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The Sense-Reference Distinction in Indian Philosophy of Language |
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著者 |
Siderits, Mark
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掲載誌 |
Synthese: An International Journal for Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science
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巻号 | v.69 |
出版年月日 | 1986 |
ページ | 81 - 106 |
資料の種類 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
言語 | 英文=English |
キーワード | Indian Epistemology;Language;Siderits, Mark; |
抄録 | It is argued that certain classical Indian philosophers were forced to recognize something sense-like as a component of meaning. The Buddhist nominalists were familiar with the informativeness objection,and responded by positing senses (of an austere kind) for singular terms. The Prabhakara Mimamsakas, in constructing a theory of sentence comprehension that is sensitive to the context principle,posited two distinct components to the meanings of predicate expressions. The result is an apparent vindication of Frege's basic claim that both singular terms and predicate expressions have both sense and reference. |
ISSN | 00397857 |
ヒット数 | 400 |
作成日 | 2001.01.09
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