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Buddhist Paleocompatibilism |
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| 著者 |
Siderits, Mark
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| 掲載誌 |
Philosophy East and West
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| 巻号 | v.63 n.1 |
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| 出版年月日 | 2013.01 |
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| ページ | 73 - 87 |
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| 出版者 | University of Hawaii Press |
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| 出版サイト |
https://uhpress.hawaii.edu/
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| 出版地 | Honolulu, HI, US [檀香山, 夏威夷州, 美國] |
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| 資料の種類 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
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| 言語 | 英文=English |
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| ノート | The Author is from Department of Philosophy, Seoul National University (emeritus). |
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| 抄録 | Neo-compatibilists hold that the causal determination of our mental states is compatible with our being responsible for our actions, in that responsibility does not require that the cause of the action be wholly located in the agent. Incompatibilists find this unpersuasive. It is claimed here that in one way of formulating the Buddhist distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth, compatibilists could accommodate the ostensibly libertarian notion of agent causation. The key to this development is that according to one conception of the two truths, the fact that one determines an action is not incompatible with every mental event being causally determined by prior events, since there are no semantic relations between conventionally true statements and ultimately true statements. |
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| ISSN | 00318221 (P); 15291898 (E) |
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| DOI | 10.1353/pew.2013.0005 |
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| ヒット数 | 777 |
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| 作成日 | 2013.07.22 |
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| 更新日期 | 2019.05.17 |
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