādhi*: The settling or unifying aspect of mind and mind's full occupation with a chosen object. Both texts are in agreement with the general nature of *samādhi*.

Though the two texts maintain a general definition of *samādhi*, they do not present *samādhi* only as a single specific state of mind. In both texts, *samādhi* stands for a wide variety of gradually ranging super-conscious states of the mind that recognizes further refinements within the *samadhi* stage.

LEVELS AND VARIETIES OF SAMĀDHI

Visuddhimagga presents a systematic detailed explanation on the gradual levels of *samādhi*. It first explains a number of objects of meditation that a meditator can select to focus on. This explanation altogether points out 40 objects of meditation which include models of four material elements (earth, water, fire, air), patches of colors, breathing and contemplations on various subjects (Vism III, 104). Once the meditator has selected an appropriate object or a meditation master has recommended him an object, then he focuses his mind on the object and tries to keep it there, fixed and alert. If the mind strays, he notices this quickly, catches it, and brings it back gently but firmly to the object, doing this over and over as often as is necessary. This exercise gives rise to a mental image of the object, which is called "the preliminary sign" (*parikamma-nimitta*) (Vism. IV 30). Then the meditator begins to focus on this sign until it gets very bright and clear in his mind. Vism points out two further

developments of clarity with regard to this sign, namely "learning sign" (*uggaha-nimitta*) and "counterpart sign" (*patibhāga-nimitta*). At this stage five mental hindrances (Sensual Desire, Ill Will, Sloth and Torpor, Restlessness and worry, Skeptical doubt) subside and "Upacāra-samādhi" is attained.

... as soon as it [counterpart sign] arises the hindrances are quite suppressed, the defilements subside, and the mind becomes concentrated in *upacāra-samādhi* (Vism. IV 31).

When the meditator continues to develop his concentration, five mental qualities called, *Jhāna* factors are developed in his mind. They are, as translated by Bhikkhu Nānamoli, applied thought (*vitakka*), sustained thought (*vicāra*), happiness (*pīti*), bliss (*sukha*), one-pointedness (*ekaggatā*). With the strengthening of these *jhāna* factors, the state of "appanā-samādhi" is attained. Even in the early stage of *samādhi*, the *jhāna* factors are present, but they lack strength and steadiness. Thus the mind in this stage is compared to a child who has just learned to walk: he takes a few steps, falls down, gets up, and walks some more, and again falls down. But the mind in *appanā-samādhi* is like a healthy man who wants to stand: he could stand for a whole day (Vism IV 33). With further practice of this concentration, the mind attains four levels of *samādhi* which are called *jhāna*. Vism expounds four *Jhanas* and they are gradual developments of levels of *samādhi* in which mind gradually drops certain factors of the preceding levels in each subsequent level. The first *jhāna* has five factors: applied thought (*vitakka*), sustained thought (*vicāra*), happiness (*pīti*), bliss (*sukha*), and unification of mind (*ekaggatā*) (Vism. IV,106). In the subsequent stages of *Jhāna*, these factors gradually drop keeping unification of mind (*ekaggatā*) and allowing equanimity (*upekkhā*) to arise at the last stage.

First *Jhāna*: "Quite secluded from sense desires, secluded from unprofitable things, he enters upon and dwells in the first *jhāna*, which is accompanied by applied thought (*vitakka*), sustained thought (*vicāra*) and with happiness (*pīti*) and bliss (*sukha*) born of seclusion" (Vism IV 79).

Second *Jhāna*: "With the stilling of applied thought (*vitakka*) and sustained thought he enters and dwells in the second *jhāna*, which has internal confidence and singleness of mind without applied thought (*vitakka*), without sustained thought (*vicāra*) but with happiness (*pīti*) and bliss (*sukha*) born of concentration" (Vism. IV 139).

Third *Jhāna*: With the fading away of happiness (*pīti*), he dwells in equanimity, mindful and fully aware he feels bliss (*sukha*) with his body, he enters upon and dwells in the third *jhāna* (Vism IV 153).

Fourth *Jhāna*: With the abandoning of pleasure and pain and with the previous disappearance of joy and grief, he enters upon and dwells in the fourth *jhāna*, which has neither-pleasure-nor-pain and with purity of mindfulness due to equanimity (*upekkhā*) (Vism IV 183).

Beyond these four *jhāna[s]* Vism elucidates four more levels of *samādhi* which are called “immaterial states” (*āruppa*). In these states, mind does not rely on any material objects and surpasses the sphere of materiality altogether. Though at the fourth *jhāna*, gross materiality has been already surmounted, the meditator may still develop dispassion to materiality and all counterpart experiences. Then the meditator can attain immaterial spheres in his meditation. These meditative states are attained through focusing on immaterial or formless objects of meditation such as boundless space. In each stage of these states, the object of meditation is changed from a relatively gross object to a subtler one. Gunaratana remarks that in the earlier *jhāna* states, the gradual refinement of consciousness occur due to change in the internal composition of those states. But in these immaterial states, the ascending from one to the next occurs not as a result of a change in internal constitution but due to the refinement of the objects of meditation (1985:108). Therefore, these immaterial states are named after their respective objects. Vism expounds these four states as follows.

Base of Boundless Space (*ākāsānañcāyatana*): With complete surmounting of perceptions of matter, with the disappearances of perceptions of resistance, with non-attention to perceptions of variety, [and aware of] “unbounded space,” he enters upon and dwells in the base consisting of boundless space (Vism X, 12).

Base of Boundless Consciousness (*viññānañcāyatana*): By completely surmounting the base consisting of boundless space, [aware of] “unbounded consciousness,” he enters upon and dwells in the base consisting of boundless consciousness (Vism X, 27).

Base of Nothingness (*ākīñcaññāyatana*): By completely surmounting the base consisting of boundless consciousness,

[aware that] “There is nothing,” he enters upon and dwells in the base consisting of nothingness (Vism X, 36).

Base of Neither Perception nor Non-perception (*nevasañhā nāsañhāyatana*): By completely surmounting the base consisting of nothingness he enters upon and dwells in the base consisting of neither perception nor non-perception (Vism X, 42).

The pinnacle of the states of *samādhi* in Buddhist mental culture is called *nirodha samāpatti* or *sañhā vedayita nirodha* (The state of the cessation of perception and feeling). The distinguishing feature of this attainment is the cessation of all mental activity in its entirety, thus generally known as “cessation experience”. This attainment is seen as the result of the balanced application of both concentration and investigation (or insight). Gunaratana explains that a meditator wishing to attain cessation experience (*sañhā vedayita nirodha*) enters each of the above eight states (both *jhānas* and *āruppā*), in turn emerges from it, and contemplates each *jhāna*’s formation with insight as impermanent, unsatisfying and selfless. After completing this procedure with each meditative attainment up to the mental sphere of nothingness, the next to the last *āruppā* and he attends to certain preliminaries, which include resolutions of the duration in which he stays in this state of *samādhi* (1985: 189). Then the meditator determines to be without consciousness for a particular length of time.

Now when he has thus attained the base of nothingness (*ākiñcañhāyatana*) and emerged and done this preparatory task, he then attains the base of neither- perception- nor non-perception (*nevasañhā nāsañhāyatana*). Then after one or two turns of consciousness have passed, he becomes without consciousness, he achieves cessation (Vism XXIII, 43)

The stopping of consciousness takes place automatically, as a result of meditator’s determination to reach this state of cessation. The meditator will remain in this state for as long as he has predetermined (Gunaratana, 1985: 189).

Thus this level appears to be a state of the stopping of the mental continuum altogether. As Dharmasiri points out, it is a transcendence of all possible forms of experience by a radical negative experience. It is an experience only in the sense that one who undergoes it can think of it afterwards. It is not ‘an experience’ while it lasts (Dharmasiri, 1974: 201). However the above description shows that this attainment is a

result of investigating the conditionality of all forms of meditative experiences. The balanced application of concentration and insight allows the meditator to understand that each meditative experience is ultimately conditioned. The investigation of the conditionality of meditative experiences allows one to go into a deeper level and to produce “the cessation experience” which is a transcendence of all positive forms of experience.

Yoga Sutra elaborates several levels of *samādhi*. Before we move into these levels, it is helpful to discuss prior stages of *samādhi*. First five limbs of Yoga eliminate the external causes for mental distraction. Once a meditator followed first five limbs, his mind is in a fitting position for an inner transformation. The beginning of actual inner transformation is called *dhāraṇa*, the sixth limb of Yoga. YS explains, “*Dhāraṇa* is the confining of the mind within a limited mental area” (YS III, 1). This is the fixation of mind on a chosen object of meditation and limiting the mind’s movements. YS recommends a number of objects of meditation including the recitation of “Om” and breath awareness. In the *dhāraṇa* stage, the meditator keeps the mind continuously engaged in the consideration of the object and brings it back again and again if the connection is broken (Taimni, 1961: 278). In this stage, he overcomes distractions of the mind reducing them in a progressive manner. The next stage is called *dhyāna* and YS defines it, “The uninterrupted flow of the mind towards the object [chosen for meditation] is *Dhyāna*” (YS III, 2). While, in the earlier stage, the meditator limits his mental territory through paying his attention to a chosen object, in this stage, he sharpens his focus and maintains that attention as a continuous whole. The continuity of mind’s focused attention in *dhyāna* is usually compared to the continuity of flow of oil being poured from one vessel into another (Taimni, 1961: 280). Once this uninterrupted continuity is maintained then gradually mind moves to the next stage, *samādhi*. However, one important change happening in this stage is the disappearance of the mind’s awareness of itself. In *samādhi*, the subjective role of the mind is reduced to the utmost limit, “as if, mind is devoid of its own nature” (*svarūpasunyam iva*. YS III, 3).

However, this is the underlying general nature of *samādhi*. YS describes ascending levels of *samādhi*. The first level of *samādhi* is known as *samprajñāta-samādhi*. YS defines it, “*Samprajñāta Samādhi* is that which is accompanied by reasoning, reflection, bliss and sense of pure being” (*Vitarka-vicārānandāsmītanugamāt samprajñātah*. YS I, 17). This level is explained in terms of the contents of the mind which are left after bringing it to a higher degree of focus as described earlier. At this stage, mind is free from external disturbances, inner fluctuations (*vṛtti*)

and has reduced the sense of subjectivity. Then it is left with certain cognitive and affective functions. Reasoning (*vitarka*), reflection (*vicāra*), bliss (*ānanda*) and sense of pure being (*asmitā*) are these functions. The mind is completely bounded to the object of meditation and it is experiencing those functions with regard to the object. With regard to these functions, four successive phases of *samprañjāta Samādhi* have been recognized.

1. *Samprañjāta vitarka*
2. *Samprañjāta vicāra*
3. *Samprañjāta sānanda*
4. *Samprañjāta sasmitā*

These four phases correlate with four layers of *guṇas* (characteristics) of phenomenal objects as taught in the classical Yoga. In *samprañjāta vitarka*, the meditator penetrates to the “*viśesa*”(particular) level of *guṇas* of the object of meditation. He penetrates to the next level of *gunas* called “*aviśesa*” (universal) in the *samprañjāta vicāra*. The third phase, *samprañjāta sānanda* brings the meditator to the “*linga*” (unity in diversity) level of *gunas*. In the last phase, *samprañjāta sasmitā*, he penetrates to the last level of *guṇas* called, “*alinga*” (substratum) (Taimni, 1961: 180).

The next level, *asamprañjāta-samādhi* is achieved through abandoning of these cognitive and affective functions. YS explains the nature of this level, “*Asamprajñāta Samādhi* is that in which remnant impressions left in the mind on dropping of the content of the mind after previous practice” (YS I, 18). As we saw earlier, the early level of *samādhi* had four types of contents in the mind. In this level, even those contents are dropped and the mind is calmed to a further degree. This level refers to a complete absence of discursive aspect of the mind. However, the impressions (*samskāra*) of those dropped functions are still left in the mind.

YS also refers to a level of *samādhi* called, *sabīja-samādhi*. It encompasses much of the field of earlier levels of *samādhi*. *sabīja* means “with seed” and what is meant by “seed” here is the object of meditation. The states of *samādhi* which are relied on as an object of meditation can be known by this name (Woods, 1927: 92). YS recognizes several phases of *sabīja-samādhi*. One is the phase called, *savitarka*. “Mixed state where words, meaning, knowledge and imagination are present is *savitarka*”(YS I, 42). The second phase is *nirvitarka* and YS explains it, “When memory is purified, mind is void of its own form and is luminous

with true knowledge of its object, then *nirvitarka*”(YS IM, 43). The third phase is explained as, “State of *samādhi* concerned with subtle objects extends up to the *alinga* state of *guṇas* (of the meditation object)” (YS I, 45). In all these three phases, the mind relies on an object of meditation and hence YS claims, “Those [stages] constitute *sabīja samādhi*” (YS I, 46). These phases closely resemble the phases of *samprajñāta-samādhi*. YS has utilized this term to introduce the other ascending level of *samādhi*, which is *nirbīja-samadhi*, the seedless state. YS explains the gradual process through which the meditator would reach this state. First “On attaining the utmost purity of the *nirvicāra* stage, there is a dawning of spiritual light” (YS I, 47). Here *nirvicāra* stage refers to equivalent state of *nirvitarka* in which reflection (*vicāra*) is absent. Then “Therein is direct cognition (*prajñā*), which holds the unalloyed Truth” (YS I, 48). This *prajñā* produces impressions (*samskāra*) which prevent the influences of previous impressions. However, towards the end even subtle impressions created by *prajñā* have to be abandoned. *Nirbīja-samādhi* is a state in which even those impressions are dropped. “On stoppage of even that impression, all ceasing *nirbīja* state (is attained)” (YS I, 51). At this stage, all modifications of mind (*citta vṛtti*), contents of mind (*pratyaya*), impressions created by those contents of mind (*samskāra*) and even impressions created by direct cognition (*prajñā*) are dropped. Taimni comments that at this level, the meditator transcends the realm of *prakṛti* altogether and reaches the realization of *puruṣa* (1961: 123). He further asserts,

“In the earlier stages of *Samprajñāta Samādhi* the dropping of the ‘seed’ leads the emergence of consciousness into the next subtler plane but after the *Asmitā* stage has been reached and the consciousness is centered on the Atmic plane, the dropping of the ‘seed’ will lead the emergence of consciousness into the plane of *Puruṣa* himself. The light which was up to this stage illuminates Itself, for it has withdrawn beyond the realm of these objects” (Taimni, 1961: 123).

YS in its fourth section refers to another *samādhi* called, “Dharma meghā”. *Yoga Bhāshya* explains, “...because the seeds of the subliminal-impressions have perished, there do not spring up for him any more presented ideas, – then the *Dharma meghā-samādhi* becomes his” (Woods, 1927: 341). It does not appear very different from the *Nirbīja-samādhi* in kind. However, this state is further characterized by the discriminative discernment (*viveka khyāti*) and constant passionlessness (*akusīth*) (YS IV, 29). The *Dharma meghā-samādhi* is the culmination of meditative process in YS.

PARALLELS

YS has been used as the handbook for the practice of meditative yoga in the classical Yoga tradition of Hinduism while Vism has served as the comprehensive guide book for the practice of meditation in the Theravada tradition of Buddhism. These two texts assume their significance in two different religious contexts and have been largely viewed by followers as exclusive to their tradition. However, a closer look at the definitions and stages of *samādhi* as explained by these texts show striking parallels.

YS explains the immediate prior stages of *samādhi* as *dhāraṇa* and *dhyāna*. *dhāraṇa* is primarily limiting mind's movement through fixing it on a chosen object of meditation. Vism recognizes a stage in which a mental image of the object of meditation appears in the meditator's mind, which is known as "the preliminary sign" (*parikamma-nimitta*). This sign is the result of fixing the mind on a chosen object of meditation for a considerable period of time. A close observation of these two explanations suggests that both texts refer to a similar stage that occurs in the beginning of the process of meditation. In referring to this stage, YS focuses on the aspect of meditator's role while Vism stresses the sharpening of the object of meditation in the meditator's mind. The next stage that Vism explains is the further brightening of the mental image of the meditation object. These bright and clear visions of the object, namely "learning sign" (*uggaha-nimitta*) and "counterpart sign" (*patibhāga-nimitta*) appear in the meditator's mind due to his continuous focus on it. YS recognizes *Dhyāna* as the next stage in which the meditator maintains the attention as an uninterrupted flow toward the object of meditation. Though it is not clear whether the scope of these stages mentioned in the two texts exactly match, it is evident again that the two texts place emphasis on different aspects of the same process. Due to this elaboration of different aspects by each text, these two explanations appear as profoundly complementary. By referring to YS, one can understand the subjective aspect of early stage of developing *samādhi* while with the help of Vism, one can comprehend the gradual transformation of the object of meditation in those stages. Two texts together provide a comprehensive picture of this beginning level of *samādhi*.

The most noted parallel of classical Yoga system and Buddhist tradition is that of *samprajñāta-samādhi* and four Buddhist Jhānas (Cousins, 1992; Bronkhorst, 1993; Crangle, 1994; Sarbacker, 2005). These two stages as presented in the two texts closely follow each other in both

content and process. *Samprajñāta-samādhi* is defined as having four characteristics: reasoning (*vitarka*), reflection (*vicāra*), bliss (*ānanda*) and sense of pure being (*asmitā*) (YS I, 17). The first *Jhāna* in Vism has five factors: applied thought (*vitakka*), sustained thought (*vicāra*), happiness (*pīti*), bliss (*sukha*), and unification of mind (*ekaggatā*) (Vism. IV, 106). The translation of these terms appear differently here but it is worth noticing the original Pāli and Sankrit terms employed here to refer to those factors.

<i>Samprajñāta-samādhi</i> (YS)	First <i>Jhāna</i> (Vism)
<i>Vitarka</i>	<i>Vitakka</i>
<i>Vicāra</i>	<i>Vicāra</i>
<i>Ānanda</i>	<i>Pīti</i>
<i>Asmitā</i>	<i>Sukha</i>
	<i>Ekaggatā</i>

The first two factors of each set refer to certain cognitive functions of the focused mind while latter factors refer to the affective dimension of the focused mind. Both *ānanda* in Sanskrit and *pīti* in Pāli mean happiness. *Sukha* in Pāli also refers to a level of happiness which is physically felt in meditation. *Pīti* is primarily felt at the mental level and *sukha* can be understood as physical counterpart of that happiness (Vism IV, 100). It seems that Vism elaborates both the mental and physical aspect of this factor while YS renders it in a single term. Interestingly the two texts differ in the last factor. *Asmitā* means pure consciousness of the existence of *puruṣa* (universal Self). YS presents it as “the identity or blending together, as it were, of the power of consciousness (*puruṣa*) with the power of cognition (*buddhi*)” (YS II, 6). However, *ekaggatā* in Vism means one-pointedness of mind or complete unification of mind with the object of meditation (Vism. IV, 108). Vism does not recognize such pure consciousness of a greater reality and only refers to the quality of mental state at that stage.

Lance S. Cousins examines references to the above factors of *jhāna* in early Buddhist sources in both Pāli and Sanskrit languages comparing them with the characteristics of *samprajñāta-samādhi* and argues that the Buddhist list of factors of *jhāna* has been modified in the Yoga system (Cousins, 1992: 149). Though it is easy to see that both the traditions have been influenced by each other, it is not possible, with certainty, to decide which precedes which in its influence on the other. However, Cousins’s remarks that the Yoga system tends to have a cosmological orientation as opposed to psychological biases of the Buddhist explanation is insightful. Vism explains four stages of *jhāna* with a psychological orientation while YS (and its commentaries) tends

to present them with a cosmological orientation. As explained earlier, four phases of *samprajñāta-samādhi* are explained with reference to the four layers of *guṇas* (characteristics) of objects. In each phase, the meditator penetrates into those layers and finally comprehends the substratum of the object (Taimni, 1961: 180). Vism in its explanation of the four *jhānas* only points out the psychological refinements occurring in the meditator's mind in each stage.

It is quite interesting that in explaining the prior proximate stages of *samādhi*, the focus of Vism is on the refinement of the meditative object while the emphasis of YS is on the subjective aspect: the refinement of the meditator's attention. In explaining the first stages of *samādhi*, the focus of the texts seem to interchange. Both texts present gradual stages of *samādhi* as moving from gross levels to subtle levels at each stage. Vism explains this transition from grossness to subtlety as changes in psychological states while YS tends to focus on transition of the object moving to subtler objects. Different emphases of the two texts in presenting different stages of *samādhi* allow the reader to use them as complementary texts.

Asamprañjāta-samādhi in YS is a level of *samādhi* which is free from cognitive and affective functions of the mind. This is a moving from "gross" levels of *samādhi* to a "subtler" level through dropping the four mental functions of the *samprañjāta-samādhi*. The term, *prajñā* used in both names primarily means, "Cognition," while *samprañjāta-samādhi* is named as such referring the element of cognition that underlies it. The next level of Samadhi, *asamprañjāta-samādhi* has been characterized primarily by the absence of the element of cognition together with other factors of the *samprañjāta-samādhi*. Yoga Bhāshya explains that this level of *samādhi* is not "conscious" of meditation objects (Woods, 1927: 42). In the scheme of the four Buddhist *jhānas*, each ascending *jhāna* drops certain factors of the preceding *jhāna* and the fourth *jhāna* is a state in which both cognitive and affective factors of the early *jhānas* are absent (Vism IV 183). Accordingly, both the *asamprañjāta-samādhi* and the fourth *jhāna* refer to a similar transformation of mind. Though the exact categorization of these states may not precisely match, it is clear that both point to the same dimension of mental development.

The four immaterial *jhānas* in Vism are higher levels of *samādhi* which go beyond the usual objects of meditation to direct the mind on objectless space, consciousness, nothingness. Taimni interprets the *nirbīja-samādhi* as objectless meditation (1961: 115). If we follow Taimni's interpretation, the four immaterial *jhāna* in Vism appear very

close to *nirbīja-samādhi* in terms of the field of focus. However, the parallels are less obvious in the later levels of *samādhi* than in the early levels.

The notion of subliminal impressions (*samskāra/sankhāra*) is a central theme in both YS and Vism in explaining the progression of meditation and the final liberation. Ascending levels of *samādhi* in both texts aim at gradual suppression and consequent elimination of subliminal impressions of mind. In YS this goal is accomplished in *nirbīja-samādhi* and in Vism, the complete elimination of subliminal impressions is achieved in *nirodha-samāpatti* (also known as *saññāvedaitanirodha*).

IDIOSYNCRASIES

Despite the close similarities found in the presentations of levels of *samādhi* in the two texts, each text's classifications of *samādhi* and terminology are heavily based on the larger doctrinal framework that each text shares. The purpose of developing *samādhi* in both texts is to overcome suffering (*duhka /dukkha*). However, two texts have different views about how suffering arises. YS is in the view that suffering arises because of the false identification of *puruṣa* (Immutable and Universal Self) with the manifested mental processes of the individual, *prakṛti*. Therefore, the goal in YS is to isolate the *puruṣa* from *prakṛti*. The classifications and explanations of *samādhi* in YS are presented to direct the meditator to transcend *prakṛti* and to experience the "isolation" of *puruṣa*. Yoga Bhāṣya interprets it, "...together with subliminal-impressions which are conducive to Isolation, the mind-stuff ceases [from its task]. When it ceases, the Self abides in himself and is therefore called pure and liberated." (Woods, 1927:98). In employing these notions of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, YS shares the doctrinal basis of Sāṅkhya philosophy. Vism, in contrast, sees that suffering arises due to craving (*taṇhā*) which is sprung from the ignorance (*avijjā*) of the selflessness of phenomena (*anattā*). The goal of *samādhi* in Vism is to facilitate the realization and experience of selflessness (*anttā*). Being a representative text of Buddhist philosophy, Vism does not postulate a *puruṣa* like Universal Self. The presentation of *samādhi* in Vism is organized in a way that guides the meditator to come to the realization of selflessness and consequently, to the experience of the extinguishing of suffering (*nibbāna*) through transcending craving and ignorance. Other than experiencing the very cessation of suffering, Vism does not present any level of *samādhi* which corresponds to a transcendental reality. Moreover, the concept of *samādhi* in YS encompasses the ultimate goal, the achieving *kaivalya* (isolation, freedom). In Vism, the concept of *samādhi* does not fully absorb its ultimate goal, *Nibbāna* (extinguishing,

freedom). *Samādhi* is the proximate cause of the insight that leads one to experience *Nibbāna*.

Though the similarities of definitions and levels of *samādhi* are evident in both texts and often explanations of each text can shed light on the other text in a complementary way, each text's presentation of *samādhi* cannot be fully comprehended out of its doctrinal framework. Both texts make use of a number of technical terms to describe the process of developing *samādhi*. Those terms are again drawn from their respective doctrinal frameworks. YS employs terms such as *guna*, *liṅga*, *aliṅga*, *bīja*, *svarūpa* which cannot be fully explained without referring to the Sāṅkhya philosophy. For example, in describing *vairāgya* (passionlessness), YS says, "This passionlessness is highest when discernment of the Self (*puruṣa*) results in thirstlessness for qualities (*guṇa*)" (Woods, 1927: 37). For one to understand this *sutra*, he should be familiar with Sāṅkhya concept of *guṇas*. Similarly, Vism uses the terms such as *sati*, *saññā*, *vedanā*, *upekkha*. In describing the highest level of *samādhi*, Vism defines it as the cessation of *saññā* and *vedanā*. Without a grasp of Buddhist concepts of *saññā* and *vedanā*, it is not possible to understand the full significance of this level of *samādhi*.

Avidyā/Avijjā is a common term that appeared in both YS and Vism. However, the meaning of the term in each text is not exactly the same. The term receives its specific meaning within the doctrinal background of each text. YS initially defines *avidyā* as "taking the non-eternal, impure, evil and non-*ātman* to be eternal, pure, good and *ātman* respectively" (YS II, 5). This phrase is interpreted to mean that *āvidyā* stands for the misrecognition of manifested matter (*prakṛti*), which are non-eternal, impure, evil and non-*ātman* with the transcendental Reality (*puruṣa*) which is eternal, pure, good and *ātman* (Taimni, 1961:141). *Avidyā*, in YS, means the ignorance of essential nature of transcendental Reality, *puruṣa*. However, In Vism, the meaning of *avidyā/avijjā* is tied to the Buddhist notion of suffering (*dukkhā*). In this context, *avijjā* means ignorance of nature, origin, cessation of suffering and the way to end suffering. The mechanism of suffering is the heart of understanding *avijjā* in Vism and the notion of Transcendental Reality assumes no significance there.

CONCLUSION

Both Visuddhimagga and Yoga Sutra present a systematic treatment of the meditative state, *samādhi* demonstrating striking parallels. The two texts stand very close to each other both in definitions and gradual levels

of *samādhi*. Though classifications and boundary levels of *samādhi* in each text do not coincide with each other, they throw a significant light on the similarity in dimensions of the meditative process. One of the reasons for these striking parallels could be that both Buddhism and the classical Yoga system grew in the same soil and influenced each other over centuries. Moreover, both traditions aim at a similar soteriological goal. Due to the different emphasis that each text places on certain aspects while keeping a similar orientation, the two texts together enable a better understanding of the meditative process in general. However, in appreciating these parallels, we should be conscious about the doctrinal background of the two texts. Even the influences they receive from each other and common goals were again conditioned by their overall worldviews and doctrinal standpoints. The explanation that each text presents can benefit the other. But no presentation of *samādhi* in one text can be considered as directly analogous to the other. At best these texts can function as complementary texts but not completely interchangeable. This may be the truth of various comparable religious and mystic traditions.

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NOTES

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- ¹ All references to *Yoga Sutra* follow the numbers of the sutras and the translation of I.K. Taimni (1961), if not otherwise mentioned.
- ² All references to *Visuddhimagga* follow the passage numbers and the translation of Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli (1956).

“Imperfectly known period of transmission” or ‘Dark Period’

Russel Bowden

B.C. Law in his ‘A History of Pali Literature’ (Varanasi Indica Books 2000) states that ‘*In between the closing of the Pali canon and the beginning of the great commentaries and chronicles we had to take note of an **imperfectly known period of transmission** which has become remarkable by the production of so great a work of literary merit and doctrinal importance as the *Milindha Pañha*, occupying as it does, the foremost place for its lucid, elegant and rhythmical prose style in the whole range of Sanskrit and Sanskritic literature*’ (p.629) and again ‘*In between the closing of the Pali canon and the writing of the Pali commentaries by Buddhadatta, Buddhaghosa and Dhammapala, there is a short but **dark period** of development of Pali literature which has not as yet engaged adequate attention of scholars*’ (p.349). Such statements from a distinguished Pali scholar cannot be permitted to go uninvestigated particularly for what this period might contribute to our understanding of the reliability or otherwise of the words and messages communicated by canonical texts as the transmission agents of the *dhamma*. Investigations, over a period of almost 900 years [483 B.C. to 410 A.D.], using four primary clues provided by Law as ‘landmarks’ proved to be less than easy because of (a) this being an ‘imperfectly known period’ and (b) the revelation of discrepancies produced results suggesting that not only might Law have been wrong but that the opposite to a ‘dark period’ of ‘bright sunlight’ possibly heralding the birth, development and ‘flowering’ of Sinhala literature founded on the Buddha’s Words and His Teachings are what these conveyed. These are all detailed and then assessed as obstacles or benefits to the reliability and integrity of the transmission processes of the Pāli Theravada Tipiṭaka.

LAW’S QUOTATIONS

The quotation in the title above is taken from the eminent Indian Buddhist scholar of the 1930’s and 1940’s – B. C Law – who writes [A] “In between the closing of the Pāli canon and the beginning of the great commentaries and chronicles¹ we had to take note of *an imperfectly*

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known period of transmission which has become remarkable by the production of so great a work of literary merit and doctrinal importance as the *Milinda Pañha*, occupying, as it does, the foremost place for its lucid, elegant, and rhythmical prose style in the whole range of Sanskrit and Sanskritic literature.” (Law, 1933; 629)

Law made an earlier, and less revealing, reference to this period [B] ‘In between the closing of the Pāli canon and the writing of the Pāli commentaries by Buddhadatta, Buddhaghosa, and Dhammapala, there is a *short but dark period* of development of Pāli literature which has not as yet engaged adequate attention of scholars. Broadly defined, this period extends from the beginning of the Christian era to the close of the 4th century A.D.’ (Law, 1933; 349) which indicates Law’s first dichotomy / discrepancy! Although it must be pointed out that a ‘period of transition’ and a ‘period of development of Pāli literature’ are not entirely synonymous. We intend to examine these opinions but not before noting some apparent discrepancies and considering how significant are these

DATINGS

In any historical examination of a long period of the transmissions of texts, [a part of which is being undertaken here] particularly those associated with events not recorded accurately as facts in any reliable history and many occurring in the period when writing down of canonical texts was, by traditions of the times, not permitted and writing for other purposes was more the exception than the rule, any reference to ‘an imperfectly known period’ cannot be permitted to pass without investigation.

To place this ‘imperfectly known period’ (or what I have referred to loosely as the ‘dark period’) in a precise time-frame or in any exact chronological period, despite Law’s attempt, is far from easy. Even Law, who identified it, is frugal with his application of specific dates [with the exception of the ‘B’ quotation]. In addition the two quotations provide dating that are not in harmony – i.e. the period’s possible commencement with the closing of the Pāli Canon and the beginning of the Christian era. These are two events separated by 247 years! Nevertheless it is only when more precise dates have been arrived at that one will be able to make any comments on the effects, if any, the activities in this period might have had on the transmission processes of the Pāli canon itself. So before we progress further we need to obtain a much clearer picture of the dates pertaining to Law’s two allegations of an ‘imperfectly known period of transmission’ [my ‘dark period’].

Law provides four primary clues [or ‘landmarks’] in the first reference quoted [‘A’] to more exact dates; the first is the ‘closing of the Pāli canon’; the second is the date for the creation of the *Milinda Pañha*; the third and fourth are the dates associated with the composition of the commentaries and the epic chronicles of Ceylon. In the second quotation [‘B’] he refers more simply to just two – the first is very clear and unchallengeable – the commencement of the Christian era and the second almost equally simple – the close of the 4th century A.D. i.e. circa 590 A.D. With the alleged commencement there is a discrepancy of 247 years between the dates but the possible ‘closure’ dates appear, at first sight, to be more contiguous.

The simple ‘B’ quotation, therefore, is the easiest for it is self-explanatory and requires no further comment except to point out that it serves as a useful over-all and broader time-frame in which to examine, in more specific details, Law’s four other ‘landmarks’ in ‘A’ and some others.

Turning now to the fuller [‘A’] quotation.

PĀLI CANON - CLOSURE

‘The closing of the Pāli canon’ is the easiest to which to fix a date – 246 B.C. Most scholars generally accept the Canon’s closure to have been in, or soon after, the completion of the Third Buddhist Council [with the exception of Moggaliputta Tissa’s ‘*Kathavatthu*’] after which the Emperor Asoka in 247 B.C. sent his son, the Arahant Mahinda to Sri Lanka. As N. A. Jayawickrama has so pertinently suggested the Emperor would not have sent the Pāli Theravada *Tipiṭaka* as a gift to the king of Lanka, had it then not been considered to have been a completed compilation.

MILINDA PAÑHA - CREATION

Turning our attention now the *Milinda Pañha* one notes that its creation is not open to any definite and agreed date. Von Hinuber is circumspect suggesting ‘between 100 B. C. and 200 A.D. (von Hinuber, 1996; 85) although Akira is more precise suggesting 150 to 140 B.C. (Akira, 1990; 223) Others however are more cautious - ‘The original Pali Milindapañha must have been completed before the fourth century A.C.’ (Jayawardhana, 1994; 94), and ‘the Milindapañha written at the beginning of the Christian era’ (Abeynayake, 1984; 15). However Malalasekera asserts that ‘It is believed that the book [Milinda Pañha] was compiled later than the time of the conversation.’ (Malalasekera.

DPPN II; 637) by which he means that alleged to have been held by King Menander with Bhikkhu Nāgasena. Jumping ahead one finds that ‘It is reasonable to assume that the Greek king reigned in or about the first century B.C.’ (Bharat Singh Upadhaya *in* Bapat, 1956; 173). The ‘Greek king’ most scholars seem to agree was Menander, a satrap and the son of King Demetrius, (ca. 189-167) (Bodhi. 1993; 4) who had been left in charge of the province of Bactria when Alexander, bowing to the requirements imposed on him by his own army in 324 B.C.² returned some of it back westwards by sea whilst he commanded the remainder for the march back on which he died in 323 B.C. in Babylon. (Cartledge, 2004; 192) History had, unknowingly, been made when, as Bikkhu Bodhi so perceptively points out, “The *Milinda* is the product of the encounter of two great civilizations – Hellenistic Greece and Buddhist India” (Bodhi, 1993; 13). Bhikkhu Bodhi proposes circa 150 B.C. (Mendis, 1993: 2) which may be exact but if it is not it suggests an acceptable compromise between the alternative dates offered by other scholars!

We now turn our attention to the last two of Law’s four ‘guidelines’ or ‘landmarks’ as to dates – the first - the commentaries (*aṭṭhakathā[s]*) and secondly - the chronicles (*vaṃsa[s]*).

COMMENTARIES

When precisely and by whom these earliest *aṭṭhakathā[s]* (commentaries) had been created history and scholarship have not thus far clearly revealed. Most scholars [Adikaram, Moro, Endo] it should be noted, seem content to accept their division into two categories – the first being those composed in India and brought to Sri Lanka along with the relatively recently-agreed canonical texts in the memories of the four colleagues who accompanied the Arahant Mahinda circa 246 B.C. Tradition has it that ‘the *Sīhalatṭhakathā* comprised the Commentaries brought by Mahinda to Ceylon and preserved there in the Sinhalese language’ (Adikaram, 1946; 11). It is these and any fore-runners to them on which their contents might have been founded that need here engage our attention.

Prior to this it is necessary to note that the scholarship and intellectual excellence evidenced today in some of their contents point with little doubt to their having had some association with the works of the Indian *bhānaka[s]* [although their compositions are not attributed primarily or solely to them as these monks’ primary responsibilities were concerned with the protection of the Words that served to communicate the integrity and truth of the Doctrine (*Dhamma*)]. Nevertheless it is generally agreed

that these *bhānaka*[s] and their *confrères* worked in the 236 year period from soon after the completion of the First Buddhist Council – that is soon after 483 - through the periods between the Second and Third Council that is until approximately 247 B.C. All we can state with certainty is that they pre-date 246 B. C. [the date of the arrival in Sri Lanka of Mahinda and his five companions with the only-then recently-approved texts of the Canon] fixed in their memories and these earlier-composed commentaries probably created closer to this latter rather than the former date. [However additions there later were – to the Mahā or Mūla atṭhakathā and Kurundi atṭhakathā - which must have been either later rather compositions or have had additions included into them - a fact proven today by the evidence that they contain Sri Lankan references indicating that they can only have been finally completed to reflect something akin to the texts available to us today after their arrival on the island.]

Further examination quickly makes it apparent that it is not these earliest commentaries to which Law is referring because their dates [post-483 through to pre-247 B.C.] then almost entirely pre-date the commencement of this ‘dark’ period and that cannot be! So clearly Law’s reference to any ‘beginning of the great commentaries and chronicles’ cannot refer to these! As a consequence we need to switch our attention then to the ‘later’ and not to the ‘beginning of the great commentaries’ and consequently concentrate now attention on the so-called ‘Five Great Commentators’ (circa 400 to 550 A.D.) of whom the first was Buddhadatta and the second and most significant Buddhaghosa. Between them they were responsible for 21 or 22 creations. Only two of the five were from Sri Lanka the others coming from India. With regard to Buddhaghosa the dates for which we are searching are traceable through the author’s own writings. Buddhaghosa himself states of the *Visuddhimagga*, his ‘trial’ text for the monks of the Mahāvihāra ‘it was begun by me in the twentieth year of the reign of peace of the King Sirinivāsa (Of Glorious Life)³ ... it was finished in the twenty-first year’ (Ñānamoli, Bhikkhu. 1956; xvii).

So we can date Law’s end of the ‘dark period’ to his ‘beginning of the great commentaries’ and - assuming that Buddhaghosa arrived from India in Sri Lanka in the year preceding his commencement of work - as 429 A.D. or 430 A.D. Any doubts about the date of its conclusion can best be allayed from the facts that the later compositions of the Commentaries achieved eminence and significance with the 21 / 22 creations of the ‘Five Great Commentators’ after which there exist doubts as to their continuation with Adikaram theorising that a remark in Buddhaghosa’s ‘*Suttavibhanga-vaṇṇanā*’ indicates that before his departure circa 450 A.D. he states ‘that the number of the *Bhānaka*[s] at

the time in question was comparatively small’ and that soon after that they seem to have disappeared from the scene. However ‘it is not possible to say when it came to an end.’ (Adikaram, 1946; 11-32). Norman associated himself with this theory on the grounds that ‘the canon had been written down for some hundreds of years’ (Norman, 1997; 48) so that the need that had brought the system into existence had passed and therefore their redundancy had removed them from the scene. It is an opinion not shared by Godakumbure who [in 1955 – that is 9 years after Adikaram and Norman 51 years after him] alleges ‘The Sinhalese commentaries, however, did not go out of use as soon as the Pali version were made; and from the surviving citations from them we know that they were in use among Sinhalese writers until at least the tenth century’ quoting as his authority ‘Quotations from the Helatuva (= Pāli: Sīhaḷatṭhakathā) are to be found in the Dhampiyāṭuvāvāgāṭapadaya, ed. Jayatilake, p. 103, p. 115, p.122’. (Godakumbura, 1955; 4)]

Nevertheless the earliest commentaries although not those to which Law wished to draw our attention – were without doubt those created in India in the 236 year period between the First Buddhist Council in 483 B.C. and the departure with the texts of whatever had been composed by then in the memories of Mahinda and his five companions in 246 B.C. but not at the commencement of this period. For ease of further references one might select [not too arbitrarily] a date such as 315 B.C.

Concentrating our attention further on these ‘earliest commentaries’ Law continues [‘Secondary Landmarks’ see Table 1] “The Pali commentaries, as we have them, were produced at a period far beyond the Mauryan and Sūnga, the Kānya and the Kūshāna.”⁴

Law continues “The Augustan period⁵ of Pali literature began with ‘the closing of the Pali canon’ and closed with ‘the beginning of the great commentaries and chronicles’. The former, as already indicated, is relatively easy to date [to circa 247 B.C.] whilst the latter two are less easily and precisely dated. Indeed difficult is it to be certain as to which of these many compositions Law is alluding.

CHRONICLES

The dating of these earliest Chronicles [*vaṃsa*] is comparatively easy. The earliest was the Dīpa-vaṃsa which Geiger has suggested was founded on an earlier *aṭṭhakathā* (commentary) known as the *Aṭṭakathā-Mahāvaṃsa* (Geiger, 1912; x) unfortunately no longer extant.⁶ Geiger reckoned this work to have been composed circa 380 A.D. [The later and

far more authoritative Mahā-vaṃsa Geiger suggests was “then a new treatment of the same thing, distinguished from the Dip. by greater skill in the employment of the Pāli language, by more artistic composition and by a more liberal use of the material contained in the original work” (Geiger, 1912, xi). Its author Mahānāma created it circa 520 A.D. Its continuation - the Cūla-vaṃsa - was composed later by Dhammakitti circa 1200 A.D. However of the earlier Dīpa-vaṃsa or its progenitor the *Atthakathā-Mahāvamsa* today nothing is known of the former’s author nor is anything known about the date of this *Atthakathā*.]

ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE

In an attempt to provide further support to secure the earlier and better boundaries for these dates, we should consider an earlier quotation of Law’s (Law, 1933; 629) “The Pali piṭakas coupled with the Jain *āgama* texts” [which, in order to date them, were in *Ardhamaghadi* (Pischel, 1981; 18) - an opinion apparently supported by Colebrook who ‘called the language of the canon of the Jainas to be Māghadī’ (Pischel, 1981; 20). It seems to be dateable to circa the 600’s B. C.⁷

Law’s quotation continues “and some of the Sanskrit treatises like Pānini’s grammar” [attributed to a wide-ranging period between 500 and 450 B.C (Sastri, N Aiyaswami, 1956 ‘2500 years of Buddhism’; 308), and to 350 B.C. (Winternitz, ca 1907; 36) Law then continues further with a reference to “Kātyāyana’s *Vārtika*” [Katyāyana alleged to have been the *gotra* name of Vararuci, the creator of one of the oldest Prākṛit grammars ‘Prākṛitprakākāra’, and Vārttikākāra who was ‘not simple a dry grammarian, but also a poet like his successor Patanjali and his predecessor Pānini’ (Pischel; 1900; 42). Vararuci was a contemporary of Kālidāsa – but this author’s dates are alleged, not too helpful as they are, to range from the 1st or 2nd century B.C. to between 450 and 600 A.D.] i.e. anywhere in this 700 or 800 year period!

Law continues “Patanjali’s Mahābhāṣya, and the contemporary inscriptions and coin-legends fill up a very important gap in history of ancient Indian humanity. The particular literature with which we are concerned developed under aegis of religion which was destined to be a great civilizing influence in the East, highly ethical in tone, dignified in the forms of expression, dramatic in setting, direct in narration, methodical in argument, and mechanical in arrangement. This wealth of literary output was shown forth in perspicuity and grandeur in the garb of a new literary idiom having a place midway between the Vedic Sanskrit

Bowden: “Imperfectly known period of transmission” or “Dark Period”

[some time around the 500’s B.C.] and Ardhamāgadhi on the other”
[circa 600 B.C.]

‘DECADENT’

The further exact identification of these closing dates is not made any easier by the fact that Law continues ‘The period which followed was a decadent one, and it became noted only for the compilation of some useful manuals, some books of grammar and lexicography chiefly in imitation of some Sanskrit works of India, and a few metrical compositions exhibiting the wealth of Ceylonese poetical imagination and plagiarism” (Law; 1933, 630) which is a most elegant - but back-handed - comment of this author! We shall investigate this allegation further.

‘DARK PERIOD’ – “IMPERFECTLY KNOWN PERIOD OF TRANSMISSION”

Identification of Law’s ‘imperfectly known period of transmission’ -
Landmarks / Signposts

Post 600 B.C.
500-350 B.C.
350-100 B.C.
100-001 B.C.
001-150 A.D.
150-300 A.D.
300-550 A.D.
550>>>

A

Primary Landmarks

1. Closing Pāli Canon	246
2. Beginning Great Commentators	315
3. Beginning Great Chronicle	380
4. Milinda Pañha	150

Secondary Landmarks

5. Beyond Mauryan	232
6. Sunya	68
7. Kanva	70

8. Kushana	129
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Additional Evidence

9. Jain agamas	post 600
10. Ardhamagadhi	post 600
11. Panini's Grammar	500-350
12. Katyāyana's 'Vartika'	200-100

B

13. Beginning Christian era	000-001
14. Close 4 th cent	599

Table 1

THE PERIOD

The range of dates in which to identify this period of the 'imperfectly known' is very wide – too wide to be of use – stretching, as it does 1,000 years, from the year 600 B.C. to the 'close of the 4th century A.D.' We can rule out the relatively early post-600 B.C. as being too early and not even credible because it pre-dates the Buddha's Enlightenment and His first Teaching by almost 80 years. The date for Panini's Grammar too can be similarly ruled out because Sanskrit in these early years, until after the schism that preceded the Second Buddhist Council in 384 B.C., had no relevance to the transmission of the canon in Pāli. We are consequently left with dates [referenced in 'A' - in detail - and 'B' - far less detailed] commencing in 232 B.C. (the end of Emperor Asoka's reign and the Mauryan dynasty) which is a significant date given his authorization to his son to convey the Pāli Tipiṭaka to Sri Lanka, 14 years earlier, in 246 B.C. The other Law criterion date – here concocted to mark the conclusion of this period – is either the created-date of the Dīpavaṃsa. in 380 A.D. or the starting date for Buddhaghosa's first commentary circa 430 A.D i.e. a difference of 50 years!

In summary from this *mélange* of facts and dates it seems, from most scholars' opinions, as if the 'landmark' events referred to by Law, to which serious attention should be given, are his –

Commencement of the 'dark' period –

- (a) 'closing of the Pāli Canon' - 247 B.C. [and the end of the Mauryan dynasty in 232 B.C. – bracketed together for

Bowden: “Imperfectly known period of transmission” or “Dark Period”

convenience to provide an ‘average’, ‘working’ date of 240 B.C.]

Middle -

(b) ‘date for the creation of the Milinda Pañha’ - 150 B.C

Conclusion -

(c) composition dates of the –

(i) commentaries - pre-dating 247 B.C [So, to provide a single ‘working’ date for convenience only] one might use 315 or a ‘rounded’ date - 300 B.C.

OR

430 A.D. and Buddhaghosa’s start on commentaries.

(ii) chronicles 380 A.D [Geiger’s date for the Dīpavaṃsa]

Law’s theory that ‘The period which followed was a decadent one . . .’ therefore seems, on the surface, to have commenced in 246 B.C. and continued until 380 A.D. (chronicle) or 430 A.D (Buddhaghosa’s works) despite his allegation in the second [B] quotation that it commenced at the start of the Christian era and concluded in the early 4th century A.D. [The last a date with which we do agree]. It is, therefore, a long period totaling 670 years the dates of which I contend are still too wide apart and embrace too long a period.

Far more significantly it includes the ‘discrepancies’ to which I earlier referred. Two of these are the most important earlier events in Sri Lanka associated with the transmission of the Pāli canon. – its writing down in 23 B.C. (or more likely 86 B.C. (Smithers, 1894; 60) [which date we shall use henceforth] and between 341 and 370 A.D. the translation out of Pāli and into Sinhala of some selected *suttas*. These represent major events in the canon’s transmission which cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be labeled ‘decadent.’ (Law, 1933; 630)

EVENTS

Unchallenged remain Law’s earliest dates. With no fully-agreed canon in existence to protect [until the Third Council in 247 B.C.] and no manuscripts containing the canon because of *srti* prohibitions available

until its redaction at Āloka Vihāra in 86 [or 23] B.C., such a date as 247 B.C. can be permitted to remain relatively un-contested.

After 86 B.C. and the redaction at Alu-vihāra Malalasekera avers that the Tipiṭaka in the ‘Āloka Vihāra edition’ began to become more widely available in monasteries throughout Sri Lanka ‘Manuscripts of the Alu-vihara edition were soon made and deposited in the Mahā-vihāra and other principal temples of the island’ (Malalasekera, 1928; 47).⁸ Thus providing strong evidence for the fact that the dark period of decadence could possibly have ended with the 86 B.C. redaction because recorded and agreed events would not have permitted its continuation after that date. We should recall however that this is greatly at variance with Law’s contended date of the early 4th century A.D. which is 161 years earlier.

Despite advantages accruing from writing down scholars seem to agree that these were unfortunately compromised by a reduction in the efficacy of the monks comprehending the Pāli language. As a consequence translations of some of the *suttas* by Mahadhammakathi between 341 and 370 A.D. would have further served to encourage access to the Theravada Tipiṭaka. Consequently it is difficult to conclude that between 341 to 370 A.D. there could have been any continuation of a period of ‘darkness’ and decadence. On the contrary one might, quite correctly, assume that these events heralded the very opposite – the birth, growth and development of a literature in Sinhala more readily available to those interested in accessing it and especially works founded on the Buddha’s Words and His Teachings that these conveyed.

In addition and in spite of these facts – but somewhat strangely in the context of Law’s earlier two quotations - he asserts ‘There is sufficient evidence to prove that Sinhalese developed as a vernacular with its wealth of literature as early as the 2nd century B.C.’ (Law, 1933; 630) This ‘squares’ well and relates satisfactorily with what Law has earlier asserted i.e. that this ‘dark’ period commenced with the ‘closing of the Pāli canon’ generally agreed to have been in 247 B.C.

The relatively short period of this 161 years representing the first portion (247 to 86 B.C.) of this period could not however, by any legitimate criteria, be classified as a barren and decadent period. The canon, in India, had just about been concluded to be followed almost immediately by Moggaliputta Tissa’s work, most significant to the Theravādins, his Kathāvattu. Sri Lanka was embracing Buddhism, the king’s nephew, Ariṭṭha, was circa 220 B.C, being ordained as the first Sri Lanka monk and the Lankan *bhānakas* thereafter were being established. Soon after that monks named in the *Thera paramparā* successions were to appear

[refer to Adikāram (1946; 59), Law (1933; 53) and Malalasekera, 1928; 29, 37)] and were to continue and continue to be identified until approx 400 A.D. Hardly one might assess a ‘short but dark period’ where decadence was prevalent – in these examples quoted here - very much the opposite!

‘FLOWERING’ OF SINHALA LITERATURE

In addition to these conclusions must be factored in what many scholars [most commenting later than Law in 1933] refer to as a period in which Sinhalese literature ‘flowered’. Unfortunately there exists little agreement amongst them as to when this might have been because their choices extend over more than a millennium! Adikaram [in 1945] identifies it earlier than any others placing it in the reigns of Mahacūli Mahatissa (17 B.C. to 3 A.D.) and terminating with Bhatika Abhaya (38 to 66 A.D.). Malalasekera [in 1928 - i.e. pre-dating Law] places it in two periods – in the reign of Buddhadasa (341 to 370 A.D.) and the last in the reign of Parakramabāhu (1161 to 1197 A.D.). Godakumbura (1953) also has two periods – in the reign of Mahinda IV (957 to 991 A.D.) and that of Parakramabāhu II (1153 to 1186 A.D.), Gunawardana (1978) from Sena I’s reign (833 to 853 A.D.) to the 1200’s. Law, himself, dates it from the 2nd century B.C. to 420 A.D. not surprisingly!! The point to notice is that in some cases the proposed dates for the ‘flowering’ fall plumb into the middle of what might be construed as Law’s ‘dead’ period of ‘decadence’!!!

Thus in these possible dates we can dispense with Malalasekera’s second period [1161-1197], Godakumbura’s two [957-991 and 1153-1186] and Gunawardana’s [833-853 and 1200s] leaving us with Adikāram’s 17 B.C. to 3 A.D. and 38 to 66 A.D. and Malalasekera’s first - 341 to 370 A.D. - and Law’s B. C. 2nd century to 420 A.D. The point to notice is that these dates in some instances coincide reasonably well with the alleged ‘flowering’ of Sinhala literature whilst others coincide with major events such as the redaction of the canon and translations of parts of it out of Pāli into Sinhala thus providing, it can [and here is] argued, strong proof for the authenticity of this ‘possible’ period.

RESOLUTION

If the date of 240 B.C. is accepted for the commencement and sometime between 374 [the Dīpavaṃsa’ creation] and 430 A.D [Buddhaghosa’s commentary] for the ending of this ‘dark period’ as well as providing the contexts in which the 2 major events occurred, as well as the significant

events that occurred in it that relate to the processes of transmission of the Pāli Theravāda Tipiṭaka, then four questions arise –

- (a) was Law correct in his assertions that a ‘dark’ period did exist and
- (b) that it was represented by a period of ‘decadence’? or
- (c) is it now impossible [Law being long dead] to arrive at any conclusions as to the correctness or incorrectness of his assertions, or
- (d) that he was quite simply wrong in these assertions.

Finally whichever of these alternatives one is inclined to support what, if any, effects did the selected alternatives represent for the transmission processes of the Pāli Theravāda Tipiṭaka?

DEDUCTIONS

A number of deductions from these facts and this plethora of dates can be made. I believe the first is the elimination of the later period i.e. from the redaction say in 87 B.C. to 370 A.D because after the first date the canonical texts had been transferred safely to documentary sources thus increasing their availabilities and the last date - after which some of the canon had been made available in Sinhala so that its contents could be that more easily studied. Also we cannot ignore Adikāram’s and other authors’ contentions that Sinhalese literature ‘flowered’ between 17 B.C. and 66 A.D. which would seem to be in direct contravention of Law’s theory that ‘In between the closing of the Pāli canon and the beginning of the great commentaries and chronicles we had to take note of *an imperfectly known period* of transition ...’ It would be unbelievable to think that after the two momentous events of writing down and translations that a period not of darkness but instead of intellectual and religious light did not dawn and that was manifest in works of literature in Sinhala. A belief confirmed by many reliable scholars such as Adikāram, Malalasekera, Godakumbura, etc.

CONCLUSIONS

Readers will draw their own conclusions as to what to believe from these facts and deductions.

I, in my turn, tend to think (a) that Law was not correct in his assertion that a ‘dark’ period did exist; (b) he was incorrect also in believing that a period of decadence occurred. [That ‘decadence’ did later descend on

Buddhism in Sri Lanka; Gunawardana - the effects of kings’ beneficence on the clergy; Malalasekera – Vaitulya heresies (56) and Mahasena’s royal edict prohibiting support for the Mahāvihāra monks (59); Godakumbura and his assignation of the times of literary excellence to later than Mahinda IV all taken together plainly provide evidence that such situations did later come into existence]. However the majority of these were not in the specific period under investigation. Too much progress [writing down and *suttas*’ translations; evidence of the ‘flowering’ of literature; the speedy spread of Buddhism; the emergence of a Lankan *sangha* and *bhānaka* traditions; the discoveries of scholarship and scholarly activities of Buddhaghosa etc] all provide further collaborative evidence to support the opinion as to the incorrectness of Law’s assertions.

Without these having been proved to have been correct, of course, there can be no consequent effects on the transmission processes of the Pāli Theravada Tipiṭaka.

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NOTES

- ¹ What would have been helpful would have been Law’s identification of the ‘great commentaries’ i.e. does he mean those from the so-called Five (two Indian and three Sri Lankan) Great Commentators? I suspect not. The ‘great commentaries / chronicles cannot be more easily identified I believe.
- ² By which time he had reached the River Beas that today flows through the Indian Punjabi city of Amritsar.
- ³ King Sirinivāsa is generally held to have been King Mahānāma who reigned 410 to 431 (Nicholas, 1961; 345). If the Visuddhimagga was commenced in the 20th year that would have been 430 A.D. and Buddhaghosa would have completed it in 431 A.D.
- ⁴ The Mauryan Empire speedily lost authority after the death of Emperor Asoka circa 232 B.C. It was finally destroyed by the general Puṣyamitra, approximately 52 years later, in 180 B.C.E.. He it was who founded the Śūnga dynasty that lasted until circa 68 A.D. The Kānva dynasty was founded by Vasudeva in approx 70 B.C.E. and lasted 45 years (i.e. until circa 25 B.C.). The Kūshāna dynasty, the strongest and largest since Asoka’s Mauryan, was first established in Bactria circa 129 B.C.E. and lasted into the 2nd century C.E. (i.e. 150 A.D.) under king Kaniska. (Akira, 1990; 223-232). Noticeably all these dates possess some relationships – however loosely – with Law’s alleged ‘closing of the Pāli canon’ (Law, 1933; 629).
- ⁵ ‘Augustan’ is a strange phrase to employ in this context - although certainly not incorrect – because it essentially alludes to European literatures where the dictionary (Concise Oxford, 1964) suggests ‘Connected with reign of Augustus Caesar, best period of Latin literature; (of any national literature); classical (in Eng. literature c. 18th c.)
- ⁶ However Geiger’s earlier 1912 theories are believed by some experts to have been overtaken by more recent opinions of scholars i.e. G.C. Mendis (1947).
- ⁷ To put a more precise date to Ardamāgadhi - although not impossible - is not easy. However a debt is owed to N. A. Jayawickrama who, in emphasising the difference between ‘Magadhan language’ and others carrying similar names, (Encyclopedia of Buddhism; 266) suggests “The language that had gained currency in Magadha and neighboring territories that came under imperial Magadhan rule during the Middle Indo-Aryan period, commencing in the 6th century B.C., was Magadhi”.
- ⁸ Thereafter one can surmise [but facts to provide proof there are not] that the Āloka Vihāra seems to have developed into a *scriptoria* thus increasing the availability of manuscript editions of the Canon in Pāli. Such a picture hardly corresponds to one of darkness or decadence.

Some Facets of the Theravāda Oral Tradition

Aruna K. Gamage

This article probes some basic features of the Theravāda oral tradition such as the traditional viewpoint on the *Tipiṭaka* and its interrelation with Nibbāna, effort in preserving the *Tipiṭaka*, characteristics of a good reciter, methods used in order to develop a sound memory, and encouraging the best posture for the recitation and appropriate voice modulation. In addition, unfamiliar cadences utilized by the Theravāda tradition for the purpose of recitation will be discussed.

(1) In order to preserve a large corpus of texts of the *Tipiṭaka* for a long time in its pristine purity, the Theravāda tradition seems to have utilized several devices such as recitation, teaching, discussion and debate on knotty points, etc. These (i.e. recitation etc.) are the different aspects of the ‘career of textual studies’ (*ganthadhura*)¹. Especially at a period when written sources were considerably scarce for academic purposes, the oral tradition was of paramount importance. As this tradition fervently emphasized, ‘when the canon disappears conduct also disappears. Alternatively, when the Canon is well established, conduct also becomes well established.’² This transmission process of the *Tipiṭaka* as evidenced in the Pāli Commentaries is not a mere academic process, though manifold scholastic methods have been utilized in it. As insisted in early Buddhism and the Theravāda tradition as well, the essential outcome of mastering *dhamma* is one’s spiritual development or attainment. The person, who practices *dhamma* in order to denounce others, acquires no applause in Buddhism.³ In this regard, the *Majjhima-nikāya Aṭṭhakathā* (=MA) explains the Theravāda viewpoint as follows: “Though a person having completely memorized the whole *Tipiṭaka*, lives recollecting it in progressive and regressive order (*heṭṭhūpariyamkaronto*) with its meaning (*pālito ca atthato ca*), and textual sequence (*anusandhito*)⁴ but, without even a slight awareness of impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and substancelessness, then he does not possess a knowledge of the path (*maggen’āgatāya paññāya abhāvato*),⁵ cannot be considered as a wise person (*paññavāti na vattabbo*), only an educated one (*viññānācarito nām’esa*).”⁶ What some Theravāda teachers wholeheartedly expected was the spiritual development of their students rather than their scholarship of the Canon.⁷ This shows that just academic erudition in the *Tipiṭaka*, was not what was appreciated by Theravādins.

(2) But on the contrary, as the Commentaries show, some passages, sentences and phrases of the *Tipiṭaka* were subjected to subtle censure

(*infra.*§5) by some Theravāda masters though it was painstakingly preserved with great reverence by them. Hence, it is not possible to identify this process of transmission as a totally religious or pious activity. The tradition affirms the recitation and study of the *Tipiṭaka* as an exercise obligatory on the *sangha* for the elimination of mental defilements. “If someone keeps the Tipiṭaka in memory, reflecting on its meaning, studying, reciting, and teaching it completely, considering its gradual progressive sequence, in him defilements gain no foothold.”⁸ Furthermore, the tradition puts forward five points (*pañcadhammā*) that facilitate the subduing of mental dullness. (*mohadhātu*)⁹ and urges one to overcome it through associating with the five points or practising them. These five factors¹⁰ apparently were connected with the process of transmission. i. Association with teachers (*garūsaṃvāsa*)¹¹, ii. Reciting of canonical texts and making others recite them (*uddesa*)¹² iii. Interrogation of the meaning of recited texts or areas (*uddiṭṭhapariṭṭhana*)¹³ iv. Listening to *dhamma* at the proper time (*kālena dhammassavana*) and v. discriminating or inferring by means of the knowledge acquired (*thānāṭṭhānavinichaya*)¹⁴ the possibility or impossibility of a thing. Hence, it is clear that the tradition has accepted studying and reciting the *Tipiṭaka* as an effective remedy for the elimination of mental defilements and frustrations.

(3) Many ancient teachers in this tradition, who flourished in Sri Lanka, seem to have fully dedicated their whole life to the perfection of this activity. [When we compare the moderns’ dedication towards academic study with the ancients’, it is clear that the latter group holds a pre-eminent place]. Even during the period of the terrible famine that existed in Sri Lanka throughout 12 years, seven hundred and sixty Theravāda monks were able to preserve the *Tipiṭaka* without losing even a single syllable (*sāṭṭhakathete piṭake ekakkharampi ekabyañjanampi anāsetvā*) through their assiduous continuance of the dynamic process of reciting.¹⁵ *Vinayaṭṭhakathā* (=VA) records an interesting narrative regarding the protection of *Niddesapāli* by Theravāda monks.¹⁶ Mahādhammarakkhitatthera of Tulādhārapabbata,¹⁷ Tipiṭaka Mahāsiṅgavāsi of Anurādhapura¹⁸ are two other remarkable characters. They did nothing else throughout their lifetime other than reciting and teaching the *Tipiṭaka* for the sake of its preservation. This procedure of recitation and study of the *Tipiṭaka* was continued with the mutual co-operation of teacher and student. In this, we see the Theravāda tradition’s affinity to the interrelation between teacher and student that persisted in the *Upaniṣad* texts in search of truth.¹⁹ The teacher is highly esteemed in Buddhism²⁰ yet, the student should not be a fan or blind follower of the teacher. He should only accept the good points of the teacher scorning his inferior traits. As *Dīghanikāyaṭṭhakathā* (=DA) says, ‘when the teacher steps upon excrement, fire, a thorn or a black serpent and when

he climbs up a stake (which is used to impale people) or when he takes deadly poison etc., the student should not emulate all of them.’²¹ Some teachers of this confraternity accepted his student’s opinion in public spurning his own viewpoint that he had held up to that time. The narrative of Tipiṭaka-Cūlanāgathera and Tipiṭakacūlasummathera is proof of this.²² As Ven. Buddhaghosa says in this regard, “ancient elders are not covetous. They don’t hold on to their own wish or viewpoint like holding on to a heap of sugarcane, and instead accept the actual fact rejecting the fallacious.”²³

(4) As we are told by the commentaries, *Theravādins* were not always extreme conservatives though they represented that tradition. For they were in need of ascertaining the truth or the accurate interpretation of some dubious places in the Pāli canon (*infra*.§5), and did not hesitate to engage themselves in vigorous argumentations with each other. The aim of those argumentations was not to denounce others but to unravel and get a fixed solution for the cryptic, knotty points of the canon. One important characteristic of these argumentative monks was that they were not attached to their own opinions unlike the policy of a sophist who frequently attempts to establish his own belief.²⁴ What they wanted was to accept the reality and deny the heresy. For the proper sustainability of a more trustworthy tradition of transmission they very enthusiastically engaged themselves in doctrinal controversies with other Buddhist counterparts and with their own members as well. These various arguments focused on the subject matter of the canon and enabled them to gain a deep understanding of it. Thorough understanding makes for easier memory retention. (*infra*§9).

(5) Sometimes, there was no uniformity in the canon and its interpretation even among all the members of this tradition. Some of them did not wish to accept the common Theravāda *status quo* standpoint. They posed questions concerning the number of the texts, phraseology and on more apt interpretations and so on. Sudinna thera who can be identified as a one of the leading members of this confraternity, rejected some texts of the *Khuddakanikāya*, namely, *Dhammapada*, *Jātaka*, *Paṭisambhidā*, *Niddesa*, *Vimānavatthu*, *Petavatthu*, *Theragāthā* and *Therīgāthā*, asserting they are not Buddha’s teaching (*taṃ sabbaṃ paṭipakkhipitvā*).²⁵ He seems to have believed that the discourses of the canon which are not designated as ‘*sutta*’ are not the Buddha’s own teaching. Goṇaraviyatthera* (in *Be Codanālayatthera*) argued that a certain prose passage of *Mahāsacchakasutta*²⁶ is not a Buddhaword (*abuddhavacanam nām’etaṃ padaṃ*).²⁷ In the explanation of ‘*abhijjhā visamalobho cittassa upakkilesa*’ in *Vatṭhasutta*,²⁸ some *Theravāda* teachers considered *abhijjhā* and *visamalobha* as separate unwholesome concomitants. Therefore, they interpreted *abhijjhā* as ‘the

craving for one's own property' and *visamalobha* as the 'craving for the property of others.' Regarding this, a teacher in the Theravāda tradition (who remains anonymous) protested adducing a passage from *Vibhaṅga*²⁹ in support of his view. "Why do you, he asked, consider them as separate concomitants? They cannot be detached. These two terms denote the same word though they have diverse syllables (*ekattham etaṃ byañjanameva nānaṃ*)."³⁰ Cūlatissatthera of Uruvelā stressed that the middle part of *Bāhiraphassanānattasutta* that describes the interrelatedness of causative factors such as perception, volition, contact, etc., in accordance with the theory of dependent co-origination,³¹ should be understood having rotated the order of its sentences (*pāḷiṃ parivattetvā*).³² As he opined, *phassa* and *vedanā* that occur in the middle of this discourse, should be put at the end in order to get the proper order.³³ It is obvious from the foregoing accounts that the erudition of Theravādins in *dhamma* was acquired by the continuous study of the *Tipiṭaka*. The transmission process of Theravādins is therefore, neither a totally religious activity nor a monotonous procedure of mere recitation of the *Tipiṭaka*. They very earnestly engaged in this task experiencing the ecstasy of studying the *dhamma*. Recitation is, in fact, only one of several integral units in this process (*infra*. §12). This activity, i.e. recitation, undoubtedly has become a very pleasant section for the reciters since it is endowed with many enjoyable poetic features such as metre (*infra*. §14-§15).

(6) Commentaries provide the bulk of evidence for the Tipiṭaka recitation of ancient Sri Lankan monks. The open space in front of Suvanṇamālicetiya and the sacred Bodhi-tree, the ground floor of Lohapāsāda were some of the popular places for their recitations.³⁴ The purpose of this recitation was to establish a fixed and accurate memory of the *Tipiṭaka*. The preciseness of the memory holds a specific place in this process. Nevertheless, intrinsically, memory is subject to rapid bewilderment and blanking out (memory lapses). Significantly, the Theravāda tradition clearly understands this tendency of the memory. Though some persons, so *Udānaṭṭhakathā* (=UA) remarks, are very fluent in grasping the meaning (of the *Tipiṭaka*) at the lesson, but they perform many blunders, dropping words and misplacing the proper order when they recollect them later (*ekacco uggahaṇakāle sammā uggahetvā pipacchā sajjhāyādivasena manasikaraṇakāle byañjanāni vā micchāropeti, padapaccābhaṭṭhaṃ vā karoti*).³⁵ According to MA "some, though they study *dhamma*, are incapable of maintaining a fixed-memory. When they are being quizzed and directed by others regarding the canonical quotations which they have previously recited, as "recite, that *sutta* or that *jātaka*", they slip off, answering 'I will do so, after having re-recited and compared with other sources.'³⁶ Some, though they have mastered *dhamma* well are unable to answer properly when others

interrogate them at the beginning, end or word by word-sequence of the canon or of the commentary. They stammer; tremble, agree with the opponent with whatever he states and accepts the others viewpoint having rejected one's own standpoint.³⁷ Hence, the one, who has only a superficial memory in reciting *dhamma*, is not suited to this process because other religious opponents can easily overcome such a person. As the Theravāda confraternity always emphasizes, reciting compulsorily conduces to a good retentive power.

(7) The Theravāda tradition pays special attention not only to voice and manner of reciting, but the accuracy of pronunciation specially. Careless recitation and erroneous enunciation of words are utterly reviled by the tradition.³⁸ MA provides a detailed explanation in this respect. "Some recite embarrassingly (*tattha tattha vitthāyati*)³⁹ in some places and some recitations sound like mere gibberish or weeping (*nitthunanto, kandanto viya*) and some excitedly (*turitaturito*) recite *dhamma* in a very obnoxious tone just like 'rubbing together two kindling sticks' (*aranim manthento viya*)⁴⁰, or 'munching a piece of hot solid food' (*uṇhakhādānīyaṃ khādanto viya*) and also just like an 'iguana creeping in panic through a heap of dried leaves'. (*purāṇapaṇṇantaresu caramānaṃ godhaṃ utthapento viya*).” They do not care about their voice as well as a pleasant tone for recitation as will be discussed (*infra*.§11). Thus, they 'from time to time recite very rapidly and sometimes very slowly (*kālena sīghaṃ kālena dandhaṃ*) and some reciters intermittently articulate in a high-tone and sometimes in a lower tone' (*kālena mahāsaddaṃ kālena khuddakasaddaṃ*). Such a person, the tradition ironically calls a 'spirit-dhamma-preacher' (*petadhammakathika*). Some of them do not pay adequate attention or concentrate on the completeness of the recitation. Consequently, they skip some passages ignoring the 'sequence of connections' (*anusandhipubbāparesu gahitaṃ gahitameva agahitaṃ agahitameva cakativā*). Apparently, they are in an exceeding hurry to wind up their recitation, and overlook many places (*osāpento, ohāya*) when reciting. Since these types of shortcomings of reciters were very detrimental to the process of preserving the Tipiṭaka, the confraternity proclaimed a variety of techniques in order to minimize them (*infra*. §8).

(8) The *dhamma* recitation should be done very vigilantly, 'as careful as plucking out a cluster of [bodily] hair one by one with a pair of tweezers' (*ekeka lomaṃ saṇḍāsenā gaṇhanto viya*)⁴¹ and without dropping or skipping the canonical connections and word-sequence (*pāliyā anusandhiṅca pubbāparaṅca amakkhento*).⁴² The tradition presents several similes that clarify the rhythm of a proper recitation and its responsibility. 'Just like draining water by means of a deep drainage system' (*gambhīramātikāya udakampesento viya*),⁴³ 'preaching without

an abrupt stoppage just like the torrential tumbling down of a river in spate' (*avicchinnadhāraṃ katvāna dīsotaṃ viya pavatteti*)⁴⁴; 'just like portraying a picture with a pencil' (*tūlikāya paricchindanto viya*)⁴⁵ and also a firm memory is esteemed by the tradition in the following way: The memory should be firm 'just as a line that is inscribed on stone' (*silāya lekhā viya*)⁴⁶, 'just as a line of oil'⁴⁷ that is poured from a golden vessel' (*suvaṇṇaghāṭe pakkhittasīhavasā viya*).⁴⁸ The person who acquires a steadfast memory as described with these similes, is capable of reciting, excerpts from any given place of the canon (*asukasuttaṃ vā jātakam vā kathehīti vutte uddharitvā tameva katheti*)⁴⁹ without stammering or spluttering (*pāḷiyam vā aṭṭhakathāya vā heṭṭhupariyena vā padapaṭipāṭiyā vā pucchiyamāno na vitthana tina vipphandati*).⁵⁰ VA classifies erudite scholars into three categories⁵¹ viz. 1. *Nissayam uccanaka*: Those who are freed from the teacher's dependence⁵², 2. *parisupaṭṭhāpaka*: Those who religiously support lay people and 3: *Bhikkhunovādaka*: those who are admonishers of the monks. Here, the acquaintance with the Pāli Canon is the main criterion to be one of them.⁵³

(9) The awareness of the meaning of that which is being recited, as the tradition recognizes, strengthens the preservation of a sound memory. In other words, if the reciter has a proper understanding of what he recites, he can straightway treasure and store it all up in his mind. Therefore the recitation, as UA says, comes easily when the meaning of the canon is realized. (*atthe hi suṭṭu upadhārite sakkāpāḷiṃ sammā uttāretuṃ*).⁵⁴ As early Buddhism also emphasizes, the mere process of by-hearting without considering its meaning is pointless (*supra. §2*). Reciprocally, recitation is also helpful for treasuring facts and retaining them in the memory without misapprehension. The tradition makes out this inter-correlation between recitation and memory. As the *Visuddhimagga* says, recitation is twofold viz. verbal recitation and mental recitation.⁵⁵ For, these two factors are reciprocally supportive of each other and the reciter, in this process, should pay attention to both these aspects. "In whichever manner verbal recitation is performed, in such manner should recitation be done equally with the mind. Verbal recitation causes (*paccayo*) mental recitation and is supportive of the penetration of the three characteristics and helps the attainment of a supra mundane state."⁵⁶ As we previously noted (*supra. §2*) the tradition, here also, asserts the interrelationship between Nibbāna and every aspect of this process. The process of reciting is not confined to mere erudition in the *Tipiṭaka*. The KhpA furnishes⁵⁷ an important method utilized by the Theravāda tradition for the progressive development of the memory regarding recitation, named as *sattavidha-uggahakosalla*: 'The sevenfold skill in memorizing.' Though the Commentary presents this method in the explanation of 'the thirty-two-fold Aspect' (*dvattimsākāra*) it can

undoubtedly be applied over a wider scope that is relevant to the activity of recitation. This method says that one should memorize both verbally and mentally, paying enough attention to some exterior circumstances such as location, direction and so on. The activity of pondering or recollecting (*manasikāra*)⁵⁸ the *Tipiṭaka* also plays a vital role in this tradition. The memory that was acquired in recitation is further stabilized in this process. Recitation, as the tradition claims, is needed even in the process of pondering. Thus, even the person who is well versed in the whole canon should essentially do the verbal recitation⁵⁹ when he is engaged in pondering. Furthermore, in the same context, the *KhpA* and *VibhA*⁶⁰ speak of a tenfold skill in pondering, *dasavidha-manasikāra* that can be assumed as utilized in the Theravāda tradition for the progress of their project of transmission. Seven factors, out of these 10 factors are the methods for proper recollection while the other 3 are important references to three canonical discourses which are helpful in increasing a sound memory and for overcoming certain habitual mental states such as sloth and torpor. The former seven are as follows (together with Ven. Ñānamoli's rendering)⁶¹: 1. *anupubbato*: by following the order, 2. *nāṭisīghato*: not too quickly, 3. *nāṭisaṇikato*: not too slowly, 4. *vikkhepaṇāṭibāhanato*: by warding off distraction, 5. *paṇṇattisamatikkamato*: by surmounting the description, 6. *anupubbamuñcanato*: by the practice of successively letting go, 7. *appanāto*: by absorption. No doubt that these were helpful in fixing a computer type memory of the *Tipiṭaka* in the members of this tradition.

(10) Similarly, the *Theravāda* tradition seems to have paid attention to the most appropriate posture for recitation. However, the Commentaries do not provide a clear cut mental picture of the best posture for recitation. The explanation of AA on the sentence '*caṅkamādhigato samādhiciraṭṭhitiko hoti*' in *Caṅkamasutta* of the *Aṅguttaranikāya*⁶² gives a clue as to the Theravāda viewpoint as to the most suitable posture for contemplation. 'The sign (*nimittaṃ*)⁶³, as it says, which is contemplated by someone in the standing posture, fades away in the sitting posture and also the sign which is contemplated in the sitting posture, fades away in the lying down posture. Nevertheless, the sign which is contemplated in the walking posture among shaking objects, does not fade away even in the sitting posture and so forth (*ṭhitakena gahita-nimittaṅhi nisinnassa nassati, nisinnena gahitanimittaṃ nippannassa. caṅkamaṃ adhiṭṭhahantena*⁶⁴ *calitārammaṇe gahitanimittaṃ pana ṭhitassa pi nisinnassa pi nippannassa pi na nassati*).⁶⁵ Here, the identical word *calitārammaṇe* (among the shaking objects) that specifies the walking posture is significant since it shows there is no shaking or moving of objects in other postures. Moreover, the citation claims that the sign which is contemplated in the walking posture is immutable or imperishable (*na nassati*). It suggests that movements or

shaking of objects is supportive of keeping a fix memory. Then again, the other three postures seem quite tiresome for contemplation or recitation. For example, drowsiness descends (*middham okkamati*) into the mind in the sitting posture. Ven. Moggallāna once sat nodding and he was advised by the Buddha,⁶⁶ that he should “rise up from the sitting”⁶⁷ posture if he feels drowsiness. In contrast, the reciter’s or contemplator’s mind becomes refreshed when he recites or contemplates in the walking posture. As the walking posture is more productive of keeping a fixed memory, it is reasonable to assume that the Theravādins preferred the ‘walking posture’ also when reciting.

(11) Reciters, as the tradition’s emphasizes, must have an euphonious as well as a sonorous voice. The audibility of voice fortifies conviction not only in the hearers but also in the reciters. The pleasantness to the ear increases the listener’s desire for hearing.⁶⁸ In many of the discourses of the canon, the word *parimaṇḍalatā* appears to specify the characteristics of a perfect delivery.⁶⁹ As MA says *parimaṇḍala* means ‘the utterance which is made by perfecting the complete pronunciation of the syllables and without neglecting the tenfold awareness of letters.’⁷⁰ The Theravāda tradition takes this word (*parimaṇḍalatā*) as a condensed or compact term and thus says that it denotes the tenfold knowledge of words or letters as to pronunciation (*dasavidha byañjanabuddhi*)⁷¹ which is helpful to preserve the verbatim accuracy of the recitation. Special attention, as VA affirms, should be paid to these factors by the reciters (*ayam suṭṭhu upalakkhetabbo*).⁷² These factors, though they have been cited in Commentaries in relation to the accuracy of pronunciation, they are applicable even to protecting the preciseness of writings. All of these factors have been integrated in the following *gāthā*: *sithilaṃ dhanitañca dīgharassaṃ-garukaṃ lahukañca niggahītaṃ, sambandhaṃ vavatthitaṃ vimuttaṃ-dasadhābyañjanabuddhiyāpabhedo*.⁷³

(12) *Sithila* denotes light tone or non-aspirated (*alpa-prāṇa*) letters or the letters of the first and third lines of the pentad of Pāli consonants (*pañcasu vaggesu paṭhamatatiyaṃ*) and *dhanita* denotes heavy tone or aspirated (*mahāprāṇa*) letters or the letters of the second and fourth lines (*tesveva dutiya-catutthaṃ*) of the same pentad. *Dīgha* denotes lengthening, of the letters that are sounded for a longer duration (perhaps, for more than one second) such as ā, ī, ū (*dīghena kālena vattabbaṃ ākāraḍi*) and *rassa* denotes shortening, i.e. letters have to be sounded for half the duration of the above, viz., a, i, u (*tato upaḍḍhakālena vattabbaṃ akāraḍi*). Here, the next two components i.e. *garuka* and *lahuka* refer to the metrical aspect (*chando*) of the recitation. It is true, to some extent, that the characteristics of these become similar to the previously mentioned two factors (i.e. of *dīgha* and *rassa*). The Commentary also admits the likeness (*garukanti dīghameva,*

lahukantirassameva) whereas roughly mentioning their difference. In this context, *garuka* denotes the syllables that should be enunciated as lengthening in spite of their shortness in terms of *metricausa* (*āyasmato buddharakkhitattherassa yassa nakkhamatīti evaṃ saṃyogaparaṃ katvā vuccati*) and *lahuka* denotes *vice versa* (*āyasmato buddharakkhitattherassa yassa nakkhamatītievaṃ asaṃyogaparaṃ katvā vuccati*). In relation to this context, Warder adduces some canonical accounts. Referring to *natthi etaṃ mama gehe* the second line of the 450th verse of *Petavatthu*, he says, the second (short) *a* of *mama* should be pronounced as a long letter (i.e. as *mamā*) and the first *e* of the *gehe* as a shortened letter.⁷⁴ Similarly, the long vowel *e* of *me dassa* in the second line of the 195th *gāthā* of the *Suttanipāta*⁷⁵ should be articulated short.⁷⁶ Next pair is *niggahīta* and *vimutta* which refers nasalization and non-nasalization respectively. *niggahīta*: nasalized should be pronounced with an unopened mouth (*avivaṭṭena mukhena*) obstructing speech organs (*karaṇāni niggahetvā*)⁷⁷ and not moving them and producing a nasal (*anunāsikaṃkatvā*). *vimutta*: opened or ‘oral’,* (as Hinuber renders)⁷⁸ should be pronounced in a totally opposite way to *niggahīta*. i.e. with an opened mouth (*vivaṭṭena mukhena*) without obstructing speech-organs (*karaṇāni aniggahetvā*) and not producing a nasal (*anunāsikaṃ akatvā*). *Sambandha*: combined, means what is pronounced combining with the subsequent word (*parapadena sambandhitvā*) and *vavatthita*: separated, what is pronounced not combined with the subsequent word (*parapadena asambandhaṃ katvā*) and separated from it (*vicchinditvā*). The commentary i.e. *VA*, presents the manifold likelihoods of mispronunciation in respect of previously mentioned ten factors.⁷⁹ Another important fact that manifests from this exegesis is that those who preserved the *Vinaya* texts have rigidly considered the verbatim accuracy in their reciting unlike the policy of those who preserved *suttanta* texts. Though the monks, *VA* says, who preserve the tradition of *Suttapiṭaka* state that they have the tendency to replace *d* with *t* and *t* with *d*. Similarly, *c* with *j* and *j* with *c*, *y* with *k* and *k* with *y* and that the pronunciation is justifiable, the bearer of the *Vinaya* should, not implement this policy.⁸⁰

(13) While reciting, the rhythmic aspect is also considered conscientiously. Rhythm also contributes to preserve a better memory of the recitation. Moreover, the process of recitation becomes a pleasant and enjoyable job to him if he performs it in accordance with the appropriate metre.⁸¹ Especially in verse form, it is of vital significance. Commentaries vehemently emphasize the utility of verses.⁸² The Buddha claims ‘metre is the basis for the verse’ (*chando nidānaṃ gāthānaṃ*).⁸³ According to the commentary of this verse, the metres beginning with *gāyatti* are intended here. Before composing a verse, the Commentary says, the poet is compulsively urged to decide on a metre appropriate to

the very theme or to the context. Accordingly, metre is called ‘pre-establishment of the verse’: *pubbapaṭṭhāpanagāthā*. It means a suitable metre has to be decided on before composing a verse. The Sub-commentary expands the scope of metre saying ‘Out of the twenty six fold metre, *chando* here means, metres beginning with *gāyatti* up to *ukatti*.⁸⁴ *Gāyattī* metre consists of six syllables per each line and *ukatti* of twenty six syllables. However, we cannot find the verses up to *ukatti* metre in the Pāli Canon. Majority of the verses of the canon belongs to the *anuṣṭubh* metre that is endowed with eight syllables per line and the rest to the *jaḡatī* metre up to *Śakvarī* metre. All of these metres have several cadences i.e. *vutta* or *vatta* (Skt. *vr̥tta*)⁸⁵ that assist the recitation to preserve the rhythm in reciting. Out of these two terms, commentaries typically use the latter to denote cadences. Interestingly *āyatakaḡitassara* means deviation of the cadence if we accept the legitimacy of AA’s and VA’s explanations on *ḡitassarasutta* of *Aṅguttaranikāya* and *khuddakavattihukkhandhaka* of the *Cullavagga* where the Buddha prohibits the recitation of *dhamma* with a long-drawn plainsong voice (*āyatakaḡitassarena*) respectively.⁸⁶ VA explains it as follows: *āyataka* means ‘the recitation which is performed having digressed from a particular cadence and having skipped syllables.’⁸⁷ Therefore it is reasonable to accept that the Buddha also permitted the recitation of the *dhamma* in accordance with the appropriate metre. In the latter canonical account, we see that the Buddha allows intoning (*sarabhañña*) when reciting the *dhamma*⁸⁸ VA recognizes *sarabhañña* as an application of suitable metrical cadences in reciting.

(14) Significantly, the explanation of the aforementioned (*supra*.§13) two words (i.e. *āyataka* & *sarabhañña*) discloses the set of unfamiliar metrical cadences which were utilized by the Theravāda tradition in the process of recitation. As this account shows, metrical cadences (*vatta*-[s] or *vutta*-[s]) have been applied by this tradition to both modes of recitation viz. verse and prose. ‘There are three cadences in *dhamma*, VA says, 1. The cadence for the recitation of *sutta*-[s] (*suttantavatta*)⁸⁹, 2. for *jātaka*-[s] (*jātakavatta*) and 3. for *gāthā*-[s] (*gāthāvatta*).’⁹⁰ Out of these three modes of cadences the third one i.e. *gāthāvatta* obviously deals with verses. No doubt the tradition has used these *gāthāvatta*-[s] when reciting verse sections of the canon. But the scope and the way of reciting of the first one i.e. of *suttantavatta* is quite uncertain since they also have already been lost (*infra*§15). Surely, there must be a considerable difference in the metrical aspect between the *suttantavatta* and *gāthāvatta*. As the majority of *suttanta*-[s] of the canon comprises both prose and verse sections, it is justifiable to think that *suttantavatta*-[s] are connected with both of these aspects though the *gāthāvatta* is totally connected with the verse aspect of the canon. It is clear from this account that the tradition has employed distinctive cadences for the

recitation of prose sections of the canon. But no opinion can be found regarding prose cadences in the prevailing metrical works such as *Vuttodaya*, *Vṛttaratnākara* etc., although divergent cadences for verses are demonstrated in them. The second mode, i.e. *jātakavatta* is rather hard to ascertain. However, a doubtless fact is that *jātakavatta*-[s] have been utilized in reciting the content of *Jātakapāḷi* which is incorporated in *Khuddakanikāya* but not of *jātakatṭhakathā*. The characteristics of *jātakavatta* seem to differ from that of *gāthāvatta* since the latter deals only with verses. In fact, *Jātakapāḷi* consists of both verse and prose forms though some scholars have hastily expressed that “it consists of *gāthā*[s] or stanzas only.”⁹¹ Especially, it can be noted that almost of the *Kuṇāḷajātaka* in *Jātakapāḷi* is in prose form although it is only in few places interrupted with several verses.⁹² The *Kuṇāḷajātaka*, as K. R. Norman states, “is unique in the *Jātaka* collection in that it alone contains prose which is regarded as canonical.”⁹³ It is apparent that the tradition has applied special cadences to recite *Jātaka*-[s]. The application of distinctive cadences for the recitation of *Jātaka*-[s] reveals an important propensity in recitation policy of the Theravāda tradition. Had the tradition considered *Jātakapāḷi* as a text that consists only of verses, *gāthāvatta* would be applied in recitation. Alternatively had it been considered a miscellaneous text with verses as well as prose-passages similar to the position of *suttanta*-[s], which comprise both these modes by the tradition, *suttantavatta*-[s] would have been applied for the recitation. Here, an obvious fact is that the view point of the tradition towards the recitation of *Jātaka*-[s] is rather peculiar. Perhaps the tradition has carried out a distinctive criterion for the recitation of *Jātaka*-[s] specified as *jātakavatta*-[s] considering their subject matter or theme, notwithstanding their structure.

(15) Intoning (*sarabhañña*) in reciting is very much what is expected by the tradition. As we are told by the commentaries, *sarabhañña* signifies the application of 32 cadences in reciting. As VA nominates⁹⁴ some of them are *taraṅgavatta* [the cadence that moves up and down like a wave?]⁹⁵, *taraṅgabhedavatta* [the cadence that replicates the ascending and descending waves of the sea?],⁹⁶ *dhohakavatta* [the cadence with pure or clear notation?]⁹⁷, *galitavatta* [the cadence of flowing out. In accordance with all the above-mentioned cadences, AAT adds *bhāgaggahakavatta* [the cadence that partially bears rhythmic form?]⁹⁸ to the same context. Since some important details on these 32 fold cadences such as the regulations regarding the articulation (*uccāraṇavidhānāni*), etc., have already been lost (*naṭṭhapayogāni*)⁹⁹ we are incapable of getting a vivid picture on the structure of them. Though the freedom has been given to the reciter to select the cadences for reciting according to his preference (*tesuyamicchati, taṃkātumlabhati*)¹⁰⁰ it is not difficult to decide that the Theravāda tradition has thoroughly expected the accuracy

of pronunciation in all of these events since we are often cautioned by commentaries with advisory statements as follows: “Having not destroyed all the syllables” (*sabbesampadabyañjanam avināsetvā*)¹⁰¹ “without changing them” (*vikāraṃ akatvā*)¹⁰² “without adding extra syllables” (*adhikamattāyuttam... akatvā*).¹⁰³

ABBREVIATIONS

Be=Burmese edition

Cy= commentary

Cties= commentaries

Ibid= *ibidem* i.e., the same place

Infra= below

Op. cit. = *opus citatum est*, i.e., the work has been cited

Supra= see above

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Dhammapada-aṭṭhakathā (=DhpA)
Dhammasaṅganiāṭṭhakathā (=DhsA)
Dīghanikāya (=D)
Dīghanikāya-aṭṭhakathā (=DA)
Dīghanikāya-aṭṭhakathā-ṭīkā (=DAT)
Itivuttaka-aṭṭhakathā (ItvA)
Khuddakapāṭha-aṭṭhakathā (=KhpA)
Majjhimanikāya (=M)
Majjhimanikāya-aṭṭhakathā (=MA)
Majjhimanikāya-aṭṭhakathā-ṭīkā (=MAT)
Milindapañha(=MP)
Paṭisambhidāmagga-aṭṭhakathā (=PtsmA)
Pācityādiyojanāpāli(=Pātyo)
Petavatthu (=Pv)
Sāratthadīpanī (=Sādp)
Samyuttanikāya (=S)
Samyuttanikāya-aṭṭhakathā (=SA)
Samyuttanikāya-aṭṭhakathā-ṭīkā (=SAT)
Suttanipāta (=Sn)
Suttanipāta-aṭṭhakathā(=SnA)
Theragāthā (=Th)
Udāna-aṭṭhakathā (=UdA)

Vibhaṅga (=Vibh)
Vibhaṅga-aṭṭhakathā (=VibhA)
Vinaya-aṭṭhakathā (=VA)
Vimativinodanī (=Vimat)
Visuddhimagga (=Vism)

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NOTES

- * Except otherwise mentioned all the references of this article are in PTS editions and translations.
- ¹ Lanman, p. 149. ‘*the burden of the books*’, i.e. *of studying the scriptures, explained as one who knows by heart one, two, or all Nikāyas*-PED, Dhpa, i p.05
- ² AA i p. 92
- ³ S ii pp. 204-5, M, i p.133
- ⁴ sv: *anusandhiconnection, (logical) conclusion, application*-PED, p. 43., *connection, sequence (between text elements)*- CPD, p. 221., *sequence (of meaning), (logical) connection; application*-DOP, vol i, p.140
- ⁵ MAT ii p. 339
- ⁶ MA ii p. 339
- ⁷ Ibid. ii pp. 293-4
- ⁸ VibhA p. 297, PtsmA, i p.169
- ⁹ *mohadhātu* is a synonym for *moha*. *mohadhātūtimoho*-MAT, ii p.74. See *mohasv: stupidity, dullness of mind & soul, delusion, bewilderment, infatuation*- PED, p. 543
- ¹⁰ MA ii p.89
- ¹¹ Ibid.
- ¹² MAT Be ii p.74. See also *svuddesa : pointingout, setting forth, proposition, exposition, indication, programme*- PED, p.136.,CPD vol ii p. 414, DOP, p. 428

- 13 MAT *Be* ii p.74
 14 PED, p. 624., See also:MA, ii p. 89
 15 AA i p. 92
 16 VA iii p. 695. See: Norman, K. R. 1997, p.56
 17 *VismBe* i p.93
 18 DA iii pp.727-8
 19 MU p. 01
 20 Sn p. 55, Norman, K. R.2006, p. 37
 21 DA i p. 37.
 22 D ii p. 290., M, i p. 56, DA, iii pp. 744-5. see also MA,ii p. 231
 23 DA iii p. 745, MA,i p. 231
 24 Viṇḍavādīsv: *a sophist, arguer*-PED, p. 620, Tilakaratne, 2002, p. 318,
 See: MA iii p. 14, p. 201, v. p. 67, AA, v p. 85., ItvA, ii p. 06., CpA, p.
 158., PtsmA ii p. 399, DhasA, p. 03, 241, VibhA, p. 09
 25 DA ii p. 566, AA, iii p. 159. See also: Abeynayaka, p. 42
 26 MA ii p. 286
 27 MAT *Be* ii p. 210
 28 M i p. 36
 29 Vibh p. 368
 30 MA i p. 169
 31 S ii pp.144-4
 32 SA ii p. 134
 33 SAT *Be* ii p. 133.,as this *sutta* (i.e. S, ii pp. 144-4)
 34 DA i p. 197, MA, i p. 264., SA, iii p. 193., VibhA, p. 358, SA, ii p. 276,VA,
 iii p. 591.,VibhA, p. 387, DAT, *Be* ii p. 410
 35 UdA p. 312, Sādp, *Be* iii p. 301., the meaning of *padapacchābhaṭṭha* is not
 clear. Perhaps, it may denote skipping of the ending words or terms.
padapacchābhaṭṭhantipadaparāvatti –Vimat, *Be* i p. 134
 36 MA ii p. 252.,Sādp, *Be* iii p. 39
 37 VA i p. 234
 38 K. R. Norman also declares the keenness of pronunciation in Pāli oral
 tradition- K. R. Norman, 1997 p. 49. see also: Gombrich, pp. 74-5., Wynne,
 p. 99
 39 sv: *vitthāyatito be embarrassed or confused (lit. To become quite stiff), to*
be at a loss,to hesitate-PED, p. 621
 40 sv: see *araṇi wood for kindling by attrition*-PED, p. 76., sv: *araṇi the piece of*
wood used for kindling fire by attrition- CDIAL, p. 26., *either of the two*
pieces of wood for making fire (but generally = adharāraṇī)- CPD, vol i p.
 416., *one of the two pieces of wood (usually the lower) used for kindling*
fire- DOP p. 233
 41 VA i p. 235
 42 MA ii p. 253
 43 Ibid. p. 253 *mātikāsv: water course*—PED, p. 528
 44 Ibid. p. 254
 45 Ibid. p. 253
 46 Ibid. p. 252
 47 sv: *vasā fat, tallow, grease* –PED, p. 605
 48 MA ii p. 252

- 49 Ibid. p. 253
 50 VA i p. 234
 51 Ibid. iv p. 788
 52 Ñānamoli, 2006, p. 56
 53 PED, p. 501., SavtBe i p. 81, VA, iv pp. 788-90
 54 UdA p. 312. The last word i.e. *uttāretuṃ* in this sentence differs in other versions. Eg: *ussāretuṃ*- UdA, *Be* p. 284 and *uccāretuṃ*- UdA, Hevavitarane edition (=Hv), 1990, Colombo, p. 208
 55 Vism *Be* i p. 235
 56 VibhA p. 225
 57 KhpA) p. 4, Ñānamoli, 2005, *The Illustrator of Ultimate Meaning*, p. 41
 58 D iii. P. 242., Tr. *contemplates it in mind*- DB, vol iii p. 230
 59 VibhA 224
 60 KhpA p. 41., VibhA p. 56
 61 Ñānamoli, 2005 p. 41
 62 A iii p. 30
 63 sv: *nimittasign, omen, portent, prognostication*-PED, p. 367
 64 sv: *adhiṭṭhahati* to stand on, to insist on, to concentrate or fix one's attention on, to direct one's thought to- PED p. 28., to tread upon, *enter (in to), abide, to stand upon, ascend*- CPD, vol i p. 133
 65 AA iii p. 236
 66 A iv p.85., once.. Venerable Mahāmogallāna sat nodding- Hare, 2006,p. 50
 67 Hare, Op.cit, iv p. 51
 68 Th p. 20., M ii p. 140
 69 M i p. 213, p. 216., A i p. 103
 70 MA ii p. 253.
 71 DA i p. 177, MA ii p. 203, AA ii p. 289.,VA vii p. 1399., MP 344., Tr. Horner, 1999, pp. 194-4, SA ii p. 59, SA ii p. 68
 72 VA vii p. 1399., upalakkheti sv: *to distinguish, discriminate* –PED, p.146., *looks at, observes, and pays attention to*- DOP, p. 469
 73 DA i p. 177., MA, ii p. 203., AA, ii p. 289.,VA, vii p. 1399
 74 Pv p. 55
 75 Sn p. 34
 76 Warder, 1967, pp 28-9
 77 *SādpBe* iii p. 492, DOP, p. 644 *articulatory organ*, von Hinuber, 2005, p. 207). CPD comprehensively mentions it as *speech organ, e.g., tongue, palate, throat*- CPD ,vol. iii p. 284
 78 Von Hinuber, Op.cit. p. 206
 79 VA vii p. 1400
 80 VA vii, p. 1400., see for comprehensive translation: Hinuber, Op. cit, pp. 198-232
 81 Bhandarkar, 1942, vol ii p. 42
 82 SnA, vol ii p. 398
 83 *chandonidānaṃgāthānaṃ*- S, i. p. 38., *metre's the hidden source whence verses flow*- KS, p. 54., *metre is the scaffolding of verses*- Bodhi, 2000, p. 130., *prosody is the basis of verse*- U Tin U, 2004, *SagāthavaggaSamyutta*, p.102., See: SA, i. pp. 94-5.

- 84 SAT *Be* i p. 131
- 85 Geiger, 2004, p. 67. Turner shows the possibility of changing Sanskrit *vr̥tta* into *vatta* and *vaṭṭa* in Prakrit. See *CDIAL*, p. 699
- 86 *āyatakasv*: Hare, 2008, p. 184., *long-drawn plain-song sound*- Horner, 2001, p. 145., *āyatakasv*: *long, prolonged, long-drawn (of a tone)*- CPD, vol ii p. 127., *drawn out (of sound)*- DOP, p. 319
- 87 *VA* vi p. 1202
- 88 *V* ii, p.108., *VA*, vi p.1202. Horner translates *sarabhañña* as intoning. Monks, I allow intoning- Horner 2001, p.146, intoning, a particular mode of reciting- *PED*, p. 697., Abeynayaka 1984, p. 24
- 89 *Pātyo Be* p. 452
- 90 *VA* vi p. 1202
- 91 As Law recognizes *Jātakapāli* is consist only with of verses. Baruah also emulates Law's opinion. Law, 2000, p.273., Singh N. K. & B. Baruah, 2003, p. 227
- 92 Fausböll, 2008, pp. 412-56
- 93 Norman, 1983, p. 81
- 94 *VA* vi p. 1202
- 95 See *tarāṅgasv*-s: *across goer, a wave, billow, a section of a literally work that contain in its name. To move like a billow, wave about, move restlessly to and fro*. -SED, p. 438., *a wave*-PED, p. 298., *brook, current, stream of water*- *CDIAL*, p. 324
- 96 *tarāṅgabhedavatta*: this can only be seen in *Hv VA*, iv p. 88
- 97 This word is quite ambiguous. *dohaka*: a milk-pale [?]- *PED*, p. 332. But in other scripts it appears as *dhotaka*. The word *dhotaka* this word also quite cryptic :. However, *dodhaka* is “a form of metre (also *vr̥tta*)”-SED, p. 498) which is incorporated in *Triṣṭubh*metre. see also *Siddharatha*, 1981, *Vuttodaya: A Study of Pāli Metre*, p. 26., perhaps this is derived from *dhota+ ka* that can be interpreted as “*washed, bleached, clean*”- *PED*, p. 343
- 98 *Aṅguttaranikāya-aṭṭhakathā-ṭīkāBe* iii p. 78
- 99 *Pātyo, Be* p. 453
- 100 *VA* vi p. 1202
- 101 *VA* vi p. 1202
- 102 *Ibid.*
- 103 *Vimat Be* ii p. 228

Meta-ethics: Teachings on Good and Bad in the Pre Buddhist Era.

H.M. Mahinda Herath

It can be understood that the teaching on *kusala-akusala* and *puñña-pāpa* belong to Buddhist fundamental ethical teachings. These teachings interpret what is good and bad from an ethical point of view but the purpose of this article is to examine the ethical context of such words in pre-Buddhist times. The ethical teaching regarding *kusala-akusala*, the unique teaching of Buddhist philosophy, raises the question whether there were such ethical evaluations in the pre-Buddhist era or not. Therefore this article focuses attention specifically on this area of study from the Vedic to the Upanishadic eras.

Vedic people revered the invisible power of gods thought to be immanent in natural phenomena. They believed that they could receive whatever good results from this invisible natural power through the performance of sacrifices. They thought that these results could be expected to appear in this world or in the world beyond. It can be assumed that though the developed theories on *kamma*, causality and rebirth were not mentioned in the texts of this era, the beginnings of those fundamental teachings could be traced to those texts. The Vedic *suktas*, Surya, Varuṇa, Yama and Pitru ... etc. exhibit important evidence of this fact.

The Vedic people believed there was an invisible power in nature. They who didn't understand this concept tried to interpret the invisible power as a personification of a divine being. They assumed it was a form of being or a fearful energy in nature. They were keen to understand the truth of nature through its invisible and visible activity. Thus the concept

of *ṛta* that arose in Vedic texts was an important development of this belief of an immanent power in and behind nature.

In the Vedic era it was believed that the concept of *ṛta* as a law of the universe was a fundamental teaching of *kamma*. *Ṛta* is the truth and order of the world and *anṛta* is the fall and disorder of the world.¹ In the Vedic era it was also believed that the sacrifice was *kamma*. It was a principle that had to be obeyed by all human beings and gods of the whole world. If there was any regulated order in the world it had to be an active universally applicable principle. Anyway, if its results did not appear in this world, then they must surely appear in some other place.

The Ṛgveda exhibits the overarching universality and rigidity of the *kamma* doctrine presented by later Indian philosophers. The primary meaning of the concept of *ṛta* is a universally pervading order that is permanent. Furthermore, it is expressed in the phenomena of rituals such as sacrifices, oblations, etc. It is not only that the concept of *ṛta* in Vedic literature is depicted as a phenomenon inherent in the world, but behavior and ethics are also prescribed in the concept of *ṛta*. It embodies order, cosmic, the ethical and the ritualistic.²

We find the word *iṣṭāpūrta* in the Vedas which was a fundamental concept of the teaching of *kamma* and rebirth at a later date.³ The word *iṣṭāpūrta* originated from the root of √yaj. “pūrata” meaning helpful to others. The whole word, *iṣṭāpūrta*, represents “sacrificer”. Macdonell explained this word as wish, sacrifice, fulfillment and reward of pious works.⁴ Theodore Benfey explains it as the performance of pious and charitable deeds.⁵ Monier Williams interpreted it as charitable effects originating in charitable action. According to the Ṛgveda, human beings go to heaven and experience happiness as a result of *iṣṭāpūrta*.

Enas appears in RV 1.24.9, with the meaning of *muñcati* where the *ṛṣi* prays to Varuṇa: “Deliver us from whatever sin (*enas*) we have committed.” Another stanza (14) of the same hymn combines *enas* with

śrathayati: “With homage, with sacrifices, with offerings, we turn down thy wrath, O Varuṇa, Wise Asura, as a ruling king, free us from the sins (*enas*) we have committed.”

Another example of *enas* appearing with the meaning of *muñcati* is met with in RV. VIII. 18, a hymn mainly directed to the Ādityās who in this hymn are said to be Varuṇa, Mitra, Aryaman, Bhaga and Savitṛ. The ṛṣi mentions various kinds of evil from which he wants to be delivered: enmity (*dveṣas*), enemies (*śṛdh*), physical weakness (*rapas*), disease (*amīvā*), malignity (*durmati*), distress (*amhas*), want (*āmati*), disaster (*durita*) etc. In the midst of these things sin (*enas*)⁶ is mentioned: “Grant to us, O Ādityās, the shelter that delivers (*mumocati*) the sinner (*enavat*) from any sin (*enas*), Ye rich ones.” Sin is here regarded as an evil of the same kind as other evils, but in attracting the verb *muñcati* it differs from them.⁷

Āgas has been met with as a synonym of *enas*. In the R̥gveda, *āgas*⁸ is less frequent than *enas*, but *anāgas* (or *anāga*)⁹, “without sin”, is more frequent than *anenas*.¹⁰ In certain instances we find *anāgas*, *āgas* and *enas* together: “Most youthful god, whatever sin (*āgas*) we have committed in a human way, through thoughtlessness, make us sinless (*anāga*) to Aditi.” As is seen from these two examples, *anāgas* is combined especially with Aditi. Scholars have had varying opinions on the character of this female deity though of uncertain divinity. The material at hand does not permit any final conclusion. When her name is used in the expression “sinless to Aditi”, it brings to mind not a concrete divinity but only the sound of the word, meaning “not fettered”.¹¹

The word for “sin” is here *drugdha*¹², related with *druh*, used as a synonym for *enas* and *agas*. Ṛṣi wants to put the whole blame of this unknown sin on various things: delusion, drink, anger, dick, lack of thought, an older man. There is no sign of a repenting sinner taking the guilt onto himself. Directly the poet frees his own will from

responsibility. The sin may have been committed even in sleep.¹³ As a rule *anṛta*¹⁴ signifies the sign connected with speech, but it may also have a wider context.

RV VII. 89 is a cry for mercy from a man struck with dropsy, standing in “the midst of waters” and fearing to die. In this stanza, the words used for sin are *abhirodha* and *enas*. *Kilbiṣa* is used in RV. X.97.16 in the same manner as *heḍana*, combined with *deva*. To the plant the prayer is directed “may they (the plants) deliver (*muñcatu*) me from that which comes from a curse, from that which comes from Varuṇa, from the fetter of Yama, every sin against the gods (*devakilbiṣa*).” The plants take away sin as well as other evils.

The *dharman*, *dhāman*, *ṛta* and *vṛta* are used side by side as expressions of a law that operates similarly in nature in the sacrifice and the moral life. As a rule, Varuṇa appears as the guardian of the law. He is the king, punishing transgressions of the law and very naturally such transgression may be called *anṛta*. Another example of how *ṛta* and *anṛta* are contrasted is met with in RV. I. 152.1, where Mitra ū Varuṇa are said to conquer *anṛta* and keep *ṛta*. *Anṛta* may also be combined with *satya*. As *satya* is usually translated “truth”, so *anṛta* is usually translated “untruth”.

Thus the *ṛṣis* speak of the anger of various gods, and ascribe their wrath to sins, committed by men. Every god may be appeased and forgive sins when addressed with prayers and sacrifices. There are no clear distinctions made between sin and other kinds of evil. Disease may be regarded as a consequence of sin, but not always is there such a connection between cause and effect. How the text makes no distinction between committed and non-committed sin at the same time, as they declare both kinds of evil belong to sin, may be illustrated in RV. X. 63.8. “O gods, deliver (*paripipṛta*) us today from committed (*kṛta*), from non-committed (*akṛta*) sin (*enas*).”¹⁵

The same words for sin are met with in Atharvan Veda as in Ṛgveda: *hedana, enas, āgas, drugdha, duṣkṛta, ṛṇa, kilbiṣa, anṛta*. We have seen forms of *muñcati* frequently used in Atharvan Veda to express the deliverance from disease. Sin and disease being most intimately connected in Atharvan Veda, we find *muñcati* used frequently with words for sin, too.

According to the Atharvan Veda sins may be committed knowingly or unknowingly, sleeping or waking.¹⁶ We find the disease called *enasya*, sinful, caused by sin. *Anṛta* is used in Atharvan Veda mainly in the same way as in the Ṛgveda. Often it is contrasted with *satya*. In AV. IV.9. 7, the *ṛṣi* says that he will speak truth not untruth (*satyaṁ vakṣyāmi nānṛtam*). *Anṛta* is a transgression committed by the tongue against the law, dharman of Varuṇa. From Atharvan Veda and its non-official charms “I proceed to the official rituals as we meet them in Yajur Veda and in the Brāhmaṇas.” There sin has the same aspects as in Ṛgveda and Atharvan Veda. It is the transgression of heavenly laws, especially those of Varuṇa, and it is a physical evil that can be wiped or washed off. In Atharvan Veda we have found several examples of sins committed in social life.¹⁷

Although in the Brāhmaṇa literature, we find the word ‘*kusala*’, it is not employed in the meaning of ethics.¹⁸ In the Sathapatha Brāhmaṇa the word *kusala* is used in the sense of clever.¹⁹

In the Itareya Brāhmaṇa *kusala* is used with the meaning of “good”. It is thought that one should not talk of evil to a Brāhmaṇa. Still this is not ethics. In the Brāhmaṇa literature, the use of the word *kusala* in related to sacrifice. Therefore it is not based on a pure analysis in terms of ethics.

In Brāhmaṇa literature of later times we find several pairs of such words as *sukṛta-duṣkṛta, sādhu-asādhu, puṇya-pāpa* etc.²⁰ They are pairs of opposites. In Sathapatha Brāhmaṇa there appears a judgemental quality

of assessing whether a person is good or bad in relation to whether he is qualified to go to heaven or hell, like weighing qualities of good and bad on a pair of scales. In Sathapatha Brāhmaṇa we also find a word *akilbiṣa* which mean stainless²¹ and the word *enas* which mean evil.²²

Monier Williams interprets it as plan, design, intention, resolution, determination, purpose, power, ability, deliberation, consultation, intelligence, understanding and a sacrificial rite or ceremony.²³ Benfey explained it as power (RV. I. 64. 13) and sacrifice (RV.VII. 79).²⁴ Mr. Apte interprets it as follows:

1. A sacrifice
2. An epithet of Vishnu
3. One of the ten Prajapatis
4. Intelligence, talent
5. Power, ability
6. Plan, design, purpose
7. Resolution
8. Desire, will
9. Fitness
10. Deliberation
11. Worship²⁵

The word *kratu* in Brāhmaṇa literature has the connotation of determining whether the person is qualified to attain heaven or not. The Ṛgveda states that an evil doer at death gets annihilated and the virtuous attains eternal life. But in the Brāhmaṇa literature it is stated that both the evil doer and the virtuous person are reborn and experience the result of their actions. We gather from this that there was a concept of rebirth in the Brāhmaṇas. One finds in the Sathapatha Brāhmaṇa that man lives in a world that he himself has constructed²⁶ and there is a saying that whatever food that a man eats in this life, he is eaten by that food in his next life.²⁷ This means that whatever action performed by a person in this life, brings him a corresponding result in the next.

By the time of the Upaniṣads, the concept of good and evil is explained with subtle distinctions. This implies that in the Upaniṣad the word *kusala* came to bear an ethical value. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad explains the word “*kusala*” with the analogy of a well-lit fire. This simile clarifies the meaning of good further.²⁸

We find Upaniṣadic literature devoting much more space to ethical considerations than the Vedic and Brāhmaṇa literature. The Upaniṣads criticize hitherto held ideas of sacrifice. They moved more towards the spiritual development aspect in man.²⁹ They believed, for instance, that a person became either a human being or god or attained liberation not by performing sacrifices but through spiritual development.³⁰ They began to see that it was not the sacrifice that held the key to liberation from the fetters of evil but *kamma* and the concept of *kamma* also underwent a change, the emphasis being laid more on the psychological aspect than mere physical action alone. Therefore what began to figure prominently was not the sacrifice but restraint of the senses, the practice of austerity, celibacy, purity and ethics. It is by good action that human beings became gods. They also believed that it is determination of the mind that creates one’s future existence, which meant that one had to make a determination to perform good action.³¹ Here we see the beginning of the concept of *kamma* as will or volition. Therefore the origin of *kamma* is seen in the concept of *kṛtu*.³² Then the idea arose that merit and demerit originated from what we do. Now we see the seers of the Upaniṣads turning towards the psychological aspect and its relation to human behavior. So it can be seen that these ideas are very akin to Buddhist ideas, ideas relating to *kamma* and rebirth, that good actions send one to heaven and bad actions to hell, that to liberate oneself from rebirth one must attain self-realization. This, they believed, could be achieved not by external actions but through spiritual development based on the practice of austerity, celibacy, faith and ethics. Those who developed these qualities will not be born again.

In the Chandogya Upaniṣad, we find the concept that those who do good deeds are born in high castes: *brāhmaṇa*, *kṣatriya*, *vaiśya*, etc., and those who do bad deeds are born in low castes such as *śudra*, *nesāda* etc. In the Chandogya Upaniṣad *ramaṇīyacaraṇa* is equated to the idea of *kusala* and *kapucarana* equated to the idea of *akusala*. The former causes a person to be born in a high caste and latter to be born in a lower caste.

We can see that in the Upaniṣads the idea of spiritual development came to the fore and revealed great affinity with Buddhist ideas.

ABBREVIATIONS

AB	Aitareya Brāhmaṇam
RV	Ṛgveda
AV	Atharvan Veda
SB	Sathapatha Brāhmaṇam
CU	Chandogya Upaniṣad
TU	Taittiriya Upaniṣad
BU	Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad

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⁷ Rodhe, Sten, *Deliver us from evil*.1946. Lund. p 139.

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⁹ RV, I.24.15 / IV.124

¹⁰ RV, I.24.15. In RV. IV.12.4

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¹³ RV, VII 86.
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¹⁶ AV, VI.115.
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Pedagogical Approach of the Pāli Grammarians with reference to the study of Pāli Verbs

Derangala Kusalagñāṇa

In Pāli language, the time of action is observable by investigating the verb. In other words, the verb alone tells us when the action was done or committed. In English, this is called 'tense' and there are many tenses under past, present and future. Traditional Pāli grammarians have made a successful attempt to elucidate the verb in coherence with the format of nominal cases. This, the pedagogy they used, is meticulously gone through by various scholars and they have made volumes of researches to define all the nuances of verbs. However, the need of producing a simple explanation rather agreeable with the traditional pedagogical approach is the main focus of the present article.

INTRODUCTION

The Pali verb has two voices: active and middle; three persons: first, second and third; two numbers: singular and plural; three tenses: present, past and future; four moods: indicative imperative, optative and conditional.¹ All these moods are denoted in one group, called '*Ākhyāta Vibhaktis*' in traditional Pāli grammar. Eight verbal cases are listed below.

- i) *Vattamānakāla* - Present Indicative Tense
- ii) *Bhavissanti* – future indicative
- iii) *Ajjatanī* – aorist/ past indicative
- iv) *Hīyattanī* - imperfect
- v) *Parokkhā* - perfect
- vi) *Kālātipatti* - conditional
- vii) *Pañcamī* – imperative /Benedictive (mood)
- viii) *Sattamī* – Optative/ Potential (mood)²

Hīyattanī, *pañcamī*, *Sattamī* & *Vattamānā* are *Sabbadhātuka* tenses.³
Ajjatanī, *Parokkhā*, *Bhavissanti* & *Kālātipatti* are *Asabbadhātuka* tenses.

According to the traditional Pāli grammar, Past tense is in four divisional tenses; they are

- i) *Parokkhā* (perfect),
- ii) *Hīyattanī* (imperfect),

- iii) *Ajjatanī* (aorist/past) and
- iv) *Kālātipatti* (conditional).

Every tense is again divided into two Padas or modes, namely, *Parassapada* (words for others/active) and *Attanopada*⁴ (words for oneself /middle or reflexive). For e.g. the suffixes or conjugational terminations of *Parokkhā* tense: *a, u, e, ttha, a* and *mha* represent the *Parassapada* form, while *ttha, re, ttho, vho, i* and *mhe* demonstrate the *Attanaopada* form of *Parokkhā* or Perfect tense of Pāli language.

A verb is conjugated by adding these suffixes, both modes differing from each other. The following table shows conjugation of the verbal root √*paca* (= to cook) in Vattamāna Parassapada form. It should be noted that the Pāli 1st person is the 3rd person in English; the Pāli 2nd person remains same in English and the Pāli 3rd person is 1st person in English.

i) Vattamānā -The Present Tense (Active Voice)

Bālāvatāra theorem and Exposition: “*Vattamānā paccuppanne*” - *paccupanne kāle vattamānā vibhatti hoti. [vattamānā ti anti si tha mi ma-te ante se vhe e mhe iti tyādīnaṃ vattamānakālasaññā].*⁵

Singular:	Plural:
3rd: (So) <i>pacati</i> = He cooks	(Te) <i>pacanti</i> = They cook
2nd: (Tvam) <i>pacasi</i> = You cook	(Tumhe) <i>pacatha</i> = You cook
1st: (Aham) <i>pacāmi</i> = I cook	(Mayam) <i>pacāma</i> = We cook

E.g. Singular:

- 1. *So bhataṃ pacati* =
He cooks rice.
- 2. *Tvaṃ bhataṃ pacasi* =
You (sg.) cook rice.
- 3. *Ahaṃ bhataṃ pacāmi* =
I cook rice.

Plural:

- 1. *Te bhataṃ pacanti* =
They cook rice.
- 2. *Tumhe bhataṃ pacatha* =
You (pl.) cook rice.
- 3. *Mayaṃ bhataṃ pacāma* =
We cook rice.

The verb *atthi* (to be) from root √*as* is a special verb of frequent occurrence. It is conjugated as:

Singular	Plural
3rd <i>atthi</i>	<i>santi</i>
2nd <i>asi</i>	<i>attha</i>
1st <i>asmi / amhi</i>	<i>asma / amha</i>

ii). **Bhavissanti**

Bālāvatāra theorem and Exposition: “**Anāgate bhavissanti**” [*bhavissanti ssati ssanti ssasi ssatha ssāmi ssāma-ssate ssante ssase ssavhe ssaṃ ssāmhe'ti etesaṃ bhavissanti saññā.*]

The future tense is formed by adding *-ssa* to the root / verbal base with, or in some cases without, the connecting vowel *-i-* the terminations are the same as those in the present tense.

Conjugation of √ <i>paca</i> (= to cook) in <i>Bhavissanti- Parassapada</i>		
persons (<i>purisa</i>)	singular (<i>ekavacana</i>)	plural (<i>bahuvacana</i>)
<i>Paṭhamapurisa</i> (3 rd person)	(<i>so</i> : he/she/it) <i>pacissati</i> will cook	(<i>te</i> : they) <i>pacissanti</i> will cook
<i>Majjhimapurisa</i> (2 nd person)	(<i>tvaṃ</i> : you) <i>pacissasi</i>	(<i>tumhe</i> : you) <i>pacissatha</i>
<i>Uttamapurisa</i> (1 st person)	(<i>ahaṃ</i> : I) <i>pacissāmi</i> (I shall..)	(<i>mayāṃ</i> : we) <i>pacissāma</i>

Conjugation of √ <i>paca</i> (= to cook) in <i>Bhavissanti- Attanopada</i>		
persons (<i>purisa</i>)	singular (<i>ekavacana</i>)	plural (<i>bahuvacana</i>)
<i>Paṭhamapurisa</i> (3 rd person)	(<i>so</i> : he/she/it) <i>pacissate</i>	(<i>te</i> : they) <i>pacissante</i>
<i>Majjhimapurisa</i> (2 nd person)	(<i>tvaṃ</i> : you) <i>pacissase</i>	(<i>tumhe</i> : you) <i>pacissathe</i>
<i>Uttamapurisa</i> (1 st person)	(<i>ahaṃ</i> : I) <i>pacissāmi</i> (I shall)	(<i>mayāṃ</i> : we) <i>pacissāma</i>

Attention should be paid to the following forms:

<i>gacchati</i> -	<i>gamissati</i>	= he will go
<i>āgacchati</i> -	<i>āgamissati</i>	= he will come
<i>dadāti</i> -	<i>dadissati / dassati</i>	= he will give
<i>tiṭṭhati</i> -	<i>ṭhassati</i>	= he will stand
<i>karoti</i> -	<i>karissati</i>	= he will do

iii) **Ajjatanī**

Bālāvatāra theorem and Exposition: **Samīpe ajjatanī** [*ajjatanī ī uṃ o ttha imhā-ā ū se vhaṃ a mhe iti etesaṃ ajjatanī saññā*]. So far, we have

noticed in the above conjugation of Pāli past tense, none is fully past; some are conditional while the others are imperfect or indefinite of the speaking action. The *Ajjatanī* or the Aorist is the full past tense. In other words, *Ajjatanī* is the complete past tense, it is definite.

Conjugation of √ <i>paca</i> (= to cook) in <i>Ajjatanī</i> – <i>Parassapada</i>		
persons (<i>purisa</i>)	singular (<i>ekavacana</i>)	plural (<i>bahuvacana</i>)
<i>Paṭhamapurisa</i> (3 rd person)	(<i>so</i> : he/she/it) <i>apaci, paci, apacī, pacī-</i> cooked	(<i>te</i> : they) <i>apacuṃ, pacuṃ</i> - cooked
<i>Majjhimapurisa</i> (2 nd person)	(<i>tvaṃ</i> : you) <i>apaco, paco-</i> cooked	(<i>tumhe</i> : you) <i>apacittha, pacittha-</i> cooked
<i>Uttamapurisa</i> (1 st person)	(<i>ahaṃ</i> : I) <i>apaciṃ, paciṃ-</i> cooked	(<i>mayāṃ</i> : we) <i>apacimha, pacimha,</i> <i>apacimhā, pacimhā-</i> cooked

Conjugation of √ <i>paca</i> (= to cook) in <i>Ajjatanī</i> – <i>Attanopada</i>		
persons (<i>purisa</i>)	singular (<i>ekavacana</i>)	plural (<i>bahuvacana</i>)
<i>Paṭhamapurisa</i> (3 rd person)	(<i>so</i> : he/she/it) <i>apacā, pacā</i>	(<i>te</i> : they) <i>apacū, pacū</i>
<i>Majjhimapurisa</i> (2 nd person)	(<i>tvaṃ</i> :you) <i>apacise, pacise</i>	(<i>tumhe</i> : you) <i>apacivhaṃ, pacivhaṃ</i>
<i>Uttamapurisa</i> (1 st person)	(<i>ahaṃ</i> : I) <i>apacaṃ, pacaṃ</i>	(<i>mayāṃ</i> : we) <i>apacimhe, pacimhe</i>

E.g. Singular:

1. *Bhūpālo dīpe cari / acari*
acarimsu -
The king wandered in the island.
 2. *Samaṇo dhammaṃ desesi*
desayimsu.
The monk preached the dhamma.
 3. *Tvaṃ bhaṇḍāni vikkiṇi*
You sold goods.
1. *Tvaṃ pupphāni pūjesi*
You offered the flowers.
 2. *Ahaṃ pabbataṃ āruhim*
I climbed the mountain.

Plural:

1. *Bhūpālā dīpesu carimsu /*
Kings wandered in the islands.
 2. *Samaṇā dhammaṃ desesuṃ /*
Monks preached the dhamma.
 3. *Tumhe bhaṇḍāni vikkiṇittha*
You sold goods.
1. *Tumhe pupphāni pūjayittha*
You offered flowers.
 2. *Mayāṃ pabbate āruhimha -*
We climbed mountains.

3. *Ahaṃ dīpaṃ jālesim / jālayim*
I lit the lamp.

3. *Mayaṃ dīpe jālayimha* -
We lit lamps.

v) ***Hīyyatanī***⁶

Hīyyatanī is the Imperfect mode. It is defined as *hiyoppabhuti paccakkeva apaccakkeva hīyyatanī* – Things done yesterday confirmed and not confirmed. [*hīyattanī ā ū o ttha a mhā-ttha tthum se vhaṃ im mhaseti etesaṃ hīyyatanī saññā*]. According to Venerable AP Buddhadatta, this was originally used to express the definite past, and *Ajjatanī* was used to express the time recently passed but now, they have lost their individual significance, and *Ajjatanī* is extensively used to express the definite past.⁷ In *Hīyyatanī* form of conjugation, *a* is added to the verbal root and then the conjugation terminations are added to the root. Examples of both *Parassapada* and *Attanopada* modes of *Hīyyatanī* would make it easier to absorb its conjugational method.

Conjugation of √ <i>paca</i> (= to cook) in <i>Hīyyatanī</i> – <i>Parassapada</i>		
persons (<i>purisa</i>)	singular (<i>ekavacana</i>)	plural (<i>bahuvacana</i>)
<i>Paṭhamapurisa</i> (3 rd person)	(<i>so</i> : he/she/it) <i>apacā</i>	(<i>te</i> : they) <i>apacū</i>
<i>Majjhimapurisa</i> (2 nd person)	(<i>tvaṃ</i> : you) <i>apaco</i>	(<i>tumhe</i> : you) <i>apacattha</i>
<i>Uttamapurisa</i> (1 st person)	(<i>ahaṃ</i> : I) <i>apaca</i>	(<i>mayāṃ</i> : we) <i>apacamhā</i>

Conjugation of √ <i>paca</i> (= to cook) in <i>Hīyyatanī</i> – <i>Attanopada</i>		
persons (<i>purisa</i>)	singular (<i>ekavacana</i>)	plural (<i>bahuvacana</i>)
<i>Paṭhamapurisa</i> (3 rd person)	(<i>so</i> : he/she/it) <i>apacattha</i>	(<i>te</i> : they) <i>apacatthum</i>
<i>Majjhimapurisa</i> (2 nd person)	(<i>tvaṃ</i> : you) <i>apacase</i>	(<i>tumhe</i> : you) <i>apacivhaṃ</i>
<i>Uttamapurisa</i> (1 st person)	(<i>ahaṃ</i> : I) <i>apaciṃ</i>	(<i>mayāṃ</i> : we) <i>apacamhase</i>

These both forms of *Hīyyatanī* conjugation, like the *Parokkhā*, give the same meaning. E.g. *so odanaṃ apacā* and *so odanaṃ apacattha*; both sentences express one meaning, i.e. ‘he cooked rice.’ As mentioned above, *Parokkhā* has six rules for the reduplication of the first two letters of the nominal root.

vi) **Parokkhā**⁸

The definition of the *Parokkhā* is ‘*apacchakkhe parokkhātite*’ (the past that is not confirmed). [*parokkhā a u e ttha a mha-ttha re ttho vho i mhe ti etesaṃ parokkhā saññā*].

Conjugation of √ <i>paca</i> (= to cook) in <i>Parokkhā – Parassapada</i>		
persons (<i>purisa</i>)	singular (<i>eka vacana</i>)	plural (<i>bahu vacana</i>)
<i>Paṭhamapurisa</i> (3 rd person)	(<i>so</i> : he/she/it) <i>papaca</i>	(<i>te</i> : they) <i>papacu</i>
<i>Majjhimapurisa</i> (2 nd person)	(<i>tvam</i> : you) <i>papace</i>	(<i>tumhe</i> : you) <i>papacittha</i>
<i>Uttamapurisa</i> (1 st person)	(<i>ahaṃ</i> : I) <i>papaca</i>	(<i>mayam</i> : we) <i>papacimha</i>

Conjugation of √ <i>paca</i> (= to cook) in <i>Parokkhā – Attanopada</i>		
persons (<i>purisa</i>)	singular (<i>eka vacana</i>)	plural (<i>bahu vacana</i>)
<i>Paṭhamapurisa</i> (3 rd person)	(<i>so</i> : he/she/it) <i>papacittha</i>	(<i>te</i> : they) <i>papacire</i>
<i>Majjhimapurisa</i> (2 nd person)	(<i>tvam</i> : you) <i>papacittho</i>	(<i>tumhe</i> : you) <i>papacivho</i>
<i>Uttamapurisa</i> (1 st person)	(<i>ahaṃ</i> : I) <i>papaci</i>	(<i>mayam</i> : we) <i>papacimhe</i>

In both conjugations, one common special feature we can notice is the prefix ‘*pa*’ is added to the verbal root √*paca* and then the conjugation terminations are added to the root. However, this differs according to the first letters of the verbal root of the verb, e.g. if the verbal root is *bhū*, the *Parokkhā* form would be *babhūva*. It is the doubling of the first two letters – (*dvitva*).

vii) **Kālātipatti**

“*Kriyā atipanne atīte kāle kālātipatti hoti*” is the definition of the *Kālātipatti* or Conditional Past mode of Pāli past tense. [*kālātipatti ssā ssaṃsu sse ssatha ssaṃ ssmhā ssatha ssiṃsu ssase ssavhe ssaṃ ssāmhaseṭi etesaṃ kālātipatti saññā*].

It speaks of some past conditional actions, sometimes in expression or connected to the future. According to Venerable A.P. Buddhadatta, it is expressing future relatively to something that is past, and an action unable to be performed on account of some difficulty in the way of its

execution.⁹ Examples of the two modes in *Kālātipatti* would make it clearer to observe the special features of *Kālātipatti*.

Conjugation of √paca (= to cook) in <i>Kālātipatti – Parassapada</i>		
persons (<i>purisa</i>)	singular (<i>ekavacana</i>)	plural (<i>bahuvacana</i>)
<i>Pathamapurisa</i> (3 rd person)	(<i>so</i> : he/she/it) <i>apacissā; apacissa</i>	(<i>te</i> : they) <i>apacissamsu</i>
<i>Majjhimapurisa</i> (2 nd person)	(<i>tvaṃ</i> : you) <i>apacisse</i>	(<i>tumhe</i> : you) <i>apacissatha</i>
<i>Uttamapurisa</i> (1 st person)	(<i>ahaṃ</i> : I) <i>apacissa</i>	(<i>mayam</i> : we) <i>apacissamhā</i>

<i>Pathamapurisa</i> (3 rd person)	(<i>so</i> : he/she/it) <i>apacissatha</i>	(<i>te</i> : they) <i>Apacissimsu</i>
<i>Majjhimapurisa</i> (2 nd person)	(<i>tvaṃ</i> : you) <i>apacissase</i>	(<i>tumhe</i> : you) <i>apacissavhe</i>
<i>Uttamapurisa</i> (1 st person)	(<i>ahaṃ</i> : I) <i>apacissam</i>	(<i>mayam</i> : we) <i>apacissāmhase</i>

viii) ***Pañcamī***

“***āṇatyāsiṭṭhenuttakāle pañcamī paccuppanne kāle bhedamanūmasitvā pañcamī hotī***” –[*pañcamī tu antu hi tha mi ma- taṃ antaṃ ssu vho e āmase ti etesaṃ pañsamīsaññā*]. The imperative mood expresses a command, benediction, prayer or wish.¹⁰

Singular	Plural
3 rd (So) <i>pacatu</i> = Let him cook	3 rd (Te) <i>pacantu</i> = Let them cook
2 nd (Tvaṃ) <i>paca, pacāhi</i> = You cook	2 nd (Tumhe) <i>pacatha</i> = You cook
1 st (Ahaṃ) <i>pacāmi</i> = Let me cook	1 st (Mayaṃ) <i>pacāma</i> = Let us cook

It should be observed that the second person plural and first person singular and plural have the same forms as in the present tense. The prohibitive particle *mā* is also used with the imperative.

1. *So vāñijānaṃ bhattaṃ pacatu.*

Let him cook rice for the merchants.

2. *Tvaṃ rathena nagaraṃ gaccha / gacchāhi.*

You go to the city in the vehicle.

3. *Ahaṃ dhammaṃ uggaṇhāmi.*

Let me learn the dhamma.

1. *Te vāṇijānaṃ bhattaṃ
pacantu.*

Let them cook rice for the
merchants.

2. *Tumhe rathena nagaraṃ
gacchatha.*

You go to the city in the
vehicle.

3. *Mayaṃ dhammaṃ
uggaṇhāma.*

Let us learn the dhamma.

With the prohibitive particle *mā*.

1. *Mā tumhe saccaṃ parivajjetha.*

You do not avoid the truth.

2. *Mā te uyyānamhi pupphāni ocinantu.*

Let them not pick flowers in the park

ix) *Sattamī* (The Optative or the Potential Mood)

Bālāvātāra Theorem and Exposition: “*Anumati parikappatthesu sattamī*”-*anumatyatthe parikappatthe ca anuttakāle sattamī hoti. [sattamī eyya eyyuṃ eyyāsi eyyātha eyyāmi eyyāma - etha eraṃ etho eyyavho eyyaṃ eyyāmhē ti eyyādīnaṃ sattamīsaññā]*.

The optative expresses mainly probability and advice, and ideas such as those conveyed by if, might, would, etc. It is formed by adding *-eyya* to the verbal base before terminations.¹¹

Singular	Plural
3 rd (So) <i>paceyya</i> = If he would cook	3 rd (Te) <i>paceyyuṃ</i> = If they would cook
2 nd (Tvam) <i>paceyyāsi</i> = If you would cook	2 nd (Tumhe) <i>paceyyātha</i> = If you would cook
1 st (Ahaṃ) <i>paceyyāmi</i> = If I would cook	1 st (Mayaṃ) <i>paceyyāma</i> = If we would cook

Conclusion

Thus, the above methodology seems very well organized as well as profound for achieving a comprehensive knowledge of verbal conjugations as presented by traditional grammarians. The comparative remarks of certain verbs would make it easier to understand that this pedagogy of grammarians is only one of the ways of explaining Pāli conjugations, which, in turn, leads us not to be bound with the format given.

ABBREVIATIONS

KV	<i>Kaccāyana Vyākaraṇa</i>
BL	<i>Bālāvatāra Grammar</i>

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It should be noted that all the grammatical explanations of Kaccāyana Vyākaraṇa were extracted from Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyanā Tipiṭaka 4.0, 1995 published by Vipassanā Research Institute.

NOTES

- ¹ Perniyola, V. (1958) *A Grammar of the Pali language*, p. 175
- ² Buddhadatta, A.P. *The New Pāli Course II*, p. 75.
- ³ *Sabba* = all *dhātuka* = having the nature of roots, *Sabbadhātuka* = common to all roots/ occupied with all roots. KV: 431, **458**. *Hiyyattanī sattamī pañcamī vattamānā sabbadhātukaṃ*.
- ⁴ KV “*Atha sabbāsaṃ vibhattīnaṃ yāni yāni pubbakāni cha padāni, tāni tāni parassapadasaññāni honti. Taṃ yathā? Ti anti, si tha, mi ma. Parassapadamiccānena kvattho? Kattari parassapadaṃ.*” *Sabbāsaṃ vibhattīnaṃ yāni yāni parāni cha padāni. Tāni tāni attanopadasaññāni honti. Taṃ yathā? Te ante, se vhe, e mhe. Attanopadamiccānena kvattho? Attanopadāni bhāve ca kammani.*
- ⁵ KV **414**, 428. *Vattamānā paccuppanne. Paccuppanne kāle vattamānāvibhatti hoti. Pāṭaliputtaṃ gacchati, sāvatthiṃ pavisati.*
- ⁶ KV *Hiyyopabhuti paccakkhe hiyyattanī. Hiyyopabhuti atīte kāle paccakkhe vā apaccakkhe vā hiyyattanī vibhatti hoti. So agamā maggaṃ, te agamū maggaṃ.*
- ⁷ The New Pāli Course II, p. 86.
- ⁸ KV **417**, 460. *Apaccakkhe parokkhāṭīte. Apaccakkhe atīte kāle parokkhāvibhatti hoti. Supīne kilamāha, evaṃ kila porāṇāhu.*
- ⁹ The New Pāli Course II p. 75.
- ¹⁰ **415**, 451. *Āṇatyā siṭṭhe’nuttakāle pañcamī. Āṇatyatthe ca āsīsatthe ca anuttakāle pañcamī vibhatti hoti. Karotu kusalaṃ, sukhaṃ te hotu.*
- ¹¹ **416**, 454. *Anumatiparikappatthesu sattamī. Anumatyatthe ca parikappatthe ca anuttakāle sattamī vibhatti hoti. Tvam gaccheyyāsi, kimahaṃ kareyyāmi.*

Anusāsani Pātihāri: The Miracle of Instruction in the Bojjhaṅga-sutta and the Girimānanda-sutta

Bhikkhuni W. Suvimalee

The original non-mystical, non-metaphysical content of the Buddhist discourses is very clear. It is emphasized in the *Kevaḍḍha-sutta* of the *Dīgha-nikāya*. However, a contradiction of it is seen in the present day popular belief among some Buddhists in Sri Lanka that there is a special supernatural power immanent in certain discourses in their *paritta* form. This article attempts to locate the origin of this belief and also the belief in cleansing and fasting preparations obligatory on the beneficiaries-to-be of the *paritta* recitations. It also suggests that the real curative potency is in the meditation technique given in the *Bojjhaṅga-paritta* and the *Girimānanda-sutta*.

The Buddha's method of delivering a discourse had the characteristic of awakening in the listener the knowledge of the real nature of existence. The method aimed at urging the listener to understand the human predicament well and the nature of the empirical world. The efficacy of applying the four noble truths to one's own individual discontent, and, seeing the cause of it clearly, are implied. Knowing and seeing the cause of discontent, suffering or unsatisfactoriness lead to the eradication of the cause which conduces to a state of calm and peace. Lastly, the detailed way to achieve that peace is also given in many a discourse.

The Buddha's approach to human affliction was holistic. His teaching was not a piece-meal, temporary *ad hoc* patch up job with the objective of getting over the existing pain or grief but comprehending totally one's own experience, seeing it as a recurrent mind-body affliction and effecting an eradication of that affliction. Needless to say, the Buddha had boundless resources of *mettā*, *karunā*, *muditā* and *upekkhā*, besides empathy with the sufferings of the 'many folk'. As he told his first disciples: "Walk, monks, on tour for the blessings of the many folk, for the happiness of the many folk, out of compassion for the world, for the welfare, the blessings, the happiness of *devas* and men."¹ He reached out even to the severely mentally traumatized, like Patācārā and Kisāgotami. He was even able to transform the mind of a serial killer, Aṅgulimāla, in whom perception of reality had gone hay wire and even helped him along the path of sainthood, with nothing more than the rational discourse of *anusāsani pātihāri*. We must also note here that in many of

his discourses he advocated solitude and meditation for bringing about tranquility, necessary for the attainment of a wholesome state of mind, an essential condition for the attainment of intense one-pointed-concentration to reach final liberation.

When Kevaḍḍha² requested the Buddha to display his psychic powers by performing miracles in public in order to win more and more converts, the Buddha declined to do so. He explained to Kevaḍḍha that there were three kinds of miracles to his knowledge, all of which he was able to perform: *Iddhi vidha* (psychic powers), *desanā pātihāri* (the miracle of telepathy) and *anusāsani Pātihāri* (the miracle of instruction). The latter, the Buddha said, he considered the noblest and what he valued most of all which he regularly employed in his interaction and interventions in society for the sake of bringing relief and ultimate liberation to people.

The Buddha further elaborated to Kevaḍḍha that if he displayed his psychic powers in public and if someone seeing his powers were to relate it to another, that person, if he is a cynic, might say “Sir, there is the Gandhāra charm by which such miracles are performed”. If, on the other hand, he displayed his powers of telepathy and if someone seeing it were to go and relate it to another, a person who was a skeptic, he might say “Sir, such things are possible with the Maṇika charm”

Continuing, the Buddha said “And what is the miracle of instruction? Here, Kevaḍḍha, a monk gives instructions as follows: “Consider in this way, do not consider in that; direct your mind this way, not that way; give up that, and gain this and persevere in it. This, Kevaḍḍha, is called the miracle of instruction.”

This method of altering someone’s perceptions resembles a technique used in psycho-therapy practised today by counselors and psychologists called ‘cognitive therapy’. It is a method whereby the mind’s distorted perceptions can be altered through a series of structured rational dialogues between the counselor and the client.

There is also evidence in the Buddhist canon that the Buddha allowed his disciples to use some of his discourses in the form of *paritta*, that is, protective recitations for the purpose of warding off evil influences or bringing about a cure of an illness. These *paritta* recitations are, among others, *Ratana-sutta*, *Karaṇīyametta-sutta*, *Khandhaparitta*, *Moraparitta*, *Dhajaggaparitta*, the *Aṅgulimālaparitta*, *Āṭānāṭṭiya-sutta*, *Girimānanda-sutta* and the *Bojjhaṅgaparitta*.

There is a strong popular belief in the magical properties of *pirit* chanting among Buddhists in Sri Lanka. E.R. Sarchchandra was one of the earliest Sri Lankan scholars to focus on the ‘magical’ elements of the folk religion that had been absorbed by Buddhism without altering the spirit of The Buddha’s teaching. In his anthropological study, *The Folk Drama of Ceylon*, he states, “The institution of *pirit* is one of the more conspicuous examples of a ceremony of a magical nature being absorbed by Buddhism. The *suttas* used for this purpose exist in the Pāli canon itself, and this makes it likely that in some form, the practice of reciting them for benedictory purpose began in India.”³

It is popularly believed by some Sri Lankan Buddhists that the *Bojjhaṅga paritta* recitations have a miraculous power. It is believed that the sick are cured through listening to the chanting of these *paritta* recitations. It is explained that the cure lies in the way the words are put together and the way their sound vibrations carry and by the fact that these words were uttered by the Buddha himself from his blessed lips (*siri mukhayen*, in Sinhala), words invested with the Buddha’s extraordinary powers (*anubhavayen*, in Sinhala). To the present writer, there is a discrepancy in this believed- in miraculous power invested in words on the one hand and the Buddha’s statement made to Kevaḍḍha. To the latter, the Buddha stated very clearly that he believed only in *anusāsani pāṭihāri*, the miracle of instruction. Since the instruction is enshrined in the *Bojjhaṅga*, there is really no need to go looking in it for miraculous sounds and vibrations. The Buddha’s non-mystical, non-metaphysical stand is too well known to be ignored.

The focus of this article is *anusāsani pāṭihāri* and its relationship to the *Bojjhaṅga paritta* and the *Girimānanda-sutta*. The former is based on the seven factors of enlightenment which contains an advanced meditation exercise given to a disciple who is on the brink of attaining enlightenment. We can assume, therefore, that the advanced meditator’s mind is developed and quick. This *sutta* appears in the *Samyutta-nikāya*⁴ as an exposition of the seven factors of enlightenment which is a meditation exercise that should be practised. In the same *Bojjhaṅgasamyutta* section, the discourse on the seven factors of enlightenment discussed above appears again⁵ recited by the Buddha for Ven. Mahā Kassapa who was ill and in great pain. At the end of the Buddha’s recitation, Ven. Mahā Kassapa was released from the pain and the illness. Immediately after that discourse, in the text, there is the same *sutta* recited⁶ by the Buddha, this time for Ven. Mahā Moggallāna who was ill and undergoing a great deal of pain and at the end of the recitation he, too, was relieved of the illness and the pain. After this the same *sutta* appears again in the text⁷ recited this time by Ven.

Mahācūda, at the request of the Buddha, when he himself was ill and undergoing a great deal of pain, and likewise, the Buddha too was relieved of the pain and the illness at the end of the recitation.

It is significant that the *Bojjhaṅga Paritta[s]* were recited for two *arahants* by the Buddha and on a third occasion by an *arahant* for the Buddha. The reason is obvious. The meditation on the seven factors of enlightenment can be accomplished only by an *arahant*. Therefore, what is being suggested here is that the cure of the illness would have come about through the actual engagement in that meditation.

We learn from these *paritta* recitations that *arahants* do experience physical pain like any other human being. It is the psychological component of fear, (*bhaya*) and grief and despair (*domanassūpāyasā*) which originate from the defilements of *taṇhā* (craving), *māna* (conceit of the ego concept) *diṭṭhi* (wrong view). All these defiling characteristics an *arahant* does not possess for he has reached the end of craving. They do not have clinging to the mind-body aggregates and to the life continuum. So, why, we may ask, is an *arahant* unable at times to surmount physical pain through meditation and attain *saññāvedayita nirodha* which he would have experienced so many times before? What follows here is an attempt to answer this question.

The three *paritta* recitation set out, are three identical meditation exercises, (*kammaṭṭhāna*), called the seven factors of Enlightenment. This is the most advanced meditation exercise that enables a meditator to exit the round of existence. When Ven. Mahākassapa was sick and undergoing great pain the Buddha visited him and having put several questions to him about the excruciating pain he was undergoing, recited the meditation exercise with which Ven. Mahākassapa was, no doubt, already familiar. A *kammaṭṭhāna* is not given for its ‘magical potency’ but to be put into practice. However, it still remains unanswered why the Buddha had to give the *kammaṭṭhāna* to Ven. Mahākassapa who was already familiar with it and, furthermore, one who had practised it and ‘gone to the other shore’. Perhaps the answer is that the Buddha recited the *sutta* so that Ven. Mahākassapa hearing it could follow it mindfully and swiftly concentrating on the various mental events prescribed in the exercise, focus mindfully (*satisambojjhaṅga*) on the meditation object of the *kammaṭṭhāna*, i.e., the pain. Then investigating it, trace it to its point of arising, delving deep into the experience (*dhammavicayasambojjhaṅga*), and persevering with energy (*viriyasambojjhaṅga*) thereby surmount the physical phenomena just as a sea gull would take off from the shore and ascend into the sky of peerless clarity and painlessness, experiencing sheer rapture, (*pītisambojjhaṅga*)

and tranquility, (*passaddhisambojjhaṅga*). From here results one pointed concentration (*samādhisambojjhaṅga*) and equanimity (*upekkhāsambojjhaṅga*). With the achieving of these steps in the meditational exercise, (in which we can recognize the cognitive events and states of consciousness) we are led to believe that the illness abated. It is almost as if the recitation provided the necessary gentle nudge or stimulus to fasten the mind on the steps in the meditation exercise. In other words it was an induced meditation exercise to a certain extent.

It is also most likely that the Buddha's powerful thoughts of *mettā* and *karunā* would have had a tranquilizing effect on Ven. Mahākassapa's mind – body interaction, making it relaxed and suitably conditioned to start the meditation. The Buddha also recited the identical *Bojjhaṅgaparitta* to Mahāmoggallāna and when the Buddha himself was suffering from a painful illness, he requested Mahācunda to recite the *paritta* for him.

The word *bojjhaṅga* means constituents of enlightenment. As these constituents are seven in number, they are often referred to as *Sattabojjhaṅga*. As the *sattabojjhaṅga* here is employed as a *paritta*, and that meditation exercise is an exclusive preserve of *arahants*, it appears to be a form of induced meditation on the seven factors of enlightenment whereby the patient, already a perfected one and familiar with its practice, is gently coerced into practising it by listening to it being chanted. It is like helping the ailing *arahant* to go on a mind-body tour, as it were, with penetrative concentration. The Buddha believed that one must effect one's own release by oneself and that the *tathgata[s]* are there only to show the way as the stanza goes: “*Tumhehi kiccā ātappam, akkhātro tathāgata*”

The *Bojjhaṅga-sutta* asserts that the insight provided by the meditation when focused on pain (penetrating deep into that experience very thoroughly, like a laser beam, perhaps, penetrating into the physical and mental phenomena of the mind-body interaction) does the work of reducing the pain and curing the illness connected with the pain.

Today, the *Bojjhaṅgaparitta-sutta* is recited to the sick in the devout belief that merely listening to the recitation itself has a therapeutic effect in the way the words are put together and pronounced to produce a particular sound and vibration which is thereby invested with a certain magical power. Perhaps tranquility is attained thereby, but whether the root cause of pain can be eradicated by merely listening to the chanting is the question. When the *Bojjhaṅga* is recited as a miraculous curing device it seems to miss the focus of the meditation exercise for which it

was, no doubt, originally meant. If the original intention of the exercise is adhered to as a *kammaṭṭhāna*, pure and simple, it becomes a dynamic instrument of therapy. But only an *arahant* can achieve that. The following is a translation of the *Bojjhaṅga*, the Seven Factors of Enlightenment:

On one occasion, the Blessed one was dwelling at Rājagah, in the Bamboo Grove, the Squirrel’s Sanctuary. Now, on that occasion, the Venerable Mahākassapa was dwelling in the Pippali Grove, sick, afflicted, gravely ill. Then, in the evening, the Blessed One emerged from seclusion and approached the Venerable Mahākassapa. He sat down in the appointed seat and said to the Venerable Mahākassapa:

“I hope you are bearing up, Kassapa, I hope you are getting better. I hope that your painful feelings are subsiding and not increasing, and that their subsiding, not their increase, is to be discerned.”

“Venerable Sir, I am not bearing up, I am not getting better: Strong, painful feelings are increasing in me, not subsiding, and their increase, not their subsiding, is to be discerned.”

“These seven factors of enlightenment, Kassapa, have been rightly expounded by me; when developed and cultivated, they lead to direct knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nibbāna. What seven? The enlightenment factor of mindfulness has been rightly expounded by me; when developed and cultivated, it leads to direct knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nibbāna ...the enlightenment factor of equanimity has been rightly expounded by me; when developed and cultivated, it leads to direct knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nibbāna. These seven factors of enlightenment, Kassapa, have been rightly expounded by me; when developed and cultivated, they lead to direct knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nibbāna.

“Surely, Blessed One, they are factors of enlightenment! Surely, Fortunate One, they are factors of enlightenment!”

This is what the Blessed One said. Elated, the Venerable Mahākassapa delighted in the Blessed One’s statement. And the Venerable Mahākassapa recovered from the illness. In such a way the Venerable Mahākassapa was cured of his illness.

The popular belief puts aside the deeper meaning of the *Bojjhaṅga* meditation in favour of a supernatural interpretation of its effectiveness in direct contradiction to the Buddha's words in the *Kevaḍḍha-sutta*. This kind of belief is no doubt embedded in the Sri Lankan folk culture. Such beliefs in 'yantra mantra' (occult practices) are to be found in the Vedas and the *Brahmaṇas*. It is not unlikely that they had a direct influence on Sinhalese folk culture which reflects many aspects of *brahmanic* Indian cultural beliefs. In the Yajurveda, for instance, instructions are set down for the performance of rites and rituals strictly according to certain prescribed ways of performing them. It was thought that the gods were rendered helpless by the performance of such rites and rituals and thereby the *brahmaṇa* priests exalted themselves above the Vedic gods they were supplicating at first and later manipulating.⁸

No doubt the *Bojjhaṅgaparitta* when recited according to the traditional tenets of oral recitation has a tranquilizing effect. It may even effect a faith cure depending on the extent of the patient's faith and the power of the reciter's thoughts of *mettā* and *karuṇā*. Beyond that, on rational grounds, we have to admit that belief in the miraculous potency invested in mere physical phenomena such as verbalized sounds fall into the category of mysticism which the Buddha and early Buddhism consistently eschewed. There is nothing metaphysical in the Buddha's core doctrines of *paṭiccasamuppāda*, *idappaccayatā* and *anatta* as expressed in statements such as Assaji's to Sāriputta related in the *Mahāvagga* of the *Vinaya Piṭaka*.⁹

*Ye dhammāhetuppabhavā
Tesaṃ hetu tathāgata āha
Tesañ ca yo nirodho
Evam vādi Mahāsamaṇo*

Those things which proceed from a cause,
Of these the Truth Finder has told the cause
And that which is their stopping – the great recluse
Has such a doctrine.

And, of course, the famous declaration in the *Mahāatañhāsankhaya-sutta*, D.I.

*Imasmim sati idam hoti
Imassa uppādā idam uppajjhati
Imasmim asati idam na hoti
Imassa nirodho idam nirujjhati*¹⁰

When this exists, that comes to be
 With the arising of this, that arises
 When this does not exist, that does not come to be
 With the cessation of this, that ceases.

These statements clearly indicate Early Buddhism's non-metaphysical stand.

Perhaps a short elaboration on this point is not out of place here. The above statements refer to the doctrine of *Paṭiccasamuppāda* and the unsubstantial, transient nature of all component things, particularly focusing on the five aggregates of clinging, their interdependence, impermanence and the absence of any abiding essence in them. These doctrines are central to the Buddhist philosophy and are discussed exhaustively in the texts. *Paṭiccasamuppāda* demonstrates causality and conditionedness of all material and mental phenomena. It is apparent that the causal sequence is a ceaseless circuit of the five aggregates of clinging.¹¹ A great deal of light is shed on the doctrine of *Paṭiccasamuppāda* when the process of cognition is discerned in it very clearly, for then, with the starting point of the circuit in ignorance, synonymous with unsatisfactoriness, (*dukkha*) the succession of mental events therefrom, conditioned by internal and external forces that lead to unwholesome states of mind and physical acts, can be comprehended experientially and empirically through insight meditation and extra-sensory perception. Buddhism does not concern itself with concepts of the transcendent, mysticism or metaphysics, speculation, logic, inference or even reason. It is concerned with what can be known experientially and is wholly concerned with psychology and ethics which underlie the path to the goal, Nibbāna. To that extent it is pragmatic. As the Buddha said, he does not teach anything other than *dukkha* and how to attain liberation from it.

Ongoing medical research into the human mind-body from the 1950's has revealed the fact that meditation reduces stress and has a therapeutic effect on the mind-body organism¹². It is also known to medical science through research that meditation can achieve the astonishing feat of controlling respiration to a level where the meditator requires very little oxygen enabling such a yogi to be sealed up in a box for several hours. The ability to control body temperature is how half naked yogis are able to withstand the perishing cold of dizzy Himalayan heights as they meditate in a half squatting posture at the edge of steep cliffs for several hours. These are facts brought to light through recent medical research. This is clear evidence of the power of mind over matter.¹³

More relevant to our subject here of the effects of meditation, particularly insight meditation, on reducing pain, are the latest research finding published in the *Science Daily of April 5, 2011*, the Journal of Neuroscience¹⁴. It states that meditation produces powerful pain-relieving effects in the brain.

We found a big effect – about a 40 per cent reduction in pain intensity and a 57 per cent pain reduction in pain unpleasantness. Meditation produced a greater reduction in pain than even morphine or other pain-relieving drugs which typically reduce pain ratings by about 25 per cent.¹⁵

Now, let us see where the belief in the miraculous power of words and their vibrations come. Raimunda Panikkar takes great pains to explain the Vedic belief regarding this subject.¹⁶ He says that in the recitation of the Sma Veda the sounds of words, their specific syllables and their vibrations produce a miraculous power. He says fasts and other austerities have to be undertaken beforehand or during participation in a recitation. Participation implies an integral participation in the total act of prayer, not only gods and men but the whole world, whole creation. According to the instructions laid down in the Sma Veda, “The Entire Universe vibrates at the sound of an authentic prayer. All is interconnected and then the fasting of the body is related to the cleansing of the mind for only a clean mind can sustain a bodily fast...The recitation belongs to the very nature of the Vedic Word which is actualized in the sound vibrations. The sacramental character of the word is seen in its necessary connection with sound as its physical element. The *śruti* indeed needs to be heard”¹⁷

Panikkar further explains the Vedic interpretation of speech as personified in the goddess Vac:

The origin and place, the locus, of the Word is prayer, the sacred formula, the brahmaṇa priest or Brahman, the spirit. The Word is not only sound, not only idea and intelligibility, it is also action, spirit, the unique word permeating everything. This is the right and the deepest theological or philosophical question. Metaphysics and Linguistic analysis meet in Vāc¹⁸

At another place, Panikkar says “The *Brāhmaṇas* are fascinated, one might almost say obsessed, by the position and function of the word. They are never far from ascribing to it a magic power and on occasion they virtually do so...”¹⁹

There is no doubt that the Buddha did set aside certain *brāhmanic* concepts. The canon testifies to this in innumerable places and it is also seen in the way he used certain words found in the *brahmanic* tradition but giving them a Buddhist connotation; for example, the word *brahmacariya*.²⁰

An interesting nugget of information is found in the *Soṇadaṇḍa-sutta*.²¹ Here, the Brahmin followers of their venerable teacher, Soṇadaṇḍa, try to prevail on him not to go and listen to the Buddha delivering his discourse. They said it is below his dignity for him to do so:

The Reverend Soṇadaṇḍa is a scholar, versed in the mantras, accomplished in the three Vedas, a skilled expounder of the rules and rituals, *the lore of sounds and meanings and fifthly, oral tradition...* (emphasis added)

It is quite clear from what source the belief originates regarding the miraculous sounds and vibrations present in the way syllables and words are intoned. This belief is not apparently articulated in the Buddhist scriptures. There are, of course, copious rules governing recitation with regard to rhythm, pronunciation, enunciation, etc. in the commentaries as to how *sutta(s)* and *paritta(s)* should be recited but the purpose of these instructions is more for textual preservation and for better understanding than for anything else. The efficacy of *paritta* recitation as found in the canon with regard to the *Karaṇīya Metta-sutta*, and the *Khandha-paritta*, lies in the Buddha's advice to recite them with *mettā*; other *parittas* like the *Aṅgulimālaparitta* and *Dhajaggaparitta* lie in the asseveration of a truth and confidence in it. The *Bojjhaṅgaparitta* is clearly different from these because it is based on an insight meditation of a very advanced nature. Its efficacy must lie in the actual practice of insight meditation for the purpose of allaying pain and the related illness. It was also, as has been pointed out earlier, recited by an *arahant* for an *arahant*, who would have perfected the technique of insight meditation. This is one way the efficacy of the *Bojjhaṅga* can be explained without falling into the fallacy of mysticism and metaphysics.

It must be mentioned here that the *Girimānanda-sutta*²² also contains meditation exercises for the purpose of effecting a cure. In this *sutta* venerable Ānanda informs the Buddha that venerable *Girimānanda* is seriously ill and suggests that the Buddha visit him. The Buddha instructs venerable Ānanda to recite ten meditation exercises to venerable *Girimānanda* and tells him that venerable *Girimānanda* on hearing the recitation will be cured of his illness then and there. Like the previous monks to whom the *Bojjhaṅgaparitta* was recited, venerable

Girimānanda is said to have been an *arahant*, which is again significant. However, it is not likely that he was already an *arahant* at the time the *Girimānanda-sutta* was recited for him. The argument here is that if he were already an *arahant* the *Bojjhaṅgaparitta* would have been most certainly recited for him which is the most advanced *vipassanā* meditation. Obviously venerable *Girimānanda* was not familiar with it because he was given nine meditation exercises before leading him into the *ānāpānāsati* meditation. If he had been familiar with the *Bojjhaṅga* or ready for it, the meditation would have effected a much quicker dispatch of his illness and pain, elevating him to the state of *nirodhasamāpatti* or *saññavedayitanirodha* very swiftly. The Buddha, instead, instructed venerable Ānanda to recite ten meditation exercises to him which show that he was not in the same class as the *arahants* featured in the *Bojjhaṅga-sutta*. However, the fact that he did become an *arahant* is mentioned in the *Therīgāthā*.²³

The ten *kammaṭṭhāna* (meditation subjects) given by the Buddha were contemplations on impermanence (*aniccasaññā*), non-self (*anattasaññā*), the foul (*asubhasaññā*) disadvantages or dangers inherent in the body, (*adīnavasaññā*) abandoning craving (*pahānasaññā*) dispassion, (*virāgasaññā*) cessation of *dukkha* (*nirodhasaññā*) disenchantment with the world, (*sabbaloke anabhiratasaññā*) impermanence of all dispositions/volitions, *sabbasankhāresu aniccasaññā*, and, concentration on in-breathing and out-breathing.

It is interesting to note what the Buddha meant by some of these contemplations. For instance, the passage on impermanence runs as follows:

And what Ānanda is the idea of impermanence? Herein a monk who has gone to the forest or the root of a tree or a lonely place thus contemplates: Impermanent are (objective) forms, impermanent are feelings, perceptions, dispositions, consciousness. Thus he abides seeing impermanence in the five aggregates of grasping.

Another passage runs:

And what Ānanda, is the idea of the foul?

Herein a monk examines just this body, upwards from the soles of the feet, downwards from the top of the head, enclosed by skin, full of manifold impurities (and concludes): there are the hair of the head, hair of the body, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, nerves,

bones, bone marrow, kidneys, heart, liver, diaphragm, spleen, lungs, intestines, bowels, stomach, feces, bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, grease, spittle, mucus, synovial fluid, urine, brain. This Ānanda is called “the idea of the foul”.

And what Ānanda, is the idea of the disadvantage?

Herein a monk who has gone to the forest...thus contemplates: ‘this body has many ills, many disadvantages. Thus, in this body arise diverse diseases, such as disease of eyesight and hearing, of nose, tongue, trunk, head, ear, mouth, teeth; there is cough, asthma, catarrh, fever, decrepitude, belly-ache, swooning, dysentery, griping, cholera, leprosy, imposthume, eczema, phthisis, epilepsy; skin-disease, itch, scab, tetter, scabies; bile-in-the-blood (jaundice), diabetes, piles, boils, ulcers; diseases arising from bile, from phlegm, from wind, from the union of bodily humours, from changes of the seasons, from stress of circumstances, or from the ripeness of one’s karma; also cold and fear, hunger and thirst, evacuation and urination.’ Thus he abides, observant of the disadvantages in the body. This, Ānanda, is called “the idea of the disadvantage”

Another very significant passage is the following:

And what, Ānanda, is the idea of distaste?

Herein a monk, by abandoning, by not clinging to those grasping of systems, those mental standpoints and dogmatic bias that are in the world, delights not therein. This is called “the idea of distaste”

What is meant in the above passage seems to be disenchantment with all the world and the translation of *upāyupādāna* as ‘grasping of systems’ must mean grasping of the five aggregates of clinging and the translation of *adhiṭṭhānābhinivesānususayā* given as “those mental standpoints and dogmatic bias” can be understood as those deeply rooted latent *anusayā* or clinging to wrong views and distorted perceptions, etc.

These are just a few meditational subjects chosen at random from the *Girimānanda-sutta*. As can be seen they form a very discursive set of meditation subjects involving deep philosophy, perhaps allowing venerable Girimānanda, to reflect on the philosophic aspects of a number of meditational subjects which would have prepared and composed his mind sufficiently in the direction of detachment and seeing clearly the

three signata in the mind-body organism and bringing the mind to a state of calm and tranquility before shifting the mind's focus to the *ānāpānāsati* meditation which is both a tranquility (*samatha*) meditation as well as an insight – *vipassanā*– meditation. From this point onwards the *ānāpānāsati* meditation runs as follows:

And what, Ānanda, is the idea of concentration on in-breathing and out-breathing? Herein a monk who has gone to the forest or root of a tree or a lonely place, sits down cross-legged, holding the body upright and setting mindfulness in front of him, he breathes in mindfully and mindfully breathes out. As he draws in a long breath he knows: A long breath I draw in. As he breathes out a long breath he knows: A long breath I breathe out. As he breathes out a short breath he knows: A short breath I breathe out.

He puts into practice the intention: I shall breathe in, feeling it go through the whole body. Feeling it go through the whole body I shall breathe out. Calming down the body-aggregate I shall breathe in. Calming down the body-aggregate I shall breathe out.

He puts into practice the intention: Feeling the thrill of zest I shall breathe in and out; feeling the sense of ease I shall breathe in and out. Calming down the mental factors I shall breathe in and out.

He puts into practice the intention: Gladdening my mind I shall breathe in and out. Composing my mind...detaching my mind I shall breathe in and out.

He puts into practice the intention: contemplating impermanence... dispassion... ending... contemplating renunciation I shall breathe in and out.

This, Ananda, is called 'the idea of concentration on in-breathing and out-breathing.'

Now, Ananda, if you were to visit the monk Girimānanda and recite to him these ten ideas, there is ground for supposing that on his hearing them that sickness of his will straightway be allayed." And so it was.

One may observe that by the time venerable Girimānanda finally begins on the *ānāpānasati* meditation he is sufficiently detached from the mind-body organism, having contemplated it from the perspective of the three signata, he is composed, not shifting from one meditation subject to another and ready to focus steadily on one meditation object. The initial meditation exercises would certainly have provided him with insights into the mind-body, so relevant to pain and illness. Then at this point, the *ānāpānasati* meditation commences, guiding him deeper and deeper into the mind-body, the rhythmic in-breathing and out-breathing composing his mind further, settling it on the object of meditation, then raising him into a state of zest, tranquility, happiness and finally one-pointed penetration into the source of pain and illness.

There is no magic, mysticism or metaphysics involved here in these *paritta[s]*. The difference between the *Bojjhaṅga* and the *Girimānanda-sutta* is that whereas the *Bojjhaṅga* gets off the ground and into the swing of concentration on mental events and mental states very rapidly, the *kammaṭṭhāna* given to venerable Girimānanda consists of a fairly long preliminary preparation before drawing him into deep absorption. The reason suggested here is that the efficacy of the *Bojjhaṅga* can be experienced only by *arahants*.

ABBREVIATIONS

- V. *Vinaya Piṭaka*
 D. *Dīgha-nikāya*
 S. *Samyutta-nikāya*
 A. *Aṅguttara-nikāya*
 M. *Majjhima-nikāya*
 Thag. *Theragāthā*

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NOTES

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- ¹ Vin.I.ii 1-12.2 *Mahavagga*, ed.Oldenbergh, PTS 1997
- ² *Kevaḍḍha-sutta*, D.I. No.11
- ³ E.R. Sarachchandra, *The Folk Drama of Ceylon*, Dept. of Cultural Affairs, Govt. of Ceylon (1952) 1966
- ⁴ S.V 46 *Bojjhaṅgasamyutta*
- ⁵ Ibid. 14 (4) iii i
- ⁶ Ibid. 15 (5) iii 2
- ⁷ Ibid. 16 (6) iii 3

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- 8 See M.Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol.2.University of Calcutta, 1933.
- 9 Book of the Discipline IV, trans. I.B.Horner, PTS p.55; also see Jā 1.85
- 10 The Long Discourses of the Buddha. Trans. Maurice Walsh, Wisdom Publication, Somerville, Mass. (1987) 1995, p.223and *Mahatāṅhāsankhaya-sutta*, Trans. Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli & Bhikku Bodhi, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha (M.i) BPS,1995.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 See Dr. D.B.Nugegoda, *Overcoming Psychological Stress*, Department of Community Medicine, Faculty of Medicine and Allied Sciences, Rajarata University of Sri Lanka, 2010, pp. 68 - 96
- 13 Google Internet: Latest medical researches on meditation.
- 14 APA, Wake Forest Baptist Medical Center (2011 April 5) Demystifying Meditation: Brain Imaging Illustrates How Meditation Reduces Pain.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 Raimund Panikkar, *The Vedic Experience of the Divine, Mantramañjari*, pp. 34 – 35.
- 17 Op.Cit. pp. 99
- 18 p.106
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 See Jotiya Dhirasekera, *Buddhist Monastic Discipline*, (1982) 2007
- 21 D 1.4; *Soṇadaṇḍa-sutta*
- 22 *Gradual Sayings (A)* Vol. V. Trans. F.L.Woodward, PTS. Oxford (1936) 1994, pp. 74 - 75
- 23 *Thag.* Psalms of the Brethren trans. Mrs. Rhys Davids, London, PTS (1936) 1994, p.193.

Not Too Tight and Not Too Loose, Properly Tuning the Lute: Avoiding the Extremes of Indulgence in Sense Pleasure and Self Mortification in the Vinaya

Mark Edsel Johnson

This paper is an exploration of how the image of the proper tuning of the lute strings (not too loose and not too tight), which was used by the Buddha in the Vinaya-Piṭaka can be applied to understanding middle way with respect to meditation and to how the Vinaya rules were developed.

INTRODUCTION:

The story of Soṇa Koḷivisa in the Mahāvagga of The Book of the Discipline ¹ illustrates two aspects of the Buddha's teaching. Both are connected with the Buddha's emphasis on the Middle Way. One aspect is about meditation, and the proper application of energy for practice. With respect to Ven. Soṇa's meditation, the Buddha recommended a middle way for practice, not too tight and not too loose. The other part of Ven. Soṇa's story is about footwear for monks, namely sandals, for Ven. Soṇa was the first monk to be allowed sandals by the Buddha, and the Mahāvagga tells of the numerous revisions to the rules around footwear that were to follow. As the story and the rules develop, we can see the constant effort of the Vinaya to find a middle path between the extremes of sensual pleasure on the one side, and overly severe asceticism on the other. Using the theme of "tuning the strings of the lute" we can see how the Vinaya is constantly seeking a middle way that is not too tight and not too loose. As we examine many of the stories of how and why the rules were formulated, we can see how the rules are alternatively tightened and loosened to adapt them to changing circumstances. This makes the tuning of the lute strings a very appropriate simile with regard to the formulation and fine tuning of the Vinaya rules.

This paper will examine selected sections of the Vinaya, using the theme of tuning of the lute to bring understanding to how the rules changed with changing conditions, always aiming for a middle way appropriate for harmonious practice and lifestyle for Saṅgha members. After looking at examples of this lute tuning image in the formulating of the Vinaya rules, the paper will briefly return to an exploration of the Buddha's original purpose in using the image of the properly tuned lute, i.e. what is meditation that is not too loose and not too tight?

THE STORY OF SOṆA KOḶIVISA:

In chapter 5, the Mahāvagga tells us Soṇa Koḷivisa was the son of a wealthy family who pampered him during his upbringing.² His life was so easy that he grew fine hair called “down” on the bottoms of his feet. Young birds grow soft down on their bodies before they get their feathers, and it was this kind of soft down that was growing on the bottoms of Soṇa’s feet. This was so unusual that the King Seniya Bimbisāra of Magadha asked to see Soṇa out of curiosity. Soṇa’s parents told Soṇa to sit cross legged in front of the king, not to point his feet directly at the king, which would have been rude. They then sent Soṇa off to the palace in a palanquin. King Bimbisāra saw Soṇa’s feet, and his curiosity was satisfied.

Sometime later, the Buddha was living in the area of Soṇa’s home. Soṇa heard his teaching and was very impressed, so much so that he went forth (*pabbajati*) from his home and became a Buddhist monk. Despite his soft upbringing, Ven. Soṇa refrained from pampering himself. In fact he bore down with extreme energy. He did so much walking meditation that his soft feet bled profusely, covering the place where he walked with blood.

Despite his efforts, he failed to sense progress. He looked at the other monks who were attaining stages along the path, but he felt no such attainment. Feeling discouraged he decided to give up his robe and go back to his family.

The Buddha, who knew Ven. Soṇa’s thoughts, came to the place where Ven. Soṇa was living. He saw blood on the path and asked the other monks about it. They reported the blood was from Ven. Soṇa’s feet, due to intense walking meditation. The Buddha called to Ven. Soṇa and asked him about his life as a layman. Ven. Soṇa had been a lute player, so the Buddha asked him about properly tuning the lute. Ven. Soṇa replied the strings should be not too tight and not too slack. Then they could make a harmonious and beautiful sound. The Buddha pointed out that one’s energy in successful meditation is just so, it should not be too little, which leads to slackness and sloth, and it should not be too much, which leads to restlessness. Rather, one should seek balance in ones practice, avoiding the extremes.

The Mahāvagga reports the Buddha as saying, “Even so, Soṇa, does too much output of energy conduce to restlessness, does too feeble energy conduce to slothfulness. Therefore, do you Soṇa determine upon evenness in energy and pierce the evenness of the faculties and reflect upon it.”³ Having understood the point of the Buddha’s teaching and

having determined upon “evenness of energy”, Ven. Soṇa returned to his meditations and achieved arahanthood.

Ven. Soṇa came to the Buddha to report on his attainment, and in a striking passage likening his mind free from dukkha to a firm mountain slope he tells of his deliverance from dukkha,

It is as if, Blessed One, there were a rocky mountain slope without a cleft, without a hollow, of one mass, and as if wild wind and rain should come very strongly from the eastern quarter-it would neither tremble nor quake, not shake violently; and as if the wild wind and rain should come from the western quarter...from the northern quarter, from the southern quarter-it would neither tremble nor quake nor shake violently. Even so, Blessed One, if shapes cognizable by the eye come very strongly into the field of vision of a monk whose mind is wholly freed, if sounds cognizable by the ear, if scents cognizable by the nose, if touches cognizable by the body, if tastes cognizable by the tongue, if mental objects cognizable by the mind come very strongly into the field of thought of a monk whose mind is wholly freed, they do not obsess his mind, for his mind comes to be undefiled, firm, won to composure, and he notes its passing hence.⁴

At the end of this paper, after exploring the application of the lute tuning simile to the Vinaya rules, we will briefly return to the subject of meditation, and how the simile applies to “evenness of energy” in meditation.

RULES ABOUT SANDALS:⁵

Pleased with his disciple, and recognizing that the Ven. Soṇa had been raised in luxury, the Buddha allowed him to wear sandals of one lining to protect his tender feet. Thus, the Buddha eschewed needless pain and allowed Ven. Soṇa some small comfort. This shows the turning away from harsh asceticism. Hence, it is a “loosening of the lute string of the Vinaya rules”.

However, Ven. Soṇa pointed out that since only he was allowed sandals, he would be liable to criticism from laypeople who would say that since he had been raised in luxury, he even yet could not give up a luxury like sandals. The Buddha then allowed sandals of a single lining to all monks. A sandal with a single lining is a rather thin sandal.

Then enters into the account the notorious monks of the group of six monks (*chabbaggiyā bhikkhū*). The group of six monks figures in the Vinaya repeatedly, as a literary device to show the extreme of indulgence in sensual pleasures. That such a group really existed, at least in the way in which they figure into the narrative, is farfetched. As we will see, the group of six monks, who act as troublemakers in the narratives, provide a necessary counterpoint to allow the compilers of the Vinaya to account for every possible way the rules might be stretched (or at least many, if not all, of the possibilities). This allows the legalistic Indian mind to explore the possible violations of the rules and then to legislate against such violations in a systematic and thorough way.

There is a corresponding group of six nuns, rivaling their male counterparts in their ability to do something similar regarding forbidden action without actually breaking the rules. The Buddha, as the rule maker, always seems a step behind them in the narrative, until he finally tightens the rules to sufficiently keep them in line, at least for the time being. In his book Buddhist Nuns (Wijayaratna, 2010) Mohan Wijayaratna points out their useful function in the formulation of the Vinaya, although he does not question their authenticity as real people. He writes, “These nuns also rendered an indirect service to the Community of Nuns by creating disorder. Because of such circumstances, it was necessary to establish new rules or to bring special amendments to the rules already enacted.”⁶

To return to the Mahāvagga narrative, now that sandals have been allowed by the Buddha, the groups of six monks try all the possibilities, which are disallowed by the Buddha, one by one. First, they wear lovely green sandals which are disallowed once the Buddha hears of it. Undeterred, they try yellow, then red, crimson, black, orange and multi-colored sandals, each of which is disallowed in turn. Then they try sandals with straps, knee boots, and sandals filled with cotton, none of which the Buddha allows. Then they ornament their sandals with goat horns, scorpion tails, peacock feathers, lion skin, tiger skin, leopard skin and skin of antelope. This is a partial list of their ingenious inventions. Of course, none of this is allowed.

Were this a narrative of actual events, the Buddha would have quickly caught on to the strategy of the group of six monks and would have called them into his presence for correction, as he did with the monk Ven. Sāti, who was holding erroneous views concerning consciousness and rebirth, and the monk Ven. Ariṭṭha, who was holding the wrong view that it was not an error to practice actions forbidden to monks by the Buddha.⁷ But of course, the Buddha never disciplines the group of six

monks, as their existence in the narrative is purely for the purpose of illuminating the various possibilities of the extreme of indulgence in sense pleasures.

Returning to the story (Vin. p.247), once the extreme of indulgence in lovely sandals has been avoided, the practicality of the Vinaya and the need for avoidance of painful extremes once again comes forward. The rules are now too tight and need loosening. The story continues that the Buddha is on alms round and his monk attendant is limping with a split foot. Some compassionate lay followers try to donate their sandals to him, which have multiple linings. But he refuses the sandals as they have too many linings and do not come within the Vinaya rule of sandals with only a single lining. Out of compassion for the painfully limping monk, the Buddha allows him these donated sandals, and says multi-lined sandals may be worn if they are “cast off”, that is used by a previous owner. Thus monks can wear the donated sandals and avoid injuring his painful foot.

The Buddha then makes some etiquette rules concerning the sandals. If the Buddha or the senior monks are walking without sandals during walking meditation time, then the junior monks should not wear their sandals at that time, out of respect. And sandals should not be worn inside the monastery.

But this rule proves to be, like the overly wound lute string, too tight. A monk with painful corns on his feet has to be carried to the toilet by his fellow monks. A corn on the foot is an abnormal thickening of the skin that can intertwine with nerves and make walking very painful. So now the rules prove to be too tight, and Buddha allows monks with damaged or painful feet to wear sandals.

The narrative continues that Monks in the monastery at night, while walking to a meeting, step on thorns and stub their toes on tree stumps that are invisible in the dark. So Buddha allows wearing of sandals inside the monastery while going to meetings at night. He also allows use of a torch or some night light, and a staff as a walking aid in the dark. With the rules now again loosened, the infamous group of six monks indulges in further sensual pleasure seeking. They try wooden shoes, which kill a lot of insects underfoot, and while strutting about in their wooden shoes smashing the insects they talk about “worldly talk” in loud and disturbing voices just for good measure. The “modest monks” complain both about the wooden shoes, the killing of the insects, and the loud worldly talk. They carry their complaints to the Buddha who then

says there will be no wooden shoes, which seems to also take care of the loud voices and worldly talk somehow.

But the rules prove to be still too loose. The group of six monks try wearing shoes from plants that cause death to insects in the construction of the sandals. They try shoes made of palmyra palms, made from young bamboo, grass shoes, reed shoes, shoes made of wool, gold, silver, crystal bronze, glass, tin, copper, and even lead. The text does not mention the quality of their conversation as they paced about in lead shoes, but it would presumably have been a bit heavy.

In turn, each of these variations is not allowed by the Buddha. He clarifies and tightens the too-loose areas of the Vinaya rules. Deterred, but not defeated, the group of six monks waits for their next chance to explore loopholes in the rules, so as to indulge in their favorite sensual pleasures.

In the meanwhile, the Buddha again recognizes the rules have in some ways become overly tight. He allows sandals at the privy, at the urinal, and sandals in the area where things are rinsed (Rinsing of clothes after washing? Rinsing of monks bowls after eating? Rinsing of hands after toilet trips?). While in the rinsing area, monks are allowed sandals (Vin. p.254).

Then comes a case where missionary monks whom the Buddha has sent to areas outside of the Ganges River plain encounter climatic conditions and social customs that make strict observance of some Vinaya rules quite difficult. With more flexibility and looseness needed, modifications are made. In one case the monk Ven. Kaccāna comes back from the frontier region of Avanti (Vin. p. 260) and reports to the Buddha that the ground there is very hard and full of stones and other sharp things, and the customs of the people are quite different from the areas around Magadha. The Buddha then allows sandals with multi layer linings to protect the feet of monks to be worn by the monks who are staying in Avanti, as well as some other relaxation of various rules.⁸ Life in Avanti is very different from that in the Ganges River area, so flexibility is allowed.

This brings our discussion of the narratives concerning sandals and the associated rules to a close, but in chapter 6 of the Mahāvagga, we read of rules being developed to serve the needs of the Saṅgha around the use of medicines. Again, the same dynamic can be seen in the text, with the rules being either too loose or too tight, and adjustments being made. Sometimes a rule needs to be adjusted, but the first attempt only partially

deals with the reality of the situation and further adjustments are made. As soon as there is an opening, that the rule is too loose in some way, we will again see the group of six monks promoting their indulgence in sensual pleasures. We will have a look at this section of the text.

The narrative concerning medicines begins at Sāvattthī in the Jeta Grove in Anāthapiṇḍika's monastery. The following long narrative detailing the development of rules for the Saṅgha around the use of medicines is quite interesting for a number of reasons other than observing how the rules are fine tuned. The narrative gives an interesting picture of the *materia medica* and medical procedures that were in use in India of the 6th century BCE.

The text begins by explaining that a contagion has spread among the monks, causing them to be unable to hold down their food. They become “lean, wretched, of a bad colour, yellowish, and the veins standing out on their limbs.”⁹

Upon seeing this and getting information from Ānanda, the Buddha went into meditation. The text says

*Then as the Blessed One was meditating in seclusion, a reasoning arose in his mind thus: “At present monks, afflicted by an affection occurring in Autumn, bring up the conje they have drunk and bring up the rice they have eaten. ...What now if I should allow medicine for monks?”....Then it occurred to the Blessed One: “These five medicines, that is to say ghee, fresh butter, oil, honey, molasses, are medicines and are agreed upon as medicines, and although they serve as nutriment for people yet they cannot be reckoned as substantial food. What now if I should allow monks to make use of these five medicines at the right time, if they have accepted them at the right time.”*¹⁰

The Buddha is concerned about the health of the monks, hence his allowance of the five medicines. However, as these medicines (and many of those that are soon to follow in the narrative) are substances used also as food, he allows them to be accepted and used only “at the right time”, being the morning hours before midday.¹¹

This rule quickly proves to be still too tight. The morning hours are insufficient, so the Buddha allows the medicines to be accepted and used at any time. However, these five medicines prove insufficient for the various ailments of the monks, so a number of medicines are then allowed as ailments come up. First, tallows were needed, and then

allowed. Then medicinal roots of turmeric, ginger, oris root, white oris root, garlic, black hellebore, khus-khus, nut grass, and others were needed and then allowed..

Then the question of storage arises, as monks are not allowed to store food. The Buddha allows storage of the medicinal roots, which, presumably, are not always easy to procure. Also, with the roots it becomes necessary to provide tools for pounding the roots, which would be in addition to the few possessions allowed the monks. So the Buddha allows a set of grindstones for pounding the roots.

In turn, astringent decoctions, leaves, and fruits (listed as *vilāṅga*, pepper, black pepper, yellow myrobalam, beleric myrobalam, emblic myrobalam, goṭṭha fruit and others), resins and salts are also allowed. Again, the need for some tools for pounding and processing arises, so the Buddha allows a mortar and pestle and a cloth sifter. These medicines and the other medicines listed in the text are still widely used by traditional Ayurvedic medicine, which is widespread and used effectively to this date in India, Nepal, Sri Lanka and other south and southeast Asian countries.

So we see a number of significant loosening of the rules to accommodate the need for medical treatments for the monks. However, the next loosening proves to be an opening for the infamous group of six monks, who have been awaiting their chance to slip something in.

One monk has an illness affecting his eyes. For his benefit, and perhaps looking ahead a bit, the Buddha allows a number of ointments and ointment powders for eye treatments. However, the monks lacked adequate containers for the ointments and put them in small bowls and saucers, where they were contaminated with grass debris and dust. So the Buddha allows ointment boxes. This is what the group of six monks are waiting for. They try gold boxes and silver boxes. Seeing this, the Saṅgha came under criticism by the lay people, who say, “Like householders who enjoy pleasures of the senses.” In response, the Buddha disallows the gold and silver, and then lists the kinds of boxes to be allowed.¹²

Soon it becomes apparent that the boxes need a lid, which is allowed. But the lid falls off, so a thread is allowed to fix the lid to the box. Then the box splits, so it is allowed to wrap the box with the thread. In addition, the monks have only their fingers to dip in the ointment to spread on their afflicted eye, which somehow causes the eye to be

painful, perhaps due to dirty hands or fingers, not explained in the text. So the Buddha allows an ointment-stick.

Always lurking in the background, waiting for their chance, the group of six monks seizes upon the ointment stick as an object of sensual desire and gratification. They devise ointment sticks made of gold and of silver. The Buddha disallows this, and specifies a proper material for the ointment sticks, that of bone from the center of a conch shell.¹³

These deviations and rules may seem insignificant or nit-picky but in a renunciate lifestyle such as that of the monks and nuns, even what might seem insignificant possessions such as an ointment stick could prove to be an object of desire. It is this natural tendency of the mind to chase after sense objects that the group of six monks represents here. The Buddha has to keep the rules strict in order to prevent this kind of attachment to sense pleasures, while balancing this with the practical needs of the monks for good health and a modicum of physical ease.

In the Mahāvagga narrative, the need for simple medical technology continues to develop. All these containers and ointment sticks are difficult to carry around the monastery. So the Buddha allows a bag to hold the containers. Then he allows a strap for the bag and a thread to secure the strap to the bag. Due to other ailments of the monks and appropriate allowances made by the Buddha, the bag now contains nose spoons, tubes, lids for the tubes, and various vessels made of copper, wood and fruit (likely dried gourds, which serve as handy containers), in addition to the previously mentioned cloth sifters, mortar and pestle and so on. With the various roots, herbs, oils, and earthen minerals, we have not only a doctor's bag, but the makings of a small pharmacy. Considering that monks were allowed only a few personal belongings, this shows a great deal of flexibility and realism on the part of the Buddha.

It is likely that a few experienced monks, perhaps with some amount of previous medical training, began to serve as physicians for the other monks, and the bag of medicines and medical tools would have been kept in a convenient place in the monastery. This is the beginning of the tendency of Buddhist monks to become adept in medical treatment, and to later serve as healers for both the Saṅgha and the lay public. The Vinaya would have preserved the memory of certain ailments and their treatments, and also served as a source of medical knowledge and procedure. In later centuries it would have been supplemented and largely replaced as a medical sourcebook by successive texts used at the great Buddhist universities.¹⁴ But back to our story.

The narrative continues with a very interesting and predictable turn of events. The monks have need of medicines that are first boiled in oil and then preserved in alcohol.¹⁵ So the Buddha gives his permission to boil the oil, and put it in a medium of alcohol. Now we have herbal medicines in an alcohol base in the monks' quarters, and the group of six will not let this opportunity pass. Of course, they drink the preparations, and become drunk. The Buddha tightens the rules due to the temptation of alcohol being kept in the monastery premises. He makes it clear that there are strict procedures around the use and consumption of medicines containing alcohol. Violators will be "dealt with according to the rule".¹⁶

At this point we will leave the narrative on medicines, although it continues on at some length, as we hope our main point about the need for alternative loosening and tightening of rules has been amply illustrated by the previous examples. In the following pages of the *Mahāvagga*, techniques are added to help alleviate afflictions such as rheumatism of the limbs and joints, sores, various skin problems, snakebite, poison, constipation, and jaundice. The main loosening of the rules that occurs in these sections, especially in the case of snakebite and poisoning, which we can take to be emergency situations, is that the Buddha allows monks to go out and get the medicines as needed, it not being necessary to have them formally presented as a gift to a monk or to the Saṅgha by a lay person. This is a considerable departure from previous allowances, as monks can now attend to a snakebite or poisoned monk by foraging for whatever medications are needed.

We can see how the Vinaya constantly steers the middle path between extremes of sensual indulgence and painful asceticism. The Buddha sought a middle way of life for his saṅgha, one in which practice could be the main focus of life. He recognized that sensual pleasures and painful asceticism would not allow the mind to be calm and steady, so he steered a middle course between these two extremes, for the benefit of his followers.

NOT TOO TIGHT AND NOT TOO LOOSE IN MEDITATION:

Now we return to the Buddha's teaching on proper tuning of the lute with respect to meditation. That proper tuning of the mind during meditation is of enormous importance as shown by the story itself. When Ven. Soṇa was too tight in his meditation, he was injuring himself physically, becoming frustrated, and getting ready to disrobe and return

to lay life. After following the Buddha's instructions and finding a harmonious way of meditating, he experienced Arhatship.

So, what does it mean in meditation to be "properly tuned", to be neither too loose nor too tight?

The easier part to understand is that of "too loose". Our minds seek to maximize pleasure and minimize discomfort. The mind, called "the flickering, fickle mind" in the Dhammapada,¹⁷ races from one object of desire to another, and creates grasping, clinging, the building of habitual formations, and the whole mass of suffering as a result. Merely sitting in so-called meditation is no deliverance from this pattern. The mind may become lethargic, sleepy, and drop away from any alertness or awareness.

So what is "too tight", which led Ven. Soṇa to leave blood on the trail? The Buddha was an expert on knowing what it was like to be too tight, as he had gone through extremes of self-mortification. In the Majjima Nikāya, the Greater Discourse to Saccaka,¹⁸ the Buddha tells of his former ascetic practice, "I thought: 'Suppose with my teeth clenched and my tongue pressed against the roof of my mouth, I beat down, constrain, and crush mind with mind.' " He relates how this, and related practices didn't work and nearly killed him. Then, on the point of death, he remembered,

*I recall that when my father the Sakyan was occupied, while I was still sitting in the cool shade of a rose-apple tree, quite secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unwholesome states, I entered upon and abided in the first jhāna, which is accompanied by applied and sustained thought, with joy and happiness born of seclusion. Could that be the path to enlightenment? Then following on that memory, came the realization: 'That indeed is the path to enlightenment.'*¹⁹

Nearly dead from extreme over tightening, the Buddha had remembered a time in his childhood when he had naturally and with attention but without strain attained a high level of meditative consciousness. Following the path to enlightenment suggested by this memory, he experienced nibbāna. When it came time for him to share his discoveries, he taught his disciples a way of meditation that is in a sense non-meditation or un-meditation. It is through letting go rather than through acquiring something that the end of suffering is achieved. Letting go of what? Letting go of the whole structure of self-grasping fed by desire, aversion, and ignorance.

Ven. Soṇa had been grasping for nibbāna until he left a trail of blood and was caught in his frustration, ready to quit the monk's life. Once he learned to relax his tension, stay alert and attentive, and let go of his habitual ego structure, he was able to find real peace and happiness. The Buddha's approach to meditation allowed him to do just that.

Nibbāna is not a thing, and cannot be grasped. Peter Harvey, having surveyed the suttas says about nibbāna, "The most accurate and least misleading descriptions are negative, saying what it [nibbāna] is *not*."²⁰ In the Udāna the Buddha says,

*There is, bhikkhus, a not-born, a not-brought-to-being, a not-made, a not-conditioned. If, bhikkhus, there were no not-born, not-brought-to-being, not-made, not-conditioned, no escape would be discerned from what is born, brought-to-being, made, conditioned. But since there is a not-born, a not-brought-to-being, a not-made, a not-conditioned, therefore an escape is discerned from what is born, brought-to-being, made, conditioned.*²¹

So the question arises, how can nibbāna which is no "thing", nothing at all, and yet can be experienced, how can it be reached by thought, analysis, imagination, or by techniques such as single-pointed concentration or absorption meditation, through bearing down as Ven. Soṇa unsuccessfully tried to do? It is a very crucial point, as many people when meditating find that their minds (naturally) wander, and that they think they are somehow failing to find a quiet mind leading to the higher stages. Often, the response on their part, and of that of their teachers, is to bear down harder, to concentrate on the object of meditation until all else is excluded.

Peter Harvey tells us, "Buddhist meditation, in common with many other forms of meditation such as Hindu yoga, aims to cultivate the power of concentration till it can become truly 'one-pointed', with 100 percent of the attention focused on a chosen object. In such a state of samādhi (concentration or collectedness), the mind becomes free from all distraction and wavering, in a unified state of inner stillness."²² As expressed by Harvey, this striving for one-pointedness of concentration, to the exclusion of all extraneous thoughts has largely become the norm in both the teaching and the practice of meditation. This school of thought which promotes a rigorous one-pointed concentration or absorption meditation has become the predominant view in most of the Buddhist world. This is true of most meditation practices in Theravāda,

Mahāyāna, and Vajrāyāna. Perhaps it is time to question the assumption that “100 percent of the attention focused on a chosen object” is the approach the Buddha was teaching and the best way to experience higher states of consciousness and nibbāna.

If such concentration is done in a way that creates tension in the meditator, especially over a prolonged period of time, it may lead to unfavorable physical and mental results, sometimes even to damage. In addition, it may be counterproductive when it comes to letting go of the hindrances and calming of the mind. Trying to calm the mind through intense concentration is rather like seeing the waves on the surface of a pond and trying to still them by putting the palm of your hand down on the surface of the water. Even if thoughts and emotions can be temporarily stopped by such a method, it is more of the nature of suppression than any real deep change. Although the front door of the mind is closed due to intense concentration, the suppressed thoughts and feelings have not disappeared, they are lurking in a dark, quiet place and will likely climb in through the back window. In fact, ego’s game may be strengthened by such an approach.

We have to face the fact that Ven. Soṇa’s blood on the trail has its counterparts in our modern day meditation centers. Not all is rosy out there, with many cases of severe physical and mental reactions to meditative practices that are done under the guidance of Buddhist teachers.²³ Some of the problems are due to the initial condition of the people who take up intense forms of meditation, but many problems may be attributed to the overly tight meditation practices themselves. Caution is warranted. And techniques we assume are good for anyone need to be reexamined with a view to making sure the meditator does not undergo undue stress and strain, especially in the beginning stages.

In his thorough and insightful book Satipatthāna, Bhikkhu Anālayo points out, “It was this balanced ‘middle path’ approach, avoiding the two extremes of stagnation and excessive striving, which had enabled him (Buddha) to gain awakening.” He cites two meditation teachers, Bhikkhu Khantipalo and Ven. Vimalaramsi, who “warn against the dangers of overstraining or forcing meditation and the emotional disturbances and hardening of the mind that may ensue.”²⁴

An example of a Buddhist meditation approach that avoids the extremes of too tight and too loose can be found in the book The Breath of Love, by Ven. Bhante Vimalaramsi Mahāthera, in which Bhante gives his guidelines to Tranquil Wisdom Insight Meditation (TWIM).²⁵ This is one approach that helps people find a harmonious approach to liberating

the mind. If people are sometimes being physically or mentally injured by overly intense approaches to meditation we would suggest following the Buddha's advice to Ven. Soṇa and retuning the approach to bring about harmony rather than stress or tension. Perhaps much can be learned from those like Ven. Vimalaramsi who are careful to avoid the extremes of too loose and too tight.

CONCLUSION:

In the earliest days of the Buddha's teaching career, he gave no behavioral rules at all, relying only on the power of his suggestions and the sincerity and virtue of his disciples.²⁶ It was with the growth of the Saṅgha, lack of direct contact with the Buddha, lack of proper instruction,²⁷ and the entry into the Saṅgha of people of mixed motivation that the need for rules and regulations arose. With the growth in numbers, the monks became a society, and all societies need some sort of internal regulation to ensure harmonious lifestyle. There were also considerations of the interaction between the Saṅgha and the lay public. Yet the main purpose of the rules was always to ensure a living environment that was conducive to meditation and spiritual progress, to the life of Brahmachariya, both in terms of outer behavior and in terms of inner attitude.

As Jotiya Dhirasekera observes in Buddhist Monastic Discipline: "It is in fact a healthy and peaceful independence of the mind and the body that is aimed at in the religious life which the Buddha prescribed. While the body is distressed no control or concentration of the mind could ever be achieved. Keeping this in mind the Buddha decried not only the baser forms of austerities which weary the body but also excessive striving, even though such striving may be channeled in the right direction...Clean and healthy living, both in mind and in body was the rule. The Buddha saw no reason to retreat from physical and mental well-being as long as it was not mingled with and contaminated by sensual pleasures."²⁸

For both social and outward behavior, as well as for the inner attitude of the monk or nun, the middle path of avoiding all extremes so as to cultivate a mind capable of spiritual development was always put forward. This correct tuning of the behavior and of the mind, not too tight, not too loose, is the message of the very first discourse of the Buddha to the five ascetics at the Deer Park at Isipathana in Bārāṇasī. As the sutta says,

*“There the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus of the group of five thus: Bhikkhus, these two extremes should not be followed by one who has gone forth into homelessness. What two? The pursuit of sensual happiness in sensual pleasures, which is low, vulgar, the way of worldlings, ignoble, unbeneficial; and the pursuit of self-mortification, which is painful, ignoble, unbeneficial. Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathāgata has awakened to the middle way, which gives rise to vision, which gives rise to knowledge, which leads to peace, to direct knowledge, to Nibbāna.”*²⁹

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NOTES:

¹ Vinaya Piṭaka Volume V, Mahāvagga, p.237 (henceforth “Vin.”); Ven. Soṇa’s story also occurs in Aṅguttara Nikāya.III.374-9 (PTS) or located in Chapter of the Sixes, number 98 in the Aṅguttara Nikāya Anthology, translation by Nāṇaponika Thera and Bhikkhu Bodhi (2007). The story is largely in agreement in the two versions, but the Vinaya version is longer.

²Vin., p.237

³Ibid., p.241

⁴ Ibid., p.244, I have replaced the translation of bhagavā, the term used to address the Buddha with “Blessed One” rather than the term “Lord” which is used by I.B Horner and is a misleading translation.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 245-60 for the narrative concerning sandals.

⁶ See Wijayaratna’s discussion in *Buddhist Nuns*, pp.28-9, and footnotes 12 and 13 on those pages.

⁷ For Ven. Sāti’s wrong view see Mahā-taṇha-saṅkhaya Sutta, MN 38 (PTS I.255), for Ven. Ariṭṭha’s wrong behavior, which Richard F. Gombrich believes was indulgence in sexual intercourse (Gombrich, 1996), see Alagaddūpama Sutta, MN 22 (PTS I.130). These examples show that Buddha quickly brought those who were caught in wrong view or indulging in inappropriate behavior into his presence for admonition. That the group of six monks was never brought in after numerous episodes of purposely provocative behavior shows they are a fiction, merely a literary device for illustrating the need to tighten various permutations of the rules. It is possible this fictionalized group could be based on a real group of six monks whose behavior had garnered them a bad reputation among their fellow monks. Then they became legend, and a literary device for the compilers of the Vinaya..

The number six used in an adversarial way occurs in the suttas as the “six heretical masters” who are named as real people, but are usually grouped together as a literary device. See Lamotte, 1988, p.20 for a discussion of that.

⁸ Lamotte points out (Lamotte, 1988, p.21) that Buddha had declined an invitation from King Caṇḍa Pradyota of Avanti, but had sent two eminent disciples, Ven. Mahākātyāyana (Pali: Mahākaccana) and Ven. Śroṇa Koṭṭikarṇa (Pali: Soṇa Kuṭṭikarṇa), not the same Ven. Soṇa as in our story above, to represent him in Avanti. This kingdom was located in modern day Madhya Pradesh State of central India, near the city Ujjain.

At the time, this was a “frontier” area, with life being much rougher than in the more civilized Ganges plains. The Mahāvagga details numerous special allowances given by Buddha to the monks in this area, including the more heavy duty sandals that are noted in the narrative above.

⁹ Vin. P.269

¹⁰ Ibid., p.269, We have substituted “Blessed One” for the epithet “Lord” which is used in I.B. Horner’s translation, as in fn 4 above.

¹¹ Ibid., p.270

¹² Ibid., p.275-6

¹³ Ibid., p.276

¹⁴ Warder (1970) lists numerous Buddhist universities and colleges in addition to the famous Nālandā at which medicine would have been among the important subjects taught to monks and lay students by the 5th century C.E., pp.442-443.

¹⁵ In contemporary herbal medicine, many medicinal essences are extracted from herbs by putting them in alcohol, and this then acts as a preservative as well, the medicine being a “tincture”. In some cases, the alcohol itself may serve as a medicine, not only as a preservative. It is possible that the oil that was boiled and then put into the alcohol medium was not only oil, but contained herbal essences that had already been extracted. This is a common procedure in herbal medicine but the text makes no mention of the herbs at this point.

¹⁶ Vin., p.278

¹⁷ Dhammapada (Narada Trans.) v.33, in the Pāli: Phandanam capalam cittam

¹⁸ MN.36.20 (PTS: MN I.242)

¹⁹ MN.36.31 (PTS: MN I.246) At the suggestion of Ven. Vimalaramsi Mahathera, I have substituted the word “joy” for the word “rapture” and the word “happiness” for “pleasure” as that seems a more workable and practical translation.

²⁰ Harvey, 2004, p.62

²¹ Udāna.8.8.3, Ireland trans.1997

²² Harvey, 2004, pp.246-7

²³ To get an idea of what meditation teachers and practitioners need be careful of, see “Can Meditation Be Bad for You?” article in *Humanist*, Sept/Oct 2007. The article quotes meditation teachers such as Dalai Lama who caution against approaching meditation and strong concentration exercises too quickly. It reports on people who have had severe reactions to various meditation approaches. Some styles of meditation initially create more stress and imbalance for the meditator, not less. Ideally, an approach to meditation should immediately help people find balance, and should be immediately beneficial. This would avoid any “blood on the trail” such as in Ven. Soṇa’s story.

Available on the web:
<http://www.thehumanist.org/humanist/MaryGarden.html>

²⁴ Analayo, 2003, p.38, see also footnote 37 for the reference to Ven. Khantipalo and Ven. Vimalaramsi and their warnings based on their experience in teaching numerous meditators.

²⁵ Vimalaramsi, Ven. Bhante, (2012), In his book, Ven. Vimalaramsi Mahathera carefully lays out a case for a sutta-based meditation approach that includes a relax step so that mental and physical tension do not accumulate in the meditator. In Bhante's system, the object of meditation is not to be held with intense concentration, but rather it (the object of meditation, such as awareness of breathing) serves as a reminder to be present in the moment. TWIM aims to provide the meditator with a structure within which he or she can remain alert and aware, yet relaxed and open. For more on this, see Bhante's book The Breath of Love, or the Dhammasukha website www.dhammasukha.org

²⁶ see Dhirasekera, 1982, p. 83 for a discussion of this.

²⁷ The lack of proper instruction for new monks and the Buddha's creation of the system of novice and preceptor (saddhivihārika and upajjhāya) is discussed in Banerjee (1991), pp.35-6. Banerjee also notes the Buddha's motivation for changing rules as circumstances changed on pp.31-2.

²⁸ Dhirasekera, 1982, pp.75-6

²⁹ SN V.56.11, Bhikku Bodhi translation, (S. V. 421 PTS)

**“THE RIGHT VIEW (*SAMMÂDITTHI*) IN THE MAIN
PHILOSOPHY”**

**Article based on my M.A. thesis submitted to the
Sri Lanka International Buddhist Academy, Pallekele, Sri Lanka**

Ven. Le Q

**Article based on my M.A. thesis submitted to the
Sri Lanka International Buddhist Academy,
Pallekele, Kundasala, Sri Lanka.**

The human world in general and India in particular everyone remembers a great historical event that took place more than twenty-six centuries ago, when a great man was born. He was Prince Siddhartha, who was the son of King Suddhodana and Queen Mahamaya, who was later called Shakyamuni Buddha. The birth of the Buddha was good news for humanity. His enlightenment as the sun appeared and dispelled the constant darkness of human life. Honor of Lord Buddha resounded not only contemporarily but also his morality is still handing down throughout history. When the human beings have not eliminated greed, hatred and delusion yet, and society has not really brought peace and happiness to everyone, his teachings still exist as eternal values. He was born as one of the great causes and conditions (*hetu-paccaya*), he has declared: “I was born for the happiness of gods and men”.

Indeed, his presence lifted the veil of ignorance of the “heaven and the earth tossing dust winds”. Many theories were born during the time of the Buddha one after another to seek an explanation about human beings and the world. And since then, during forty-five years of rolling the wheel of law (*Dharma-cakka*), the Buddha went everywhere to preach human beings, depending on the fundamenal ability of the human beings that he preached. His wisdom flowed in the human beings’ soul at that time and gradually spread to neighboring countries to become a global religious stature and contributed so much to human civilization.

In this article, I have written about “The Right View (*Sammā Ditṭhi*) in the main philosophy” to find out how the Buddha taught Right View in his doctrines. Because of having Right View, we can understand exactly what we need to understand and do what we need to do to be happy that we ourselves desire at least, as well as the conditions that we want to build up for today and tomorrow. To read the goal of Nibbāna -

destruction of the taints in Majjhima Nikāya I – No. 2: Sabbāsava sutta said that:

“Bhikkhus, I say that the destruction of the taints is for one who knows and sees, not for one who does not know and see.”¹

1. THE MEANING OF THE RIGHT VIEW:

During forty-five years preaching, all efforts of the Buddha are to present his insight on the way to practice and achieve enlightenment, happiness in the present life or in the next. So his name is praised by human beings and said to his intellectual qualities through the Ten titles of a Buddha: Tathāgata, Arhat, Samyak-Sambuddha, Vidya-carana-Sampanna, Sugata, Lokavit, Anuttara Purusa-Damya-Sarathi, Sasta-deva-Manusyanam, Buddha-lokanatha-Bhagavan and Lokanatha.²

Learning the Right View in the Buddhist Canon, we see the Buddha’s teachings extremely diversified and profound, being able to get people to realize the ultimate reality, satisfying the demand of happiness in all classes even in the present life. Of course this is not an achievement of normal people in the world. That starts from very limited knowledge about people and the world and always make human beings acquire it suffering in one way or another, whether to acquire it themselves do not want that. So his teachings always contain objectives of liberation during the handed-down tradition from his time to the Sects (school or dharma-door) of Buddhism later without distortion. Those doctrines are developed with the level of depth and width to go into the thoughts and feelings of each ethnic group. we can say Right View which is the whole Buddha’s teachings is presented such a closed circle that we can start anywhere in the entire teachings and find out the Buddha’s wisdom as he has stated in Digha Nikāya I – No. 4. Soṇadaṇḍa Sutta:

“...For wisdom, oh Gotama, is purified by uprightness, and uprightness is purified by wisdom. Where there is uprightness, wisdom is there, and where there is wisdom, uprightness is there. To the upright there is wisdom, to the wise there is uprightness,

¹ Teachings of the Buddha, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, Part one: The Root fifty Discourses, 1. The Division of the Discourse on the root, No. 2: Sabbāsava Sutta, A translation of the Majjhima Nikāya, Translated by Ñānamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, Wisdom Publications, 199 Elm Street Somerville Massachusetts 02144, 2005, pp. 91.

² Teaching of the Buddha, The Long Discourses of the Buddha, Division I: The Moralities, No. 4. Soṇadaṇḍa Sutta, A Translation of the Digha Nikāya by Maurice Walshe, Wisdom Publications, 199 Elm Street Somerville Massachusetts 02144, 2005, pp. 131.

and wisdom and goodness are declared to be the best thing in the world...”

Right View is the first of the eight path factors in the Noble Eightfold Path, and belongs to the wisdom division of the path. According to the Buddha, knowledge or wisdom regarding suffering (*dukkha*), its cause, nature and cessation is right view. In other words, right view is the understanding of the Four Noble Truths. However, the understanding is very profound. As mentioned in the introduction, when discussing about the Right View, we are talking about all the Buddha’s doctrines with the huge Suttas. Here, through the definition of Right View, we have two ways to talk about it:

The relation between cause and effect in the sense of the Buddhist law of “Karma”: Every action which is a cause will have a result or an effect. Likewise every resultant action or effect has its cause. The law of cause and effect is a fundamental concept within Buddhism governing all situations. Karma is a product of body, speech and mind; while recompense is a product or result of karma. Karma is like a seed sown, and recompense is like a tree grown with fruits. When the body does good things, the mouth speaks good words, the mind thinks of good ideas, then the karma is a good seed. In the contrary, the karma is an evil seed. Thus the Buddha taught: “To lead a good life, you Buddhists should make every effort to control the activities of your body, speech, and mind. Do not let these activities hurt you and others”.

The Dependent Origination (*Paticcasamuppâda*): According to Buddhism, human beings and all living things are self-created or self-creating. The universe is not homocentric; it is a co-creation of all beings. Buddhism does not believe that all things came from one cause, but holds that everything is inevitably created out of more than two causes. The creations or becomings of the antecedent causes continue in time-series, past, present and future, like a chain. This chain is divided into twelve divisions and is called the Twelve Divisioned Cycle of Causation and Becomings. Since these divisions are interdependent, the process is called Dependent Production or Chain of causation. The formula of this theory is as follows:

*“From the existence of this, that becomes,
From the happening of this, that happens.
From the non-existence of this, that does not become,
From the non-happening of this, that does not happen.”*

2. THE CONTENT OF THE RIGHT VIEW:

The Right View is the source of the Buddha's wisdom which is presented throughout in Buddhist scriptures. Although it was presented in many different forms, it eventually took human beings out of suffering life to happy and free life. So, in Tipiṭaka, Right View has mentioned fully in one Sutta that is *Sammā Diṭṭhi Sutta*. Feeling that, if the Buddha speaking Right view was the first factor of the Noble Eightfold Path, it was because he probably realized that the role of Right View is very important to the Buddhist monks' religious life. From without beginning to here and now, the human beings, who are always in suffering, are sinking in the ocean of life and death only because of ignorance, attachment, without Right view. It was wrong view that led the sentient beings to the realm of interminable pain, made so many bad karmas about the body, speech and mind. So the first condition is to have Right View, which is like a guideline leading the Buddhist monks to the right way, eliminates all false tenets and misconceptions from long time setting their mind on. The Buddhist monks begin going step by step in Right View until they have attained liberation.

After acquiring by himself along with his experience, the Buddha pointed out the Middle-way to avoid two extremes: excessive sensual enjoyment of life and austerity. This is the path leading to the cessation of suffering that the Buddha was inducted in *Mārga* of the Four Noble Truths. It is often described as the Noble Eightfold Path, starting with Right View, Right Thought, Right Speech, Right Action, Right Livelihood, Right Effort, Right Mindfulness, Right Concentration. The description of such order, of course, is the Buddha's own intention and depends on the level of motive power of every object hearing dhammas that he said. So, if we take them to separate discrete part or required by a fixed order as mentioned above, obviously we do not understand anything about the Dependent Origination. Moreover, the practice will not achieve any results because of attachment.

Buddhism lasts forever and has great significance for human life. It is Buddhism that always clears and plays a decisive role in any right way to achieve the desired results. So, Right view is the most important factor of the Noble Eightfold Path. The dark or bright, happy or suffering life is set on the basis of Right View. Every action of greed, hatred, delusion, selfishness, evil thoughts, brutality, etc. is a consequence of a lack of understanding in the area of individual lives, families and society. Thus every effort achieving accurate view about dhammas is essential for the process of enlightenment at the beginning. The first time, a person who practices the Buddha's teachings, his faith is called Right View. Due to having Right View, we have practiced effectively and achieved

liberation. Right view is the path to enlighten practitioners to step into Buddhism until going on the path of liberation.

3. TO IMPLEMENT THE RIGHT VIEW:

In forty five years of preaching, the Buddha taught: “The suffering and the path leading to cease the suffering”. Right view is one of the paths which the Buddha has taught. The value of the path to be summarized into scriptures as a guideline for all directions of practice in all the time. Although that path has spent many upheavals and changes to adapt to each era, it is still everlasting and lights up in all traditions of the Buddhist sects: Mahayāna and Theravāda. Right View, which has been taught by the Buddha, is always suitable for each human’s motive power. It has two levels: share merit (*puñña*) and share demerit (*pāpa*). For share merit, to implement Right View is to bring happiness in the relative range in the present or future. It is based on the principle:

“Every evil never doing
and in wholesomeness increasing
and one's heart well-purifying:
this is the Buddhas' Teaching.”³

The principle above can reduce in the spirit of five precepts (*Pañca sila*): No killing, No stealing, No sexual misconduct. No lying and No intoxicant. These five principles are considered as the standard for all human activities through Three kinds of kamma. If we want to establish happy life, we must abide by five principles as a guideline in the direction of the pursuit of happiness.

For share demerit, to implement Right View is to abide reflecting the impermanence, no-self and mindfulness-awareness in order to attain the ultimate enlightenment and liberation.

4. THE BENEFITS OF APPLYING SAMMĀ DIṬṬHI TO PRACTICE AND TO PROPAGATE THE TRUE DHAMMA:

The Right View sends forth light to us about this heaven and earth that no creative deities can prevent. The Right View has taught that all suffering originate from wholesome or unwholesome mind, not that any deities give blessings or visit calamities on us. Thus, the Right View is considered as the guideline; the raft that transports human beings to cross

³ K.Sri Dhammananda, *The Dhammapada – No.183*, Sasana Abhiwurdhi Wardhana Society, Kualalumpur, 1988, p. 388

the sea of births and deaths; the great light that enlightens the ignorance; the good medicine that cures any diseases and the sharp hammer that cuts off all the defilements (kleśa). Being Buddhists, we need to equip ourselves fully with Buddhist knowledge to live in this world happily. How can we do it? Is it true that the human beings will be underdeveloped in the social civilization nowadays if they do not cultivate the knowledge and strive for rising? Is it enough if we only study? Of course, it is not. We study to get many Degrees and academic titles of the world to build up many external worlds that we forget the path to return to it. For Buddhist monks, if we focus on knowledge only, we will easily fall into the state of idle talk when we propagate the true Dhamma. All will be the teaching of voice without practice. It is true that the Buddha's life is a clear proof. It is the Buddha that has bequeathed so many valuable lessons for human beings in the practice of the path.

The Buddhist monks, we are the nice pictures and a mirror to illuminate for the future generations. It is a way of practice in daily life that is a practice dhamma for everyone. We all tend to focus on the Buddha's life to follow his example. We ourselves cultivate the noble actions and are the beautiful flowers in the garden of method to attain Nibbāna:

*“The fragrance of flowers drifts with the wind
as sandalwood, jasmine of lavender.
The fragrance of the virtuous sweeps the wind,
all pervasive is virtue of the good.”⁴*

So, study must go together with practice that is most wonderful and live dhamma to be able to reject the delusion of the rebirth worlds and enter into Nibbāna enlightenment. Then, we can save the human beings to free themselves from the suffering.

The Right View, which is preached by the Buddha, is always suitable for the human beings in each era, helps them to have lucid thinking enough to face their reality of suffering. The Buddha has emphasized that human beings own their kamma; successor of kamma; womb treasury (garbhadhatu) of kamma. If the human beings act on tendency to make unwholesome kamma, they must not only sustain the effects of unwholesome kamma which cause suffering here and now but also contribute the seed of that suffering into environment that they are living. But if human beings build happiness on the principle of carrying out wholesome kamma, they can achieve what they want easily. All derive

⁴ K.Sri Dhammananda, The Dhammapada – No.54, Sasana Abhiwurdhi Wardhana Society, Kualalumpur, 1988, p. 142.

from the human's seeing and knowing. With this view, the humans in the new age can really feel their world, of others and the Buddhas. These worlds blend with each other without distinction, no difference. Since then, the human beings become free and independent (*isvara*); no longer depend on others, deities and existence around. On the contrary, the value of the humans is raised ultimately because the heaven and earth as well as the universe is former one for a long time.

If we want a peaceful life, we need to learn the Buddha's teachings. Since that time, we will get the Right View to make it a first source of wisdom that operates in the way of thinking to behave in society. Due to knowing the truth of suffering, the operation of the five aggregates and the world, we can build a happy life in which the negative factors such as corruption, hatred, racial discrimination, gender discrimination and class discrimination are all absent. This is the difference between Buddhism and other religious traditions that have built happiness and liberation on the basis of the establishment of faith in omnipotent God. Of course, that way makes the people rely heavily on faith, but the humanity overlooked and leads to happiness but liberation is not guaranteed.

**SAMVEGA, PASĀDA AND NIBBIDA
AS KEY CONCEPTS IN EARLY BUDDHISM**

Evgenia Evmenenko

**Article based on my M.A. thesis submitted to the
Sri Lanka International Buddhist Academy,
Pallekele, Kundasala, Sri Lanka**

ABSTRACT

The history of the Buddha Gotama's Great Renunciation begins with three major episodes of which each disciple knows very well.

Young prince Siddhattha walks accompanied by his assistant and discovers multiple scenes of earthly sorrow. He meets a sick person, a frail old man and a person who lay dead on a stretcher. Deeply moved, after witnessing the vulnerability of the human body, he returns to the palace with a heavy heart.

Prince Siddhattha shaken and disturbed by his visions of human grief, spends days and nights in reflection, contemplating the reasons and possibility of liberation from the dilemma of old age, illness and death. He needs to find the answers.

We live now in an Information age, hearing daily about the horrors of life. The mass media bombards us with news of the next tsunami or act of terrorism, from which hundreds and even thousands of people perish. Hospitals and funeral parlours render a non-stop service yet citizens pass by without reflecting. Sooner or later, they will surely come to these same doors.

Strangely enough, *samvega*, *pasāda* and *nibbida* aren't written about in most works, and the impression is made that these subjects aren't publicly expressed. Thanks to venerable Thanissaro Bhikkhu we have an interesting article about *samvega* and *pasāda*. Other separate compositions specifically on these subjects were difficult to find.

I chose my dissertation on *samvega* and *pasāda* because I consider these subjects highly important in comprehending the full understanding of the Dhamma. Personally I have met many self-proclaimed Buddhists who ignore or reject all these feelings and even the Four Noble Truths. Without recognizing, without first understanding suffering there can be no end or escape from it. When one is full of disappointment and desire,

it is difficult to develop the necessary attitude to solve the problem of suffering.

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THE MISERY OF LIFE

Samvega (sk. sam+vij) – means agitation, fear, anxiety, dread or emotion of awe caused by contemplation of the miseries of the world.

Samvega has a number of objects including emotions - birth, old age, illness, death, misery in hell, misery in *samsāra*, misery in the past, present and future.

Samvega means a sense of urgency to escape the round of meaningless existence; and *pasāda*, a clarity and serene confidence that allows one to proceed confidently towards the goal without lapsing into despair.

*...Evam passam, bhikkhave, sutavā ariyasāvako
cakkhusmim nibbindati, rūpesu nibbindati, cakkhuvīññāne
nibbindati, cakkhusamphasse nibbindati, vedanāya
nibbindati, tanhāya nibbindati.*

Sotasmim nibbindati...

*...Nibbindam virajjati virāgā vimuccati. Vimuttasmim
vimuttamiti ña hoti. 'Khīnā jāti, vusitam brahmacariyam katam
karāya nāpara itthattāyā'ti pajānātī'ti...*

People in our times are surrounded by images of decay, beheadings, bullfights, and bloody murder. Far from reminding us of our own fate, these images are used for entertainment and profit. Death has become a consumer product.

Most of us do not contemplate the nature of death on a deep level. We don't acknowledge that our bodies and environment are made up of unstable elements that can fall apart at even the slightest provocation. Of course, we know that one day we will die. But most of us, unless we have been diagnosed with a terminal illness, think we are in the clear for the time being. On the rare occasion that we think about death, we wonder, how much will I inherit? Or - where will they scatter my ashes?

For Prince Siddhatha, this was not just a passing melancholic reflection. He was obsessed with the unavailability of decay, illness and death. To prevent the prince from sinking deeper into his depression, his father told him not to leave the palace again, and secretly instructed the royal attendants to keep close watch over his son. In the meantime, like any concerned father, he did everything he could to make things right by concealing further evidence of illness, death and decay from the prince's view.

In our everyday lives we have this desire to shield ourselves and others from the truth. We've become impervious to obvious signs of decay. We encourage ourselves by "not dwelling on it" and by using positive affirmations. We celebrate our birthdays by blowing out candles. Ignoring the fact that the extinguished candles could also be seen as a reminder that we are one year closer to death. We celebrate the New Year with firecrackers and champagne, distracting ourselves from the fact that the old year will never come back and the new year is filled with uncertainty. Anything could happen.

Here I'll stay for the rains. Here, for the summer and winter.' So imagines the fool, unaware of obstructions. That drunk-on-his-sons-and cattle man, all tangled up in the mind, death sweeps him away - as a great flood, a village asleep. There are no sons to give shelter, no father, no family for one seized by the Ender, no shelter among kin. Realizing this force of reasoning, the wise man, restrained by virtue, should make the path pure — right away — that goes all the way to Unbinding.

Dhp. 268.28

DHAMMA OF THE BUDDHA AND "AMERICAN BUDDHISM"

It is surprising that the pure Doctrine of the Buddha is now degraded to a standard set of rituals and ceremonies - in the East; and - in a certain type of psychotraining which consists in restoring attentiveness and being "conscious" (by the way, there is a misunderstanding between terms related to mindfulness and attention, but it is already another subject).

Very many people who call themselves Buddhists, don't recognize the essential foundation - the Four Noble Truths. Many "Buddhists" openly deny that "birth is suffering", in the positive belief that birth can be a great source of happiness.

The word "dukkha" is extremely important in the Doctrine of the Buddha. Dukkha is quite often translated in English as "problems or

uneasiness". For the sake of not frightening the gentle European people with "Eastern pessimism".

The term *dukkha* as the First Noble Truth, represents the Buddha's view of life and the world. It has a deeper philosophical meaning and connotes enormously wider senses. It is admitted that the term *dukkha* in the First Noble Truth contains, quite obviously, the ordinary meaning of 'suffering', but in addition it also includes deeper ideas such as 'imperfection', 'impermanence', 'emptiness', and 'insubstantiality'. It is difficult therefore to find one word to embrace the whole concept of the term *dukkha* as the First Noble Truth. So, it is better to leave it without translation, than to give an inadequate and wrong idea of it by conveniently translating it as 'suffering' or 'pain'.

Tired of the dogmatism of traditional religions, Europeans and Americans find joy in the freedom and tolerance that is found in Buddhism. Meanwhile, without recognizing suffering as a fact - any practice in Buddhism becomes only a temporary method for reducing stress.

The Buddha didn't say that simply attention and awareness will lead to Enlightenment. Although he taught that the causes that lead to rebirth in different heavens are through virtue and kindness. Nevertheless, a cornerstone and treasure of Buddhist thought. In searching and achievement there is a contrast of life which we know. The treasure is called *Nibbana* and has characteristics which are opposite to the world - *ajātam abhūtam akatam asamkhatam*.

In a way, Buddhism has been well-adjusted to the "positive" mind idea of the Western person and it has been well-adjusted to the performing traditional rituals mindset of the Eastern person. These mindsets make the understanding of the True Dhamma rare, and the desire to stop completely the cycle of the birth and death - even more rare.

Thanissaro Bhikkhu:

*If the young prince were living in America today, the father would have other tools for dealing with the prince's dissatisfaction, but the basic strategy would be essentially the same. We can easily imagine him taking the prince to a religious counselor who would teach him to believe that god's creation is basically good and not to focus on any aspects of life that would cast doubt on that belief. Or he might take him to a psychotherapist who would treat feelings of *samvega* as an*

inability to accept reality. If talking therapies didn't get results, the therapist would probably prescribe mood-altering drugs to dull the feeling out of the young man's system so that he could become a productive, well-adjusted member of society

If the father were really up on current trends, he might find a Dharma teacher who would counsel the prince to find happiness in life's little miraculous pleasures — a cup of tea, a walk in the woods, social activism, easing another person's pain. Never mind that these forms of happiness would still be cut short by aging, illness, and death, he would be told. The present moment is all we have, so we should try to appreciate the bittersweet opportunity of relishing but not holding on to brief joys as they pass.

It's unlikely that the lion-hearted prince we know from the story would take to any of this well-meant advice. He'd see it as propaganda for a life of quiet desperation, asking him to be a traitor to his heart. But if he found no solace from these sources, where in our society would he go? Unlike the India of his time, we don't have any well-established, socially accepted alternatives to being economically productive members of society. Even our contemplative religious orders are prized for their ability to provide bread, honey, and wine for the marketplace. So the prince would probably find no alternative but to join the drifters and dropouts, the radicals and revolutionaries, the subsistence hunters and survivalists consigned to the social fringe.

Birth, aging, disease and death are indicated as the most rough forms of dukkha, besides being in itself dukkha. They point to the changeable nature of life, and this changeable nature of life defines the main property of suffering - insufficiency. Life from the point of view of experience is nothing other than change, but also the world around us is full of changes. Everyone and everything that we experience during life, is subject to change.

If something arises, it, as well, will stop, and here is where the dissatisfaction creeps in. During our life, we sometimes experience happy moments - at least, we consider it as happiness. This happiness appears, develops, and then leaves. And as it floats, it never reaches a point where it will be fulfilled and complete. It also can't - because it arises from conditions, which in itself is unstable as well as are our intellectual relationship to most experiences. Therefore, happiness which

we test during life, never is a finished, absolutely full experience, and that experience is unsatisfactory. Life as a whole has such a nature and therefore it is unsatisfactory.

INTERNATIONAL SUICIDE STATISTICS

Over one million people die by suicide worldwide each year.

The global suicide rate is 16 per 100,000 population.

On average, one person dies by suicide every 40 seconds somewhere in the world.

1.8% of worldwide deaths are suicides.

Global suicide rates have increased 60% in the past 45 years.

HOW CAN PEOPLE ESCAPE FROM SAMVEGA?

People aren't able to live with the thought of future sickness and of death, and are compelled to use things like drugs, in direct or figurative meanings. This use of intoxicants may help for a while, by helping to forget about the horrors of life. Figuratively the person has a huge number of ways to forget about how he now lives and waits for relief in the near future.

So, *samvega* itself and the spiritual search are very strongly dependent on conditions and contacts in which the person lives and grows.

It is obvious that such a search means a certain quantity of time, free from vanity and daily cares. In war people practically don't test despair from the senselessness of life because all are forced to fight for survival. Being put in wild living conditions, the person starts living wild soon, being guided by simple biological instincts.

In fact, war turns the person into a highly developed animal, after all neither the cat, nor a hare don't think of that, why they live and what waits for them after death. Thus, war removes all philosophical cares, leaving only corporeal sufferings.

The following level "from *samvega*" can be described as freedom from the bondage of life which is passing not in war, but also in very poor conditions of life. When the person lives in deep poverty and hunger is there, all his thoughts are absorbed by the search for food and the seeking for a minimum of comfort. Here too not despaired by the senselessness and emptiness of life. Pluckers of tea in Sri Lanka, receive only a couple of dollars a day, or the Siberian miners working at a temperature of

minus forty, just for the sake of a piece of bread - hardly these people think of the "eternal".

The other way to avoid *samvega* is to be constantly busy. It is worth looking at people. The impression is created that the whole world is constantly running.

They are running generally from themselves and from whom else to escape? People manage to load the days and nights so that (the abstract reflections simply doesn't suffice forces and time). Even if the person remained alone by himself, he will surely turn on the TV or read a book.

To have a career is also a good way to avoid *samvega*. Since childhood we are attacked by ideas that "it is necessary to be successful", or that "it is necessary to give birth to children." If suddenly someone dares to ask a question, like children who ask "why is it necessary"?, In Russia it will cause immediate censure. As if it needs to be asked it! Children are the meaning of life! And in the meaning of life children will have their own children. It's interesting to note that people don't even hide their selfish intentions. Like the idea to have children, for example. It offers an escape from loneliness. They have security in knowing that their kids will feed and look after them during old age. However, the champion for despair- avoidance from senselessness of life, is nevertheless the philosophy and various religious systems. It wasn't for nothing that the Buddha avoided philosophical speculation called *diññhi* - one of the lowest fetters which tie a being to the wheel of birth and death. In Brahmajāla Sutta the Buddha in detail explains all types of views, and mainly gives a full explanation of how they appear. It is interesting that views are questioned by people with the highest spiritual abilities. Brahmans were capable of remembering their antecedents and possessed other types of spiritual qualities. It is difficult to compare people of such level to present- day philosophers, who if they managed to remember at least one antecedent, they would be given a BBC interview right away!

NOT ONLY MISERY, THERE IS HOPE

Twenty-five years had passed since my going forth. I did not attain peace of mind for even one moment. Not obtaining peace of mind, being without mastery over the mind, then I reached a state of samvega, remembering the teaching of the Conqueror. Delighting in diligence because of many painful dhammas, the destruction of craving has been attained by me. The Buddha's teaching has been done. Today it is the seventh night since my craving dried up.

Thig. Sāmā Therī

So, there is a person who faced and understood all the misery of life and who didn't find for oneself a way out neither in belief in god, nor in sensual pleasures, neither in a family, nor in a career.

The first option - a deep depression with possibility of suicide.

Emptiness and absurdity of life becomes so obvious, how to continue it there are no more motivation, and the rope or the gun looks like the only solution.. In this case it is important for us to remember the second word which is used along with "*samvega*" it's - "*pasāda*". This word means a various range of feelings that mainly come from hope, serenity. The hope and belief that there is something, free from the world of sufferings. An opposite to it which allows the person not to go on the way of self-destruction because it will lead only to the increasing of sufferings. *Pasāda* is what supported eremite Gotama after his Renunciation and forced him to believe in himself and in the Highest. *Pasāda* is that which encourages us, his followers, at least "to put an ear" to Dhamma and to try to separate the true Doctrine from later additions. *Pasāda* motivates us in different ways; to study the Canon, to practise, to develop morality, to become kinder. *Pasāda* motivates us to cultivate Wisdom, to study about concentration.

This confidence when it becomes firm, helps us to endure all obstacles in the Path, to break down all doubts, gradually to let go of increasing the big empty vanity of normal worldly life.

Adzhan Chaa said it well: "Why were we born? We were born once again never to be born again".

NIBBIDA

Nibbida is the next step after *samvega*. Step to the Deathless.

Nibbida (*nirvid* - sk, *nirveda*, to *nibbindati*) - weariness, disgust with worldly life, tedium, aversion, indifference, disenchantment. Preliminary and conditional states for the attaining of Nibbana. Occurs frequently together with *virago* (dispassion) *vimutti* and Nibbana (Liberation).

Its means - disenchantment; aversion; disgust; weariness. The skillful turning-away of the mind from the conditioned *samsàric* world towards the unconditioned, the transcendent.

This leads to being thoroughly tired of the world, to dispassionateness, to destruction, to perfect wisdom.

Nibbindati (nis+vindati, vid) - to get wearied of to have enough of, be satiated, turn away from. In two roots nibbindati usually combines with virajjati and vimucchati.

When you see with discernment, 'All fabrications are inconstant' - you grow disenchanted with suffering. This is the path to purity. When you see with discernment, 'All fabrications are stressful' - you grow disenchanted with suffering. This is the path to purity. When you see with discernment, 'All phenomena are not-self' - you grow disenchanted with suffering. This is the path to purity.

Dhp 277-279

NIBBIDA AND INSIGHT MEDITATION

After the emergence of right view, the yogi creates in himself the intention to be exempted from all sufferings and to reach one of the fruits. He cultivates in himself this aspiration, through developing virtue, practicing generosity, and compassion. Earlier he was certain that in this world he was the only person who suffers. Now he understands how all beings around him are also desperately looking for happiness. They too are unfortunate and confused. He feels deep compassion for them and forgives all the harm that was done to him by other people. He experiences conscious torments for the evil which he inflicted - by hurting another and wants to ask forgiveness.

Yogi develops kindness to all beings and wishes them prosperity. If he meets cruelty and roughness, he doesn't have anger, but only sympathizes with the other person, whose mind is filled with defilements. He knows how it is difficult - to live with defilements and they are worse than any prison. He wants to get rid of them and wishes the same fate to all beings, whether it be people or animals, gods or demons.

His Faith is strong, all his spiritual qualities increase, and the Understanding and Vision blossoms.

He sees the body as a combination of four great elements, each of which is changeable. He understands the true nature of the body; it is simply a congestion of sufferings, a congestion of sewage. There are huge demands to support this body: the body needs food, water, shelter from changing weather, clothes, and medicines.

For comforting this body, people are constantly putting forth plenty of effort. Thus the body isn't a grateful "recipient": it is continually ill. Even if being rather healthy, it forces the yogi to change poses in meditation, in it easily there is a fatigue, an itch, some kind of discomfort.

Any tasty and expensive food enters in this body and becomes excrements. No expensive creams and masks for the skin will help to rescue a body from wrinkles and decay. When the time will come, destruction become more and more relentless: teeth will collapse, any movements will be accompanied by painful feelings.

"There is no misfortune bigger, than a body", - the Buddha told.

Now yogi understands the correctness of these words by his own experience, and sees the body as an infinite source of pain and problems. He wonders: if this body is changeable, the suffering nature, whether that it is possible to supervise wrong word this process? Whether it is possible to supervise an element of water and to tell it: "Be such or such"? Whether it is possible to supervise an element of the earth, fire, or wind?

Studying it, the yogi comes to a conclusion that the body doesn't give in to control and lives according to its own rhythm; according to the reasons and conditions.

It arose a certain number of years back, it grew, changed, was ill, fell, recovered. Nobody taught this body to grow or breathe, nobody taught it to eat and to digest food and nobody taught it to grow old.

Yogi realizes that although since childhood he got used to considering the body as his, in actuality it belongs to nature. Nobody asked it to be born, but because of the reasons and conditions it appeared.

The body can't be ordered to be like something or another, and (even what surgical interventions can actually change is little). We have no power over a body, differently we would relieve it of diseases, spots, excess weight, would make it fine and forever young, full of strength! But for this wish there is no opportunity.

He sees: "This body isn't me, isn't mine. In it there is nothing constant, not any essence. Body is simply a combination of elements which are in process of continuous change".

Such understanding leads it to a condition of renunciation of the body. He ceases to see it as something uniform and whole, as something steady and constant. He ceases to see a body as a pleasure source, seeing it as a suffering source. Seeing so, he feels indifference to a body. He is disappointed in the body and no longer considers his body as himself. He perceives detached any changes in the body. Able to transfer the most unpleasant increasing corporeal feelings because no longer takes them personally.

His obsession with body and the desire to please it sharply decrease or disappear at all. Yogi no longer wants to spend a lot of time making the tastiest dinner, to buy a fashionable dress or to live in expensive hotel. Even in expensive hotel the body remains all in the same place a source of pain and the center of sewage. Yogi wants to limit it to minimum necessary things in the form of a roof over the head, several sets of clothes, simple food once - twice a day.

His relation to the body reminds him of the relation of the sick person to own illness. It considers a body - as a wound as the illness, that doesn't experience hatred to a body, but doesn't wish and to look after him excessive and to extol it. Its task - to cure this wound therefore it puts necessary efforts for this purpose. His care of a wound isn't a consequence of love to this wound, but is only connected with desire to become healthy.

Yogi knows that there is no sense in hating or seeking to destroy the body because it will lead it to even more intensive sufferings in the next life. No, testing the quiet relation to the body, he wants to take maximum advantage from it, bearing in mind the precious human birth. It is more difficult to bring up the *nibbida* to what makes mentality, to mind, mentality, to consciousness, to feelings. On one day the Buddha says that even the ordinary person is capable of being disappointed in the body and not to consider it as oneself. Even other religions speak about "caducity" of a body, opposing its eternal soul and imperishable essence. Meanwhile, to be disappointed and completely to turn away from mind - improbably difficult because mind is something that "always nearby", and that creates our world and ourselves. Since the birth we consider mind ourselves, but it is really better to consider the body as ourselves than the mind as the body does not change as fast, not so promptly. The mind is simple a myriad of changes, and the mind never remains in rest, changing even more often than every second.

Our sense organs continually meet objects of the outside world: on the basis of an eye and a form there are a visual consciousness, then - feeling, thoughts, perception, ideas and intentions. One promptly

replaces another, and the ordinary person isn't able to trace these conditions. It seems to it that during life his mind remains the same mind while it consists of a billion particles which are in continuous state of spinning.

In meditation yogi learns to observe all these changes, and finds them frightening. The mind works as a mechanism, talking to itself, changing, creating in one moment of consciousness, then in another. In one moment of mind there is nothing stable, there is no basis, essence. The mind - is a fiery ring, is as a flow of water, is a magic illusion of the magician. It does anything, it creates focuses and constantly deceives the "owner".

We understand how it is terrible - to have such a deceiver near oneself which doesn't submit to our desires. We understand that mind doesn't belong to us, but we are responsible for it. Like an elephant or a horse doesn't belong to the trainer and isn't him, but the trainer bears responsibility for it and is obliged to bring them up. Similarly yogin doesn't possess mind, however it has to cultivate in it necessary good qualities and lead it to result in Liberation.

In this way the *nibbida* is born. Free from addiction, thirst and hatred, it allows distance from the body and mind and cultivates passivity in relation to it and to everything else.

Here high levels of sensibleness and self-checking is necessary.

RESULTS

What is, monks, "to add a burden"?

This perfect impassivity, passion extinction, passion leaving, failure from passion, release from passion, absence of aspiration to this ~passions. It is called "to add a burden".

Indeed, a burden — quinary mass; Grabs a burden — the person; To Shoulder it — to endure grief in this world;

To add it — pleasure.

If the person removes this burden from shoulders

Also doesn't undertake another,

If it with a root pulls out all this desire,

More not tormented ~hunger, it — is free.

"SN" III, 25

Some people looking for Buddhism, because its support of the moral belief (vegetarianism, practice non-violence). Some people study

Buddhism as scientists or to write dissertations or even simply to learn more about "Eastern philosophy".

All this has no relation to the real practice of Dhamma which is made only for the sake of the disposal of sufferings and cycle of *samsàra*. The aspiration to reduce the stress of this life is clear and natural. Not everyone shall aim to go beyond the short satisfaction and not to turn the great Doctrine into the next type of psychotherapy. Eventually, problems of one - the single life can not quite solve using worldly methods. It is correct that the Buddha taught not only people who were seeking Nibbana, but also those who dreamt about heaven and paradise. Nevertheless, at least, those people trusted in a *karma* and regeneration. In western Buddhism, they try to make an art of how to live "here and now", without creating the correct and stable foundation

Alone *samvega* without hope can lead to depression and even to suicide therefore we need to cultivate also a feeling of hope and have Faith in the Buddha and his Doctrine.

Nibbida doesn't mean disgust or hatred in relation to life and in relation to the body and mind. It means supersaturation, leaving, interest loss. (Like the child who built sand blocks and I was tired of them), meditator loses interest and ceases to enjoy and look for happiness in the world. Being satiated, it becomes passionless. By means of impassivity it is completely released. Having released, he understands: "Saint life is lived. Everything what should to be done, have been done. This last birth; there is no existence for me anymore".

**The Buddha and Patañjali:
The Impact of Buddhism on the *Yoga Sūtras* of Patañjali with
Regard to Ethics as Foundation of Spiritual Attainment as well as
the Conception of the Cause and Cessation of Suffering**

Mark Edsel Johnson

**Article based on my M.A. thesis submitted to the
Sri Lanka International Buddhist Academy,
Pallekele, Kundasalala, Sri Lanka**

ABSTRACT

The teachings of Gotama the Buddha have heavily influenced Modern Hinduism and one avenue of this influence can be traced through the *Yoga Sūtras* of Patañjali. The *Yoga Sūtras* show the influence of numerous prior traditions and practices, and some direct lineage from the Sāṃkhya School, but the influence of Buddhist teachings and those of related śramanic schools form a crucial part of Patañjali's foundations of ethical practice and analysis of the cause of suffering and its cessation.

Within India, the crucial impact of Buddhism on Yoga and modern Hinduism goes largely unacknowledged due to the predisposed tendencies to credit the Vedas as the origin and inspiration of all subsequent philosophical and religious developments among the Indian schools of thought and practice.

This standpoint runs counter to the discovery of the ancient Indus Valley Civilization as the likely origin of yoga, meditation, and a philosophical/religious movement termed śramanism. This places the origin of the most important elements of modern Hindu practice outside of the Vedic and brahmanic tradition.

In rejecting the authority of the Vedas and placing primacy on direct spiritual experience, the Buddha firmly established a movement which came to be known as Buddhism, which under the patronage of successive monarchs, especially the Mauryan Dynasty, became widespread in India in the centuries following the Buddha. Largely through the influence of Buddhism, the wider śramanic teachings gained popularity and respectability, even among the Brahmin caste, who had originally been firmly opposed to such movements. The śramanic ideas and practices began to penetrate newly arising religious trends such as embodied in the Upaniṣads and Bhagavad Gītā.

The *Tevijja Sutta*, the *Discourse of the Threefold Knowledge*, of the *Digha Nikāya* (DN 13) provides an interesting study of how the Buddha contrasted his threefold knowledge with that of the Brahmins of his time in an interesting and illustrative sutta. In this sutta, the Buddha clearly lays out the defining characteristics of his path and calls into question the traditional approach of the Brahmins. Later philosophers and teachers within the reforming Hindu tradition followed the Buddha's teaching much more than that of the Vedas. So a look at this sutta and related topics will yield much insight into the re-formation of Hinduism in centuries following the Buddha.

In this environment of Buddhist/śramanic influence, Patañjali composed his *Yoga Sūtras*. Patañjali's work displays much closer affinity to Buddhism and the other śramanic schools than to the early Vedas. Due to the widespread influence of *Yoga Sūtras* on medieval and modern Hinduism, this Buddhist/śramanic influence has become the standard in Hinduism. Despite the elements in common with Buddhism, modern Hinduism and the Yoga School hold views that set them apart from Buddhism.

Many of the common elements, such as primacy of spiritual experience rather than blind faith make both Yoga and Buddhism remarkably "modern" in their outlook, despite being the product of a remote age. In the spiritual vacuum of the modern material world, both Yoga and Buddhism are enjoying widespread popularity and growth, as many people are experiencing acute suffering due to the excessive modern lifestyle. In fact, Buddhism and Yoga are having parallel growth among many of the same sorts of people in modern society and it is not uncommon for people to combine the two practices, or to begin with the one and be naturally led to the other. Depending on whether one's practice is Buddhist or Hindu/Yogic, one will need to adapt any borrowing to fit one's main practice, as there are some unharmonious elements as well as the common ground.

THE THREE KNOWLEDGES IN BRAHMANISM AND IN BUDDHISM

The study of the Vedas was the source to the brahmins of the three knowledges (*veda-trayi*), which was the knowledge of the first three Vedas, the *R̥g*, *Yajur*, and *Sāma* Vedas. It was this study that informed their religious views. It also gave them their position as the superior group among the social castes, one which was to be honored by all the other castes and members of society. It gave them a strongly self-

conscious identity, which was reinforced by a unique lifestyle laid out in detail by their tradition.

By contrast, the Buddhists had their own version of the three knowledges, which they believed to be far superior to that of the brahmins. These knowledges were not from an ancient oral tradition like that of the Brahmins, but rather from the direct experience of the Buddha on the eve of his enlightenment. The *Sāmaññaphala Sutta*, for instance, gives the account of how the Buddha gained the knowledge of previous existences, the passing away and arising of beings, and the destruction of the taints (*āsavas*).ⁱ The choice of the term “the three knowledges” was not accidental, but intended as an answer to the brahmins. As Gombirich writes of the Buddha’s three knowledges,

There is no reason why this particular set of attainments-of which the last one is indeed composite-should be called ‘three knowledges’ if they were not intended to parallel and trump the ‘three knowledges’ of brahmins.ⁱⁱ

The Buddha pointed out the superior nature of his knowledge, which was due to his own achievements and direct experience. He reasoned that the brahmins were operating on mere hearsay, depending on a tradition that they could not verify but to which they could only give their blind allegiance.

One of the best illustrations of the Buddha’s critique of the Vedas and those who relied upon it is found in the *Tevijja Sutta*, the *Discourse of the Threefold Knowledge*, of the *Digha Nikāya* (DN 13). In this sutta, two young brahmin men, Bhāradvāja and Vāsetṭha, are disputing on the correct way to find union with Brahmā, with each of them advocating the path put forward by his particular teacher. Unable to settle the dispute, they decide to go to see the Buddha who happens to be temporarily residing in their area. They have heard that the ascetic Gotama knows the way to union with Brahmā. They proceed to the Buddha’s location to see what he will say.



Figure 1

The Buddha, perhaps speaking with his young brahmin friends Bhāradvāja and Vāsetṭha, Stone sculpture from Polonnaruva, Sri Lanka (photo by the author)

Their question is most interesting, as it represents a shift in the views of the brahmin thinkers of that day and age (ca 350-550 BCE) and is a question that would perhaps never have been asked in the preceding centuries except in a few closed circles, but was appropriate to the new thinking beginning to emerge with the spread of Upaniṣadic ideas. The question asked by these young men represents the beginnings of a major redefining of the spiritual life. Instead of trying to find a way to merely go to the heaven of Brahmā after death, the young men are seeking a way to find union with Brahmā. Even when speaking of going to Brahmā's heaven, a deeper meaning was being hinted at. The purpose of going to

Brahmā's heaven was not just to get to a paradisiacal place, but instead had connotations of attaining a higher state of consciousness.

This change in thinking represented a shift away from a desire for worldly happiness for one's personal soul towards the giving up of that individuality and the merging with something greater, superior to one's small self. Their question, and their quest, echoes that of the Upaniṣads and it is likely that they and their teachers were familiar with some of the Upaniṣadic ideas beginning to circulate in northern India. What these young men were looking for was later to be called *mukti*, or liberation, in the emerging world of Upaniṣadic brahmanical thought.

Recognizing the intelligence and earnestness of the young brahmins, the Buddha hears their question, and then engages them in an illuminating dialogue in which he brilliantly shows them his version of the path of liberation. He begins by clarifying what and who can be trusted as a source of knowledge and as a guide along the path. First, the claims of the Vedic tradition and its teachers are examined.

‘Well, Vāseṭṭha, when these Brahmins learned in the Three Vedas teach a path that they do not know or see, saying: “This is the only straight path...leading to union with Brahmā”, this cannot possibly be right. Just as a file of blind men go on, clinging to each other, and the first one sees nothing, the middle one sees nothing, and the last one sees nothing—so it is with the talk of these Brahmins learned in the Three Vedas: the first one sees nothing, the middle one sees nothing, the last one sees nothing. The talk of these Brahmins learned in the Three Vedas turns out to be laughable, mere words, empty and vain.’ⁱⁱⁱ

and,

‘Vāseṭṭha, it is just as if a man were to say: I am going to seek out and love the most beautiful girl in the country.’ They might say to him: ‘Do you know what caste she belongs to?’ ‘No.’ ‘Well, do you know her name, her clan, whether she is tall or short...dark or light complexioned..., or where she comes from?’ ‘No.’ And they might say: ‘Well then, you don't know or see the one you seek and desire?’ and he would say: ‘No.’ Does not the talk of that man turn out to be stupid?’ ‘Certainly, Reverend Gotama.’

‘Then Vāseṭṭha, it is like this: not one of these Brahmins has seen Brahmā face to face, nor has one of their teachers.’ ‘Yes indeed, Reverend Gotama.’^{iv}

As in the *Kalama Sutta*, AN III, 65, the Buddha cautions his friends to rely on their own experience and common sense, not on a hallowed tradition or line of teachers, however well respected. It is this point which makes Buddhism heterodox rather than orthodox in the eyes of the Indian tradition. As it turns out, the Buddha has no need of Vedic certification.

In further discussion with his young brahmins, the Buddha establishes the nature of Brahmā according to what they surmise to be his characteristics. They conclude that Brahmā is unencumbered with wives and wealth. He is without hate or ill-will. He is pure and disciplined.^v

Then the Buddha proclaims himself as a worthy guide because as he says of himself, the Tathāgata, “I know Brahmā and the world of Brahmā, and the way to the world of Brahmā, and the path of practice whereby the world of Brahmā may be gained.” (v.38)

Like Brahmā, the Buddha points out that he and his Ariyan (Āryan) disciples who practice *brahmacariya*, are unencumbered, without hate or ill will, and are pure and disciplined. The discussion reveals that it is in purity of ethics and practice wherein lies the key to the higher, exalted states of mind and consciousness.

The Buddha skillfully leads his young friends to a clear realization of what a true brahmin is, and what union with Brahmā consists of. He recounts how a Tathāgata arises in the world, frees himself of the five hindrances, and proclaims the dhamma to his disciples. Those disciples in turn practice the moralities, purify themselves of the five hindrances, and attain the higher states of meditation (jhānas).

THE WAY TO UNION WITH BRAHMĀ

Then in a series of profound passages, the Buddha proclaims the way to union with Brahmā as “the liberation of the heart through loving kindness, through compassion, through sympathetic joy, through equanimity.” And this practice “leaves nothing untouched, nothing unaffected in the sensuous sphere.” Such a liberated heart suffuses the whole world with Loving Kindness etc., like the sound of a mighty trumpeter of the conch shell, who fills the four quarters with sound. This liberated heart is abundant and unbounded, without hate or ill-will. This is the “way to union with Brahmā.”^{vi}

Knowing the religious background of his interlocutors, the Buddha finishes with a reference to the possibility of the Ariyan disciple, the unencumbered monk, attaining union with Brahmā at the time of death.

This sutta deserves some discussion with respect to our theme of Buddhist impact on Brahmanism and on the development of the *Yoga Sūtras*. As we will see, Patañjali makes the development of such a loving heart and the keeping of ethical precepts the cornerstone of his system. Thus, *Yoga Sūtras* represent a swing away from the Vedic approach to that taught by the Buddha and some of the other ascetics.

It is good to begin with the last point the Buddha makes, that of the monk attaining union with Brahmā at the time of death. This sounds a bit like the old theme of going to heaven as put forth in the early and middle Vedic periods. However, as the Buddha suggests, the monk not only goes to the Brahmā world, he attains union with Brahmā, which is a different outcome. And the previous passages in the sutta make it clear that one need not wait until death for attainment of a higher state of consciousness. The equanimous, abundant, unbounded heart itself is liberation. And the Buddha indicates that he has already achieved union with Brahmā, in which case he need not wait until his demise to realize that state.

So why the mention of the realization at death? In brief, we can say that the Buddha was speaking to both the old conception of Brāhma and the new one. He was addressing two ways of conceptualization at the same time, like a musician who is responding the rhythms of his drummer while at the same time playing in harmony with the bass. The Buddha was keeping in mind and addressing two different modes of concept of the religious goal at the same time, like a very skilled musician.

Why two modes of talk in this conversation? It is due to the fact that the goal of spiritual life in Brahmanism during the time of the Buddha, which is also the age of the spread of Upaniṣadic thought, was not yet fully clarified. The old view, still partly in vogue, thought of Brahmā as a god presiding over a heaven to which the follower of the ritual and caste dharma could hope to go after death. The emerging view taught that such a goal was superficial, and that the real goal of the spiritual life was not heaven, but liberation, which was conceived as union with Brahmā, the gaining of a higher state of consciousness. The Brahmā who presided over the heaven was also much more superficial than the Brahmā with which one sought union. This greater Brahmā was beyond the changing conditions of the world of form. To find union with this

greater Brahmā was to find true deathlessness, and ultimate bliss and happiness.

The transition between these two vastly different goals was confusing to many of the brahmins. What, in fact, was the difference between the two alternative conceptions of Brahmā? How could the new goal be realized? Did it mean the total abandoning of the former conception and goal, or were they somehow compatible? Who were the reliable teachers, and what the reliable methods for realization of this new doctrine or experience? Where in the Vedas could the basis for such teachings be found?

Such confusion among the Brahmins is reflected in the opening of the sutta, where Vāsetṭha explains their quandary to the Buddha thus,

There are so many kinds of Brahmins who teach different paths: the Adhariya, the Tittiriya, the Chandoka, the Chandāva, the Brāhmacariya Brahmins-do all these ways lead to union with Brahmā? Just as if there were near a town or village many different paths-do all these come together at that place? And likewise, do the ways of the various Brahmins...lead the one who follows them to union with Brahmā?^{vii}

Keeping in mind the primacy of religious experience rather than insistence on certain doctrines or dogmas, the Buddha was willing to adopt the terminology of his questioners. He adopts the term “union with Brahmā” as a metaphor denoting spiritual attainment and liberation. Rather than using the vocabulary that he developed during his teaching career, such as speaking of *nibbāna* or one of the higher jhānas, he uses the brahmins’ own language.

Many other brahmanical terms are employed in this sutta or elsewhere in the early discourses, albeit in the Buddha’s reinterpetive way. The practices he recommends in this sutta are *brahmacariya* (Skt: *brahmacarya*) as foundation of *sīla*, and the four brahma-viharas (abodes of Brahmā) for higher meditative attainments and actual union. The term *brahma-vihara* is not used in the *Tevijja Sutta* but is common elsewhere. The advanced disciple is termed an *ariyan* (Skt: *āryan*) and the Buddha uses the term brahmin to describe himself and his disciples. In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (the following phrase occurs more than once, for instance at AN II, 211), the Buddha uses the phrase *brahma-bhūtena attanā viharati*, translated by Gombrich as “with his self/essence become Brahman”^{viii}, and by Bhikkhu Bodhi as “with himself become divine”^{ix}. As this “becoming Brahmā” is only used by the Buddha when speaking

with his brahmin friends, it is obviously not his preferred language, and lack of such phrasing elsewhere in the suttas further indicates its metaphorical usage in this case. The Buddha did not elsewhere advocate a union with Brahmā in the Upaniṣadic sense.

The Buddha is not content with the traditional or Upaniṣadic meanings given to these terms connected with Brahmā. He is speaking creatively and metaphorically, giving them a meaning in alignment with his teachings on the path to awakening. In his way of speaking, union with Brahmā is not a state of eternal existence, but rather a total purification and opening of the heart and mind. It is akin to the higher stages of meditation and to *nibbāna*.

Brahmacariya is, for the Buddha, not a stage of studenthood in the life of Brahmin youth, but rather a term for the pure and holy life. Its purpose, according to MN 29, *Mahāsāropama Sutta*, is for the “unshakeable deliverance of mind” (*akuppā ceto-vimutti*) rather than to train a young man to do the Vedic rituals.^x The brahmā-viharas are not actual abodes of Brahmā, but the practice of loving kindness (*mettā*), compassion (*karunā*), sympathetic joy (*muditā*), and equanimity (*upekkhā*), leading to the purification and exaltation of the mind. The mind of such a one purified one dwells in a boundless (*appamaññā*) state.

In the Buddha’s way of speaking, an *ariya* (skt: *ārya*) is not a member of a certain ethnic group or a term denoting the white skinned rulers of northern India, but rather is a ‘Noble One’ who has realized one of the eight stages of holiness, i.e. the four supermundane paths (*maggā*) and the four supermundane fruitions (*phala*) of these paths. Even the term brahmin is given a higher meaning by the Buddha. A brahmin is not a member of the hereditary priestly caste, but one who truly lives the holy life of practicing the Noble Eightfold Path.

Thus, the Buddha has adopted the spiritual and social vocabulary of his day but is using it in a unique and creative way, so as to shake his young friends loose from their rigid conceptions and point the way to his version of true liberation, to *nibbāna*. Known for his skillful means and use of concept and language according to the capacity of his listeners, the Buddha is here empowering his brahmin friends to proceed with their way to union with Brahmā, but to do it on the basis of a firm foundation of morality (*sīla*) and by adopting the proper approach to meditation (*samādhi*) and the development of wisdom and insight (*paññā*).

This is also the approach laid out by Patañjali in the *Yoga Sūtras* some five centuries later, although some details are not a perfect fit with the

Buddha's approach. Patañjali sometimes uses a different vocabulary and his philosophical scheme is not purely Buddhist, but is rather admixed with Sāṃkhya and language of other traditions. But in broad outline, we will see that Patañjali adopted the path that the Buddha is advocating in *Tevijja Sutta*.

The Buddha made it clear that the old brahminical way of seeking heaven through proper *yajña* (ritual sacrifice, often bloody) and following one's caste dharma or social role was insufficient for attainment of the higher levels of consciousness (*jhāna*) or the transformation of consciousness (Pali: *nibbāna*, Skt: *nirvāna*). This is a major turning point in the history of spiritual thought and practice in India. It is difficult to overemphasize this point, as the impact of the Buddha's teaching is so deep and profound, changing the entire history of spirituality in India and many other countries around the world. Indeed, to say that it changed the entire world is not amiss.

Approximately 500 years after the Buddha's talk with the two young brahmins, Sage Patañjali was composing his yoga sutras, for a primarily bramanical audience. Instead of embracing the path of (sacrifice) *yajña* and advocating the following of dharma based on observation of caste duties (*varṇa*), as advocated by the Vedas, Patañjali set forth his version of the Buddha's message that had been given to the two young brahmins, as well as to many others. In the *Yoga Sūtras*, we find Patañjali's version of *sīla*, *samadhi*, and *paññā*. We will explore this below.

When considering the events and exchange of ideas recorded in the *Discourse of the Three Knowledges*, it is fair to question the account of Brahmanism given in a Buddhist text that is obviously bent on demonstrating the superiority of the Buddha's path. How fair a picture of Brahmanical thought of that day and age is the picture provided in this discourse?

Certainly, when looking at the picture of brahmins and other spiritual or philosophical groups such as the Ājīvakas or Jainas as presented in the early discourses, it is good to be cautious. Caution is warranted whenever we rely on the works of antithetical sects as a source of information about their opponents. To verify that possibly biased picture, we need to verify with other sources.

Part of the difficulty in is that we have very little primary material from that day and age with which to compare the Buddhist accounts. In fact, aside from some material in the early and middle Upaniṣads, approximately contemporaneous with the Buddha, and a few Jain sutras,

which postdate the Buddhist accounts, the Pali Nikāyas and the Āgamas are our main literary and historical source on Indian spiritual and social life ca. the sixth or fifth centuries BCE, depending on how we date the life of the Buddha. This makes the material, especially in the Pali Suttas extremely valuable for those purposes. But in reading the many accounts of interactions between the Buddha and various brahmins in the early discourses we will acknowledge that they may vary in their reliability. How about this particular account, in the *Tevijja Sutta*?

In the case of the *Tevijja Sutta*, most scholars see it as a reliable account of brahmin thought and social behavior during that era. For example, Govind Chandra Pande writes,

The sutta draws a vivid picture of Brāhmanic society and beliefs, just as we might expect those to have been in the 6th century B.C. further, the character of Buddha stands out for its earnestness and independence of thought. He insists that Truth must be directly known, and declares a merely traditional belief to be quite inadequate.^{xi}

The Buddha was not a dogmatist, but a pragmatist, keen on helping his friends to make significant progress on the path to awakening. If such concepts as union with Brahmā were a help rather than a hindrance, he was not going to eliminate, but rather to elevate such use of language.

As the sutta ends with Vāsetṭha and Bhāradvāja taking refuge in the Triple Gem, it is most likely that they would have gone to see the Buddha at a later date when he would have returned to their area of Kosala. Maybe they returned the next day! In any case, the Buddha's teaching must have had a profound impact on these two intelligent young men as we find them some time later as Buddhist monks in the *Aggañña Sutta* (DN 27). In that sutta, they relate that they are the objects of abuse by their former brahmin fellows, due to their having given up the status of brahminhood for the “menial” (according to the brahmins) position of the Buddhist monk.

Getting back to the *Tevijja Sutta*, it is remarkable the extent to which the Buddha was willing, as skillful means, to embrace the language and goals of the Upaniṣadic movement, even though on other occasions he went to lengths to demonstrate that he was not advocating belief in any permanent self or divine essence. However, in this case the Buddha was teaching a path to awakening using the language of the brahmins.

Some might argue that the Buddha was not actually teaching the young men a path to awakening, but only a path to transiting to the Brahmā

world at the time of death. While it is true that part of his instructions were in the mode of rather literally going to the Brahmā world at the time of death, when we read his remarks in the full context of his teachings in this sutta we can understand that the Buddha was speaking metaphorically about going to the Brahmā world and of union with Brahmā while at the same time addressing the literal meaning as given in the brahmins' tradition.

To my mind this is an amazing example of the Buddha's skill in communicating with his listeners. He is speaking both literally and metaphorically at the same time, and leaves no doubt that the metaphor is carrying the most profound of the teachings. In this teaching on the path to awakening the Buddha was teaching something much more profound than these young brahmins had previously heard of, namely the development of an abundant, unbounded mind, free from hatred or ill-will.

The teaching of the four brahma-viharas: the liberation of the heart and mind

In giving this teaching, the Buddha was personally modeling this boundless compassion as he gave his teaching “for the good of the many, for the happiness of the many, out of compassion for the world.” (*bahujanahitāya bahujanahitasukhāya lokānukampāya*)^{xiii}. In this case, his compassion was for the two young Brahmins and for all those whom the message of this sutta later reached, such as ourselves.

In addition to the fundamental teachings on ethics, why did the Buddha in this sutta choose to teach the young Brahmins about the four brahma-viharas as a path to awakening? The most basic answer is that observance of ethical precepts forms the indispensable basis for going further on the spiritual path. The metta meditation is also considered one of the primary ways to change one's perspective and to erase boundaries between self and other, hence giving a fresh perspective on ethical practices. They no longer become merely a set of rules to obediently follow, but rather embody a new and dynamic understanding of one's relationship with the various people and creatures in the world. A high ethical standard becomes natural and effortless to the one with boundless mind.

The teaching on *metta* (*karuna* etc.) meditation is by the most commonly recommended meditation by the Buddha in the Nikāyas. This fact has largely been lost sight of with the growth of popularity of the *ānāpāna* (breath) meditation and the *satipaṭṭhāna* (four foundations of

mindfulness) styles of meditation. Of course, these meditations need not be exclusive of each other.

In keeping with a doubtful reading of the *satipaṭṭhāna* as “the only way” (*ekāyano maggo*^{xiii}) to awakening, the meditation on *metta* (Skt: *maitri*) which was so widely used by the Buddha and his disciples during his teaching career has now been somewhat marginalized and the original form of the meditation has been changed to a liturgical recital, rather than a primarily feeling/experiential practice. The liturgical approach follows the tradition laid out by Buddhaghosa in the *Vissudimaggā*, which altered the original instructions given in the suttas. Buddhaghosa’s method is now the dominant one within the Theravadin world. The liturgical version emphasizes the use of stock phrases and is a sort of intellectual/spiritual exercise.

Had this liturgical version been the actual or dominant form of the *metta* meditation practiced in the centuries following the life of the Buddha, I doubt it would have been adopted by Patañjali and used as a cornerstone for his own teaching system. Rather, I would assume that Patañjali was using a form of the meditation more akin to the one given in the early discourses, which is primarily a feeling meditation rather than an analytical one.

To understand why this meditation was so significant for the two young Brahmins, and for Patañjali five centuries later, we need to look at its original form, not to the liturgical version now widely practiced today. To understand the vitality of the original meditation as given by the Buddha, we need look no further than the *Tevijja Sutta* itself, although a nearly identical version is taught on numerous occasions in the early discourses. In very abbreviated form (DN 13:76-77),

A disciple goes forth, practices the moralities, attains the first *jhāna*....Then with his heart filled with loving-kindness, he dwells suffusing one quarter, the second, the third, the fourth. Thus he dwells suffusing the whole world, upwards, downwards, across, everywhere, always with a heart filled with loving-kindness, abundant, unbounded, without hate or ill-will.

Just as if a mighty trumpeter were with little difficulty to make a proclamation to the four quarters, so by this meditation, *Vāseṭṭha*, by this liberation of the heart through loving-kindness he leaves nothing untouched, nothing unaffected in the sensuous sphere. This, *Vāseṭṭha*, is the way to union with *Brahmā*^{xiv}

This is repeated for compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity.

First, let us look at the Pali term translated by Maurice Walshe as “liberation of the heart”, which is a translation I quite like for its resonance in English.^{xv} The term is *ceto-vimutti* (Skt: *cetto-vimukti*), which can also be translated as “release of the mind” as per Gombrich.^{xvi} Gombrich cautions us not to forget that mind is not an object but a process. Further, he says, referring to *ceto-vimutti* that,

...in the early texts it is simply a term for enlightenment, the attainment of nirvana. To deny that here [in the *Tevijja sutta*] the Buddha is saying that infinite kindness, compassion etc. bring Enlightenment is to do violence to the text.^{xvii}

Hirakawa Akira agrees with Gombrich’s analysis of this key term. Writing of *ceto-vimutti* he states,

In this state the mind operates in complete freedom, unaffected by thirst. Because true bliss, (*sukha*) is experienced, *nirvāṇa* is sometimes said to be the bliss of extinction. Because the term *nirvāṇa* may be translated as ‘extinction’, some people have considered *nirvāṇa* to be a nihilistic state. However, only thirst is extinguished, not the mind itself.^{xviii}

We can see that *ceto-vimutti* is equated with *nibbāna* by these two scholars, and is quite a dynamic state, not one of mental extinction. This is in keeping with the characterization of the release of the mind or liberation of the heart which the Buddha speaks of in the *Tevijja Sutta*.

I will not go further the analysis of this rather controversial subject except to say that I agree with what Gombrich and Hirakawa are saying about *ceto-vimutti* and that Buddhist orthodoxy does not agree, as they usually assign the results of practicing the four brahma-viharas to the higher rupa jhānas and no further. Following Buddhaghosa’s fifth century work, the *Visuddhimagga*, or *Path of Purification*, it is generally considered in the Theravādin world that the practice of *mettā*, *karuṇā*, and *mudita* cannot lead one past the third jhāna and that *upekkhā* leads no further than the fourth *jhāna*.

However, some teachers cite the *Bojjhaṅgasamyutta* wherein it is indicated that the mind of *metta* can attain the beautiful liberation, abiding in compassion leads to the infinity of space, abiding in altruistic joy leads to the base of the infinity of consciousness, and equanimity

leads to the base of nothingness.^{xix} If not quite all the way to *nibbāna*, this is knocking at *nibbāna*'s doorway, so to speak.^{xx}

The relevance to our discussion is that the meditation of the brahma-viharas would not likely have made their way into Patañjali's work unless practitioners were having success with the meditation and it was working its promised transformation on the avid meditator, the liberation of the heart referred to in the *Tevijja Sutta*.

It should be noted that the Buddha recommended the practice of the brahma-viharas as a part of the Noble Eightfold Path for them to be fully efficacious. In the *Makhādeva Sutta* (MN 83) the Buddha tells how he instituted the practice of the brahma-viharas in a former life "and later generations continued that good practice instituted by me" but that good practice did not lead to the full result of *nibbāna* whereas the good practice (not necessarily only brahma-viharas in this case) as part of the Noble Eightfold Path leads to awakening.^{xxi}

This reference indicates that the brahma-viharas were practiced by others outside of the Buddhist tradition in the time of the Buddha. Sure enough, we find a group of ascetic wanderers claiming to practice the brahma-viharas and questioning some Buddhist monks about what makes the Buddhist version so special. They ask,

We too, friends, teach the Dhamma to our disciples thus: 'Come friends, abandon the five hindrances...dwell pervading the entire world with a mind imbued with lovingkindness ... compassion. ... altruistic joy ... equanimity ... without ill will. So friends, what here is the distinction, the disparity, the difference between the ascetic Gotama and us, that is regarding the one Dhamma teaching and the other, regarding the one manner of instruction and the other?'^{xxii}

The Buddha gives a long answer to this question, but basically indicates that, as in the *Makhādeva Sutta*, the practice must be part of a larger framework of understanding and practice. To practice it apart from the Noble Eightfold Path will achieve limited results. Except for these groups of ascetic wanderers reported in the *Bojjhaṅgasamyutta*, there is no other Indian tradition dating from the time of the Buddha or previous to him that has such teachings. The ancient scriptures of the Brahmins including the Upaniṣads lack any such teachings on the primacy of morality and opening of the heart to universal love. The Jaina scriptures do not have any reference to the *brahma-vihara* practice until the *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra* of Umāsvāti ca. the second century CE,

roughly contemporary with the appearance of *Yoga Sūtras*.^{xxiii} So it must be assumed that the Buddha is the primary influence on both the *Yoga Sūtras* and the Jaina Sutra *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra* of Umāsvāti. It must be noted that this is the most influential and authoritative of any of the Jaina writings within that tradition.

To return to our task of locating the source of Patañjali's use of the practice of the brahmaviharas and the remainder of his ethical system, we must conclude that the Vedic tradition lacked any such teaching on the primacy of morality and opening of the heart to universal love. So when we find the teaching of the four brahmaviharas in Patanjali's *Yoga Sūtras* nearly identical in its wording as that given by the Buddha in the Nikāyas, we have here a prime example of the primary influence of Buddhism in the Yoga tradition in Hinduism. The sutra is from the first of the four chapters of sutras called by Patañjali the *samādhi pāda*. It reads as follows,

Through cultivation of friendliness, compassion, joy, and equanimity to pleasure and pain, virtue and vice, the consciousness becomes favorably disposed, serene, and benevolent.^{xxiv}

maître karuṇa muditā upēkṣāṇām sukha duḥkha puṇya apuṇya viṣayāṇām bhāvanātaḥ cittaprasādanam^{xxv}

Renowned yoga teacher and writer, B.K.S. Iyengar, in his commentary on the sutra illustrates its central importance in the development of the proper attitude by the *sādhaka* (the spiritual aspirant or practitioner). He writes,

These qualities keep the mind in a state of well-being. Patañjali here lays the groundwork for our journey towards Self-Realization. Citta vikṣepa is a current of disturbed thoughts running like a river. In citta prasādana, graceful diffusion, the turbulent flow is dammed up and consciousness diffuses calmly like a lake.

If the citta is caught up in a web of the senses, and the sādhaka fails to cultivate friendliness, compassion, delight and equanimity, sorrow and unhappiness arise in his heart. This sūtra asks us to rejoice with the happy, to be compassionate with the sorrowful, friendly to the virtuous, and indifferent to those who continue to live in vice despite attempts to change them. This mental adjustment builds social as well as individual health. Besides cultivating these qualities, one should follow the social

virtues of yama (II.30) for the well being of society as a whole. This approach to life keeps the mind of the sādḥaka serene and pure.^{xxvi}

According to Iyengar's interpretation of this sūtra, the practice of the four brahma-vihāras has two closely connected main effects. One is to help the aspirant turn away from the lure of sense pleasures, thereby developing favorable states of consciousness and laying the foundation for higher states of consciousness. Secondly, it creates individual and social well-being.

This is broadly in agreement with the Buddha's teaching on the value of ethical thought and behavior. Walpola Rahula eloquently states the Buddhist view and shows the connection of the practice of the brahma-viharas and observance of the precepts thus,

Ethical conduct (sīla) is built of the vast conception of universal love and compassion for all living beings, on which the Buddha's teaching is based. It is regrettable that many scholars forget this great ideal of the Buddha's teaching and indulge in only dry philosophical and metaphysical divagations when they write and talk about Buddhism. The Buddha gave his teaching 'for the good of the many, for the happiness of the many, out of compassion for the world' (bahujanahitāya bahujanasukhāya lokānukampāya).^{xxvii}

and,

This moral conduct is considered as the indispensable foundation for all higher spiritual attainments. No spiritual development is possible without this moral basis.^{xxviii}

Similarly, Radhakrishnan writes,

Uncompromising devotion to the moral law is the secret of the strength of Buddhism....

To which he adds,

The Brāhmanical systems, as a result of the Buddhist influence, cast into the shade those parts of their religion which were irreconcilable with humanity and reason. The Mahabhārata [of which Bhagavad Gītā is a part] has echoes of the fine side of Buddhism.^{xxix}

It is interesting to note that Radhakrishnan says of the parts of Hinduism that were “irreconcilable with humanity and reason” that they have been cast into the shade, which indicates they are more difficult to see, but have not disappeared. Reformed Brahmanism has not done away with the negative holdovers from the Vedic Age.

To illustrate this, I would like to relate a story from personal experience in India. In 1983 I was in Manali, a town in the lovely Kulu Valley of the Himalaya in the Indian State of Himachal Pradesh. Near where I was staying was a beautiful old Shiva temple surrounded by an extensive grove of tall and graceful deodar cedars. In the trees lived rather large flying squirrels that would not just jump, but actually glide from tree to tree. I would go to the temple in the dusk and sit, imbibing the peaceful atmosphere and watching for the flying squirrels. There was a wandering ascetic, a yogi dressed in the saffron robes who was living in a small building to the side of the temple. I was friendly with him, and sometimes brought him some food, but we exchanged few words. I chose to leave him in peace.

One evening while sitting near the temple and watching for the flying squirrels, I heard a repeated cry, which as it drew nearer, I could recognize as the panicked bleating of a goat. Soon, I saw two men approaching, dragging the tethered goat behind them. In front of the temple, they drew their long knives and sacrificed the goat. One went inside the open temple doors and offered some of the blood. The remainder of the goat’s body was then hauled away to their house, to be consumed as food.

I was stunned, and offered some prayers for the well-being of the goat and for the people who had performed the sacrifice. I knew these were poor farmers, and that goat meat formed a part of their diet. Yet it was not merely an act of killing for food, but also a religious offering. As I sat there, the wandering ascetic walked over to me and looked into my eyes. He shook his head with disapproval, spat on the ground, and said in Hindi and then in English, “No good, no good.” He then returned to his hut.

On a folk and village level, many of these ancient and cruel customs such as sacrifice and untouchability are still a part of life in India. Yet the philosophers and yogis of India have long since rejected them, as Radhakrishnan indicates above. The Buddha and others of the ascetic yogis of his time have had an uplifting impact on a very conservative and slow to change Hindu society.

THE BUDDHA'S TEACHING OF DEPENDENT ORIGATION AND ITS IMPACT ON PATAÑJALI

The Buddha and later Patañjali were among those great teachers who have uplifted the minds of so many people by showing them a way out of their habitual and endlessly repeating thoughts, emotions, and reactive patterns. The Buddha was the first to clearly and systematically lay out a comprehensive teaching on suffering and its cause. His explanation of the Four Noble Truths and of Dependent Origination (Pali: *paṭicca-samuppāda*, Skt: *pratītyasamutpāda*) inspired later teachers such as Patañjali to map out a similar system. To my mind, the Buddha's explanation has never been matched in its simplicity with profundity, but that it has inspired a whole yogic psychology to emerge within the Hindu tradition has been a great influence for the betterment of the people of that great religion.

This teaching of Dependent Origination was the Buddha's explanation of how the Four Noble Truths worked in the lives of both the unawakened and the awakened. His great disciple Sariputta equated the understanding of Dependent Origination with the understanding of the dhamma with the words, "One who sees dependent origination sees the dhamma, one who sees the dhamma sees dependent origination."^{xxx} On the eve of the Buddha's awakening, he understood the cause of suffering and the way to end suffering through Dependent Origination, according to the account of his *nibbāna* given in the *Mahāvagga* and elsewhere.^{xxxi}

When we find Patañjali offering his own version of the cause of suffering and the way to the release from suffering, we must look to the Buddha's teaching of the Four Noble Truths and Dependent Origination as the primary source of this fundamental teaching in *Yoga Sūtras*.

In modern times, unfortunately, the power of the original teaching on Dependent Origination is only partly appreciated as the interpretation relied upon for understanding this doctrine is that of Buddhaghosa and his *Vissudhimagga*. Like his treatment of the meditation of the brahma-viharas, Buddhaghosa made some major changes in the original sutta version. It is not that his interpretation of brahma-vihara meditation or Dependent Origination are without value. They are powerful teachings in their own way, but I feel they pale in comparison to the original teachings by the Buddha, and the original teachings are usually looked at through the lens of the *Visuddhimagga* in the Theravadin world. I believe Patañjali had access to versions closer to the originals.

In the case of Dependent Origination, Buddhaghosa's interpretation is one of how causes and their effects manifest over three lifetimes. For those who assume rebirth of the human, this is a valuable explanation of the driving force behind that rebirth. However, this misses what I believe is the main teaching.

I will attempt to give a brief description of what I think to be the main thrust of Dependent Origination. I do so with the humility of one who is reminded of the Buddha's reprimand of his disciple Ānanda in the *Mahānidāna Sutta* (DN 15) when Ānanda claimed to understand the teachings of Dependent Origination. I would agree with the Buddha that no one understanding of the doctrine can exhaust its depth and profundity. Yet we must try to understand it, as the Buddha himself explained in the same sutta,

It is through not understanding, not penetrating this doctrine that this generation has become like a tangled ball of string, covered as with a blight, angled like coarse grass, unable to pass beyond states of woe, the ill destiny, ruin, and the round of birth-and-death.^{xxxii}

So here is my attempt to penetrate this doctrine, keeping in mind that other interpretations, such as that of Buddhaghosa may also be part of the great depth of this teaching.

We human beings produce our own suffering. The main agent of this suffering is a constant stream of self-talk. It is a sort of "voice in the head", and is incessant, compulsive, and mostly of no good use. In fact, it is usually quite negative and damaging, and produces suffering, stress, unhappiness, and can lead to despair and depression, even suicide. It also results in anti-social behavior. It can form the basis of unethical behavior.

It is natural for the human being to produce thoughts, but when we identify with them and take them seriously, they form the major part of our view of the world. This incessant self-talk then forms a sort of virtual reality that we mistakenly believe to be the way the world really is. This virtual reality is like a strongly colored pair of glasses that we put on every time we get caught up in our thinking, and we see the world through the distortion of this artificial film or filter that lies between us and the world.

A bit of meditation can reveal to us how busy and chaotic our mind is, but the common *vipassanā* meditation which has the practitioner

constantly evaluate experience through the lens of *anicca*, *dukkha* and *anatta*, tends towards microscopic analysis and does not necessarily yield the big picture, a picture of how this voice in the head is operating and ruining our life. The teaching of *paṭicca-samuppāda* does give us this picture. Through the understanding of Dependent Origination we always understand the three hallmarks of existence. But through only focusing on the three hallmarks, we may miss the big picture, that of Dependent Origination.

With some persistence, the meditator is certain to discover that the same old thoughts and emotions are coming up over and over again. There is nothing new or creative about these repetitive products of the thinking mind. They are inherited from our parents, our relatives, our school, the native language that we speak, the media that we pay attention to, and perhaps from previous lives. They are endlessly recycled, and our reactions of body, speech and mind to these thoughts and emotions also occur over and over again. One doesn't have to believe in rebirth to see how these patterns are passed on through the generations. To explain this cyclical effect, within the twelve link version of Dependent origination, the Buddha talked about *jāti*, which can be understood as the birth of reactive pattern of action. These are actions of body, speech and mind. Skipping a few links, we see how these reactive patterns of activity reinforce ignorance (*avijjā*) and results in a growth of the *saṃkhāras* or conditioned states, wherein our karma resides. This negatively influences *viññāṇa*, consciousness, so that nearly every time we have a sensory experience, our voice in the head provides a commentary, which is ongoing.

In his teaching of Dependent Origination, the Buddha is showing us how a low, *saṃsāric* state of consciousness functions, and inevitably produces *dukkhā*. Although there will be some fluctuations in such a level of consciousness, and some pleasure may be experienced, it inevitably leads us to suffering. In fact, this low level of consciousness is *dukkhā*, with its ups and downs, pleasures and pains. While experiencing life from this low level of consciousness, we are living someone else's life as very little of what goes through our heads is original. We are bound to the wheel and do not experience life directly in its amazing variety and beauty.

The key driving forces to this wheel are identified by both the Buddha and Patañjali. They are ignorance and self-craving. With these forces in the driver's seat, our minds are engaged in a constant evaluation of our sensory world in terms of loss and gain, that is, attraction and aversion. This is the ignorant mind's habitual response to sensory contact, and if

allowed to go unchallenged, it produces, through the process of *papañca*, proliferation of thoughts and complex emotions, plus a sense of a self that is experiencing it all, right at center stage of the cosmic drama. It becomes a sort of personal soap opera.

This level of samsāric consciousness is actually quite dreadful, and it is the main reason why more than fifty percent of people in the Western world are now on some kind of mood altering drug. It also explains the rampant use of alcohol, illegal drugs, cigarettes, and dozens of other distractions and addictions. Getting children off of debilitating addictions to computers is big business in Korea. Developing countries such as Sri Lanka and India are not far behind in the race to *samsāra*. Nearly all young people are now addicted to mobile (cell) phones, constantly playing with them. And it can't be blamed on influence of the corrupt western world. The Buddha instructed us to look within for the malady and its cure, not to foreign countries or to events in the newspapers.

None of these endless distractions, entertainments or substances is of any lasting use in finding happiness. The modern world offers a bewildering variety of entertainments and distractions to its eager consumers. There is no evidence that any of them are working to effect true happiness.

The Buddha, and Patañjali offered alternative ways to this low level of consciousness.

With proper experiential understanding of Dependent Origination, the whole structure of self-grasping incessant voice in the head can be undercut and will collapse. This opens a transformation of consciousness, a looking at life via an entirely new dimension. The Buddha called it *nibbāna*. Patañjali called it *kaivalya*, and his final chapter or fourth *pāda* is named *kaivalya pāda*, wherein the culmination and goal of Yoga practice is described. *Kaivalya* means separation. Separation from what? Separation from the incessant self talk, the unhelpful chatter, the soap opera, the personal drama.

The alternative to the incessant mental chatter is higher states of consciousness leading to a transformation of consciousness. The possibility of this uplifting of the mind is very real, not an impossibility. This is not something totally foreign to the average person.

Every human being has moments of this higher consciousness in their lives, very fulfilling moments when we feel vitally alive. At those times, the voice in the head is quiet and we experience something in our

sensory world directly, without the interference of our habitual patterns. Such moments may be very ordinary, yet are filled with a sense of awe and wonder. Due to lack of wisdom, they are soon replaced by the old self talk and by our usual habitual patterns.

As the Buddha shows, there is a way out of this saṃsāric syndrome. With wisdom and sufficient insight the self-grasping disintegrates and does not return. Or if it is not totally let go of, it loses much of its power and over time, perhaps not a long time, the self-talk, self-grasping structure fades away.

Wisdom and insight in Buddhism refer to understanding the Four Noble Truths, Dependent Origination, and the three hallmarks of existence on an experiential level.

With the coming of such wisdom and insight, the incessant voice in the head with which we are constantly identifying loses its position of primacy. It is like a former commander in chief who loses his position at central command and is demoted to a minor desk job somewhere. The apparent self has its minor useful function to keep oneself alive. It need not be banished completely. As long as we do not take it too seriously, it can quietly go about its job and serve a useful purpose. Thinking is a wonderful and useful tool, as long as it is kept from endless proliferation.

The former dictator needs to be demoted to a desk job somewhere in a minor department, as we realize there is no central control and never was. That, too, was part of the illusory spell that had captured our attention. The reality is that it is all an impersonal process, or *anatta* (Skt: *anātman*).

Both Buddhism and Yoga analyze the suffering of human beings in a similar way and their prescription for treating the problem is very similar. Their practices aim to get rid of the little dictator in the head and to break the hypnotic spell of the voices and incessant self talk. As the voices are mere thoughts, they only have power because we believe the stories they constantly spin. Once we no longer believe in this distorted version of reality, the dictator is exposed as nothing but the arising and ceasing of thought. Only ephemeral thought!

Like Dorothy in *The Wizard of Oz*, who peeks behind the curtains of the mighty wizard and discovers that he is all show, and is actually an ordinary little man from Kansas, we find the voice in the head is not what we took it to be. This incessant chatter that can drive us to distraction, despair, and in some cases even suicide is only an illusion.

To help us see through this sham, the Buddha prescribes the release of the mind, or *ceto-vimutti*. At the end of his first discourse, his final sentence is,

And the realization arose in me: the release of my mind is unshakeable; this is my last birth, now there is no more rebirth.

ñāṇam ca pana me dassanaṃ udapādi: akuppā me ceto-vimutti,
ayam antimā jāti, n'atthi dāni puna-bbhavo^{xxxiii}

As we have already seen, *ceto-vimutti* is produced by the practice of the brahma-viharas, hence its central importance in the teachings of the Buddha. By breaking down all barriers of self and other in the mind structure, a wonderful spaciousness and openness of mind is achieved. This is the release of the mind, the liberation of the heart.

CONCLUSION

We have traced the primary origins of yoga not to the Vedas, but to the śramanic traditions harkening all the way back to the Indus Valley Civilization. We have shown how this tradition was outside of the pale of Brahmin orthodoxy, but steadily gained influence until by the time of Patañjali it was becoming the norm rather than the exception among brahmin thinkers and practitioners, such as Patañjali, not to mention the non-brahmins. Although there were many streams of thought among the traditions, the outstanding influence upon the reforming Hinduism was the teaching of the Buddha and the subsequent Buddhist schools.

Through such immensely influential works as *Yoga Sūtras* the śramanic tradition, with teachings contrary in many ways to the original standpoint of the Vedas, became the dominant strain in modern Hinduism, and is now accepted as orthodoxy, without question. The original Vedic concepts, practices and goals have been reinterpreted to fit the new scheme of things. The radical change in viewpoint can also be traced in the Upaniṣads, with especially the middle and late Upaniṣads showing the influence of the new doctrines and practices, a theme which has been ably demonstrated by numerous scholars.

Ironically, the main source of this brahmanic reformation was Buddhism, which is considered a heterodox school within the Indian religious tradition. Also, the immense and decisive influence of Buddhism on Hinduism has been largely neglected, as loyalty to the Vedas dictates an alternative view of religious history, that of the primacy of the Vedas in all subsequent religious developments. Due to this loyalty to Vedic

tradition, certain doctrines are maintained within Hinduism that keep it apart and separate from Buddhism. This study has concentrated on the ethical basis for spiritual practice and the affinity of the Buddhist and yogic versions of Dependent Origination.

ⁱ Walshe, DN 2: 93-97, p.106-107.

ⁱⁱ Gombrich, p.29.

ⁱⁱⁱ Walshe, DN 13:15, p.189.

^{iv} Ibid, p.190, DN 13: 20-21.

^v Ibid, v. 31.

^{vi} Ibid, v. 76-79.

^{vii} Ibid, v.10.

^{viii} Gombrich, p.42.

^{ix} Bodhi, 2012, p. 586.

^x Bodhi, 2009, MN 29:7, p.290.

^{xi} Pande, p.93.

^{xii} Bodhi, 2012, p.526, AN II,147, and Rahula, p.46 for discussion of this topic.

^{xiii} Walshe, p. 589, fn. 626.

^{xiv} Walshe, p.194

^{xv} In the Nikāyas, as in English, citta and hadaya (mind and heart) are sometimes used interchangeably.

^{xvi} Gombrich, p.60.

^{xvii} Ibid, p.60-1.

^{xviii} Hirakawa, p.50.

^{xix} Bodhi, 2000, p.1607-11, SN V:II:46:54, and fn. 111, p. 1912. See also Winston King's discussion of what he calls the divine-abiding meditations in King, p. 56-64

^{xx} See Ven. Vimalaramsi's books *Moving Dhamma* and *Breath of Love* for his discussion on how brahma-vihara meditation as a feeling meditation rather than as a read-aloud exercise can rapidly take dedicated practitioners to the higher arupa jhānas.

^{xxi} Bodhi, 2009, p.696-7.

^{xxii} Bodhi, 2000, p.1608.

^{xxiii} http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tattvartha_Sutra.

^{xxiv} Iyengar, p.81. Here I have followed the Iyengar translation of this sutra (I.33) except for substituting the word equanimity for his indifference. The word "indifference" in English has a quality of not caring and a suggestion of lack of energy, whereas equanimity is alert and attentive, with a quality of engagement but without grasping.

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- ^{xxv} Ibid, p.82. I follow the Iyengar version of the Sanskrit unless otherwise noted. Variations between the various Sanskrit editions are very minor.
- ^{xxvi} Ibid, p.81.
- ^{xxvii} Rahula, p.46.
- ^{xxviii} Ibid, p.47.
- ^{xxix} Radhakrishnan, p. 522-3, brackets are mine.
- ^{xxx} Bodhi (2009), Mahāhatthipadopama Sutta, MN 28:28 at M.1.191.
- ^{xxxi} Hirakawa, p.28.
- ^{xxxii} Walshe, p.223, DN 15:1, at D.II.55.
- ^{xxxiii} Vin I, 11, PTS., alternatively, Bodhi (2000), p.1846, AN V.424.

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BOOK REVIEW

Meena Talim: Foundations of the Science of Medicine and Surgery in Buddhist India

H. D. Khobragade

“Foundations of the Science of Medicine and Surgery in Buddhist India” is a book written by Dr. Meena Talim who is a retired Professor and Head of the Department of Ancient Indian Culture and Pāli, St. Xavier’s College, Mumbai, Maharashtra, India. She is the first person to be awarded Ph.D. in Pāli from the prestigious University of Mumbai. She has guided post-doctoral projects of the scholars from Mumbai and Pune Universities. Now she is the guide for Ph.D. in Ancient Indian Culture and Pāli at Mumbai University, Mumbai, Honorary Professor at K. J. Somaiya Centre for Buddhist Studies, Mumbai, Visiting Professor at University of Mumbai for M. A. (Pāli) and M. Phil. (Pāli) degrees. She has contributed nearly 100 research papers to Indological magazines, and actively participated in national and international seminars and conferences. She has written 7 books for children out of which “King Asoka” won N. C. H. R. T. prize in 1975 in addition to 6 more books for those who are interested in Pāli, Buddhism and Ancient Indian Culture. One of them is “The Foundations of the Science of Medicine and Surgery in Buddhist India” published by Buddhist World Press, New Delhi, India, whose editorial board consists of the 7 eminent personalities – Prof. Sacchidan and Sahani, D. C. Ahir, Dr. K. L. Hazra, Prof A. K. Narain, Dr. Andrea Loseries, Prof S. Pathak and Dr. C. D. Naik.

Prof. Dr. Meena Talim’s commitment was made to Dr. I. B. Horner, former President, Pāli Text Society, Oxford in 1967. The author had written 2 articles viz. “Ancient Indian Medicine according to Buddhist Sources” and ‘Surgery and Surgical Instruments in Buddhist Era’ which were appreciated by the latter in her letter dated 6th September, 1967 in the following words:

Your article on surgery and surgical instruments is also most interesting. Perhaps you’ll collect your articles, expand them a little and make a book.

Prof. Dr. Meena Talim has suffixed the caption as “Buddhist India” in the sense that it would convey a specific period of ancient India, a period that had dominated the Buddhist ethos in the history of ancient India. This period approximately falls between the time of the Buddha (6th century BCE and the rule of King Harshavardhana, 7th century CE). It

seems that she has followed the footsteps of the great scholar of Buddhism, Dr. T. W. Rhys Davids, who has labeled his historical work of the same period as “Buddhist India”. The author does not show at any place, her intention to injure anybody and her presentation is purely of an academic nature. Neither has she intended to dethrone present glory and popularity of Buddhism.

This monograph is divided into 5 chapters as follows.

Chapter 1

The first chapter – “Medicine and its Type” narrates medicines. It explains how to use these medicines for different diseases to maintain good health. All the medicines are made of natural resources mostly plants. Botanical words of the medicinal plants are mentioned wherever necessary. I am wonderstruck to know that she, being a philosopher and a guide in the faculty of Arts, knows botanical names of the medicinal plants. One may find thirty types of medicines and their applications in this chapter. Ghee, butter, oil, honey and molasses were commonly used as medicine. In addition Prof. Dr. Meena Talim has mentioned 30 types of medicines and 4 types of phases or durations for partaking medicine observed in the Buddhist era, which are followed by modern doctors in their prescriptions. Importance is given to the proper diet to keep one’s body sound. 62 types of health drinks and their preparations have been discovered for the first time. Many a time anecdotes are presented to make it more explicit and interesting.

Chapter 2

It is entitled “Diseases and Remedies”. It narrates fifty types of diseases out of which seventeen types of diseases –headache (*sisābhitāpo*), stomachache, bile (*pitta*), arthritis, rheumatism (*angavāto*), cracks, skin disease (*tacābādha*), leprosy, jaundice, constipation (*malabaddha*), dysentery (*pakkhandika*), snake-bite, eye-disease, ear-disease, fistula (*bhagandalābādho*), diabetes (*madhumeha*) and mental disease (*cetasikarogo*) have been studied intensively. Epidemic diseases as well as uncommon diseases have also been mentioned. They are investigated and narrated along with prescriptions of medicines. Practical evidences are narrated in this chapter. Many a times for one type of disease, patients are treated with different therapies namely medicinal and surgical therapies depending upon diagnoses. Similarly for one type of disease two or three types of medicines are prescribed for different patients. Here diagnosis of the doctor is important. Rare types of diseases such as inhuman diseases and uncommon diseases are studied. Generally

there were some people who lived up to 60 years and very few people lived over 100 years. Mahākassapa, Ānanda Anuruddha, Bakula, all the 4 monks and Visākhā, the householder lived for more than a century. All of them were happy till the end of their lives because they were following the *Dhamma*. The life of a person increases or decreases owing to happiness, seasons and diet one takes.

Observations on the wonders of sexology such as hermaphrodites and eunuchs etc. have been narrated only from an information point of view. Hermaphrodites mentioned in this monographs are the human beings with both types of sexual organs but could be classified as male hermaphrodite and female hermaphrodite depending upon how they respond to sex. There are five types of eunuchs. Attempts to find out reasons for them have also been studied by the author. I think these observations are very laudable as so far no one has taken note of sexology.

Chapter 3

It is heartening that the Pāli literature could record “Surgery and Surgical Instruments”. It explores surgeries which were carried out in Buddhist India. Surgeries carried out in 11 types of diseases have been located and detailed information about them has been narrated. This chapter records the knowledge of the surgical instruments used in ancient India. Prof. Dr. Meena Talim has divided the chapter into 2 parts – Part I Surgery and Part II Surgical Instruments. Some scholars like to remark without any reason mostly as an *orbiter dictum* that the fall of science of surgery was because of *ahimsā* taught by the Buddha. It shows their ignorance of Indian History and of Buddhism and perhaps desire for making false charges. Surgery was a treatment for an ailing person in order to help him get rid of pain.

The author has discussed the causes of the decline of knowledge of surgery and categorically emphasized that Buddhism is not responsible for such decline. The Buddha never discouraged surgeons who were householders. Jīvaka who graduated (*snātaka*) from Takkaṣilā University, was a devout Buddhist and a renowned royal physician and surgeon, but he was never advised by the Buddha to discard surgery. On the other hand the Buddha allowed Jīvaka to perform a surgery on his foot. There are many instances in the life of the Buddha that indicate that he was never against surgery. The Buddha advised children who were blind by birth to go for surgery. So surgery was advanced to such an extent in the Buddhist era that blind people by birth could see the beautiful world after surgical operations. There is an example of the well

trained and experienced surgeon in Sivi Jātaka (No. 499), who preferred not to use surgical instruments for removal of eyes, indicating thereby that priority and importance was given for treatment of a disease by medicine rather than operating and damaging a tissue. The monk Nāgasena of the 1st century praises surgeons. At times the author has taken the help of Charak and Susruta to understand them. Susruta, who was the noble physician in the court of king Kaniska, is supposed to be the father of Ayurveda. The author has discussed 3 methods that a surgeon pursues in modern operations viz. pre-operative (*pubbakamma*), operative (*padhānakamma*) and post-operative (*pacchakamma*), which were practised by the surgeons like Jīvaka Komārabhacca of the ancient Buddhist era. An example of the cranial surgery on a certain merchant of Rājagaha narrated in the *Mahāvagga* is given to make the readers understand that even complicated surgeries were performed by him. Surgeries on fistula (*bhagandalābādho*), cranial surgery (*sisābādho*), hernia, foot, rheumatism, boil, abscess, knotty boil, wounds, arrow-stricken patient (*sarābādho*) and hydrocele are narrated.

It is really notable that the author has found surgical instruments from Pāli literary sources and given illustrations. According to Susruta there are one hundred and five surgical instruments. The author has discovered seventy one surgical instruments found in the Pāli literature, which have been line-drawn with intuition and from Pāli sources. The surgical instruments were made of iron (*ayo*), silver, gold, tin (*tipu*), lead, copper (*tambaloha*) a kind of copper (*vekantaka*), vessels of wood and clay. *Nakhasattha*, *vatthiyanta*, *suci*, *salākā*, *pharasu*, *kuddāla*, *pothanikā*, *lonasakkharikā*, *kusapatta*, *satthakanī*, *yantamukha-satta*, *ulūka*, *antamukha-satta*, *kuñcika*, *lohacakkalaka*, *phaladeepa*, *deepa*, *dīparukka*, *deepakapallikā*, *jalūka*, *natthudāni*, *musala* and *ukkhaliare* are some of the seventy one kinds of instruments. A glossary of surgical instruments is given at the end of this book.

Chapter 4

This chapter is on “Diseases of Women” It is mainly based on gynecological issues. Prof. Dr. Meena Talim has made her best efforts to find information on the diseases of women in the Pāli literature. She has collected tid-bits about this specialized branch of medical science and presented them in this chapter. The author is surprised to find that the topic was systematically and enthusiastically studied in the Buddhist Era.

Most of the diseases of women are related to gynaecology. So she started the chapter with “*Utusavanā*”– menstruation. At this stage of life a woman faces some difficulties which are explained here.

The methods of contraceptive used by the people are also mentioned here. The contraceptives were made of 4 types namely wax / resin, wood, flour and clay or mud. A list of 11 types of deformities of women is given, who can't conceive.

The chapter narrates information about barrenness of women. It is heartening to observe that a very positive aspect has been established and a ray of hope is kindled in the minds of such women. It is mentioned that “no woman in this world is barren”, every woman has the capacity to bear a child. However, there are certain causes that hinder conception and they are to be rectified. These causes are not only narrated in detail but also information is given as to how to activate conception. This is a boon to barren women. It is also mentioned that viviparous creation was also known to them. This is a very advanced type of technology. We can imagine how advanced Buddhist India was! The portion indicating 7 points about conception without sexual intercourse (ajjhācāra) can't be totally agreed on by the students of science. These points might have been added to *Samantapasādikā* by pseudo monks while it was being compiled because the Buddha has clearly stated that birth of a child is a scientific process. Besides we have information about pregnancy, miscarriage and birth of a child. There are 4 types of delivery. One of the types is when the child comes out of the vagina keeping the head upward, feet downward and both the hands spreading out, with open eyes. This type is very painful and this might be the reason why Mahāmāyā died on the seventh day after the birth of Siddhartha Gotama in a standing position. She also states that Pāli sources wrongly conceived the notion that Mahāmāyā died because her uterus was a holy place which no other creature can occupy. The author authoritatively states the way he was born and puts forth her opinion against such superstition. Thus causes of death of queen Mahāmāyā, the mother of Siddhartha, are also mentioned in this chapter. I appreciate her confidence in writing the scientific truth to which I fully agree. This could be the reason why he could touch the earth with his feet immediately after his birth. There were pediatricians (*dāraṅgikicchakā*) to look after children. An interesting survey of an infant till it grows up to ten years, as found in *Mugapakkha Jātaka*, is reproduced here. Perhaps it is the first time such a type of research work has been done about women from the pious pages of Pāli literature.

Chapter 5

This chapter deals with “Nursing, Hospitals and Homes of Destitutes”. Nursing was considered an important aspect of medicine in Buddhist India. We get information about it in Pāli literature. The message given

to us is that a patient needs kind help on humanitarian grounds and it should be provided to him, whether the patient is your kith and kin or not. Most of these instructions about nursing are provided by the Buddha himself. One can understand the way nursing was performed in hospitals and there was a class of attendants mentioned in the *nikāya[s]*. Nursing as an important faculty of medical science is a great asset to physicians and surgeons. The Buddha always encouraged the order to nurse their fellow brethren. Information gathered from the Vinaya Piṭaka indicates that 5 types of help could be provided to sick monks. The Buddha had recommended that they should be provided with proper food, medicine and nursing to enable them to get rid of the diseases at the earliest. *Mahāvagga* has mentioned 5 rules for sick monks while *Cullavagga* indicates 12 allowances for them. Allowances to nuns also are mentioned in the Pāli literature. *Patimokkha* rules have relaxed some rules for ailing nuns. They are mentioned in *Pārājika*, *Sanghādisesa*, *Nisaggiya*, *Pācittiya*, *Patidesaniya*, and *Sekhiya* rules. In modern times we have separate wards in hospitals for different types of patients. Monks and nuns suffering from different diseases were given specific areas depending upon their needs in Nursing Homes or hospitals (*gilānasālā*). There were *Osadhālaya* or *Bhesajjāgara* or *Bhesajjālaya* – a house where medicines were stored which were very useful to ailing persons. There were also dispensaries (*vicikicchā* or *cikicchā*) where diagnosis was made and treatment along with medicines were given to sick persons. Health-care of the people was not neglected. There seem to be a group of elderly monks who supervised the condition of ailing monks in a capacity of “*gilānapucchakā*”. Aṅguttaranikāya mentions 2 types of attendants, viz., good and bad types depending upon how they serve patients. There were also senior attendants and junior attendants. The senior attendants were considered as ideals to serve patients. Interestingly we are also apprised of “Houses of the Destitute” (*anāthasālā*). In these houses of destitute men but rarely women, criminals, dacoits or king’s defaulters were kept with their hands and feet cut off; with no one to look after them. They were laid down in such a pitiful condition that they were not provided with food, medicine or nursing. So naturally they were awaiting death. Hence, out of compassion, monks and some lay devotees used to visit them and serve them. The analytical approach of the author is very convincing.

Prof. Dr. Meena Talim has labouriously worked on the topic i.e. “Foundations of the Science of Medicine and Surgery in Buddhist India” which enumerates for the first time nearly more than thousand years (6th BCE to 7th CE) of history of the Ancient Indian Science of Medicine and Surgery. A thorough, exhaustive and historical record of medicament has been presented on the basis of original sources. Her scrupulous and

methodical survey throws a flood of light on various unexplored areas such as; thirty types of medicines, sixty two types of health-drinks, fifty types of diseases, out of which seventeen types are studied intensively, rare diseases, surgery for eleven types of diseases, seventy one surgical instruments; diseases of women, causes of barrenness, conception, contraceptives, pregnancy, birth of a child, nursing, hospitals and attendants, houses of destitute and many such allied topics.

The book written by Prof. Dr. Meena Talim "The Foundations of the Science of Medicine and Surgery in Buddhist India" has potential credibility to create interest in the minds of people of all sections of society. It is a new, challenging, virgin interdisciplinary monograph, honestly and sincerely undertaken by her. The author's writing stands the test of researchers and it surpasses all controversial writings relating to the responsibility of Buddhism regarding medicine and surgery. Her work is praiseworthy. It indicates the tremendous efforts taken by her in gathering the scattered information of medicine and surgery in the Pāli literature. I am sure it will serve to be a precious possession for those who are interested in the History of Medicine, Buddhism, Pāli and Ancient Indian Culture.

Prof. Dr. Meena Talim's research is to find out the hidden truth of the origin, growth and glory of various branches of medical science and their relation to the maintenance of health common to all humanity.