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| 著者 |
Davis, Richard Brian
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| 掲載誌 |
Religious Studies
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| 巻号 | v.42 n.4 |
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| 出版年月日 | 2006.12 |
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| ページ | 371 - 391 |
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| 出版者 | Cambridge University Press |
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| 出版サイト |
https://www.cambridge.org/
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| 出版地 | Cambridge, UK [劍橋, 英國] |
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| 資料の種類 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
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| 言語 | 英文=English |
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| 抄録 | In this paper I critically examine Brian Leftow’s attempt to construct a theistic semantics for counterpossibles, one that can be used to make sense of the fact that propositions, which exist necessarily, nevertheless depend on God as their cause. I argue that the impressive theoretical framework erected by Leftow cannot guarantee an asymmetrical dependence of propositions on God, and ultimately leads to a semantic collapse in which every counterpossible comes out false. I end by defending an alternative account of God and propositions – what I call ‘ theistic existentialism’. It is shown how this account underwrites a semantics for counterpossibles that conveniently avoids the problems attending Leftow’s theory |
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| 目次 | Introduction 371
The ‘null-world’ semantics 372
Much ado about nothing 375
Counterpossible crisis 380
A way forward? 382
Two objections 386
Objection 1 386
Objection 2 387
Notes 389
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| ISSN | 00344125 (P); 1469901X (E) |
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| ヒット数 | 145 |
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| 作成日 | 2008.07.31 |
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| 更新日期 | 2019.10.25 |
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