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人格同一與道德責任：從初期佛教聖典對神經科學的挑戰的回應=Personal Identity and Moral Responsibility: A Response from Early Buddhist Pāli Texts to Neuro-Science |
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| Author |
羅候羅 (著)=Rahul Ratna (au.)
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| Date | 2017 |
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| Pages | 161 |
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| Publisher | 國立中央大學 |
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| Publisher Url |
https://www.ncu.edu.tw/
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| Location | 桃園市, 臺灣 [Taoyuean shih, Taiwan] |
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| Content type | 博碩士論文=Thesis and Dissertation |
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| Language | 英文=English |
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| Degree | doctor |
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| Institution | 國立中央大學 |
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| Department | 哲學研究所在職專班 |
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| Advisor | 孫雲平 |
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| Publication year | 105 |
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| Keyword | 人格同一性=Personal identity; 神經科學=Neuroscience; 化約論=Reductionism; 阿含經=Pāli Texts; 三毒貪嗔痴=Three Poisons |
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| Abstract | 人格同一性的概念首先出現在古希臘哲學中，發展成許多不同的形式，並持續到現代哲學。人格同一性的簡單地定義為;一個人在一段時間內是一樣的。人格同一性有兩種標準;身體和心理的同一性。兩者都聲稱存在著一種在人類的整個人類生命中繼續存在的東西，這符合一個人的要求。另一方面，從古希臘哲學到現在，我們發現個人身份為道德責任和判斷提供了基礎。因此，我們可以說，傳統哲學中的道德責任觀是基於個人認同的概念。然而，當代學術領域神經科學的出現否認了個人認同的全部概念，並聲稱個人認同感，人類情感，野心不僅僅是神經細胞及其相關分子，神經科學，突觸和神經遞質。這提出了道德責任的根本問題，如果沒有格同一性，那麼為什麼過去對自己的行為負責？
本文重點介紹了佛教文化和佛教文本的基礎上，佛教文化認同的道德觀念，但對道德行為和責任的肯定。 佛教的巴利（Pāli）經典文本涉及三個層面的論據，它們斷言為什麼一個人應該是道德的。手腕層認為，因為道德行為減少了存在的痛苦，應該是道德的，第二個論點則集中在道德行動上，消除了三種毒藥，貪婪，仇恨和妄想，最後動作本身也成為其他動機。
The concept of Personal Identity first emerged in ancient Greek philosophy, developed in many different forms and continued till modern philosophy. It can simply define as be; an individual being one and the same over a period of time. There are two criteria of personal identity; physical and psychological. Both claim existence of something which continues throughout entire life time of human being which fulfills the requirement of a person to be the one and the same. On the other hand, from ancient Greek philosophy till now, we find that personal identity provides foundation for moral responsibility and judgment. Therefore, we can say that the concept of moral responsibility in traditional philosophy rests on the concept of personal identity. However, the emergence of Neuroscience in the contemporary academic field denies the entire concept of personal identity and claims that the sense of personal identity, human emotions, ambitions are not more than the behavior of vast assembly of nervous cells and their associated molecules, neurons, synapses and neurotransmitters. This raises fundamental question on moral responsibility that if there is no personal identity then why individuals responsible for their actions done in the past?
This paper focuses on the Buddhist concept of morality based on Chinese Buddhist Agama texts and claims, though Buddhist texts denies personal identity but they are affirmative towards moral actions and responsibilities. The Pāli texts account three layers of arguments which asserts why one should be moral. Frist layer argues that one should be moral because moral action reduces existential suffering, second argument focuses on moral action eliminates three poisons, greed, hatred and delusion, and finally, the action itself becomes motivation for the others. |
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| Table of contents | English Abstract: i
Chinese Abstract: iii
Acknowledgement: iv
Abbreviations: vi
Table of Contents: viii
Chapter One 1
Introduction 1
1. Background and Problems 1
2. Research Design and Methodology: 14
3. Book Review: 16
4. Research Suitability: 21
5. Expected Conclusions: 22
Chapter Two: 24
Historical Survey of Personal Identity and Its Relation with Moral
Responsibility 24
6. Introduction 24
7. Definition of Personal Identity 25
8. An Initial Survey: Various Criteria of Personal Identity 29
9. Greek Philosophy: Survey of the Relation Between Personal Identity and
Moral Responsibility 35
10. Contemporary Philosophy: Survey of Relation Between Personal Identity
and Moral Responsibility 41
Chapter Three 48
Neuroscience and Personal Identity 48
11. Introduction: 48
12. Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience 49
13. Neuroscience Critique of Personal Identity: Francis Crick 63
14. Neuroscience Challenge to the Traditional Foundation of Morality:
Patricia S. Churchland 68
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15. Buddhist Attitude Towards Morality: Morality Without Self 71
Chapter Four 76
Buddhist Philosophy of Not-Self and Moral Responsibility 76
1. Introduction: 76
3. Etymology of the Word Self (Ātman) 77
4. Buddhist Foundation of Morality without Self 95
5. Can The Concept of Not-self Reconcile with Moral Responsibility? 104
6. Three Layers of Moral Responsibility in Pāli 106
Chapter Five 120
Conclusions 120
Bibliography: 124 |
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| Hits | 249 |
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| Created date | 2021.11.02 |
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| Modified date | 2023.02.17 |
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