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Reasons and doubt in Dharmottara and his critics |
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| 著者 |
Nowakowski, David (著)
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| 掲載誌 |
Asian Philosophy: An International Journal of the Philosophical Traditions of the East
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| 巻号 | v.27 n.4 |
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| 出版年月日 | 2017 |
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| ページ | 340 - 368 |
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| 出版者 | Routledge |
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| 出版サイト |
https://www.routledge.com/
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| 出版地 | Abingdon, UK [阿賓登, 英國] |
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| 資料の種類 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
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| 言語 | 英文=English |
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| キーワード | Dharmottara; inference; doubt; hetvābhāsa; Buddhist epistemology |
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| 抄録 | This paper examines the role of doubt in the classification of inferential reasons in Dharmottara’s Nyāyabinduṭīkā, and in the works of his Nyāya rivals Keśavamiśra and Jayantabhaṭṭa. As deeply systematic thinkers, larger themes in these philosophers’ metaphysics directly determine the more local issues in epistemology and inferential theory, helping to explain, and show the significance of, the differences in their accounts of inferential reasons. For Keśava, an ontology which includes real universals allows for an externalist, reliabilist epistemology, on which the conditions for a genuine inferential reason can be stated in an absolute (as opposed to cogniser-relative) manner. For Dharmottara, on the other hand, an ontology in which mentally constructed universals are imposed upon real particulars leads to greater dependency on the cognising agent, such that the triple conditions for the inferential reason are formulated in a cogniser-relative way. These differences lead to a more restrictive list of acceptable reasons on Dharmottara’s part, which excludes cases involving doubt.
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| ISSN | 09552367 (P); 14692961 (E) |
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| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2017.1396652 |
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| ヒット数 | 69 |
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| 作成日 | 2022.12.26 |
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| 更新日期 | 2022.12.26 |
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