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vijñāna에 관한 논변=Debate on consciousness between Vasubandhu and Vaiyākaraṇa |
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著者 |
이종철 (著)=Lee, Jong-cheol (au.)
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掲載誌 |
불교학연구=Korea Journal of Buddhist Studies
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巻号 | v.1 |
出版年月日 | 2000.05 |
ページ | 399 - 427 |
出版者 | 불교학연구회=佛教學研究會 |
出版サイト |
http://www.kabs.re.kr/
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出版地 | Daegu, South Korea [大邱, 韓國] |
資料の種類 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
言語 | 韓文=Korean |
キーワード | Vasubandhu; Vaiyākaraṇa; Abhidharmakośa; Vyākhyāyukti; vijñāna; svatantra; anātman |
抄録 | In this article, I would like to point out the fact that Vasubandhu not only approached dependent origination from an ontological perspective, but that he also put great importance on its episte- mological dimension having to do with the phenomenology of mind and consciousness, taking care to focus in on how the theory may be applied to the arising of consciousness. This article, keeping in mind the above problematik deals with the unfolding of Vasubandhu's thought in the process of moving from the Abhidharmakośa to the Vyākhyāyukti. This represents an attempt to reconstruct an integral basis for Vasubandhu's discussion of the process of co-arising consciousness and his theory of epistemology, stretching from the time he wrote the Abhidharmakośa all the way down to his later Yogācāra-vijñānavāda inclination period. Through various debates with Indian schools such as the Sāṃkhya, the Vaiśeṣika, and the Vaiyākaraṇa, we can see that Vasubandhu rejects any belief in the existence of an actual self conceived as the “subject responsible for action” or as the “subject of cognition”. According to the basic tenets of Vasubandhu's theory of consciousness ― based on his view that a permanent real self does not exist (anātman) ― in the case of consciousness there does not exist any subject behind it that engages in acts of cognition. There can only be the workings of consciousness which arise constantly dependent on conditions. Focusing on the debates between Vasubandhu and Vaiyākaraṇa, which are introduced in the Abhidharmakośa and the Vyākhyāyukti (Peking ed. 104b2-106b8), this article deals with the problems which were the object of their discussion. In the Appendix, I have enclosed a critical edition of extant Tibetan translations of the Vyākhyāyukti as they appear in the Peking, Derge, Narthang and Cone editions. |
目次 | 1. 들어가는 말 399 2. 문법학자의 비판에 깃든 형이상학적 입장 401 3. 인식주체를 둘러싼 문제 403 4. 인식의 존재론적 성격 404 5. “인식은 대상을 식별한다”는 문장의 뜻 406 6. 맺음말 413 『釋軌論』티벳어 번역(VY. P.104b2-106b8)校訂本 415 약호와 참고문헌 424 |
ISSN | 15980642 (P) |
ヒット数 | 109 |
作成日 | 2021.03.16 |
更新日期 | 2021.03.23 |
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