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Self-Intimation, Memory and Personal Identity |
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| 著者 |
Ganeri, Jonardon
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| 掲載誌 |
Journal of Indian Philosophy
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| 巻号 | v.27 n.5 |
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| 出版年月日 | 1999.10 |
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| ページ | 469 - 483 |
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| 出版者 | Springer |
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| 出版サイト |
http://www.springer.com/gp/
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| 出版地 | Berlin, Germany [柏林, 德國] |
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| 資料の種類 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
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| 言語 | 英文=English |
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| キーワード | Memory; Metaphysics; Personal Identity; Ganeri, Jonardon |
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| 抄録 | The Indian Buddhist philosopher Dinnaga defend the thesis that self-consciousness consists, not in awareness of a 'self'，but in the reflexivity of mental states. He argues from certain facts about memory，and from a theory that mental states have a 'double-aspect'--a subjective aspect and an objective aspect. I attempt a defense of his argument and compare it with neo-Lockean views about personal identity. |
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| 目次 | 1. THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY OF MENTAL STATES 469
2. MEMORY 472
3. DINN_AGA’S ARGUMENT FOR SELF-INTIMATION 474
4. LOCKE ON MEMORY, SELF-INTIMATION AND PERSONAL IDENTITY 477
5. AN EVALUATION OF DINN_AGA’S ARGUMENT 481
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| ISSN | 00221791 (P); 15730395 (E) |
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| ヒット数 | 248 |
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| 作成日 | 2000.12.14
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| 更新日期 | 2019.07.31 |
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