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佛教邏輯學的論辯解釋與認知解釋——陳那、法稱與因明=The Dialectic and Epistemic Interpretation of Buddhist Logic: Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and the Hetuvidyā-Tradition |
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| Author |
湯銘鈞 (著)=Tang, Ming-jun (au.)
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| Source |
邏輯學研究=Studies in Logic
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| Volume | v.14 n.1 |
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| Date | 2021 |
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| Pages | 82 - 100 |
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| Publisher | 中山大學 |
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| Location | 廣州, 中國 [Guangzhou, China] |
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| Content type | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
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| Language | 中文=Chinese |
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| Note | 作者單位：復旦大學哲學學院宗教學系 |
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| Keyword | 認知運算元; 陳那; 法稱; 因明; 佛教邏輯 |
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| Abstract | 佛教邏輯有別於西方形式邏輯的一項重要特徵，在於對論證前提為真的強調，並在此基礎上提出了著名的“因三相”理論。論證前提的真，在陳那著作中又被理解為辯論主體將該前提確定為真。這種“確定”體現為文獻中對“極成”（prasiddha）、“成”（siddha）、“決定”（niścita）、“見”（dṛṣṭa）、“已知”（vidita）的強調。這些表達辯論者認知狀態的詞彙，皆可概括為佛教邏輯中的“認知運算元”（epistemic operator）。本文通過研究東亞因明與法稱兩個傳統對陳那《正理門論》中“決定同許”的理論設定的不同解釋，說明因明傳統在陳那奠定的方向上，進一步採取了“論辯解釋”（dialectic interpretation），將“確定為真”解釋為在辯論的情境中為辯論的雙方承認為真（共許、同許）。法稱《釋量論自注》對陳那“決定同許”的解釋，則表明由他開啟的傳統在陳那的基礎上，進一步採取了“認知解釋”（epistemic interpretation），將“確定為真”解釋為在認識論的意義上得到確定（niścita/niścaya，決定），即為有效認知的手段（量）所證成。這是因明傳統與法稱傳統的一項根本差異。因明傳統對辯論術的關注，極有可能反映了法稱以前印度學界對陳那思想的詮釋路徑。
A basic feature of Buddhist logic which distinguishes it from Western formal logic is that the Buddhist conception of what makes an argument good is grounded on the in-tuition that a good argument should start from true premises. In Buddhist logic, the truth of a premise is usually understood as being ascertained to be true by both the proponent and the opponent in a debate. Hence, the common ascertainment by both sides in de-bate, which is a special kind of epistemic condition, plays an essential role in defining the truth of a premise and in elucidating the standard of a good argument. Vocabularies used by Buddhist logicians to refer to this kind of epistemic condition, like siddha “established,” prasiddha “well established,” niścita “ascertained,” dṛṣṭa “observed” and vidita “known,” are considered by the present author as the epistemic operator in Bud-dhist logic. This paper is a preliminary study of the interpretation of this kind of epistemic operator by Buddhist logicians. In Nyāyamukha 2.2, Dignāga (c. 480–540 CE) claimed that not only the logical reason’s (hetu) being a property of the subject (pakṣa) but also the relation of the logical reason to the similar instances (sapakṣa) and to the dissimilar instances (vipakṣa) should be “ascertained by [both] the proponent and the opponent”(vādiprativādiniścita). By comparing the interpretation of this claim in the East Asian tradition of Buddhist logic, i.e., the hetuvidyā-tradition, with the interpreation of it by Dharmakīrti (c. 600–660 CE), this paper finds that the hetuvidyā-tradition held a dialectic interpretation of the epistemic operator in Buddhist logic. The “dialectic” inter-pretation means that an expression’s being “ascertained”/“[well] established”/“known” is simply to be equally accepted by both sides in debate on account of whatever evidence. In contrast, Dharmakīrti, in his Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti 13, 5–19, clearly refused this dialectic interpretation and proposed instead an epistemic interpretation of the epistemic operator. In this connection, he quoted and reinterpreted Dignāga’s above claim so as to support his epistemic interpretation. The “epistemic” interpretation means that an ex-pression’s being “ascertained”/“[well] established”/“known” is to be ascertained by both sides in debate only on account of certain epistemic evidences, namely, on account of certain means of valid cognition (pramāṇa). |
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| Table of contents | 1 佛教邏輯學中的認知運算元問題 83
1.1 論域全集的三分與認知運算元 84
1.2 因三相與認知運算元 85
1.3 論辯解釋與認知解釋 87
2 共許即成：因明傳統中的論辯解釋 88
3 共許非成：法稱學說中的認知解釋 91
3.1 Kevalavyatirekin：單純基於相離關係的邏輯理由91
3.2 《釋量論自注》對“決定同許”規定的解釋 93
4 因明視角下的三支作法 96
5 結論 98
參考文獻 98 |
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| ISSN | 16743202 (P) |
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| Hits | 186 |
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| Created date | 2023.08.16 |
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| Modified date | 2023.08.16 |
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