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유식(唯識)의 이유에 대한 요가 철학의 비판=Yoga Philosophy’s Criticism on the Reason of Vijñaptimātra |
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정승석 (著)=Jung, Seung-suk (au.)
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| Source |
불교연구=佛教研究=Bulgyo-Yongu
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| Volume | v.42 n.0 |
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| Date | 2015.02.28 |
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| Pages | 387 - 422 |
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| Publisher | 韓國佛教研究院 |
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| Publisher Url |
http://kibs.or.kr/xe/
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| Location | Korea [韓國] |
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| Content type | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
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| Language | 韓文=Korean |
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| Note | 저자정보: 동국대학교 불교대학 교수 |
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| Keyword | 동시지각; 3질=three guṇas; 소지성=knowability; 요가주; 요가철학=Yoga philosophy; 유가행파; 유식설; 자기인식=self-cognition; sahopalambha-niyama; vedyatva; vijñaptimātra; Yogācāra; Yogasūtra-bhāṣya |
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| Abstract | 유식설의 관점에서는 인식 대상은 식(識)에 귀속된다. 그러나 요가 철학의 관점에서는 식(識) 또는 인식 작용은 ‘마음 작용’에 불과하며, 이것은 별개로 실재하는 대상에 의존하여 다양하게 변화한다. Vācaspati Miśra는 대상의 독자적 실재성을 입증하는 데 주력하면서, 유식설을 부정하는 요가 철학의 관점을 대변한다. 그가 여기서 결정적인 논리로 적용한 것은 상키야 철학의 3질설이다.
그는 먼저 동시 지각의 필연성과 소지성은 ‘결정적인 이유가 될 수 없다’는 부정인(不定因)을 적용하여 유식의 관점을 비판했다. 그는 또한 소지성(자기인식)의 전제로 간주되는 주장을 비판하는 데 주력했다. 즉, “외적 대상을 인식한 관념 속에 그 대상의 조대성과 외재성이 공존한다.”라는 주장은 성립될 수 없으므로, 이에 의거하는 자기인식은 허위일 뿐이다.
끝으로 그가 대변한 요가 철학의 지론에 의하면, 대상에 대한 인식은 다양할 수 있지만 그 다양한 인식의 대상 자체는 동일하다. 하나의 동일한 대상에 대해 다양한 인식이 발생하는 것은, 모든 대상을 형성하는 3질의 기능과 작용 때문이다. 그러므로 다양한 식(識)을 일으키는 원인도 3질로 이루어진 대상이다.
3질로 이루어진 대상이 식(識)을 야기한다면, ‘동시 지각의 필연성’ 또는 소지성은 유식을 입증할 만한 결정적인 이유가 될 수 없으며, 이에 따라 유식도 부정될 수밖에 없다.
Commentators on the Yogasūtra considered that the Yogācāra principle of vijñaptimātra(consciousness only) was based on ‘theories of the co-occurrence of thought and object’(sahopalambha-niyama) and ‘knowability of the object’(vedyatva). Their understanding of the Yogācāra position can be summarized as follows: (1) a cognition and the object of the cognition are the same and occur at the same time, which is regarded as the co-occurrence of thought and object; (2) a cognition is consciousness’s self-cognition(consciousness is actually perceiving itself), which is called knowability of the object. Therefore, there can be no object without consciousness, but there is cognition without its object. Thus, the Yogācāra maintains that the object of cognition belongs to the consciousness.
From the perspective of Yoga philosophy, however, a cognitive activity or consciousness is a mere function of the mind; therefore, cognition should depend on real objects and vary from object to object. The Yogasūtra-bhāṣya shows the unshakable premise for Yoga philosophy to deny the position of the Yogācāra: “There may be an object of common interest to many minds; it is not figured by one mind, nor by many minds, but is grounded in itself.” This premise affirms the independent reality of the external object.
Vācaspati Miśra, representing the Yoga school’s refutation of vijñaptimātra, focused on demonstrating the independent existence of the external object. His argument is based on the Sankhya’s theory of three guṇas.
In the course of elaborating his refutation of the Yogācāra idealism, Vācaspati Miśra first applied ‘the deviant fallacious reason’(anaikāntika) to his claim that the co-occurrence of thought and object and knowability of the object could not be a decisive reason to support the Yogācāra’s position. He appears to have made good use of the debates among Buddhist schools at that time.
Secondly, he devoted to criticize the Yogācāra notion that a perception of an object contains both grossness and externality of the object. He seemingly considered that the Yogācāra took the notion as the prerequisite of knowability of the object(vedyatva). In other words, his criticism implies that knowability of the object, equivalent to Yogācāra’s sva-saṃvedana(self-cognition), is a fallacy because an idea can never possess both grossness and externality of an object. According to him, it is not possible that an idea has extended into more spaces than one and yet co-existed separately in separate places.
Lastly, on the basis of the theory of three guṇas, Vācaspati Miśra claims that even though many people perceive the same object, their cognitions of it are various. According to him, various cognitions of an object can be caused by the functions and actions of three guṇas that constitute everything but puruṣa; therefore, the cause of various cognitions is an object made up of three guṇas. Thus, if an object made of three guṇas causes a cognition, the Yogācāra notions of the co-occurrence of thought and object(sahopalambha-niyama) and knowability(self- cognition) cannot support the theory of vijñaptimātra.
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| Table of contents | Ⅰ. 머리말
Ⅱ. ‘동시 지각의 필연성’에 대한 비판
Ⅲ. 소지성에 대한 비판
Ⅳ. 유식을 부정하는 요가 철학의 지론
Ⅴ. 맺음말 |
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| ISSN | 12253154 (P) |
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| Hits | 126 |
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| Created date | 2022.01.16 |
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| Modified date | 2022.01.16 |
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