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The Sense-Reference Distinction in Indian Philosophy of Language |
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| Author |
Siderits, Mark
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| Source |
Synthese: An International Journal for Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science
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| Volume | v.69 |
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| Date | 1986 |
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| Pages | 81 - 106 |
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| Content type | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
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| Language | 英文=English |
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| Keyword | Indian Epistemology;Language;Siderits, Mark; |
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| Abstract | It is argued that certain classical Indian philosophers were forced to recognize something sense-like as a component of meaning. The Buddhist nominalists were familiar with the informativeness objection，and responded by positing senses (of an austere kind) for singular terms. The Prabhakara Mimamsakas, in constructing a theory of sentence comprehension that is sensitive to the context principle，posited two distinct components to the meanings of predicate expressions. The result is an apparent vindication of Frege's basic claim that both singular terms and predicate expressions have both sense and reference. |
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| ISSN | 00397857 |
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| Hits | 380 |
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| Created date | 2001.01.09
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