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There is Something Wrong with Raw Perception, After All: Vyāsatīrtha’s Refutation of Nirvikalpaka-Pratyakṣa |
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| 著者 |
Chaturvedi, Amit (著)
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| 掲載誌 |
Journal of Indian Philosophy
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| 巻号 | v.48 n.2 |
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| 出版年月日 | 2020.04 |
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| ページ | 255 - 314 |
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| 出版者 | Springer |
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| 出版サイト |
http://www.springer.com/gp/
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| 出版地 | Berlin, Germany [柏林, 德國] |
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| 資料の種類 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
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| 言語 | 英文=English |
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| キーワード | Non-conceptual perception; Dvaita Veda¯nta; Navya Nya¯ya; Direct realism |
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| 抄録 | This paper analyzes the incisive counter-arguments against Gaṅgeśa’s defense of non-conceptual perception (nirvikalpakapratyakṣa) offered by the Dvaita Vedānta scholar Vyāsatīrtha (sixteenth century) in his Destructive Dance of Dialectic (Tarkatāṇḍava). The details of Vyāsatīrtha’s arguments have gone largely unnoticed by subsequent Navya Nyāya thinkers, as well as by contemporary scholars engaged in a debate over the role of non-conceptual perception in Nyāya epistemology. Vyāsatīrtha thoroughly undercuts the inductive evidence supporting Gaṅgeśa’s main inferential proof of non-conceptual perception, and shows that Gaṅgeśa has no basis for thinking that non-conceptual perception has any necessary causal role in generating concept-laden perceptual awareness. He further raises a number of internal inconsistencies and undesirable consequences for Gaṅgeśa’s claim that non-conceptual states are introspectively invisible. His own causal theory of perception is more parsimonious than the Nyāya account, and is equally compatible with direct realism. I conclude by noting several striking parallels between Vyāsatīrtha’s views and the conceptualism of John McDowell, while also suggesting that Vyāsatīrtha own conceptualism is not unduly constrained by some of McDowell’s limiting assumptions about concepts and perceptual contents.
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| 目次 | Abstract
Initial Arguments for and Against Non-conceptual Perception
Does Non-conceptual Perception Have Any Exclusive Causal Role?
Does Direct Realism Need Non-conceptual Perception?
An Exception to the Causal Rule: The Case of Perceiving Absences
Producing Qualificative Awareness: No Non-conceptual Perception Needed
Rucidatta and Vyāsatīrtha on Defeating the Regress Objection
Are There Non-conceptual States of Awareness of Which We Must be Unaware?
Just What are Non-conceptual Perceptions Good for, Anyway?
Conclusion: The Contemporary Philosophical Significance of Vyāsatīrtha’s Refutation
References |
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| ISSN | 00221791 (P); 15730395 (E) |
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| DOI | 10.1007/s10781-020-09420-7 |
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| ヒット数 | 598 |
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| 作成日 | 2022.12.29 |
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| 更新日期 | 2022.12.29 |
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