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Self-Cognition? Saṃghabhadra, Armstrong, and Introspective Consciousness |
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Author |
Hu, Chih-chiang
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Source |
Philosophy East and West
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Volume | v.68 n.3 |
Date | 2018.07 |
Pages | 702 - 720 |
Publisher | University of Hawaii Press |
Publisher Url |
https://uhpress.hawaii.edu/
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Location | Honolulu, HI, US [檀香山, 夏威夷州, 美國] |
Content type | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
Language | 英文=English |
Note | Author Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, National Chengchi University, Taiwan |
Abstract | On the shoulders of Saṃghabhadra (5th century C.E.) and D. M. Armstrong (1926–2014), this article presents a model of consciousness which is reflective and perceptual. It addresses tentative replies to criticisms of the higher-order perception (HOP) theory of consciousness, implications of this model for empirical cases, and issues pertinent to the Buddhist idea of non-self. |
Table of contents | I. Saṃghabhadra's Idea in Ny: A Very Brief Overview 703 I.1. Why reflexive self-cognition is not possible 703 I.2. A reflective model of consciousness 705 II. Armstrong's Introspective Consciousness: Buddhism Plug-in Installed 707 III. Further Remarks from the Buddhist Perspective 709 III.1. Higher-order "perception" 709 III.2. Causal, asymmetrical, and rational 711 IV. Conclusion 712 |
ISSN | 00318221 (P); 15291898 (E) |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1353/pew.2018.0069 |
Hits | 573 |
Created date | 2018.09.27 |
Modified date | 2019.05.17 |
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