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Causation, ‘Humean' Causation and Emptiness |
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Author |
Siderits, Mark
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Source |
Journal of Indian Philosophy
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Volume | v.42 n.4 |
Date | 2014.09 |
Pages | 433 - 449 |
Publisher | Springer |
Publisher Url |
http://www.springer.com/gp/
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Location | Berlin, Germany [柏林, 德國] |
Content type | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
Language | 英文=English |
Note | M. Siderits (&) Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea e-mail: msideri@ilstu.edu |
Keyword | Causation; Emptiness; Madhyamaka; Humean; Intrinsic nature |
Abstract | One strategy Mādhyamikas use to support their claim that nothing has intrinsic nature (svabhāva) is to argue that things with intrinsic nature could not enter into causal relations. But it is not clear that there is a good Madhyamaka argument against ultimate causation that understands causation in ‘Humean’ terms and understands dharmas as tropes. After exploring the rationale behind the intrinsic-nature criterion of dharma-hood, I survey the arguments Mādhyamikas actually give for their claim that anything dependently originated must be devoid of intrinsic nature, and suggest that none actually succeeds in ruling out this hypothesis about how ultimate causation might work. |
Table of contents | Sources of the svabhāva Criterion Vaibhāṣika Eternalism and Vasubandhu’s Presentist Response Madhyamaka Arguments Against Causation at the Ultimate Level Abbreviations and References |
ISSN | 00221791 (P); 15730395 (E) |
Hits | 289 |
Created date | 2014.12.31 |
Modified date | 2019.07.29 |
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