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Ratnākaraśānti on Prakāśa |
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片岡啓 (著)=Kataoka, Kei (au.)
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| Source |
インド学チベット学研究=Journal of Indian and Tibetan Studies=インドガク チベットガク ケンキュウ
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| Volume | n.22 |
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| Date | 2018.12 |
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| Pages | 224 - 239 |
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| Publisher | インド哲学研究会 |
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| Publisher Url |
http://www.jits-ryukoku.net/
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| Location | 京都, 日本 [Kyoto, Japan] |
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| Content type | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
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| Language | 英文=English |
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| Note | 神子上恵生教授追悼記念号＝In Memory of the Late Professor Esho Mikogami
作者單位：九州大学准教授 |
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| Keyword | Ratnākaraśānti; prakāśa; saṃvitti; Mīmāṃsā |
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| Abstract | In his Prajñāpāramitopadeśa (PPU) Ratnākaraśānti claims that all dharmas are mere cognition in nature (vijñānamātrasvabhāvāḥ). This view is based on his theory of illumination (prakāśa, shining forth). He regards the illumination/appearance of all dharmas as possible only when illumination is accepted as their nature(prakāśamānānāṃ dharmāṇām ... ātmabhūtaḥ prakāśaḥ ). Only something luminous in nature can shine forth. An object, if it did not have the nature of being luminous, could not shine forth (sa ced atadrūpo na tarhi prakāśate). Thus, for him, luminous dharmas, which have the very nature of cognition, are precisely cognition in nature. Whereas Ratnākaraśānti regards illumination as cognition in nature, Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas regard it as an additional property produced in a cognized object (viṣayasya grāhyasya dharmaḥ) as a result of a cognizing action (jñānakārya). Naiy ̄ayikas, etc., regard it as nothing more than the occurrence of cognition (jñānasyotpattiḥ ). They need no separate category called illumination. When a cognition of blue arises, blue appears to the mind. Another theorist, whom Ratnākaraśānti designates merely as aparaḥ (another), claims that a non-luminous object is illuminated by a luminous cognition (arthaḥ punar atadrūpo jñānavaśāt prakāśate). In other words, the illumination of objects is possible not because illumination is the nature of objects but because they are connected with the illumination of cognition, just as a pot is illuminated by the light of a lamp. Ratnākaraśānti refutes these three heretic views one by one. The present paper aims at clarifying Ratnākaraśānti’s arguments against these views. |
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| Table of contents | I. Structure of the text 225
Synopsis of the entire PPU 226
II. Other theories of prakāśa 227
1. The view of aparaḥ (D) 227
1.1. Because of being bound to the same causal aggregate (ekasāmagrīpratibandhāt ) 228
1.2. Because it is an object (viṣayatvāt) 228
1.3. Because of the connection with the illumination of cognition (jñānaprakāśasaṃsargāt) 229
2. The view of Naiyāyikādayah. (C) 230
3. The view of Mīmāṃsakāḥ 231
3.1. 232
3.2. 233
3.3. 233
III. Ratnākaraśānti’s strategy 234
1. Narrower context 234
2. Wider context 235
2.1. Refutation of nirākāravāda 235
2.2. Refutation of the Sautrāntikas (E) 235
2.3. Refutation of the reality of blue, etc. 236
2.3.1. Refutation of the Vaibhāṣikas (F) 236
2.3.2. Justification of his own view of alīkaprakāśa 236
2.3.3. Refutation of satyākāravāda (G) 237
3. Context recapitulated 237
IV. Some remarks 238
Bibliography and abbreviations 238
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| ISSN | 13427377 (P) |
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| Hits | 36 |
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| Created date | 2021.06.24 |
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| Modified date | 2021.06.24 |
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