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The Metaphysics of No-Self: A Determinist Deflation of the Free Will Problem |
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著者 |
Sridharan, Vishnu
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掲載誌 |
Journal of Buddhist Ethics
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巻号 | v.20 |
出版年月日 | 2013 |
ページ | 287 - 305 |
出版者 | Department of History & Religious Studies Program , The Pennsylvania State University |
出版サイト |
https://history.la.psu.edu/
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出版地 | University Park, PA, US |
資料の種類 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
言語 | 英文=English |
抄録 | For over two millennia, the free will problem has proven intractable to philosophers, scientists, and lay people alike. However, Buddhism offers us unique insight into how, when, and why human agency matters to us. In his 2009 book, Consequences of Compassion, Charles Goodman argues that the ultimate nonexistence of the self supports the ultimate nonexistence of free will. Recently in this journal, Riccardo Repetti has critiqued Goodman’s view and made the case that free will does, in fact, ultimately exist. This article first illustrates how Repetti’s view of the self is, actually, entirely consistent with Goodman’s. It goes on to argue that Repetti misconstrues elements of hard determinism as entailing that our wills have no influence on final outcomes. Lastly, it shows how, if Goodman and Repetti are in agreement on the ultimate nonexistence of the self, as well as the causal efficacy of the will, their disagreement about the ultimate existence of free will may be inconsequential. |
ISSN | 10769005 (E) |
ヒット数 | 103 |
作成日 | 2014.07.14 |
更新日期 | 2017.07.13 |
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