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漢傳因明「不可得」因析論=Interpretation of “Anupalabdhi” Hetu in Chinese Buddhist logic |
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梁陳安 (著)=Leo, Sing-ann (au.)
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| Source |
福嚴佛學研究=Fuyan Buddhist Studies
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| Volume | n.14 |
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| Date | 2019.09 |
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| Pages | 61 - 84 |
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| Publisher | 福嚴佛學院 |
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| Publisher Url |
https://www.fuyan.org.tw/
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| Location | 新竹市, 臺灣 [Hsinchu shih, Taiwan] |
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| Content type | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
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| Language | 中文=Chinese |
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| Note | 作者單位: 國立政治大學哲學研究所 博士班一年級 |
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| Keyword | 「不可得」因（anupalabdhi）=anupalabdhi; 因明學=hetuvidyā; 否定性命題=negative proposition; 法稱=Dharmakīrti; 漢傳因明=Chinese Buddhist logic |
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| Abstract | 此文試圖反省桂紹隆對於陳那系統中，容不下「否定性命題」（negative argument）的說法，並且以漢傳因明對於「不可得因」的使用為依據，試圖梳理漢傳因明如何討論「否定性命題」。筆者在此文章中關注「不可得」（anupalabdhi）因，如何被漢傳詮釋者刻畫，並且如何被應用在否定性的命題上。在此文章，筆者關注三個議題：第一，「不可得」因在漢傳的解釋，與法稱的觀點有什麼不同？第二，此因究竟是現量還是比量？第三，此因是否有被明確的定義？其必須被放在什麼樣的狀態下，才算是一種正因？按照以上三個議題，筆者欲對善珠、慧沼、神泰三家對於「不可得」因的使用做討論。在討論順序上，筆者沒有按照作者在歷史上的登場順序，因為筆者認為善珠對「不可得」因的觀點不同於他的老師──慧沼，因此筆者首先提出。而慧沼與神泰的觀點比較相似，因此擺在接下來的章節。「不可得」因在漢傳確實有不同的發展。善珠結合了遮詮、表詮的解釋，把「不可得」因限定在「但遮非表」，作為一種簡單否定來使用。「不可得」因所能論證的，或者是「無」、或者是「無體」，都不是認識的對象，只是名言上假立的概念而並非具有任何存有學的意涵。乍聽之下，容易使人將「不可得」因判斷為一種比量，因為它是一種「假安立」，可是對於善珠而言卻不見得只是一種「概念」而已，可能存在著更豐富的意涵。他將「現量」也納入「不可得」因當中，無獨有偶，窺基也曾把「現量比量不可得」當做正因。慧沼和神泰對待「不可得」因的立場，筆者認為比較一致，他們二人關注的是這個否定性理由要如何應用在「空無主詞」上，即是指無體的「有法」如何做為「不可得」因所依託的對象，二人都把此因視作為語詞上的施設（假安立）。慧沼說「有體宗」的有法是存在的（有體），而且它的能別一定是「亦遮亦表」的表詮；如果有體宗配上無體因的話，就有過失，因為無體因「唯遮無表」。神泰稍有別慧沼，他除了說明此因在辯論時候所能達到的效果外，也進一步擴充解釋陳那「不可得」因的論證效力，同時應該是漢傳因明學者中，第一個提供此因定義的學者。他將因區分為三種情況，而此因屬於第二種類型：它只適用在論證「無體的有法」（唯依無法）上。綜合以上觀點，桂紹隆根據法稱之思想，認為於陳那之因明系統中容不下「否定性命題」。然而筆者認為漢傳對於「不可得」因概念的討論，沒有受到法稱太多的影響，反而是開展出屬於漢傳因明系統下不同的解釋。
This paper reconsiders the opinion claimed by Shōryū Katsura(桂紹隆) that the Dignāga system of logic does not contain negative proposition. The Chinese hetuvidyā materials strongly contradicts Katsura’s interpretation, which I will try to show by analysing the interpretation and further application of “anupalabdhi (nonperception)”-hetu by Chinese and Japanese monks. There are three focal points discussed in this paper. First is the difference in the interpretation of anupalabdhi-hetu between Chinese monks and Dharmakrīti. Second is the question of whether this type of hetu should be considered as “perception” or as “inference” [i.e. direct non-cognitive act of knowledge or indirect cognitive act of knowledge]. Third is the definition of this hetu and under what situations can it be applied as an acceptable hetu in logical syllogism. To answer the above focal points, I will analyze three Chinese Buddhist works that discuss the nature and application of anupalabdhi-hetu. The materials analyzed in this paper are not arranged in chronological order, rather, they are arranged based on the similarity of views of their authors concerning the concept of anupalabdhi. Therefore, since Zenju’s(善珠) opinion is different from histeacher, Huizhao(慧沼), I will discuss his works first. The views expressed by Huizhao and Shentai(神泰) are more similar and therefore I have grouped them together. The concept of anupalabdhi-hetu has a long history of development in the Chinese Buddhist scholastic system, bringing forth different opinions on its proper definition and scope of application. Zenju combined the logical concept of “negation”(遮) and “affirmation”(表) and limited the scope of anupalabdhi to exclude its use in the positive proposition. Therefore, according to Zenju, anupalabdhi-hetu could be used as a proper logical reason if, and only if, being limited to a simple negation. According to him, anupalabdhi-hetu can only support the concept of “emptiness” or “non-existence”, which are conceptual objects without any ontological basis. However, Zenju’s understanding of anupalabdhihetu should not be considered as a kind of simple “nominal construction”. It can be argued that in his understanding of anupalabdhi, Zenju included not only “inference”, but also the “direct perception” aspect into it. And this idea is also shared in Kuiji’s(窺基) understanding of anupalabdhi-hetu – [that which cannot be obtained by perception or inference] – as an acceptable formal type of hetu. Huizhao and Shentai’s concept of anupalabdhi-hetu are consistent with each other. They both focus on how to apply anupalabdhi-hetu to the situation of “empty subject terms”, that is, they analyze how dharmin, which is nonexistent, can be what anupalabdhi-hetu refers to. In short, both of them consider this hetu as a kind of “nominal construction”. Huizhao claims that dharmin should be regarded as existent if it is established in the “existent proposition”(有體宗) and its specifier should be understood as an |
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| Table of contents | 一、前言 63
二、陳那對於「最勝」之反駁 63
三、善珠對「不可得」因的使用 67
四、慧沼對於「不可得」因的觀點 72
五、神泰對《門論》之「不可得」因的詮釋 75
六、結論 78
參考資料 80 |
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| ISSN | 20700512 (P) |
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| Hits | 175 |
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| Created date | 2022.04.14 |
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| Modified date | 2022.04.14 |
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