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意識如何緣取不存在的對象？以經量部上座的理論與說一切有眾賢的批評為中心=How does the Mental Consciousness Cognize Non-existent Objects? ─ Focusing on the Theory of the Sautrāntika Master Srilata and the Criticism Thereof from the Sarastivada Master Samghabhadra |
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| Author |
耿晴 (著)=Keng, Ching (au.)
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| Source |
正觀雜誌=Satyabhisamaya: A Buddhist Studies Quarterly
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| Volume | n.89 |
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| Date | 2019.06.25 |
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| Pages | 31 - 69 |
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| Publisher | 正觀雜誌社 |
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| Publisher Url |
http://www.tt034.org.tw/
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| Location | 南投縣, 臺灣 [Nantou hsien, Taiwan] |
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| Content type | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
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| Language | 中文=Chinese |
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| Note | 作者單位:政治大學哲學系副教授。 |
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| Keyword | 意識=mental consciusness; 不存在的對象=non-existent objects; 上座=Srilata; 眾賢=Samghabhadra; 說一切有部=Sarastivada; 經量部=Sautrāntika |
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| Abstract | 本文旨在檢討佛教阿毘達磨哲學之經量部論師上座關於「意識如何緣取不存在的對象」的理論，以及來自於說一切有部論師眾賢的批評。不同於有部三世實有的形上學立場，在經量部剎那滅的形上學前提下，上座必須面對不存在的對象如何能夠引生意識的困難。本文集中探討意識耴如何緣取不存在的對象的三種案例:(1)緊接眼識後生起的意識如何緣取已經不存在的外在對象?(2)意識如何回憶?
亦即意識如何緣取過去曾經歷的對象?(3)意識如何緣取果去曾經歷或未來的對象。在這三種案例下，分別檢討上座解決困難的策略，以及如何招致來重賢的批評。本文贊成重賢對於上座理論的批評，但進一步主張，對於經量部來說不可解的困難卻也成了佛教知識論進一步發展的動力。在上座之後，以陳那為代表回應來自於眾賢的批評。
The article investigates the theory held by the Sautrāntika Master Srilata about how the mental consciousness cognizes non-existent objects and the criticism thereof from the Sarastivada Master Samghabhadra. Different from the ontological scheme of〝all dharmas are real in the past,present and future,〞 Srilata starts from the ontological scheme of momentariness and has to face the difficulty of how non-existent objects can cause the mental consciousness to arise. The article explores the issue in question by driving it into three cases: (1)How does the mental consciousness that succeeds a sensory consciousness cognize an external object that does not exist when the mental consciousness arises? (2)How does the mental consciousness memorize, i.e.,cognize a long-past object that one has experienced? (3)How does the mental consciousness cognize a past object that one has not experienced or future object? Under these three cases, this article explores the various strategies proposed by Srilata for resolving the difficulties, and the criticism thereof from Samghabhadra. This article sides with Samghabhadra's criticism, but suggests that the irresolvable difficulties actually motivate further development of Buddhist epistemology. After Srilata Dignanga's idea that cognition there is a mental image of the object, can successfully defends itself against Samghabhadra's criticism. |
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| Table of contents | 摘要 31
前言 33
1.阿毘達磨認識理論的背景與主要爭論 34
2.案例(1):緊接眼識後生起得意識耴和緣取已經度存在的外在對象? 37
2.A經量部關於感官、感官識、意識在不同剎那間相續繼起的知覺模型 37
2.B經量部關於意識能夠緣取過去對象的主張 41
2.C眾賢對於經量部上座前述主張的批判 43
3.案例(2):意識如何回憶?亦即意識如何緣取久遠過去曾經歷的對象? 46
3.A眾賢對於經量部的批評 49
3.B隨界無法解決案例(1)的困難 52
4.案例(3):意識如何緣取過去未曾經經歷或未來的對象? 53
5.經量不可能的出路?識的二分說 57
5.A從上座的理論到陳那的認識二分說 60
結語 63
參考書目 66 |
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| ISSN | 16099575 (P) |
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| Hits | 1597 |
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| Created date | 2019.09.17 |
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| Modified date | 2019.09.20 |
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