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On recognition and self: a discussion based on Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Buddhism |
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Author |
Fan, Wenli (著)
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Source |
Asian Philosophy: An International Journal of the Philosophical Traditions of the East
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Volume | v.27 n.4 |
Date | 2017 |
Pages | 292 - 308 |
Publisher | Routledge |
Publisher Url |
https://www.routledge.com/
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Location | Abingdon, UK [阿賓登, 英國] |
Content type | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
Language | 英文=English |
Keyword | self=ātman; recognition=pratyabhijñ; Śāntarakṣita; Kumārila (fl. approximately 700); Uddyotakara (c. 6th century CE) |
Abstract | The phenomenon of recognition is a point of contention in the debate between the orthodox Hindus and Buddhists on whether the self (ātman) exists. The Hindus, including Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas, argue that recognition evidences the existence of the self, while Buddhist philosopher Śāntarakṣita maintains that there is no self and recognition should be explained in another way. This article examined two disputes, focusing on the two subsidiary aspects of a recognition: memory and self-recognition. For Hindus, it is the existence of the self that makes memory and self-recognition possible. For Buddhists, it is due to the phenomena of memories and self-recognitions that people postulate the existence of the self. I argue that Buddhist explanation of memory is more acceptable, while their debates on self-recognition should be considered as a tie.
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ISSN | 09552367 (P); 14692961 (E) |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2017.1389388 |
Hits | 131 |
Created date | 2022.12.26 |
Modified date | 2022.12.26 |
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